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1   Introduction-The Context of LIFT 
1.1 Background 
Difficulties in establishing a strong building infrastructure for primary care 
existed in UK healthcare well before the creation of the NHS, and are bound 
up with the problems of defining a clear role for general practice. General 
practitioners were the most reluctant group to vote to join the NHS at its 
establishment in 1948 (Klein, 2006). Whereas the hospital consultants, 
arguably after receiving a range of concessions from Health Minister Bevan, 
agreed fairly quickly to the government’s proposals to nationalise hospitals 
and for consultants to effectively move from being honorary appointments 
to salaried state professionals, general practitioners were more wary 
(Rivett, 1998). This was because of a range of concerns, some concerning 
remuneration, some concerning the role of the government in general 
practice. 
 
General practitioners did not want to become salaried state employees like 
the consultants, but instead fought hard to retain a ‘per capita’ system 
whereby their salary was linked to the number of people on their patient 
lists. There was clearly, therefore, a strong incentive for GPs to attempt to 
service as big a list as possible, with as few a GPs in each practice as 
possible.  
General practice was barely recognisable from today’s service. Around 50% 
of the 18,000 GPS worked in single-handed practices, a situation which was 
largely based on the notion of the lone ‘family doctor’ working from his (this 
was the era of the male general practitioner) home. In pre-NHS panel days, 
the GP would often admit patients into his parlour where they would be 
treated, with fee-paying patients being allowed through the front door, and 
patients who could not afford to pay the full cost (or perhaps make any 
contribution to the cost of their treatment) being expected to wait around 
the back. The gradual extension of national health insurance after the first 
World War meant that an increasing range of workers was able to access 
primary care without the need to pay fees, but there was still a huge relief 
when access to general practice was made universally free at the 
establishment of the NHS. 
 
GPs, especially those in single-handed surgeries often worked from their 
own homes rather than from bespoke facilities. This created a number of 
tensions. First, GPs tended to want to live in good areas – Eckstein (1958) 
found that practice density in the north of England varied tremendously 
with Harrogate (an affluent area) having a large number of GPs, but Leeds 
and Bradford having a scarcity. In the lead up to the creation of the NHS 
the Socialist Health Association particularly wanted to address this problem, 
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proposing that the state take greater control over the distribution of GPs so 
that new practices would not be allowed to be established in areas that 
were already over-represented (Honigsbaum, 1989), but were met with 
such anger from the British Medical Association that Bevan was required to 
drop them between the NHS Act in 1946 and the establishment of the NHS 
two years later. 
 
Second, because GPs owned their own premises even where they were not 
their homes, this created problems for new GPs to enter primary care 
because doing so would often entail ‘buying in’ to a practice – involving a 
substantial capital payment to join an existing practice that was meant to 
cover not only their share of the stake in buildings, but also a payment 
towards ‘goodwill’, representing the acknowledgement that existing 
practices came with established lists of patients that the doctors would 
otherwise have to build up for himself.  
 
Another area of significant difference between general practice today and 
1948 was that GPs, regardless of practice size, made far more visits to 
patients’ homes in the earlier time period – around a third of all 
consultations in some surveys appeared to take place outside of the 
practice surgery (Pemberton, 1949). The quality of care offered by GPs 
appears to have been hugely variable and the source of some concern. 
Collings (1950 p. 563) suggested that the state of general practice was ‘bad 
and still deteriorating, with inner-city practices criticised for being 
‘unsatisfactory and at worst a source of public danger’. Hadfield (1953) 
suggested that around 60% of GPs were in good or adequate premises, but 
that a quarter still lacked basic facilities and 10% were totally unsuitable. 
Taylor (1954) suggested that a quarter of practices lacked essential items 
of equipment, and within that quarter there was a twentieth ‘for whom it is 
difficult to find any excuse’ (p. 8). 
 
The infrastructure problems these surveys found were due to there being 
very few incentives for GPs to develop their surgeries. Because health 
centres had not taken off, this left the development of services down to GPs 
themselves, and improved facilities cost money and led to higher costs of 
practicing, when GPs were paid according to the number of patients they 
had on their lists rather than the quality of care that they offered. GPs were 
not only perceived by the government to have been the most uncooperative 
clinical grouping the founding of the NHS (Greener, 2008), but they were 
also often regarded by their consultant colleagues as being second-rate 
doctors who had no specialism, and who often sent them ‘GP rubbish 
referrals’ (Payer, 1996 p. 106) where they did not have the opportunity to 
exercise their specialist knowledge. Because general practitioners had to 
refer patients onto their specialist colleagues, but specialists, now that they 
were salaried public professionals rather than depending on GPs to retain 
their hospital appointments, no longer depended upon GPs for their work or 
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pay (Greener & Powell, 2008). The GPs needed the consultants for their 
referrals, but the consultants, as public employees, no longer really needed 
the GPs. Hospital medicine was the glamorous and exciting end of care, 
where breakthroughs were being made almost annually and where hi-
technology medicine was practiced (Le Fanu, 1999).  
 
Little progress was made in terms of raising the profile of general practice 
in the 1950s, where debates appeared to be centred mostly on GP pay and 
conditions, especially for many rural doctors who appeared to be suffering 
real hardship as a result of the pay system devised for them at the creation 
of the NHS (Greener, 2008). By the end of the decade, however, Balint’s 
ideas were becoming debated in which General Practice was more about the 
development of human relationships than biomedical diagnosis (Balint, 
1957). Balint’s ideas were developed through the 1960s and eventually led 
to the publication of The Future General Practitioner (Royal College of 
General Practitioners, 1972), which advocated continuity of care for 
patients as lists grew.  
 
During the 1960s NHS capital building programme, expenditure again 
focused on hospitals rather than in Primary Care (Minister of Health, 1962), 
while the debate about the nature of primary care continued to exist largely 
within general practice itself rather than making inroads into changes in the 
way that services were funded or incentives for investment in practices 
provided (Klein, 2006). 
 
By the beginning of the 1970s, the problem of GPs being overly located in 
affluent areas of the country had not really been resolved. Tudor-Hart 
(1971 p.?) captured the problem in his phrase the ‘inverse care law’, where 
the areas of the country that most needed the support of good local 
healthcare were often those where facilities were most absent. Although 
this problem had been acknowledged by the government since before the 
creation of the NHS, little was done because of the political sensitivities that 
were involved in forcing GPs to locate in other areas.   
 
The 1970s saw the beginning of the idea of the primary healthcare team. 
Lewis (1999) suggests that in the early part of the decade, care was ‘GP-
centred and negative’ in that GPs had increasingly employed practice nurses 
and administrators as their practices had grown, but the other staff’s roles 
were primarily about protecting them from the everyday ‘trivia’ that come 
along with general practice. However, as the decade went on, there was a 
movement to care being ‘GP-centred and positive’ in that GPs gave an 
increasing recognition to the contribution that other members of the team 
might be able to make.  
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By the end of the 1980s there was an acknowledgement that primary care, 
as opposed to general practice, was a topic of policy debate in its own right. 
However, the model the government favoured tended towards considering 
how individual general practitioners might be incentivised to provide more 
responsive care for their patients (Department of Health and Social 
Security, 1987). Two years later, the internal market reforms (Secretary of 
State for Health, 1989) attempted to redress the power imbalance between 
GPs and consultants that had existed since the creation of the NHS by 
giving GPs budgets to purchase care with, so creating the possibility for 
more sensitive purchasing and for consultants to have to be more 
responsive to the needs of GP’s patients. GP Fundholding also allowed 
successful practices to retain their surpluses to invest in developing their 
infrastructure, leading to a growth in investment in those practices that 
were able to achieve fundholding status and contract successfully (Goodwin, 
1998). 
 
The GP contract of 1990 moved preventative screening into the remit of 
practice surgeries (Lewis, 1999), a move given emphasis by the increased 
use of targeting in the area of health promotion (Secretary of State for 
Health, 1992). This led to a growth in the number of staff employed in 
practices as GPs made increasing use of nurses in order to make sure their 
practices met the required targets. Additionally, practice managers were 
employed in order to oversee the increasing range and complexity of the 
services being offered in surgeries (Huntington, 1995). The model of 
primary care, and the talk of a ‘primary-care led’ (Department of Health, 
1996b) health service, however, remained focused largely around general 
practice. What it also led to was an increase need for clinical 
accommodation, as well as for more flexible accommodation that can 
provide for services offered on a sessional basis. 
If primary care still appeared to be based around general practice, however, 
it was incorporating an increasing network of community health services 
(Bailey, Glendinning & Gould, 1997).  
 
By the mid-1990s a range of possible ways of GPs investing in the capital 
infrastructure of their practices existed, but for various reasons were not 
well taken-up. As well as having to deal with barriers concerning the 
availability of suitable land or property and the difficulty of lack of space for 
expansion in urban properties, the lack of capital funding to build new 
premises or convert or refurbish existing premises, remained a very 
significant problem (Bailey et al., 1997). Cost rent schemes were designed 
to allow GPs to be reimbursed by Health Authorities for the costs of funding 
new capital developments subject to limits which depended upon the size of 
the practice including maximum floor areas. A 1996 White Paper 
(Department of Health, 1996a) attempted to allow funding of larger scale 
projects than had been the case in the past, as well as for a wider range of 
facilities. Improvement Grants were also available from Health Authorities 
to expand and improve surgery accommodation, but not to build new 
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premises or purchase land, but were cash limited and only 2/3 of the cost 
of the improvements was potentially available to GPs. In addition, GPs were 
able to access private finance in the same way as any other small business, 
but there seemed to be disincentives for GPs taking on loans because of the 
risk of negative equity and reduced mobility (Bailey et al., 1997). 
 
In 1997, primary care was given a new impetus by Labour’s movement to 
one based instead around partnership or integrated care. Primary Care 
Groups (PCGs) were established in 1997 and defined as being ‘teams of 
local GPs and community nurses’ (Secretary of State for Health, 1997 
paragraph 3.6). New targets were also issued for the improvement of the 
public’s health, and, by 2000 (Secretary of State for Health, 2000), PCGs 
were moving to become PCTs, being given responsibility for providing an 
increasing range of services as well as spending around 75% of the NHS’s 
budget in a return to the market that Labour claimed to have abandoned in 
1997. Finally, the return to primary care commissioning led to Practice-
Based Commissioning (Department of Health, 2004c), and scope for GPs 
invest at least a proportion of any surpluses into their practices, although 
the scope for this appeared considerably more constrained than it had been 
under GP Fundholding a decade earlier (Greener and Mannion, 2006). 
 
The problem of a lack of investment in Primary Care health facilities still 
remained, however. Greater emphasis than ever was being placed on 
attempting to move care from secondary to primary settings (Department 
of Health, 2002a), but without the necessary means for GPs to be able to 
respond to the opportunities the new marketplace for care offered because 
of infrastructural limitations (Health Policy and Economic Research Unit, 
2006). Equally, the gradual shift in emphasis from curative medicine to 
preventative medicine had created an opportunity for primary care to be far 
more engaged with public health agendas (Department of Health, 2006c), 
but the infrastructural limitations of primary care facilities represented a 
significant barrier to achieving change.  
 
The government then, needed an approach that would be able to meet 
these challenges in order for the primary care element of their reforms to 
become coherent. The policy designed to achieve this was LIFT, which itself 
borrowed heavily from earlier experiences with PFI which had become the 
principal form of public private partnership in the UK.   
 
1.2 Traditional PFI — the UK Experience 
Over the past decade the NHS has increasingly relied on private finance in 
addressing its capital investment needs.  This reliance has centred on the 
use of PFI, which involves the private sector in the financing, construction 
and maintenance of facilities, typically on the basis of a 30 year contract, 
after which the facility reverts to the public sector.   
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Contrary to public belief, the origins of public private partnership (PPP) can 
be traced to the Labour administration of the late 1970s.  At the time, the 
US was experimenting with public private partnership as a means of 
regenerating depressed communities.  When Peter Shore, then Environment 
Secretary, visited the US in 1978, a decision was made to emulate US 
approaches and plans were made to set in motion the creation of similar 
groupings in the UK (O'Brien, 1997).   
 
During the 1990s there was discernible decline in public sector investment 
at both central and local government level (Rutherford, 2003) which 
resulted in a maintenance backlog for existing facilities and insufficient 
resources being allocated for new projects (Crooks, 2003).  For example, 
the investment backlog in educational facilities in 1997 was estimated in 
the range of £7 billion, while the investment shortages in NHS amounted to 
£3 billion.  These deficiencies affected the ability of the local authorities to 
meet the requirements for quality service provision (HM Treasury, 2003).   
 
When the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was launched by the 
Conservatives in 1992, it largely focused on the involvement of private 
sector companies or consortia in infrastructure projects which were 
sponsored by central government departments.  Its initial uptake was 
relatively low. Harding et al. (2000) report that during the budget years 
1992/93 and 1993/94, only about £500 million was raised for PFI projects 
originating from organisations such as the London Docklands Development 
Corporation, and much less by hospital trusts (see also, The Stationery 
Office, 2000).   
 
The New Labour government initiated a number of initiatives aimed at 
eliminating obstacles to NHS Trust and LA involvement in PFI (Ball et al., 
2000).  While re-iterating the expectation that PFI procurement would allow 
the private sector to introduce cost saving and efficiency enhancing 
innovations (Birnie, 1999), the new Labour government stated that PFI at 
all costs was not appropriate.  According to the Treasury Taskforce (TTF) 
(1997 p.?) “PFI solutions should be pursued where they are likely to deliver 
better Value for Money (VfM)”.  VfM in this context was assumed to involve 
a combination of competitive tendering processes and optimum risk 
transfer.  In parallel with the relaxation of the universal testing rule, New 
Labour’s guidance documents sought to emphasise the public-private 
partnership aspect of PFI over purely economic considerations (Treasury 
Taskforce, 1997; HM Treasury, 1999).  As a consequence, the m 
requirement became a major criterion in the selection of the procurement 
method among the options available (Akintoye et al., 2001).   
 
Nonetheless, a number of government commissioned reports have 
emphasised the need to enhance public sector skills in areas like contract 
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negotiation and project risk management (HM Treasury, 1999).  
Specifically, the government commissioned three major reviews which 
included the first Bates Report (in June 1997), and the Gershon Report and 
Second Bates Report (in 1999).  While the predominant focus of these 
reviews has been on the public sector deficiencies, all three reports 
evidence the “increasing recognition of the importance of procurement in 
government policy and a commensurate rise in the status of the 
procurement function” (Erridge and Greer, 2000 p.?). 
 
1.3 Local Improvement Finance Trusts (LIFTs) as 
Second Generation PFI 
‘Traditional’ PFI procurement involves several VfM exercises, which inter 
alia, include the calculation of a Public Sector Comparator.  Although these 
measures are meant to ensure that PFI projects provide a cost effective 
response to public infrastructure or service needs, this type of procurement 
continues to attract criticism (Pollock, 2005).  While initially much of this 
criticism has centred on issues of cost effectiveness and the accounting 
treatment of PFI (e.g. Heald, 2003) more recent analyses have focused on 
issues of flexibility and accountability (Froud, 2003; Edwards and Shaoul, 
2003).  Another area of area of evolving research has focused on 
managerial and processual problems associated with PFI procurement.  In 
this context a number of studies have identified inexperience and lack of 
relevant commercial skill on the side of the public sector client, cultural 
differences between public and private sector project participants which 
hinder communication, and a lack of standardisation of the procurement 
process and relevant contractual arrangements as a key obstacle to the 
achievement of VfM in ‘traditional’ PFI projects (Akintoye et al., 2001; 
Asenova and Beck, 2003a,b; Asenova et al., 2003).  Furthermore, this 
research highlighted a lack of competition and market demand in some PFI 
projects, which characterises the hospital sector in particular (Asenova et 
al., 2004), as well as a reluctance of smaller organisations to become 
involved in PFI procurement (Beck and Hunter-Beck, 2003).   
 
Although the LIFT initiative appeared to have been introduced primarily in 
order to meet the investment needs which arose from the poor state of 
existing primary care facilities, the initiative also reflected some concerns 
with ‘traditional’ PFI, particularly its suitability in the context of smaller 
projects and perhaps less experienced public sector clients.  Thus the LIFT 
initiative differed significantly from traditional PFI procurement in a number 
of ways.  Firstly, by contrast to standard PFI, LIFT involved significant 
public sector shareholding, both in form of local trust share ownership and 
PfH share ownership.  Secondly, the governance structures of LIFTs include 
a public sector director and mandates close collaboration between local 
LIFTs and local NHS partnering boards.  These measures have ensured a 
closer working relationship between Trust and LIFT than is typical of the 
arms-length relationship between Trusts and Special Purpose Vehicles 
(SPVs) in a traditional PFI setup; which should, in theory, have improved 
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accountability and responsiveness to local needs.  In practice, however, 
such a close working relationship can itself become a source of increased 
conflicts and/ or obstacles to collaboration.   
 
Another major difference between LIFT and traditional PFI projects 
concerned the use of the Public Sector Comparator.  While traditional PFI 
procurement mandates the calculation of the PSC as part of a VfM-exercise, 
there was no such requirement for LIFT projects.  Again, in theory, this 
appears to be unproblematic since LIFT projects were likely to be of a 
smaller scale than traditional PFI projects and because the calculation of the 
PSC might have added unnecessary delays and costs to the procurement of 
such projects.  However, in practise, the lack of a PSC requirement, 
together with the exclusivity clause over the period of the Strategic 
Partnering Agreement has given rise to criticism (Aldred, 2006). 
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
Overall the similarities and differences of LIFT as compared to traditional 
PFI give rise to a series of policy relevant questions which include the 
following: 
 given the need for LIFT to be applied to smaller projects, are there 
 significant obstacles in terms of overhead/transaction costs, skills, 
 cultures, lack of guidance, market factors etc. which would limit its 
 applicab ility? 
 what are the key deal breakers and tradeoffs which affect LIFT 
 projects in terms of market demand, affordability, risk allocation ..? 
 how can VfM best be assessed and ensured in a LIFT context? 
 to what degree can LIFT provide local solutions to local needs, both 
 across different regions and over time? 
 what represents best practice in terms of stakeholder (including 
 employee) involvement in LIFT projects? 
 what potential conflicts of interest affect LIFT and which 
governance systems are most appropriate in monitoring and 
managing these?  
 
While this multi-method study addresses all of these questions it places 
particular focuses on two related thematic issues.  These include, firstly, the 
role of cultural factors in determining the success, or otherwise, of LIFT 
partnerships and, secondly, the issue of value for money or financial 
awareness among LIFT participants.  Our concerns with cultural issues are 
grounded in previous studies which noted that partnership-based 
procurement poses particular challenges to the parties involved in these 
projects, which can be partly attributed to cultural differences among NHS 
organisations and their partners.  Since public private partnership and 
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organisational cultures and behaviours have hitherto been studied in 
isolation, little is known about the organisational factors, governance 
structures and processes which contribute to the success of public-private 
partnerships. This issues are explored here with reference to earlier studies 
on the role of cultural factors in determining the effectiveness of healthcare 
organisations (Mannion, Davies and Marshall, 2004; Marshall, Mannion, 
Nelson and Davies, 2003; Sheaff, Schofield,Mannion, Dowling, Marshall and 
McNally, 2004) as well as recent anaylsis of organisational learning within 
the NHS (Greener, 2003; 2004a; 2004b, 2008).   Similarly, recent research 
by the authors has highlighted the increasing complexity of VfM issues 
alongside the failure of public organisations to fully explore these matters 
(Asenova, Beck and Toms, 2007; Toms, Asenova and Beck, 2008; Asenova 
and Beck, 2009), which informs both the qualitative and quantitative 
financial analysis of this study.  
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2 Methods / Structure 
This study initially envisaged a multi-method approach which would rely on 
six methods of information gathering (see appendix 2 for original 
specification).  It was expected that these would include the following: 
 
 Document analysis 
 Key informant interviews 
 Process focused case-unspecific interviews 
 Outcome focused case specific interviews 
 Financial document analysis 
 
In addition, the team was investigating the possibility of conducting  
Developmental Case Studies, where fieldwork would be undertaken in areas 
which was in the process of forming, an/or participating in, a LIFT scheme. 
 
The study, as well as the report presented here, follows this outline with 
minor modifications.   These modifications vis-à-vis the initial specification 
include the following:  
 
Firstly, the document analysis is now subsumed in a broader literature 
review (section 3, ‘Literature Review’) which focuses on publicly available 
academic and non-academic studies of LIFT and reviews 131 articles.  The 
reason for this was that it was felt that the documents supplied to the 
researchers by local LIFT schemes were not sufficiently informative to 
warrant a separate investigation.  In any case, where relevant this local 
information has been included as background material to the case studies of 
section 7. 
 
Secondly, both the key informant and the process focused case-unspecific 
interviews (user interviews) have been modified slightly (see section 4, 
‘Stakeholder Views (Interviews)’).  Specifically, having successfully gained 
access to some of the most senior health policy makers in this area for the 
key informant interviews, it was decided to also include a senior bank and a 
senior law firm representative, both of whom specialised in LIFT 
procurement.  Overall, we were able to obtain and analyse transcripts for 9 
key informants each of whom attended an interview of circa one hour.  As a 
consequence of this focus on key informants, as well as a discernable 
repetitiveness of findings the team decided to conduct fewer than the 
originally planned case-unspecific (user) interviews.  Overall the team 
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conducted 11 case-unspecific interview of circa on hour which involved 
sample interviewees who had been elected according to the following 
criteria: urbanity/rurality of the location, north south location, LIFT 
wave/age of project and organisational position (public/private, with public 
sector interviewees ranging from Associate PCT Directors and Finance 
Directors to Centre and Practice managers).  Most interviews in this and 
other sections were analysed with the computer-based software programme 
DICTION 5 which the team found to perform superior to alternatives (such 
as Atlas TI) in the given context.  
 
Thirdly, due to the theoretical importance of cultural issues a series of 
supplementary interviews were conducted with user interviewees and key 
informants from each of the case studies.  This supplementary analysis is 
presented in section 5 (‘Managing Cultural Diversity’) as well as being 
referred to later on in the case-study section (section 7). 
 
Fourthly, as expected, the team encountered considerable difficulties in 
obtaining financial information about LIFT schemes.  These difficulties were 
eventually overcome, and section 6 (‘Financial Analysis’) presents the first 
comparison of the actual cash flows of 3 LIFTCo-s against National Audit 
Office (2005) predictions; all of which indicated significantly higher private 
sector returns than expected. One of the LIFTCo-s analysed in this section 
(‘urban North East LIFT’) also formed one of the case studies, allowing the 
report to triangulate findings from the cultural, financial and interview 
analysis for this case. 
 
Fifthly, while initially encountering difficulties in recruiting LIFTCo-s for the 
case-study analysis, the team was eventually able to draw a careful choice 
from a limited number of volunteers, using similar criteria to those used for 
the selection of case-unspecific user interviewees.  Eventually, the team 
chose to conduct fieldwork for 4 detailed case studies (selected by 
urbanity/rurality, north/south and LIFT wave), each involving circa 8 
detailed interviews, rather than conducting a greater number of less 
detailed case studies.  The findings of this part of the analysis are presented 
in section 7 (‘Case Studies’). 
 
Lastly, rather than attempting to conduct developmental case-studies, 
which had, at the time become almost impossible (as LIFT was being 
phased out), the team decided to conduct a supplementary analysis of the 
new Express LIFT scheme, which had been widely publicised in early 2009.  
In this context, the team was able to conduct 5 detailed interviews with key 
informants which are presented in an addendum to the report (‘Addendum-
Express LIFT’).  It is believed that the analysis of Express LIFT has allowed 
the team to explore important aspects with regard to the future of PPP in 
primary care.  Additionally, this analysis forms the basis of an ESRC bid on 
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the ‘Evolving Plurality of PPP’ which some of the team members are 
currently co-authoring with colleagues in Scottish universities.   
 
Further details on methodology are given in each of the relevant sections as 
well as relevant appendices.   
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
20 
 
3 A Systemic Review of the Literature and 
Empirical Evidence on the Role and 
Implementation of Public-Private 
Partnerships in Primary Care Settings 
This section presents a systematic literature review on the role and 
implementation of LIFT schemes. Given the paucity of robust empirical 
evidence in this area, our findings are far from conclusive.  Our limited 
evidence base draws partly on published ‘opinion’ pieces and anecdotal 
evidence, accepting that such sources may be biased, subjective and 
provide an incomplete account. 
 
3.1 Aims and Objectives  
This review synthesizes information on the operation of public private 
partnerships in primary care focusing on identifying relationship issues, 
success factors and best practice in the design and governance.   
 
The specific objectives of the review were to: 
 assess the role and scope of LIFT 
 identify relative success factors 
 identify barriers to and facilitators of LIFT schemes. 
 
3.2 Search Mechanism 
This review follows guidelines provided by the Centre for Reviews and 
Dissemination at the University of York (see Khan et al., 2001). First, a 
range of electronic databases was searched using search terms. These were 
then screened, using a range of inclusion/exclusion criteria.  
 
For the electronic database search, the key search terms used were ‘Local 
and Improvement and Finance’ and ‘GP practice premises’ and ‘Primary 
care premises’ and ‘GP practice finance’ and ‘GP premises’ and ‘LIFT’ with 
the complementary search term ‘private finance’. 
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Searches were made within the following electronic bibliographic databases: 
 Health Management Information Consortium (HMIC) [which replaced 
HELMIS] 
 Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health (CINAHL) 
 Medline 
 PsycInfo 
 Web of Knowledge 
 PubMed . 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria used in the review are as follows: 
Box 3.1 
Inclusion Criteria Contents 
Settings Public and private sector (UK) 
Language Engl ish 
Date Since 1992 (Post PFI introduction) 
Publication type Published and unpublished including ‘grey’ 
literature 
Originality Primary, secondary data 
Box 3.2 
  Exclusion Criteria Contents 
Language Other languages 
Date Before 1992 
 
In addition, a manual search of the British Medical and Hospital 
Development Journals was undertaken together with a search of NHS and 
DoH sources, a broad internet search and a secondary search for all 
relevant references cited in articles.  Each article was read to assess its 
relevance. 
 
These references were entered into “Endnote” which was used to screen out 
duplicate entries.  
 
3.3 Results 
524 articles were identified as satisfying the inclusion criteria.  Of these, 
212 articles were removed following a check for duplicates.  42 publications 
preceded the introduction of PFI in the UK and were eliminated and 28 
articles related to non-English content were excluded. Of the remaining 242 
articles, a review of the titles identified 76 were irrelevant to the 
development and implementation of LIFT.  Screening abstracts identified a 
further 14 that were not related and 9 which were unavailable.  After 
eliminating 13 articles which did not relate to LIFT, a total of 131 articles 
remained and formed the basis of the review (Figure 3.1 overleaf). 
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
22 
Figure 3.1: Selection Process 
Total: 525
PubMed, CINAHL, 
Medline, World of 
Knowledge, HMIC etc.
Further 
screening: 313
No relevant content: 
13
No relevant abstract 
/ not available :                     
23
No relevant title :       
76 
Non-England 
content:        28
Out of date range:    
42
Duplicates: 
212
Final results: 
131
Further 
screening: 167
Further 
screening: 243
Further 
screening: 271
Further 
screening: 144
 
3.4 Overview of the Literature 
3.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The earliest relevant literature dates from 1992 with documents continuing 
through to 2008. As shown in Figure 3.2 below, only 11% of relevant 
articles were written between 1992 and 2000, and 56% of articles were 
clustered between 2003 and 2006.  One article from 1988 was retained in 
spite of falling outside the parameters as it provided insight into the 
establishment of premises for a new combined GP practice prior to the 
establishment of LIFT.  
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Figure 3.2: Number of publications by year of literature 
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Having restricted evidence to England, the studies demonstrated a 
relatively even spread across health regions with regard to LIFT projects. 
 
Of the 131 documents identified for inclusion, 30 (22.9%) were empirical 
studies, whilst 18 (62.1%) of these used mixed research methods; 22 
(75.9%) used interviews.  
 
Other methods included: 
 Review of third party / published data 
 Surveys 
 Focus groups 
 Non-participant observation 
 Review of written correspondence. 
 
In four articles, the research method was not disclosed.  
 
Two articles were included in the empirical group as they reported on direct 
involvement with LIFT.  An independent review commissioned by the DoH 
(Rassell, 2008) was included as it presented the opinions of staff at various 
LIFT projects, as was a Value for Money Study for one LIFT project 
undertaken by Capita Advisory Services (2007).  
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Twentynine publications were grouped under the heading of ‘Guidance’ from 
Government bodies, Partnerships for Health, the NAO, NHS departments, 
Union organisations, private sector partners or agents of the above; and 10 
were news releases about LIFT.  
 
The remaining 62 publications were opinion pieces.  
 
Each literature group is detailed in Appendix 1: 
 Group 1 – Empirical findings (n = 30) 
 Group 2 – Guidance material (n = 29) 
 Group 3 – New releases (n = 10) 
 Group 4 – Opinion pieces (n = 62). 
 
3.5 Literature Review Findings 
3.5.1 Introduction 
Several themes were identified which would be examined during the key-
informant, case unspecific and case specific interviews.  Consequently, a 
deductive approach was taken when reviewing the literature to determine 
whether they would provide some insight into these areas including the 
following: 
 
 Economic and market factors 
 Contractual Issues 
 Skill requirements  
 Local Impact 
 Stakeholder views  
 Cultural issues  
 Conflict resolution. 
 
In the following sections, the a priori questions identified when considering 
each key theme have been used as an organising framework for analysis.  
Subsequently, an inductive approach was used to analyse additional 
themes.  
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3.5.2 Economic and Market Factors 
The a priori questions centred on whether: 
 LIFT projects provide VfM  
 LIFT projects serve as an incentive for GPs 
 LIFT projects are affordable to PCTs 
 there are particular ‘stumbling blocks’ or ‘deal breakers’ within the 
LIFT process 
 there is a trade-off between incentives for the private sector and 
affordability for the public sector 
 there is adequate interest from the private sector to provide a 
genuinely competitive environment  
 LIFT provides lower overhead and transaction costs compared to 
standard forms of PFI. 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the first five questions was analysed first.  
 
Is there evidence that LIFT projects provide VfM? 
The VfM characteristics of LIFT have not been formally investigated and 
there is an absence of guidance or published methodology from the DoH or 
Partnerships for Health (House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts, 
2006) regarding how to assess VfM in LIFT.  According to the NAO (2005, 
22), “The VfM of a LIFT project needs to be judged on the basis of whole life 
costs (taking operation, life cycle, replacement and maintenance costs into 
account as well as construction costs) and how well it meets objectives, 
including local health priorities, delivery to time and budget, the quality of 
the building in structural and functional terms and flexibility of use over 
time”.  However, to meet this standard, a LIFT project would have had to 
run the term of the lease before an accurate evaluation could be obtained.  
 
The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2006, 15) notes that 
“comparing the VfM of LIFT with other procurement routes is not 
straightforward because the LIFT framework is designed to offer tenants 
more and better services than obtainable under a standard commercial 
lease. LIFT also delivers a broader and more complex range of services to 
patients than typical primary care premises.  Moreover, the contribution of 
the LIFT initiative to better health outcomes or to the wider community in 
terms of meeting a local regeneration agenda, is hard to quantify”.  
However, Paxton and Lissauer (2000, 56) maintain that the opportunity to 
provide “soft services” such as laundry and catering, which are frequently 
out-sourced to reduce the cost of service provision, is not possible in a 
single, day-use building such as a replacement GPs surgery.  To some, it 
would appear that initial capital spent takes precedence over revenue 
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generation and this may reduce the sustainability, and affordability, of this 
process (Hudson et al., 2003).  
 
Some bodies, including the Institute of Public Policy Research and the 
House of Commons Select Committee, have argued that it is impossible to 
accurately assess whether LIFT represents VfM (Kmietowicz, 2001, Tyndale-
Biscoe, 2003;).  Many organisations, including local authorities, struggle to 
find a methodology to compare LIFT with other financial mechanisms, such 
as PFI and traditional procurement methods (Ballantyne, 2005).  
 
According to the King's Fund (2001) there were indcidents when the (LIFT) 
prospectus did not make it clear how VfM was to be defined and failed to 
specify the requirement for a public comparator.  Instead the LIFTcompany 
once formed appeared to enjoy a local monopoly of health service 
development.  This raised fears that LIFT would become the ‘only show in 
town’ whatever its merits (King's Fund, 2001).  It is, therefore, unsurprising 
that assessment of VfM in LIFT schemes has caused controversy.  LIFT 
schemes are currently not valued against real alternatives but against an 
‘ideal’ model (UNISON, 2003).  The NAO (2005, 23) suggest that VfM is 
being ‘demonstrated’ by evidence of there being a competitive procurement 
and review of proposed rental costs by the District Valuer and the funding 
terms”.  However, the ability of the NHS District Valuer to identify that an 
NHS project has built new premises for which the resulting rents which are 
too high has been questioned (Tyndale-Biscoe, 2003).   
 
 
Do LIFT projects serve as an incentive for GPs? 
GPs traditionally invested in their premises with view toward using these 
funds for retirement (Paxton and Lissauer, 2000, Foster, 2003).  Some 
reports indicate that recently qualified GPs view property ownership as a 
burden, given the risk of negative equity.  This affects deprived areas with 
high special health needs (Paxton and Lissauer, 2000) in particular where 
there is an under developed property market (Hudson et al., 2003).  GPs 
may be deterred from investing in premises--either for initial purchase or 
expansion--and, thus, commit themselves to a lengthy tenure at a specific 
location (Foster, 2003; NAO, 2005).  Others may be tied into financial 
commitments to their existing premises (DoH, 2000a). 
 
It was hoped that LIFT would resolve these issues by buying out GPs from 
their existing premises and offering flexible leases within purpose-built 
accommodation.  As the National Audit Office (NAO, 2005, 9) states, GPs 
can also “take shares in the LIFTCo equivalent to the value of the freehold 
on their existing premises, effectively swapping an interest in one property 
for an investment in a portfolio of properties and services, which may be 
traded if a secondary market develops”.  
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Reviewing one-stop health care centres, Andalo (2003) found that by 
grouping practices, general practitioners developed an enhanced sense of 
community, increase shared learning and the ability to share costs. Gilbert 
(2005a) found that group practices in super-surgeries have the ability to 
provide cover for each other, which may be particularly useful in areas 
where locums are hard to recruit and by co-locating, practitioners may 
become increasingly aware of the services their colleagues (i.e., staff in 
social services) (Gilbert, 2005b). Gilbert (2005a, 21; 2005b) notes the 
ability of physicians to communicate with colleagues, resulting in a more 
timely and complete understanding of a particular case and a possible 
reduction in the potential for errors arising from the transfer of information 
based on hand-written notes. Gilbert (2005) and Simpson (2007) found 
that the new centres had a positive impact on staff morale by making 
personnel ‘feel valued’.  
 
Holmes et al. (2006) report that LIFT process participation may be hindered 
by the fact that some GPs operating in substandard premises prefer to 
remain where they are and retain their independent contractor status rather 
than move into a LIFT building where they are forced to co-locate.  
 
Burrell (2006, 31) suggests that “younger GPs are less interested in 
ownership because of changing career patterns, a desire for flexible working 
practices and the increasing capital commitment required”. He further 
argues that the need to invest heavily makes succession difficult for a 
retiring GP with property being as “barrier rather than an inducement to 
recruitment”. One of the aims of LIFT is to “free GPs from the burdens of 
property ownership” (Dudman, 2003, 24), something Kmietowicz (2001) 
believes would add flexibility to their careers, allowing GPS to transfer their 
practices without selling property (Mathieson, 2002).  
 
In some housing areas, buying into a practice is very expensive, and in 
some inner city areas–with increased special health needs and greater 
deprivation (Parker, 2005) GPs run an increased risk of negative equity 
(Mathieson, 2002; Dudman, 2003;; Slingsby, 2004). Additionally, the trend 
towards “ever larger premises” has been a concern of younger GPs “unable 
or apprehensive about investing in premises” (Bunce, 1997, 32). LIFT may 
ease these financial hurdles by offering expanded services without the 
significant investment required for redevelopment (Burrell, 2006). Whilst 
independent GPs could still design and build their own buildings, and raise 
investment from public or private sources, there is little incentive to do so 
(Godden et al., 2001). 
 
Hellowell (2004) claims that in London many GPs were forced to work in 
old, insecure facilities, and suggested that many had taken the decision to 
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leave the (London) area, with few lining up to take their place.  Mathieson 
(2002) observes that the cost of acquiring their own premises is often 
prohibitive for these GPs. Tredinnick (1993, 17) claims that “46% of 
premises in inner London were below minimum standards compared to 7% 
in the rest of England”, a view upheld by the DoH, and one of the reasons 
the area was selected for heavy investment in the first phase of LIFT (DoH,  
2003a). However, if negative equity is a risk for GPs, this also applies to 
LIFTs building in that area, an issue identified by Anthony Harrison 
(Mathieson, 2002).  
 
Although LIFT offers GPs flexible leases within a building where a 
management company assumes responsibility for delivering and 
maintaining premises (Dudman, 2003), in the case where a GP chooses to 
rent premises and the value of the property falls, the GP would not be 
risking their investment. However, Mathieson (2002) notes that if GPs 
chose to invest in LIFT, they may benefit from increases in property value. 
Burrell (2006, 31) believes that “Many GPs who bought properties in the 
1960s and 70s are looking to retire and are seeking to extract the capital 
equity from the building by selling on to their partners or incoming GPs”. 
With LIFT, if premises are rented, this option is lost to them (NAO, 2005), 
and if they buy into the LIFTCo they are banking on a secondary market 
developing and their investment increasing over time. Indeed, it is unclear 
how readily GPs would be able to withdraw their funds. For those GPs who 
lease commercial premises and are reimbursed by the DoH, there is no 
difference between their current arrangement and LIFT. Thus there is no 
financial disincentive for relocation (Dudman, 2003). Parker (2005) 
suggests that the construction of high quality buildings which allow for staff 
integration whilst recognising the need for security in high risk locations 
may help recruit health care professionals in difficult to recruit locations.  
 
 
Affordability to PCTs 
Aldred (2007, 147) cites an interviewee as stating that LIFT is the
“only game in town. If PCTs want new capital facilities, that is the route to get them.
There is no alternative that’s available”. Foster (2003, 13) also highlights voiced by the 
practice premises subcommittee chairman’s concern (General Practitioners 
Committee) that LIFT “should not swamp other methods” of funding 
primary care infrastructure development. 
 
Others noted that there is no alternative to LIFT (King's Fund, 2001; 
Dawson, 2001) and that the process may create an ‘affordability gap’ 
(Aldred/UNISON, 2006). Dr Ingrams of the Coventry PCT professional 
executive committee argues that “we (were) given no option by the DoH 
other than LIFT schemes. The NHS Improvement Plan says LIFT is the 
future. It might be the future, but it will bankrupt us” (Comerford, 2004, 
10). 
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Has procurement of LIFT projects led to a reduction in other areas? 
There is little empirical on this issue. One exception is the Commons Select 
Committee on Public Accounts (House of Commons, 2006) in which Dr Kohli 
is quoted as saying that in Newham, two LIFT buildings serve 8% of the 
population while using 33% of the premises budget. Foster (2003, 14) 
quoted Dr. Shubaker, secretary of the Redbridge and Waltham Forrest Local 
Medical Committee (LMC) who championed a motion at the LMC conference 
in June 2003 “deploring the fact that since LIFT has been announced, some 
Primary Care Organisations have not allocated any funds for improvement 
grants or cost-rent schemes, thereby denying practices the opportunity to 
improve premises to Disability Discrimination Act 1995 directive standards”.  
 
Non-empirical work and opinion pieces reveal concerns that by spending on 
a few large and expensive LIFT schemes, other practices may be denied the 
opportunity to obtain funding, even “for the poor chap still consulting from 
a converted house” (Comerford, 2004; Banyard, 2004; Robinson, 2005).  
Neal (2005, 2) suggests that LIFT is “devouring nearly all” the national 
funding earmarked for premises.  
 
Concerns have been raised by the Chairman of the Public Accounts 
Committee that procurement under LIFT diverts funds away from other 
primary care needs (Guillochon, 2006). GPs outside the LIFT schemes 
would appear to be struggling to obtain funds for basic improvements even 
where LIFT does not apply (Robinson, 2005; Guillochon, 2006; 
Aldred/UNISON, 2006), denying them the opportunity to bring their practice 
premises in line with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 directive 
standards (Comerford, 2004) or to accommodate the increasing number of 
GP trainees (Comerford, 2004). With multiple PCTs within one LIFTCo area, 
there have been concerns that lead PCTs may have access to estates funds 
leaving the other PCTs worse off (Ward, 2004). 
 
 
Is there a trade-off between incentives for the private sector and 
affordability for the public sector? 
It was hoped that LIFT would encourage the creation of innovative and 
exciting buildings but this has not necessarily happened. One author 
suggested that LIFT, as a vehicle, was not necessarily producing very much 
better buildings and produced mediocre at best” (Simpson, 2007). Peter 
Wearmouth, chief executive of NHS Estates, criticised a lack of innovation in 
NHS design and states “We are still designing buildings that look the same 
as they did 30-40 years ago. We still have waiting rooms and consulting 
rooms, but society has changed. Patients are no longer submissive yet we 
build architecture that is submissive” (Davis, 2002, 8).  
 
The implementation of LIFT has accelerated the regeneration of primary 
care premises. For example, in Merseyside alone 17 schemes are now open 
representing a capital investment of £94m. Given that many GP practices 
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were housed in poor accommodation with only 40% of premises purpose 
built, and almost 50% in either converted shops or former residential 
buildings (Montague, 2004), the government may have held high hopes for 
LIFT-built premises. Mathieson (2003, 33) illustrates this “unimaginative” 
approach, describing one proposed centre with five stand-alone GP 
surgeries, each with their own waiting room.  Lord Hunt, Ministerial Design 
Champion, is quoted as saying “It is striking how unambitious the health 
service has been in the quality of the design of what it produces” (Davis, 
2002, 8). Sunand Prasad, commissioner at the Commission for Architecture 
and the Built Environment, states that “There is a legacy of sub-standard 
buildings in primary care and we are still, tragically, constructing buildings 
in PFI that are not buildings to be proud of in the future”. Prasad outlines 
the aims of the NHS Achieving Excellence in Design evaluation Toolkit, yet 
conceded it would not ‘produce genius designs’, but ‘prevent the worst’ and 
‘increase transparency’” (Davis, 2002, 8).  
 
Designing for a health care market is a new area of activity for many 
architects/design companies (Holmes et al., 2006). For example, the need 
to take into account the “unique aspects of each centre such as the acoustic 
features for those which had audiology departments, the need to develop 
bespoke characteristic entrances to each site” (Hospital Development, 
2006g) and the security concerns of staff (Holmes et al., 2006) are all 
complex issues requiring bespoke designs. It has been recognised that the 
health service did not “want to make the same mistakes as we did in the 
1950s and 1960s” when “we built health centres, which are now unloved 
buildings surrounded by security fences and covered in graffiti” (Andalo, 
2003, 18). However, some initial designs were apparently likened in a 
deleterious way to ‘car show-rooms’ or ‘prisons’ by lay stakeholders 
(Holmes et al., 2006, 570).  
 
The LIFT process has been credited with attracting national construction 
and design teams (Holmes et al., 2006), and for facilitating attention to 
detail, such as the creation of a design with features to maximise light and 
ventilation, which previously would not have been possible (Montague, 
2004). However, bringing such “sophisticated design expertise” into the 
procurement process has introduced negotiation teams with greater 
knowledge of PFI-style bidding processes who “used this experience to drive 
a hard bargain with the PCT teams for whom each negotiation was a first” 
(Holmes et al., 2006, 571). One of the main concerns with LIFT was that 
the health service may be locked into inflexible contracts for poorly 
constructed buildings with high operating costs for the next 25 years 
(Paxton and Lissauer, 2000). 
Whilst this lack of “flair” was perhaps understandable during the first wave 
where the focus was on getting projects completed, Parker (2006) raises 
the concern that there have been few improvement later on. The private 
sector meanwhile claims that they are “on the hook” to deliver “decent 
buildings” that are “affordable”, “efficient” and “good-quality” whilst being 
“architecturally-striking civic landmarks” (Sansom,2007). There is also an 
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economic incentive for the private partner to design and build in a way that 
will minimise maintenance costs (Dawson, 2001). However, it would seem 
that for LIFT there is a trade-off between design, quality, maintenance and 
affordability. 
 
Potential stumbling blocks in LIFT procurement 
Whilst the literature search did not identify any ‘deal breakers’, it did 
identify two issues which either slowed or limited the adoption of LIFT in 
primary care settings: 
 Relocation concerns by both GPs and patients 
 LIFT workload. 
 
Each of these is discussed below. 
 
 
A-Relocation concerns 
A key concern of clinicians and patients is the relocation of premises. 
Forrest (2004) argues that whilst residents have moved out of many urban 
centres, many doctors remained in their practice premises. Forrest argues 
(2003) that patients may be drawn to one of the new one-stop centres 
rather than staying with GPs in poor quality premises. However this goes 
against the ethos of a locally based general practice surgery, and Dix 
(2001, suppl. 2) raises concerns that if the GPs relocate to a new 
centralised LIFT building, even if it provides extended services, the patients 
may not follow. Central relocation does not necessarily reduce the amount 
of, or ease, travel for patients, and the House of Commons Committee of 
Public Accounts (2006, 13) noted that there should be “provision for the 
patients within a LIFT area who are likely to find it difficult to reach a LIFT 
building, such as the elderly and people dependent on public transport”.  
 
Davis (2002) reports that the Government is planning 500 one-stop primary 
care centres by 2010 and according to Dix (2001), approximately 20 GPs 
would be required to make each of these centres viable. According to 
Maryan Pye, associated consultant with Dearden, this would mean the 
relocation of 10,000 GPs, representing over one third of the England’s 
27,000 GPs (Dix, 2001). This would be in addition to the planned 
redevelopment of 3,000 GP premises.  Dix goes on to identify that if each 
one-stop centre serves 35,000 patients, 17.5 million patients would have to 
be written to, asking if they want to stay with their GP, who is moving”. 
 
        B-LIFT Workload 
A recurring theme for GPs, PCT staff and the private partners was the 
volume of work involved, not only in the negotiation and construction 
phases of the LIFT process, but also in the ongoing maintenance of the 
contracts. Therefore, the LIFT process has been described as being time 
consuming and harrowing (Foster, 2003). 
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Dix (2001, suppl 2) and Paxton and Lissauer (2000) found that the most 
significant impact workload impact of LIFT falls upon the staff of PCTs, 
including GPs, as a LIFT project is outwith their day-to-day business and 
reduces the time available for clinical practice.  
 
Once Board approval is obtained, the workload is extensive, and the 
timescales tight. Hines (2003) found that some projects have been forced 
to reduce the number of schemes to ensure a manageable workload.  
 
Mathieson (2003, 33) states that the DoH now recognises the considerable 
workload LIFT demands of PCTs and the “challenging timetable” imposed.  
Before the project can be considered, the PCT must convince their Board 
that the project has merit, and for the first wave, this proved difficult 
(Aizlewood, 2002).  
 
 
3.5.3 Contractual Issues 
The a priori questions identified focused on two key questions: 
 Whether the length of a LIFT contract posed a problem 
 How LIFT participants viewed the exclusivity clause. 
 
 
 
 
Is the length of a LIFT contract seen as a problem? 
There is little empirical (or non-empirical) evidence to gain a perspective on 
this question, so this was identified as an area to be addressed during the 
interviews.  
 
 
How do LIFT participants view the exclusivity clause? 
As Aldred (2007) argues, GP-owned premises are usually small and their 
refurbishment is not the type of project that would be profitable for private 
investors. Inherent in LIFT is an exclusivity clause giving the successful 
LIFTCo the right to build primary care premises for PCTs in the area 
(Aldred, 2007).  By grouping projects together and including the long-term 
operation and management of these facilities, the scale of each initiative is 
increased, making them attractive to private investors (Hudson et al., 
2003; NAO, 2005; Holmes et al., 2006).  
 
The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2006, 11) stated 
that “granting the LIFTCo an effective monopoly for five years, provided the 
costs are reasonable, is intended to encourage private sector interest. 
Exclusivity does not have to apply to other premises, for example, mental 
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health or Local Authority developments. Where LIFTCo fails to demonstrate 
value in terms of operating costs, through benchmarking or market testing, 
Primary Care Trusts can use any supplier they choose”.  Whether any will 
enforce this ability has yet to be seen. 
 
The House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (2006, 10) notes that 
“for the LIFT model to work efficiently there needs to be a continuous flow 
of developments. The LIFTCo is intended to operate as a local property 
development business with overhead costs spread over a number of 
projects. Given the cost to the local health economy of developing LIFT 
buildings, and the long term funding requirements, there is a risk that a 
continuous flow of projects may not be taken forward.  If so, the model 
may not achieve the expected benefits”. 
 
The non-empirical literature review suggests that some GP practices and 
local authorities have found innovative ways to create the type of multi-
functional, multi-disciplinary approach that the DoH seems to expect from 
LIFT; but by limiting PCTs to use LIFT, the potential for this innovation may 
be stifled  
 
Whilst it is recognised that there are ways to enhance premises that may be 
affordable, particularly if they do not involve a third party seeking to make 
a profit, there have been concerns that the exclusivity clause of the LIFTCO 
contracts may preclude GPs from developing their premises themselves 
(UNISON, 2003). 
 
3.5.4 Skill Requirements 
The a priori questions focused primarily upon the skill levels in the public 
sector, in particular whether: 
 public sector staff feel that their understanding is undermined by the 
complexity of LIFT schemes 
 current levels of experience and skill allowed public sector managers 
to become genuine partners with their private sector counterpoints  
 there are any cultural, educational or behavioural barriers within 
public or private sector organisations which could create a barrier to 
partnership working 
 current guidance on LIFT is sufficient to allow public sector managers 
to make informed choices in the public interest 
 Local Authority, NHS representatives and advisory board members 
feel they have sufficient understanding of the LIFT procurement 
process to make informed choices. 
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Whilst the literature discussed the first three questions, there is little 
evidence on the latter two, so these were identified as areas to be 
addressed during the interviews. 
 
 
Do public sector staff feel that their understanding is undermined 
by the complexity of LIFT? 
Staff acknowledged that they found LIFT to be a lot more complex (Aldred, 
2007) and the process was further complicated by frequent changes in rules 
applied by the DoH including Red book room space allocations in general 
practice and the availability and use of enabling funds (Hines, 2003). The 
NAO (2005, 17) found that PCTs found the development of plans 
understandably “complex and time consuming”. 
 
Opinion pieces have expressed similar concerns describing the process as 
“horrendously complicated” (Dudman, 2003, 24), and the funding 
mechanism behind LIFT as “very complicated” (Tyndale-Biscoe, 2003).   
According to UNISON (2003), there is a worry that the contract is so 
complex that these extra layers of bureaucracy diminish the ability of NHS 
directors and managers to control the services provided and make it still 
harder for patients and staff to make their voices heard.  
 
 
 
Do current levels of experience allow public sector managers to 
become genuine partners in LIFT projects? 
It has been reported that local authorities and other public sector bodies 
struggle to become equal partners in PFI projects (Clark & Root, 1999). This 
arises because of a number of factors. The PFI process inherently suffers 
from asymmetry of information (Asenova et al., 2002). Private sector 
partners possess the technical skills required to complete the design, 
negotiations, construction and management of a new building as they are 
required to do this on a frequent basis. For the public sector partners, 
involvement in PFI is often a unique one off experience that challenges their 
commercial acumen. In theory public sector clients must lead the entire 
process if they do not wish to be at a relative disadvantage; but in reality 
many clients feel as though they are “walking in the dark” (Akintoye et al., 
2003). Asenova et al. quote one NHS Manager as stating that building a 
hospital is a once in a lifetime experience (Asenova et al., 2002). Similarly, 
HM Treasury note that skill shortages occurred in the healthcare sector, 
particularly in areas such as contract negotiation and project risk 
management (HM Treasury, 1999). Such skill shortages continue to be 
apparent many years after PFI has been introduced (Spackman, 2002). 
 
Holmes et al.’s (2006, 570) study of LIFT projects suggested that the 
“inequality in the size and expertise of the negotiating parties has given the 
upper hand to the contractors when discussing technical specifications and 
operational arrangements”. To try to overcome this, Hines (2003) found the 
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PCT needed a project team adequately resourced with the appropriate 
skills, and management/leadership support. Although this may seem a 
basic requirement, according to the NAO (2005), 56% of PCTs did not have 
sufficient resources to complete their project efficiently in 2005.  
 
 
Are there any factors within public or private sector organisations 
which could create a barrier to partnership? 
PPP requires the agents to come from both the public and private sector, 
each bringing their particular values, beliefs, skills and experience. The LIFT 
process inherently suffers from asymmetry of information. Hines (2003) 
argues that whilst the PCTs have little, if any, experience of property 
(re)development and management, the consultants required to assist them 
with those critical skill sets have little, if any, experience of health care and 
special requirements in terms of design and specifications. The impact of 
such deficiencies has not been discussed in the literature.  
 
3.5.5 Local Impact 
Three a priori questions were identified: 
 
Is there a danger of local interests being marginalised? 
There seems to be little, if any, empirical evidence to assess whether LIFT 
schemes marginalise local interest. In the non-empirical literature the 
degree of locality of service for patients appears to be mixed. Some claim 
that the new LIFT premises “can offer many services traditionally only 
found in hospitals” (Hospital Development, 2006d) and NHS patients can 
get “minor surgery for hernia repairs, sports injuries and even vasectomies. 
X-rays, medical tests, speech and language therapy, chiropody and 
physiotherapy… (in) centres (that) are more convenient for patients, 
particularly older patients and those with long-term conditions, as they offer 
more care closer to home”. However, Aldred/UNISON (2006, 6) believes 
that the marginalisation of local people and their organisations is evidenced 
by “organised opposition to LIFT schemes”.  
 
 
Are smaller organisations able to effectively participate in LIFT 
projects? 
One of the government claims for LIFT is that it will involve ‘local 
businesses delivering local solutions’. Given the scale of the combined LIFT 
projects, companies bidding for the work must go through a detailed 
procurement process governed by European legislation. The scale of the 
projects means that a bidding company must have the requisite skills and 
adequate resources not only to complete the job, but also to develop and 
fund expensive, and potentially unsuccessful, bids (Hudson et al., 2003; 
Holmes et al., 2006). Holmes et al. (2006, 569) argue that submitting a bid 
may cost an organisation between “£500,000 and £1 million, with only a 
one-in-three chance of success”. Consequently, some smaller developers 
are unable to compete and are squeezed out by the large companies 
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(Hudson et al., 2003). However, Hudson et al. (2003) and Holmes et al. 
(2006) state that these larger, often national, companies often have higher 
overheads which can be a significant factor in the overall construction costs 
of the schemes.  
 
A report by UNISON (Aldred/Unison, 2006, 6) challenges the government’s 
notion of local solutions as “smaller organisations generally do not have the 
resources to bid for such complex contracts. There is no guarantee that 
large companies will select local businesses as part of their supply chain. 
They are likely to use their existing, centralised subcontracting networks, 
which will be cheaper and help support their profit margins – but will not be 
‘local’”.  
 
 
Local employment generation and urban regeneration  
LIFT has been used as a vehicle to regenerate urban areas and to promote 
healthier living. For example, at Towerhill, after the local population had 
moved away from the area of the existing clinic, the new site selected was 
adjacent to a local school and now includes a health care and community 
facility in one integrated campus aimed at reinforcing the notion of health, 
recreation and training. The local authority worked with the developer and 
identified an alternative source of access and location for schools parking, 
thereby allowing the complex to be traffic-free and encouraging the locals 
to walk to the complex from their residences (Burton, 2004). A similar 
approach to urban regeneration is planned for an area of derelict land in St 
Helens (Burton, 2004; Grice, 2008) where an ambitious project is planned 
that will include housing, shops, leisure developments and possibly a hotel 
(Forrest, 2004).  
 
3.5.6 Stakeholder Views 
The literature suggests that the LIFT process is facilitated by teamwork, 
open lines of communication and amicable working relationships (Gilbert, 
2005b; Hines, 2003).  Simpson (2007) argues that listening to the needs of 
stakeholders ensures that fewer changes are required at a later date, thus 
saving time and resources.  Involving the local authority, councils, staff, 
service users and the community at large would seem to ensure that the 
project retains a strong position in the community and give people a sense 
of ownership (Hines, 2003; Gilbert, 2005b).  It is recognised that local 
authorities have different priorities and planning cycles to the PCTs, but the 
NAO (2005) identifies the value of their involvement from the earliest stage  
 
In the early phases of bidding Holmes et al. (2006) recognised that the 
vendors are competing and the designs are therefore highly confidential 
and should not therefore involve the community at that time but should 
strive to do so at later stages. Where projects have failed to do this there 
have often been problems. For example, for one health centre the GPs 
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developed the design of the one-stop shop from the perspective of 
individuals who would work there rather than the patients who would use it.  
 
The a priori questions developed for this study asked: 
 Whether stakeholders, such as clinical and non-clinical staff, 
members of advisory boards etc. feel that they have been 
sufficiently involved with LIFT projects? 
 What were the levels of user and client satisfaction with LIFT 
projects? 
 Whether stakeholders, clients and users feel that LIFT has added 
extra layers of bureaucracy to primary care provision? 
 Whether stakeholders, clients and users feel that LIFT has added 
extra cost to primary care provision? and  
 How LIFT has affected levels of staffing – whether there has been 
increases in subcontracting and job losses? 
 
 
Levels of user and client satisfaction 
Whilst inside some LIFT buildings, multi-disciplinary and open-layouts have 
created a “sense of community spirit” that has been well received by some 
(Gilbert, 2005, 21), it has created problems and concerns.  Gilbert (2005) 
identified that in one location a centralised reception area for four physician 
practices reduced patient privacy (Gilbert, 2005).  
 
The CABE report (2008) investigated the design quality of 20 of the 82 LIFT 
buildings through site visits by 10 experts in health care architecture design 
and delivery, formal interviews with a minimum of six participants in the 
LIFT process and informal interviews with users at each location.  They 
noted that “many users were happy to be working in their new premises” 
although they acknowledge that a “greater understanding of these areas of 
satisfaction and of areas for improvement… could be gained through 
systematic user satisfaction feedback services”.  This suggestion has been 
incorporated into the present study via a user satisfaction survey 
distributed at the case study sites (section 6). 
 
Do stakeholders, clients and users feel that LIFT has added extra 
layers of bureaucracy to primary care provision? 
Rather than “freeing up enterprise”, Aldred (2007, 147) claims that LIFT 
creates large, legalistic, and bureaucratic systems “locking the NHS into the 
use of certain buildings and services for a long period.  Although the roll-out 
of LIFT has been quicker than anticipated, with the prospectus for the 
program released in July 2001, by the end of 2004, only four new buildings 
were open to the public (NAO, 2005). In part, this has been blamed on 
Partnerships for Health, which is said to have provided little continuity in 
the individuals allocated to schemes while being slow in decision-making 
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(NAO, 2005).  According to Aldred (2007) GPs have stated that they believe 
it to be a very bureaucratic process which is heavily management-led 
(Aldred, 2007). 
 
 
Do stakeholders, clients and users feel that LIFT has contributed 
additional cost to primary care provision? 
With the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (2006, 9) stating 
that “Primary Care Trust accommodation spending on patients registered 
with GPs in a LIFT development is up to eight times higher than total 
primary care spending on accommodation” it is understandable that the 
Chairman stated that “… really need to know is whether the expected 
benefits to patients justify the cost of using LIFT to provide the new 
facilities” (Guillochon, 2006, 64). 
 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recognised that the returns for LIFT 
were perceived to be high in relation to the levels of risk assumed by the 
private sector partners, a view shared by Holmes et al. (2006, 571) who 
believe that “contractors involved in the LIFT process are making a greater 
return on their investment than the much-criticised PFI schemes”. However 
the PAC (2006, 11) argues that this may have been the case in the early 
schemes “because of perceived greater risk associated with the newness of 
the schemes, and uncertainty over the pace of future developments”. The 
NAO (2005) confirmed their belief that the returns should reduce over time 
as learning curves are overcome. 
 
These criticisms are still being raised by UNISON (Aldred/Unison. 2006, 10) 
who claim that “the projected LIFT rate of return of 15.1% on average 
compares with 8-9% for traditional third party development – a lot of extra 
profit given that a PCT may pay around £1 million per year or more to lease 
each LIFT health centre”.  However, a 15% return is considered standard 
for a low-risk, privately financed project according to Dawson (2001). 
According to UNISON (Aldred/UNISON, 2006), one of the greater risks of 
focusing on rates of return is that future schemes may actually draw GPs 
away from where they are needed. 
 
LIFT is perceived by some as an effective, but lengthy and costly process 
(Hospital Development, 2006c), and it has been claimed that even “the DoH 
acknowledges that LIFT is likely to cost PCTs more than other ways of 
building and refurbishing surgeries” (Aldred/UNISON, 2006).  
 
In the past the NHS, and individual GPs, could choose to reduce immediate 
expenditure by deciding to postpone building maintenance, and the 
replacement of equipment.  With LIFT, this no longer remains an option as 
all maintenance falls under the remit of the LIFTCo contract and the PCT 
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will automatically have a share of these charges routinely included in their 
fees (Dawson, 2001).  
 
To facilitate the start of LIFT projects, the Government made ‘enabling 
funds’ available to the projects to “remove obstacles to a project going 
ahead by, for example, purchasing sites or releasing GP practices from 
negative equity” (Hines, 2003, 22). These funds could be used to reconvert 
primary care premises back into residential premises to make them more 
attractive to the market and easier to sell if the GPs were prepared to 
relocate into LIFT premises (DoH, 2000a). These funds are “not 
automatically refundable” but in the guidance provided by the Government, 
it was stated that “there may be circumstances in which the Department 
would be keen to reclaim funding to enable it to be recycled into further 
LIFT developments” (NAO, 19 May, 2005, 15).  The NAO state that one 
third of project managers were uncertain how to use the enabling funds, 
leading to “variation” in usage (NAO, 2005; Hospital Development, 2005).  
 
Whilst the LIFT process was supposed to reduce PCT involvement in the 
construction and day-to-day management of buildings, it would seem that 
they are still required to take on the initiation and management of revenue 
contracts, including undertaking “all the leg work, paying solicitors’ costs, 
accountants and consultants when they set them up” (Comerford, 2004, 
10); costs which Comerford claims are higher than those under the 
previous system of fixed cost or notional rent.  Whilst this may be done 
using the enabling funds, it is still an additional cost in the process. 
 
Finally, concerns have been raised about refinancing packages where 
private sector consortiums have managed to re-negotiate lower rates of 
interest but may not have passed benefits on to their local authority 
partner.  According to UNISON, “The Government has now said that there 
has to be a public sector clawback on such-refinancing packages in PFI 
schemes. It is not clear whether this will apply to LIFT schemes or, if it 
does, whether it would be the local public sector partners or the national 
partners who would benefit” (2003, 11).  
 
Rental income has been a consideration of developers given the significant 
opportunities for revenue raising (Paxton and Lissauer, 2000, 57).  Some 
have designed and built more traditional GP surgeries, preferring GP 
stability and steady rental income over multi-use facilities with “more risky 
tenants” (Mathieson, 2002, 31).  It is interesting to note that at one LIFT 
project, the coordinator chose not to discuss rents with its GPs as “it does 
not want them to become alarmed over figures that are still being 
discussed: the bidders have put indicative rental figures in their bids and we 
are in negotiation with them over those figures” (Dudman, 2003, 25) 
suggesting that the rent would be considerably higher than the GPs would 
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anticipate.  Holmes et al. describe the major concern over rents to be paid 
by tenants of LIFT buildings perfectly when he states that “there is a 
perception that the higher costs of LIFT, compared to current rent 
payments, outweighs the benefits of new, purpose-built premises” (2006, 
570).  
 
Obtaining tenants for all LIFT spaces has not been straight forward. Some 
GPs, including those approaching retirement age, are not in a position to 
sign a 25 year tenancy agreement. PCTs can take over a head lease with 
the developer and then sub-let to GPs or other tenants on a shorter-term 
basis; an option which may be more attractive to practitioners (Paxton and 
Lissauer, 2000; UNISON, 2003; Aldred, 2007) including those who wish to 
work in an inner city location or to secure new skills before relocating 
elsewhere (Sansom, 2007). However, this leaves the NHS at risk of the GPs 
either leaving or defaulting (Aldred, 2007) or coming to the end of their 
lease and the PCT being unable to find a replacement tenant (UNISON, 
2003). 
 
These concerns are also voiced by Aldred (2007) describing the feelings of 
dentists, pharmacists and local authorities when asked about LIFT.  Holmes 
goes on to say that “In the case study area the rent charged for the new 
LIFT premises is in the order of £210/m2… In real terms, the facilities 
provided are expensive when compared to market rents in the locality” 
(Holmes et al., 2006, 570). For this reason it is suggested that local 
authorities and allied health practices including pharmacies and dentists 
have chosen not to rent spaces in the LIFT buildings, preferring in some 
cases to rent retail premises adjacent to the doctor’s practice at a 
“considerably” lower rent (Holmes et al., 2006). The reason pharmacies in 
particular may not wish to relocate into a LIFT building was identified by the 
NAO who state that whilst primary care providers such as dentists and 
doctors who receive automatic reimbursement for the rent paid for primary 
care premises, the PCT determines whether a pharmacy is similarly 
classified. In the main they tend to be considered as a business and as such 
will be expected to pay full rent for their space (2005, 23). As the NAO 
notes that pharmacies are “likely to be the most significant source of third 
party income” which can be used to “plug funding gaps and reduce the rent 
levels paid by other tenants” (2005, 23), pricing them out of the market 
would seem to be a short-sighted approach and this may be why 
alternatives such as cafes, vending machines, internet training facilities and 
complementary therapists (NAO, 2005) may be encouraged to locate within 
the space. In order to encourage healthcare professionals to relocate into 
the space, some PCTs have agreed to subsidise rents (NAO, 2005). As 
Andalo states, there are “economies of scale. The more professionals you 
cram into a one-stop shop, the more profitable the site” (2003, 18). 
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With the current lack of any form of independent evaluation, it is 
understandable that costs associated with the LIFT process are being 
questioned, from initial set-up (Tyndale-Biscoe, 2003), fees payable to 
Partnerships for Health (NAO, 2005), and operating costs (Comerford, 
2004) to the rents being charged to tenants (Holmes et al., 2006). 
 
How has LIFT affected levels of staffing? 
There is no empirical evidence to assess the impact of LIFT on staffing 
levels within the public sector. Non-empirical literature sources identify that 
LIFTCo contracts group non-clinical services under the heading of 
“partnering and lease plus services” (Aldred/UNISON, 2006) and can 
include a large range of support and facilities management services. 
Furthermore, the terms of the contracts state that these services may be 
provided not only for the LIFT buildings but also to “other buildings within 
the contracting authorities’ estate” which may “not just mean PCT 
buildings; potentially it could include staff in local authority buildings and 
hospitals, as councils and acute NHS trusts are normally additional 
‘contracting authorities’ in the LIFT process” (Aldred/UNISON, 2006). In 
reassigning some activities to the LIFTCo, affected former public sector 
employees will be transferred to the privately operated LIFTCos whilst 
others remain employed by public sector PCTs. This has been seen by some 
to represent the start of privatisation of primary care (Aldred/UNISON, 
2006).  
 
As new positions within the LIFTCO could be subject to different terms and 
conditions, UNISON (2003, 4) claim “one of the ways in which operators of 
PFI schemes and private providers of public services have tried to cut costs 
and increase profits is through worsening pay, terms of employment and 
career opportunities for new staff, creating a two-tier workforce”. As public 
sector bodies employ significant numbers of women and ethnic minorities in 
low paid employment, groups that are frequently cited as marginalised in 
the work force, there are concerns that these are the sorts of positions that 
may be transferred and at greatest risk from reclassification. Consequently, 
UNISON (2003, 7) has suggested that policy on equality should form part of 
the selection process for the private sector partners and “only those 
services and facilities that are genuinely part of the Strategic Services 
Development Plan” should be included in LIFTCo contracts. The King's Fund 
(2001) has also commented on this arguing that “no government should 
ever privatise an existing public enterprise unless the new company could 
be allowed to fail. If it cannot, it will blackmail government with an endless 
need for subsidies”. 
 
The introduction of LIFT is accompanied by changes in the structure of 
organizations participating in the process, creating a number of problems. 
For example, being aware that their Primary Care Trust (PCT) was due to 
be merged with others in a region had “implications for their commitment 
to the LIFT partnership” according to Ballantyne who believes this 
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“rationalisation of PCTs will have an impact on the number of future 
projects likely to be undertaken by LIFT, as well as on contractual 
structures” (CIPFA, 2005).  This structural change is not limited to the 
PCTs. Aldred (2005, 1338) claims “PFI providers will increasingly link up 
with the private health care companies now running independent service 
treatment centres, creating giant monopolies, complex subcontracting 
chains”. Much of this belief comes from new language contained in the 
LIFTCo contracts authorising them to “privatise clinical services in LIFT and 
non-LIFT buildings” by getting them to “engage private medical companies 
to provide GP services, or agencies to provide district nursing services” 
(Aldred/UNISON, 2006, 12). Assuming that LIFTCos do engage others to 
provide these services, there are fears that such deals would be “shrouded 
in ‘commercial confidentiality’” and embedded in highly complex, long-term 
contracts making it impossible for others to intercede, even if public safety 
was at stake (Aldred, 2005,1338). There are also concerns that the 
planning function of the NHS will be eroded by fragmenting this function 
and allowing the LIFTCos to determine how, and by whom, service will be 
delivered (Aldred, 2005).  
 
Where projects have included stakeholders, some surprising benefits have 
arisen. For example, one PCT asked visually, physically and hearing 
impaired people to sit on the design team and found that “their input was 
invaluable – simple things like using contrasting colours and symbols for 
way-finding and signage, rather than words. We’ve also got raised bumps 
on the handrails to denote the beginning and the end of staircases. None of 
these details have come in as an extra cost because we were able to 
incorporate them early enough in the process” (Simpson, 2007, 1).  
 
3.5.7 Inductive Themes 
After addressing the a priori questions developed by the researcher, a 
number of important additional themes emerged, including: 
 Lack of a Pilot Scheme/evaluation 
 Flexibility 
 Site selection  
 Types of project 
 Potential for Influence 
 Control over premises 
 Poor risk management  
 Transfer of assets 
 Alterations to Buildings 
 Revenue for Upkeep. 
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Lack of a Pilot Scheme/evaluation 
Paxton and Lissauer (2000) argue that the evaluation of earlier attempts to 
use private finance to fund the development of primary care premises has 
been limited. Holmes et al. (2006, 569) feel that this is “not only bad 
practice but… at odds with government guidance on the evaluation of 
completed health care projects” (2006, 571). The NAO (2005, 3) note that 
second and third wave LIFT projects were rolled out “before the first wave 
schemes had completed negotiations” which meant that, as found by Hines 
(2003) many of the early teething problems had not been resolved centrally 
before the next round of projects commenced. It has been argued that this 
expansion of the scheme comes more from a political “imperative for visible 
investment in the NHS” than from any demonstrable VfM benefit (Holmes et 
al., 2006, 569). 
 
Whilst the NAO (2005, 30) reiterates that Partnerships for Health and the 
DoH both “recognise the importance of evaluation”, they also note that, at 
that time, there was “no formal framework to evaluate LIFT” (2005, 3) and 
“no clear guidance recommending either its nature or timing” (2005, 30). 
MPs, including Edward Leigh voiced their concerns stating that it was 
“essential that the department of health and Partnerships for Health speed 
up their development of a mechanism for evaluating LIFT” in order to 
demonstrate publicly that funds were being used efficiently and effectively 
and would not be better used elsewhere (Parley, 2007) yet little evaluation 
has been undertaken. Whilst there was little, if any, guidance from central 
bodies, Trusts were left to their own devices in terms of developing 
performance indicators. However, the NAO report identifies that this had 
lead to an inconsistent approach and there was little evidence that this had 
been done in a satisfactory manner (2005).  
 
The NAO (2005, 16) share a similar view to many (Tyndale-Biscoe, 2003; 
UNISON, 2003;  Aldred/UNISON, 2006) when they stated that “it is 
important that the Department evaluates LIFT in comparison to other 
available procurement routes… Formal and ongoing analysis of the 
advantages and disadvantages of LIFT in comparison to other procurement 
mechanisms needs to be undertaken to enable local areas to decide which 
route to take”. 
 
 
Flexibility 
Flexibility is a loose term that may have several meanings when considered 
in relation to a LIFT project. As Aldred (2007, 146) states “Analysts should 
ask: flexibility for what, and for whom?” She goes on to say that the “LIFT 
structure allows flexibility for capital to move in and out of holding 
companies, but this does not equate to flexibility in service provision”. 
Flexibility of design can refer to the ability to adapt the building to suit the 
immediate needs of the occupants. Whilst it would seem that some LIFT 
buildings are being designed with this in mind (Hospital Development, 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
44 
2002), through the use of multiple-use rooms and strategically placed 
reception areas (Simpson, 2007) and movable partitions (Parker, 2005), 
there are concerns. Whilst the LIFTCos are responsible for the maintenance 
of facilities, there is “no minimum cost for minor alterations” Guillochon 
(2006, 64). In the past, owner-occupier GPs could go to the open market 
and obtain quotations for the work and the NHS would reimburse them at 
the rate of the lowest of the three. However, the LIFTCos now have a 
monopoly and may charge what they wish for the duration of their contract 
(Aldred/UNISON, 2006).  
 
Flexibility may also refer to the ability of the building to be adapted to meet 
changes in functional use in the future. With the 25 to 30 year expected life 
of the PFI project buildings, the DoH’s head of capacity planning, Bob 
Ricketts, said that the NHS was building “unwanted and inflexible 
‘monuments’ on 30 year hospital contracts through PFI. Many of these, he 
said, would be redundant in five years. A report by UNISON (Aldred/Unison, 
2006) has suggested that LIFT is in danger of replicating this expensive 
mistake in primary care centres across the country. Paxton and Lissauer 
(2000, 65) state that “At the moment there are no break-out clauses in PPP 
contracts, allowing the PCG/T to terminate its lease. This means that the 
PCG/T has little leverage by which to hold the developer to account”. 
 
Although many developers try to create adaptable buildings (Hospital 
Development, 2006g), through the use of movable partitions (Samson,  
2007) and steel frame construction (Parker, 2005), it is difficult to predict 
changes in services provision and population need and that the required 
flexibility to adapt comes at an added cost (NAO, 2005). Hudson et al. 
(2003) argue that specifying standards and mandatory requirements reduce 
the opportunity to achieve innovation in design and make it less likely that 
the tender or Invitation to Negotiate documentation will include either 
prescriptive or performance requirements for items relating to 
sustainability.  
 
The NAO (2005) states that in spite of the above, “some” first tranche 
projects have been designed to allow for future changes in use.  While 
many new centres have chosen a more traditional ‘hub and spoke’ design 
model, others are using more innovative approaches, such as a ‘stem and 
leaf’ design which allows for future growth through the addition of 
additional ‘leaves’ of accommodation in the future connected by the central 
‘stem’ as services expand or new ones are introduced.  It is claimed that 
this simple model “offers opportunities for a high level of standardisation in 
construction, systems and components with the potential for progressive 
improvements across the supply chain as a series of schemes are delivered” 
(Burton, 2004, 11).  However, changes in government policy and technical 
changes in treatment methodology could still render them redundant 
(Simpson, 2007; Dawson, 2001). 
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Site selection  
As the early LIFT projects were implemented in highly populated urban 
areas, several authors have identified the difficulty in finding a site suitable 
for the build (Dix, 2001; NAO, 2005; Parker, 2006) which has resulted in 
the construction of some buildings with “less than satisfactory views or 
ambiance” (Parker, 2006) or poor patient access (DoH, 2000a). Developers 
seek to avoid deprived areas as they provide poor returns on investment 
(DoH, 2000a; Holmes et al., 2006), but development in affluent areas 
involves competing with residential developers for sites (Holmes et al., 
2006). Consequently, LIFT developers have had to employ a range of 
creative solutions, such as the inclusion of residential apartments in the 
complex. Thus, new housing may significantly subsidise the cost of the 
project (Sansom,  2007). However, this approach increases the risk for the 
developer from a downturn in the residential property market (Holmes et 
al., 2006). Additional revenue may also be received from the sale of any 
sites previously occupied by the PCT that become vacant once the new build 
is complete (Burton, 2004). It has been noted that some LIFT projects 
outside the big cities, where the opportunity to make additional income will 
be more difficult, are struggling to attract bidders (Mathieson, 2003). 
 
 
Types of project 
Whilst the new LIFT finance and the model of GP super-surgeries should 
transform disadvantaged communities in areas with the worst health care 
inequalities, and “counteract the current fragmentation of GP provision” in 
some areas (Forrest, 2004, 34), there are concerns that “wholesale 
development of extremely large practices could work against the ethos of 
family medicine that patients value and want” (Little, 2006, p.?). Currently 
there is little guidance from the DoH on these ‘poly clinics’ who state that “it 
is up to local trusts to do what they think best to meet local need” (Little, 
2006, 26).  
 
 
Potential for Influence 
In the NAO study (2005), two thirds of Primary Care Trust Chief Executives 
or Finance Directors had been appointed to act as public sector directors on 
their LIFTCo. In their employment contracts they were charged with a duty 
to protect the interests of the PCT, such as minimising the costs of 
purchasing services from the LIFTCo. However, their new roles with the 
LIFTCo would require them to act in the interest of the LIFTCo board, 
including maximising profits for the shareholders which could clearly create 
a potential for conflict of interest (UNISON, 2003; NAO, 2005). There are 
similar concerns over the potential conflict for any GPs who become 
members of a local LIFT company and their requirement to act in the best 
interest of their patients (Mathieson, 2002). A report by the King’s Fund 
(2001) suggests that, whilst the private sector will be seeking to develop 
sites with profitable complementary uses, the public shareholders will be 
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seeking to ensure good locations and a good mix of (non-profit making) 
users.  
 
Similarly, the recruitment of independent non executives to Chair the PCT 
and strategic Partnering Boards has proved difficult for many LIFT areas 
(NAO, 2005). Whilst it is recognised for the board to have the requisite 
skills to protect public interests, in practice this has resulted in the 
recruitment of individuals with conflicting interests.  
 
 
Control over premises 
Doctors have expressed concerns over the loss of control over their 
premises when they choose to become involved in a LIFT project rather 
than owning their own premises (Foster, 2003; NAO, 2005).  One key 
aspect of this is the control over tenancy agreements and sub-letting.  Their 
concern relates to two areas.  In their contracts with the LIFTCo, PCTS have 
the right to decide whether they wish the company to provide any clinical 
services.  Whilst they could request that the LIFTCo restricts service 
provision to one discrete area, such as diagnostics, allowing the LIFTCo to 
provide x-ray services for example, some PCTS have chosen what UNISON 
(Aldred/UNISON, 2006, 12) states is “the most radical” option and is 
including clinical services in the most general terms within their contract 
with the LIFTCo. Thus, it is argued that giving the private companies the 
right to determine how, and by whom, services will be provided for the local 
population, a role typically performed by healthcare planners (Aldred, 
2007).  
 
In the same way that the LIFTCo can determine which clinical businesses 
are given tenancy agreements, they can determine which private 
businesses can move in, a key concern of GPs. As one respondent told Dix 
(2001, suppl. 3), they did not want to see a McDonald’s next to the waiting 
room, something that has appeared in some NHS hospitals (Aldred/ 
UNISON, 2006). Some LIFT project managers have negotiated the right of 
veto so that public sector partners can determine who tenancy agreements 
are awarded to. In one such project the co-ordinator explained that other 
complementary shops and services can rent spaces on the site.  They may 
also allow third party revenue generation from private businesses. In a 
number of sites, the space provides a base for the local housing team ( 
Montague, 2001; Hospital Development, 2007c) and others are seeking to 
provide “open access to information for the local community” in the form of 
an internet café, for example (Hospital Development, 2007c). Whilst this 
may be an appropriate use of the space, UNISON (Aldred/UNISON, 2006, 
7) has argued that there should be “proper scrutiny to ensure service 
integration puts the needs of local people first, before LIFT company profits.  
In particular, to ensure that ‘retail units’ developed within LIFT sites are 
appropriate to health care facilities”.  By co-developing one-stop, mixed-use 
facilities in, which are more likely to obtain local planning consent (Holmes 
et al., 2006), it is argued that public sector will be forced to consider how 
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the profitability of new premises can be maximised whilst enhancing the 
services available (Aldred, 2007). 
 
 
         Poor risk management  
In interviews with members of public sector bodies undertaking LIFT 
projects, Aldred (2008) noted that they believed that private sector 
companies, in particular banks, were highly risk averse and suggested that 
the public sector would not get good VfM when attempting to transfer risk 
to the public sector.  The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) recognised that 
the LIFT returns were perceived as high in relation to the level of risk 
assumed by the private sector partners, a fact confirmed by Holmes et al. 
(2006).  However, the PAC argues that this may have been the case in the 
early schemes because of perceived greater risk associated with the 
newness of the schemes, and uncertainty over the pace of future 
developments” (House of Commons, 2006a). This is confirmed by the NAO 
(2005) who noted that the returns should reduce over time as learning 
curves are overcome.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, criticisms remain with regard to the risk 
premium achieved by LIFT companies, UNISON (Aldred/UNISON, 2006, 10) 
claims that “the projected LIFT rate of return of 15.1% on average 
compares with 8-9% for traditional third party development – a lot of extra 
profit given that a PCT may pay around £1 million per year or more to lease 
each LIFT health centre”.  Others, including Dawson (2001) argue that a 
15% return should be considered standard for a low-risk, privately financed 
project.  Overall, there appears to be little agreement as to how private 
sector companies involved in LIFT projects should be rewarded for the 
investment risk.   
 
 
        Transfer of assets 
Although some LIFT projects comprise bespoke buildings on new sites, 
others involve the purchase and redevelopment of publicly owned 
properties.  At the end of the contract, unlike PFI where premises may 
revert back to the public sector, LIFT premises remain under the ownership 
of the LIFTCo (UNISON, 2003).  This transfer of public assets into private 
ownership is a source of concern, and it has been suggested that the NHS 
should be appropriately represented during these negotiations (Dudman, 
2003).  At the end of the lease, organisations may have the opportunity to 
purchase the LIFT building from the LIFTCo, but as UNISON (2003) points 
out, the sites may not then be affordable.  
 
At the start of the LIFT process, some PCTs encountered problems where 
asset ownership has been transferred to them in advance of the formation 
of the LIFTCo.  These assets attract capital charges, for which the PCT 
would appear to be liable even though it was made clear that the LIFT 
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process should not financially penalise any PCT (Hines, 2003).  How this 
would be resolved has not been identified. 
 
 
Alterations to buildings 
Health care professionals working within LIFT buildings have argued that 
contracts make it difficult and expensive to undertake minor alterations to 
the property once completed (House of Commons Committee of Public 
Accounts, 2006). 
 
          
        Revenue for upkeep 
Although LIFT provides the capital to build new buildings, in the opinion of 
Comerford (2004) and Ward (2004m) there are concerns that additional 
revenue will be required for upkeep. Dr Grant Kelly, former Chair of the 
Practice Premises Subcommittee of the General Practitioners Committee, 
allegedly said that if the Government doesn’t provide the running costs for 
buildings, you would be mad to build them (Comerford, 2004), a view 
shared by UNISON (2003, 7).  
 
3.6 Discussion 
At the start of this chapter, the objectives of the review were identified: 
 To assess the role and scope of LIFT 
 Identify relative success factors 
 Identify barriers to and facilitators of LIFT schemes. 
 
3.6.1 Role and Scope of LIFT 
There is recognition of the previously poor state of many primary care 
premises and a need for investment and improvement. LIFT is credited with 
attracting national construction and design teams and bringing more 
sophisticated expertise to the development of purpose built primary care 
premises. 
 
LIFT projects can appear an attractive option for GPs, helping them to 
improve on their current premises, reduce negative equity and requirement 
for heavy financial investment and offering the opportunity to relocate into 
purpose-built accommodation.  It offers the opportunity for flexible working, 
the possibility of relocation, and a chance to work as part of a group 
practice which facilitates a range of benefits including shared learning, cost 
reduction, vacation coverage, extended services and improved 
communications between health care professionals. 
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3.6.2 Relative Success Factors of LIFT schemes 
Evidence suggests that LIFT projects have extended local primary care 
delivery, providing services, previously available only in hospitals.  Enabling 
funds would appear to have successfully supported the removal of obstacles 
to project progression, although the use of these funds has been criticised. 
 
There is a view that the LIFT process may have supported urban 
regeneration and promoted healthier living in some locations. However, this 
kind of programme is unlikely to be able to take advantage of any fortuitous 
opportunities for economical and efficient redevelopment that may arise.  
While LIFT has created a number of striking landmark buildings, there are 
concerns that this has been to the detriment of other smaller GP projects 
which have been subsequently unable to secure funding. 
 
There is limited evidence albeit not fully evaluated, that users and client 
staff are satisfied with the new buildings. 
 
Where stakeholders are involved with LIFT projects, there is an increased 
sense of ownership of the project and innovative benefits have been 
realized.  
 
LIFTCos recognise that demand for primary health care services is likely to 
change during the contract period, and many seem to be incorporating a 
degree of flexibility into their designs to meet changes required in the 
future, although it is recognised that such changes seem to come at a very 
high price, and it has been argued that the incorporation of flexibility 
requires a higher initial cost.  However, the sites selected for some LIFT 
projects make this type of flexibility impossible, and it is also recognised 
that subsequent changes in government policy or changes in treatment 
modalities could render the new building obsolete regardless of any attempt 
to make them ‘future-proof’. 
 
3.6.3 Barriers to and Facilitators of LIFT schemes 
The LIFT process appears to be facilitated by the perception that it is the 
only option for practices seeking to improve their premises.  The role and 
scope of LIFT, together with the success factors outlined, identify many of 
the facilitators of the process.  This section considers the barriers to LIFT 
schemes. 
 
While all schemes involve some degree of bureaucracy, for LIFT this is 
widely perceived as being excessive and slow.  In addition, one key barrier 
to the LIFT procurement process identified in the literature was the heavy 
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burden of workload for both public and private sector partners.  It was 
noted by HM Treasury (1999) that the public sector did not have all the 
required resources, particularly in areas such as contract negotiation and 
project risk management.  Whilst it was suggested that additional 
professional resources would be required, obtaining such support was 
inconsistent.  Also noted was the complexity of the process, compounded 
by frequent changes in rules and staff guidance.  
 
One policy barrier is the lack of evidence of whether LIFT projects provide 
VfM or central guidance to support projects trying to establish comparative 
value between LIFT and traditional procurement methods.  The returns to 
the private sector appear higher than anticipated and do not adequately 
reflect the level of risk transferred from the public to the private sector.  
Whilst the LIFT process should reduce the involvement of the PCTs in 
construction and management of the new buildings, in reality it may 
increase both the workload and risk, with the PCTS becoming responsible 
for high-value contract negotiation and management. 
 
It has been argued that the exclusivity clause associated with LIFT can 
potentially reduce the procurement workload by eliminating duplication.  
This may increase the potential for excluding smaller private sector partners 
who may have insufficient resources for a complex multiple project 
development.  This could, in turn, reduce the VfM achieved under this 
procurement methodology.  It was also recognized that this marginalization 
of local companies applied to some prospective tenants of LIFT buildings, 
with local independent pharmacies being dissuaded from competing. 
 
There is a trade-off between attractiveness to the private sector and 
affordability to the public sector which would appear to take the form of less 
exciting designs or a lack of expected functionality. With regard to the 
latter, the private sector’s lack of experience in designing health care 
facilities has resulted in some basic oversights, but some argue that with 
experience, this should be less of a problem.  For PCTs there are concerns 
over the long-term affordability of LIFT projects.  There are concerns that 
these new buildings will require additional revenue for their upkeep and this 
is compounded by the inability of the PCTs to postpone/stage any 
maintenance payments or equipment replacement to reduce immediate 
expenditure.  Some projects offer subsidies to attract tenants, leading to a 
reduction in the cost effectiveness of the project, and there have been 
concerns that rents within LIFT buildings are higher than would be 
anticipated compared to local market rates, with the result that health care 
professionals are relocating in proximity to, but not within, the new LIFT 
buildings. 
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Further barriers to LIFT include the reluctance of some GPs to relocate their 
practice, the loss of independent contractor status and the requirement that 
they co-locate with other health care providers.  Prior to the current 
economic down turn, GP property owners benefited from the significant 
increases in property values in the UK: an opportunity which will be lost if 
they chose to take up a lease in a LIFT building (unless they swapped 
investments and bought into the LIFTCo).  With regard to relocation, some 
GPs are concerned that their patients may be reluctant to relocate to the 
new LIFT location, preferring to transfer to another GP closer to home.  
There is a larger question – whether polyclinics or super surgeries are the 
form of service provision actually wanted by patients.  There is recognition 
that some of the project buildings have been developed in areas with 
limited public transport, creating problems for patients.  There are also 
issues for GPs approaching retirement who may be unable to take 
advantage of LIFT as they are not in a position to sign up for a lengthy 
tenancy agreement.  
 
Whilst the Committee of Public Accounts identified that benefits from the 
LIFT procurement approach would only be realized if there was a continuous 
flow of projects, in reality this does not appear to be occurring and some 
contractors indicating that planned projects have been cancelled or 
subsequent phases have failed to progress..  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Many have welcomed LIFT as a way to improve general practice premises, 
although the scheme has also been the subject of criticism.  This could, 
perhaps, have been circumvented had LIFT been piloted before national 
roll-out, or if there had been a detailed, public examination of the practical 
and financial viability of LIFT compared to other procurement methods.  
 
Aldred (2007) has argued that the organisational networks surrounding 
LIFT have developed in a way that muffles criticism or even suggestions for 
improvement. This encapsulates the belief that regardless of the 
appropriateness of the model, LIFT is being aggressively promoted as the 
only way for PCTs to improve their estates.  The King's Fund (2001) has 
suggested that the prospectus for some LIFT projects does not contain any 
analysis of the reasons why the state of much of the local health capital 
stock is in poor condition.  They believe that this was due to the cost, and 
risk, of developing inner city sites, an issue which is not addressed by LIFT 
which merely provides the funds for such undertakings.  
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4  Stakeholder Views (Interviews) 
4.1  Stakeholder Views: Study Design and 
Methodology 
The LIFT and Express LIFT initiatives are embedded in an evolving policy 
arena thatincludes a multitude of decision makers and stakeholders.  In 
order to gain a fuller understanding of this policy arena, a number of 
interviews have been undertaken with individuals who have, and are, 
playing key roles in the development and implementation of the LIFT 
initiative.  
For the purpose of this report, these interviews have been grouped into two 
broad categories.  The first category includes key informant interviews 
(subsections 4.2.1 to 4.2.6).  Key informant interviews are defined as those 
interviews that have been conducted with ‘high level’ individuals who have 
been involved in the design of the LIFT initiative and/or have acted as 
advisors to groups of LIFT users, but who have not actively participated in 
specific LIFT projects as public sector clients or private sector partners.  The 
second category of user interviews took place with individuals who have 
been involved in specific LIFT projects either on the public sector client side 
or as private sector partner (subsections 4.3.1 to 4.3.6).  Some of the user 
interviews involved individuals who had been interviewed at the beginning 
of the project but who had not been part of a full case study analysis which 
constituted much of the second phase of the fieldwork.  Other user 
interviews discussed here emerged as part of the case study analysis which 
was discussed in greater length in section 7 (‘Case Studies’) of this report.  
The decision to include some case specific interviews as user interviews in 
this section was based on the recognition that the case specific interviews 
yielded, in addition to the case study-relevant information discussed in 
section 7, significant findings with regard to the policy aspects of LIFT 
procurement.  All interviews conducted in connection with this project were 
semi-structured while giving ample opportunity for respondents to provide 
additional impressionistic views in an unstructured setting. In the following 
subsections, key informant interviews and user interviews are discussed 
separately in order to highlight differences in the views gathered from 
actual LIFT users as compared to those acting in a policy design or advisory 
capacity.   
 
As a whole, this section is based on twelve key informant interviews and 
nearly eleven user interviews.   Most of the key informant interviews, which 
are discussed in the first part of this section, were conducted during the 
early phase of the project in 2007.  However, these key informant 
interviews were supplemented with a small number of additional interviews 
which were conducted in 2008.  The reason for the addition of these 
interviews was that contact gained during the fieldwork highlighted the role 
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of these individuals as crucial bearers of information with regard to general 
issues surrounding LIFT procurement.  All of the supplementary, later stage, 
key informant interviews involved individuals who act or acted in a general 
advisory capacity to potential LIFT, and now Express LIFT, clients.    
 
As a general principle, all interviewees were contacted well in advance of 
the interview.  This typically involved the interviewees being sent a letter 
describing the purpose of the study and the nature of the study, i.e., our 
position as a group of university researchers conducting a project funded by 
the SDO.  Once initial agreement to be interviewed was gained, the 
interviewees were usually contacted by telephone and given a brief 
summary of the questions that they should expect to be asked, as well as 
pertinent information about the interview process.  As part of this pre-
negotiation phase, most interviewees agreed to be interviewed at their 
place of work for a period of forty minutes to one hour with the interviews 
being taped and subsequently professionally transcribed.  Most interviewees 
agreed to this process: however, a small number of key informant 
interviewees—two in total—asked for the interviews to be minuted by the 
interviewer rather than being taped.   For reasons of consistency, all 
interviews were conducted by the same research team member.  Moreover, 
all interviews were professionally transcribed, again by the same 
professional transcription company throughout the study.  As a further 
quality control measure all interview transcripts were individually checked 
by the interviewer for potential transcription errors.  Taken together, these 
measures helped ensure that high quality interview transcripts were 
obtained which could later be subjected to thematic analyses by different 
team members as well as a detailed analysis via the computerised content 
analysis programme DICTION 5. 
 
Although it was initially assumed that the project would utilise the software 
package Atlas-TI on account of its suitability for grounded research based 
designs, it was decided later on to employ the potentially more advanced 
software package DICTION 5 for this purpose.  This decision was based on 
the fact that DICTION has a number of attractive features which can be 
used to analyze unique elements of language in texts related to 
management and policy research (Short and Palmer, 2008).  As a 
consequence of these advantages DICTION has recently been applied in a 
number of contexts where researchers have sought to assess the verbal 
tone of statements made in business and policy contexts (see e.g., Bligh, 
Kohles and Meindl, 2004 a,b; Rogers, Dillard, Yuthas, 2005;Hart and 
Childers, 2005; Short and Palmer, 2008) and, in particular, where it was 
deemed desirable to conduct comparisons among such statements (Rogers, 
Dillard, Yuthas, 2005).  With regard to the origins and applicability of 
DICTION, Short and Palmer (2007) noted that one of the advantages of 
DICTION is that it was originally created for considering a range of types of 
text, including business texts such as annual reports, corporate public 
relations statements, mission statements, CEO speeches, f nancial news, 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
54 
legal documents, and magazine and TV advertisements.  This has allowed 
published research using DICTION to examine a number of 
“organizationally-produced texts with relevance to management research 
such as CEO letters to shareholders, management discussion and analysis 
sections from annual reports, and press releases”.  According to Short and 
Palmer (2008) research using DICTION has been published in a number of 
management-oriented journals such as Journal of Applied Psychology, 
Journal of Business Ethics, and Leadership Quarterly, and has been used to 
examine conceptual ideas in management such as charismatic leadership, 
organizational image, and organizational identity.  
 
Based on lexicographic theory, DICTION uses 33 different dictionaries, 
containing over 10,000 search words, to analyze a text passage. These 
dictionaries are context specific, allowing the user to specify the analysis of 
a text in comparison to DICTION’s repertory of text in specific areas, such 
as “politics”, “business”, “scholarship”, with further subcategories such as 
“corporate financial reports, “corporate public relations” and others for 
“business” or “campaign speeches”, “public policy speeches”, and “political 
debates” in the “politics” setting.  DICTION’s dictionaries contain individual 
words whereby homographs are explicitly treated by the program through 
statistical weighting procedures which partially correct for context (Hart, 
2000; Bligh, Kohles and Meindl, 2004a).  By comparing a specific text 
passage with a specified repertory of texts, DICTION generates scores for 
word passages of text of ca 500 words for a set of each of its pre-set 
variables.  For instance, DICTION provides a straightforward measurement 
of the levels of ‘certainty’ which underpins a textual passage of a speaker or 
author by combining totals from dictionaries signalling assuredness (allness 
words, uses of the verb ‘to be’, collectives, etc.) and subtracting from them 
dictionaries connoting tentativeness (e.g., ambivalent words, hyper-
specifications) by comparison across passages (Bligha, Kohles and Meindl, 
2004a).  While DICTION could be criticized for imposing a significant set of 
assumptions in deriving its output scores on account of the pre-supplied 
repertories of text with which imported text passages are compared, this 
problem is significantly reduced by comparing thematically categorized 
imported text passages derived in similar settings with each other (Rogers, 
Dillard, Yuthas, 2005).  As a consequence, our own DICTION- based 
analysis, which is discussed in greater detail in the subsequent subsections, 
primarily relies on supplementing software-based output scores with inter-
textual comparisons of theme specific views (issues relating to the 
effectiveness of LIFT, views pertaining to partnership …) of different 
interviewees.  This analytical approach was greatly facilitated by the fact 
that interviewees had been ab inito deliberately selected to represent the 
views and attitudes of different organisations and stakeholders involved in 
policy issues related to LIFT (key informants) or the procurement and 
management of LIFT facilities (user interviewees).   
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The following subsections analysing key informant interviews and thereafter 
user interviews are structured, as far as possible, in a similar fashion so as 
to allow for an overall comparison.  The first part of the analysis within each 
of these subsections follows a traditional approach to qualitative research 
whereby interview transcript is examined along core themes (see e.g., Miles 
and Hubeman, 1994).  These themes reflect, with minor modifications, the 
research design as described in the initial research proposal with six broad 
sub-themes and associated questions relating to: 
 
LIFT as incidence of policy learning: What were the key rationales, goals 
and objectives for the introduction of LIFT?  How does LIFT figure into 
overall strategic developments within the health sector?  To what degree 
was the design of LIFT influenced by earlier experiences of public private 
partnerships and PFI-based procurement?  What are the key deal breakers 
and stumbling blocks in LIFT procurement?  What lessons appear to be 
emerging at this stage? 
 
Effectiveness of LIFT: In which terms, if any, can LIFT be described as a 
success?  Does the current approach to LIFT provide for significant 
improvements over other forms of procurement?  Are LIFT projects 
sufficiently financially attractive to ensure competitive participation by the 
private sector?  Is LIFT sufficiently attractive to public sector clients, given 
issues such as the exclusivity clause, contract length or head leasing?   
 
Partnership and Skill Requirements: Do members of the public sector feel 
that they have a sufficient understanding of the LIFT procurement process 
to make educated choices?  Do they feel that their understanding is 
undermined by the complexity of these schemes?  Is current guidance on 
LIFT sufficient to allow public sector managers to make educated choices in 
the public interest?  Is there a need for further guidance or for public sector 
skilling?  Do current levels of experience and skill allow public sector 
managers to become genuine partners to their private sector counterparts 
in LIFT projects?  Are there cultural, educational or behavioural barriers to 
such partnering on either side, and if so, how can these be overcome?  
 
Cultural Issues and Conflicts: How do the different values and beliefs of the 
public and private sector affect collaboration, for good or ill, in a LIFT 
context?  Are there conflicts between different professional cultures and 
working patterns of the pubic and private sectors?  How are private sector 
values and beliefs affecting professional cultures within the public sector?  
In general, is there a contradiction between the investment culture of 
private sector LIFT participants and public need?  What mechanisms or 
processes are in place to avoid, or resolve, conflicts? 
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Targeting and Local Impact: In light of the need for investment returns, 
have LIFT projects targeted areas of deprivation of greatest need?  Is there 
evidence of local involvement and urban regeneration through LIFT 
projects? 
 
Value for Money and Related Financial Issues: Is there evidence that LIFT 
projects provide VfM and, if so, is this performance widely and evenly 
distributed?  How can the VfM of LIFT projects be assessed and what 
difficulties, if any, does this issue pose?  Is it appropriate to draw 
comparisons with non-LIFT projects?  How does the cost of finance affect 
LIFT projects and their affordability?  Are there indirect financial advantages 
to LIFT in terms of timely completion within existing budgetary parameters? 
 
Subsections 4.2.4 and 4.3.4 analysing respectively key informant and user 
views on ‘Cultural Issues and Conflicts’ are supplemented by a more 
detailed analysis in section 5 (‘Managing Cultural Diversity in LIFT 
Partnerships’) which investigates these issues in detail in relation to the 
main case studies of the report (see also section 7, ‘Case Studies’).  This is 
based on the importance attributed to these issues in the original research 
design as well as the fortuitous fact that the team was able to conduct a set 
of separate interviews on these matters.    
 
Likewise, subsections 4.2.6 and 4.3.6, analysing respectively key informant 
and user views on ‘Value for Money and Related Financial Issues,’ are 
supplemented section 6 (‘Financial Analysis’) which provides a detailed 
financial analysis of cash flows and operating profits for a number of LIFT 
projects.  
 
It should be noted that, although the researchers sought to maximise 
comparability between key informant and user interviews, the two groups of 
interviewees differed in terms of the extent to which they addressed these 
questions.  As expected, key informants with senior policy roles, or advisors 
with senior management roles in organisations were more likely to address 
questions relating to organisational learning and policy design as well as 
broader issues relating to VfM.  User interviewees, meanwhile, were more 
likely to address issues relating to relatively detailed procurement matters, 
conflicts and skills.  In order to compensate for these differences it was 
decided that responses to more detailed technical issues associated with the 
operation of specific LIFT projects would be discussed in connection with the 
specific case studies of section 7 (‘Case Studies’).  These questions include, 
inter alia, the following: Do stakeholders, such as clinical and non-clinical 
staff, members of advisory boards, etc., feel that they have been sufficiently 
involved in LIFT projects?  Do stakeholders, clients and users feel that LIFT 
has added extra layers of bureaucracy and cost to primary care provision?  
In general, what are the levels of user and client satisfaction with LIFT 
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projects and the project specific impact of LIFT projects?  Have there been 
increases in subcontracting and job losses?  
 
4.2 Key Informant Interviews 
As noted earlier, most of the key informant interviews were conducted 
during the early phase of the project in 2007.  This means that the majority 
of these interviews neither reflect the recent impact of the credit crunch on 
financial environment of the UK, nor its hitherto unclear implication for 
public finance and procurement.   
 
On the positive side, it is likely that the absence of this information 
impacted advantageously on the willingness of senior policy and managerial 
staff to participate in the study.  Overall, the researchers were able to 
interview nine individuals who were placed in very senior positions, with 
diverse backgrounds including a senior finance official of the Department of 
Health [DoH representative] (full interview transcript based on a taped 
interview), four senior members of Community Health Partnerships [CHP] 
with different functional responsibilities (two full interview transcript 
transcripts based on a taped interview [CHP representative 1 and 2], and 
two minuted interviews), a senior representative of Partnership UK [PUK 
representative] (full interview transcript based on a taped interview), four 
senior representatives of the Public Finance Unit [PFU] of the Department of 
Health with different functional responsibilities (two full interview transcript 
transcripts based on a taped interview [PFU representative 1 and 2], and 
two minuted interviews), a senior representative of the NHS confederation 
[NHS Conf representative] (full interview transcript based on a taped 
interview), a senior partner at a law firm which represents public sector 
clients in LIFT negotiations (full interview transcript based on a taped 
interview[Law firm representative]), a senior representative of a bank which 
has been a leader in the financing of LIFT projects (full interview transcript 
based on a taped interview [Bank representative]). 
 
The following six subsections present a thematic cross-section of the views 
of these key informants with regard to six themes and question groups 
highlighted above.  Each of these six subsections includes a DICTION-based 
content analysis in which the verbal characteristics of the respective key 
informants are assessed and compared across a number of characteristics.   
 
4.2.1 LIFT and Policy Learning – Key Informant Views 
This group of questions focused on a number of issues, including the 
rationales underpinning the creation of the LIFT scheme and its goals, its 
relationship to PFI and other experiences of public private partnership as 
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well as issues of uptake and interest among public and private sector 
parties.  
 
While there is extensive literature around policy learning and policy change 
(Bennett and Howlett, 2004), only a small number of researchers have 
explored this issues in the context of PPP (see, e.g., Osborne, 2000; 
Asenova and Beck, 2003a).  The motivation for this set of questions was, 
therefore, to probe how different key informants viewed the rationales, 
goals and objectives of LIFT in relation to their earlier experiences of PPP.  
As expected, this question elicited the most extensive and detailed 
responses from those key informants who had been involved in the design 
or implementation of LIFT at government level.   
 
Although there was a relatively broad consensus that LIFT had evolved from 
a need to improve primary care facilities in the UK and attract private 
investment into this sector, there were some differences with regard to how 
different key informants viewed the origins and goals of the scheme.  This 
indicated that different policy makers tended to associate different 
expectations and ambitions with the scheme. 
 
This was exemplified by the statement of the senior finance official of the 
Department of Health [DoH representative] who viewed LIFT primarily as a 
response to existing shortcomings in primary care premises: 
 
“LIFT was started off as a response to poor GP facilities particularly in 
urban areas.  That is where the whole concept of LIFT almost really came 
from, originally.  If I go back to the original policy thinking around, it was 
very much about--we have got a lot of very poor quality GP premises in 
some pretty poor areas where we need to improve them, well, what is the 
mechanism for doing it because clearly over the years nothing had 
happened about that.  So the aim was to do that, and I think the 
distribution has broadly worked.” 
   
This contrasted to the perspective of a senior Partnership UK representative 
[PUK representative] who, having also participated in the design of LIFT, 
viewed LIFT primarily as a means of engaging PCTs in long term strategic 
planning: 
 
“LIFT was designed to deliver a programme solution rather than an 
individual deal, recognising that the actual responsibility for local primary 
care rests with PCTs which are devolved entities.  … There was a 
recognition that actually what we needed is strategic planning and delivery 
over the long run. … A local LIFTCo is a strategic planning vehicle.” 
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The latter view was echoed by the senior representative of the Pubic 
Finance Unit [PFU representative 1], who viewed LIFT both as a means for 
PCTs to adopt a long-term perspective on estate planning and as a means 
for addressing deficiencies of market-based procurement: 
 
“The issue about primary care property under doctors, the old model, 
under third party developers, is that essentially a group of GPs are 
approached by a developer who then looks at what can be built under a 
cost rent scheme for a location, and offers GPs a building of a certain size, 
because the scope is dictated by what can be reimbursed on the rent 
scheme.  The PCT has no direct input into that. It was left to GPs to 
position their buildings in a way that suited them, and then the rent 
stream was linked to office rents in the locality.  That was great if you 
were a GP, or builder to be precise, in London, because your cost of 
building was recouped many times over. It was very poor if you were a GP 
in a city location like Liverpool, where rent reimbursements never met the 
cost of building.  Buildings were either under scale, where GPs had to rent 
over shops or whatever, or they were not built because they could not be 
afforded.  The vision is how do you find something that stabilised costs.  
With LIFT, rents were linked to the retail price index rather than the 
market, there was an approval that went through the PCTs so what was 
needed was done, and the PCTs became a stakeholder in the company to 
make sure the locations were right.” 
 
Overall, our interviews indicated that most policy makers tended to view 
LIFT as a means of addressing immediate shortcomings in primary care 
facilities as well as an approach that would force, or allow, PCTs to 
rationalise estate planning.  The latter difference in viewpoints was 
indicative of broader differences in terms of underlying perspectives about 
the capabilities of PCTs as planners and procurers.  Thus, there was a 
tendency amongst the key informants to either assume that PCTs were 
eager to engage in long term estate planning, but were prevented from 
doing so on cost grounds or due to the interference of market forces, or that 
PCTs lacking long term strategic views could be encouraged to engage in 
strategic planning via their involvement in LIFTCo-s.   
 
Despite these divergences there was a broad consensus that LIFT had 
evolved from a recognition that procurement via PFI was, for several 
reasons, not appropriate in the primary care context. 
 
This view was again expressed most clearly by the senior finance official of 
the Department of Health [DoH representative]: 
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“For the type of things we were looking at doing, the PFI model just did 
not work properly.  LIFT provides a lot more shared direction and shared 
ownership than the PFI model. PFI is more than a form of sort of off 
balance sheet borrowing, but it is a pretty rigid contractual model.  With 
LIFT we tried to build in more flexibility and more local ownership as well 
as a lot more NHS engagement.”  
 
This view was mirrored by the senior representative of Partnership UK [PUK 
representative] who described how LIFT evolved away from the PFI model:  
 
“We worked out that if we were to get an effective engagement on smaller 
projects, we needed to look at them on a programme basis rather than as 
individual projects. … The overall objective headline was, from Alan 
Millburn all those years ago, I want to improve the level of primary health 
care, particularly in deprived areas … what is the best way to deliver that?  
LIFT, which is different to PFI, was designed to deliver a programme 
solution, recognising that the actual responsibility for local primary health 
care rests with PCTs which are devolved entities.”   
 
This informant also further elaborated on his organization’s involvement in 
the development of LIFT:  
 
“From our point of view, it is our job to engage in solutions for that sort of 
thing. So we worked with the Department of Health to design a solution 
that involved in the end setting up Partnerships for Health, which we took 
50% stake in and held until this time last year.  At that point we 
completed waves one, two and three and the model was established. As 
far as PUK was concerned, we had established the market, got it to a 
stage of maturity and it was time for us to look at putting our resource 
elsewhere and the Department actually approached us to say we would 
like to buy your stake back, so we exited out of PfH this time last year.” 
 
While the representative of the NHS confederation [NHS Conf 
representative] broadly agreed with the notion that PFI could not deliver 
primary care facilities in the same way as LIFT did, there was less certainty 
with regard to the question as to whether LIFT had helped overcome some 
of the problems associated with PFI.  Specifically, this informant noted that 
many PCTs continued to struggle with the complexities of LIFT: 
 
“Both LIFT companies and people in PCTs struggle with complex 
procurement. PFI is in some ways it is quite simple, it is very standardised 
and people have done it for longer than they have done LIFT, and there 
are fewer stakeholders as well.  The thing about LIFT is that you have got 
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your Local Authority in there, you hook in Mental Health Trusts and all of 
these people are potentially equity partners and it is a different set up, a 
different set of interests and a different model.” 
 
The senior partner at a law firm [Law firm representative] also expressed 
doubts about the advantages of LIFT over PFI and voiced particular 
concerns over the exclusivity agreements which are a part of LIFT 
contracts: 
 
“Lawyers and accountants will have a very different impression of how 
LIFT works, because they deal with the bowels of the partnership.  You 
have at the top of this document the [S]trategic [P]artnership 
[A]greement, and it gives exclusivity, and it can never be terminated 
which from a lawyer’s perspective is quite an awkward position. This is 
meant to be a partnering arrangement, and everybody is tied.  For the 
PCT this means that every time they build a project above a particular 
threshold, usually £10K, in its patch, it will be done by the LIFTCo unless 
they have listed it upfront as being excluded. There are a couple of other 
defined exceptions, but otherwise everything they develop will have to be 
given to LIFT.  It is very difficult to terminate this agreement.”   
 
Overall most key informants appeared to agree that LIFT should be seen as 
an adaptation of existing practices of public private partnership to primary 
care, which had been necessitated by a need to make these approaches 
work in a primary care context.  However, while government officials tended 
to argue that LIFT was well suited to these needs, other key informants 
suggested that LIFT still presented major problems for public sector clients 
or created new risks for them. 
 
These differences also characterised the views of the informants with regard 
to the level of public and private sector interest in LIFT.  While 
representatives of the Department of Health, Community Health 
Partnerships, Partnership UK and the Public Finance Unit suggested that 
public and private sector interest in LIFT had been adequate, this was not 
the case when it came to the representatives of the NHS Confederation and 
the law firm.  Specifically the representative of the NHS Confederation [NHS 
Conf representative] noted that: 
 
“The problem with most LIFTs is that they have not been around a very 
long time. They also have not had enough projects so all these extra 
benefits that we are supposed to have from the partnerships and proper 
joint venture structure, I really do not think we have seen them.  It has 
been like the deal flow has been so weak that it is just been a series of 
individual projects, and each one has been in effect treated like an 
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individual project; so all these synergies where we will roll the same 
design forward and we will help you with your service planning are not 
happening as much as people initially thought they would do.  The reason, 
I think, is that we cannot afford to do more projects, and it was a bit of a 
false expectation that we were going to have all these huge deal flows and 
all these ventures would sort of flow from that and it just has not 
happened. Some LIFT companies … will probably say that they are actually 
struggling to make any profit out of this, because they simply have not got 
enough work going through.” 
 
Overall, there was a strong indication that key informants associated with 
the government tended to associate LIFT with an ambitious reform agenda.  
This agenda expected the LIFT initiative to trigger extensive investment in 
primary care together with the adoption of long term strategic and 
synergistic procurement strategies by PCTs.  Meanwhile, other key 
informants expressed more cautious views which, while recognizing LIFT as 
a policy refinement, questioned whether it could help achieve these 
ambitions goals, or indeed should be expected to do so. 
 
This pattern was broadly confirmed by the computer-based contents 
analysis with the software package DICTION which was conducted for the 
relevant subsections of the interview transcripts for all nine key informants 
for whom tape-based transcriptions were available.  As part of this analysis 
the relevant subsections were first isolated as separate texts.  Next, the 
interviewers’ questions were removed from each of the transcripts.  Lastly 
each text was separately imported and analysed under the “politics” setting 
with the sub-setting “political debates”.   
 
The table below reports the relevant results of this analysis whereby each 
standardised score represents the deviation of a particular group of words of 
the imported text from DICTION’s text and dictionary bank.   In addition, 
scores are marked with an asterisk where this deviation is statistically 
significant.  As a means of interpretation, it is important to note that a 
significant positive score indicates that the use of terms denoting, for 
instance ‘praise’, significantly exceeds that of the chosen DICTION text 
bank, whereas a significant negative score denotes the opposite. 
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Table 4.1, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘policy learning’ text 
segments,standardized scores and significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certainty+ 
DoH 
representative  
 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.50 
 
-0.62 
 
1.40* 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
0.21 
 
-0.17 
 
-1.01 
 
0.21 
 
+* 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
-0.02 
 
0.81 
 
0.08 
 
0.68 
 
0 
P-UK 
representative 
 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.27 
 
-0.47 
 
0.81 
 
0 
PFU 
representative 
1 
 
-0.08 
 
1.26* 
 
-1.01 
 
0.61 
 
+* 
PFU 
representative 
2 
 
-0.13 
 
0.07 
 
-0.58 
 
0.51 
 
+* 
NHS Conf 
representative 
 
 
0.07 
 
0.31 
 
-.79 
 
-0.26 
 
0 
Law Firm 
representative 
 
 
-1.30* 
 
-0.85 
 
-1.06* 
 
-0.33 
 
0 
Bank  
representative 
 
 
-1.12* 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.46 
 
0 
+ As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
 
Looking first at statistically significant results only, significant positive 
results are detected for the variable ‘accomplishment’ in case of the DoH 
representative and for ‘certainty’ in case of the CHP representative-1, the 
PFU representative-1 and the PFU representative-2, as well as for 
‘satisfaction’ for the PFU representative-1.  By contrast significant negative 
results are detected for the variable praise in case of the Law Firm 
representative and the Bank representative, as well as for the variable 
‘inspiration’ in case of the Law Firm representative.  This confirms the 
incidence of significantly more negative attitudes among non-governmental 
key informants with regard to their view of LIFT as an incidence of policy 
learning.   
 
An alternative way of interpreting the above table, that does not rely in 
equal measure on the DICTION text repertory as a means of detecting 
outliers, is to compare standard scores across key variables.  This is 
particularly useful in the case of the key variable ‘accomplishments’ which 
shows positive standard scores for all key respondents associated with 
governmental organizations and negative, albeit insignificant, standard for 
the other three key informants (NHS Confederation representative, Law 
Firm representative and Bank representative). 
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4.2.2 Effectiveness of LIFT – Key Informant Views 
Our literature review (section 3) indicated that, while there is an extensive 
literature on the effectiveness of PPP as a procurement mechanisms in 
different contexts (see, e.g., Akintoye and Beck, 2008; Akintoye, Beck and 
Hardcastle, 2003), relatively little has been written about these issues in 
connection with LIFT.  This group of questions, therefore, sought to gauge 
whether, and in what respects, key informants viewed LIFT as a success or 
otherwise.  As part of this research, the interviewees were asked to describe 
whether the then current approach to LIFT met existing objectives and 
provided for significant improvements over other forms of procurement.  
Additionally, the key informants were questioned about their views with 
regard to the attractiveness of LIFT projects to private and public sector 
organisations and the resultant competitiveness, or otherwise, of the LIFT 
market.  Finally, they were presented with relatively open ended prompts 
which enquired about their views with regard to LIFT’s contribution to an 
overall emerging health strategy. 
 
As a general pattern, most key informants tended to focus on different 
aspects or issues relating to LIFT in responding to questions relating to the 
effectiveness of LIFT.  Although the key informants working for, or with, 
governmental organisations again tended to take a more positive view of 
the LIFT initiative, there was a significant degree of reflexivity among all key 
informants in addressing this question.  This reflexivity related primarily to 
problems in measuring and identifying success and was particularly 
noticeable in connection with statements pertaining to the overall success, 
or otherwise, of LIFT as well as to more specific statements relating to 
issues of process or competitiveness. 
 
As an example of such a reflective assessment of LIFT, the senior finance 
official of the Department of Health [DoH representative] suggested that 
LIFT could overall be described as a success particularly in terms of project 
completion, but emphasised that many users still perceived LIFT as 
exceedingly complex and bureaucratic:  
 
.  “I think LIFT has partly been effective.  We have delivered an awful lot 
through LIFT programmes, which is a good thing.  We have had more 
clinical involvement in LIFT than we ever did with PFI.  I am not sure that 
we have sorted out the complexity issue.  When I talk to people in the 
NHS, there is still a feeling that perhaps the structure of LIFT ends up 
being more bureaucratic and less flexible than they actually wanted it to 
be.  If you talk around, you will get quite a lot of positive comments from 
within the NHS but the negative stuff will be views about the bureaucracy, 
because they still feel it is not flexible enough.”  
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This perception of LIFT as an essentially successful policy which required 
further refinement in order to simplify the procurement process, of course, 
relates closely to the creation of Express LIFT which is discussed in greater 
detail in section 7.  For the purpose of this subsection it is interesting to 
note that statements by a senior DoH official made in 2007 already 
indicated a movement towards a simplification of this procurement process.  
 
The above-mentioned view was largely echoed by key informants who had 
participated in an advisory capacity for a number of LIFT projects, such as 
the senior Community Health Partnership representatives.  These key 
informants also viewed LIFT as a largely successful approach which required 
refinement at the margins [CHP representative 2]:  
 
“Some places have done very well.  We have got 220 schemes, £1.5B 
capital invested, 47 LIFT companies, they can’t all be perfect.  Some are 
brilliant and some are not.  One of the things our knowledge transfer 
programmes have been doing is taking all of the good practice and sharing 
with people who have got a poor experience of LIFT for whatever reason 
and actually, you know what, this does work.  The reasons it works are 
because you invest time, you invest effort, you actually do not listen to the 
rhetoric and you look at what you can deliver.”  
 
However, in line with earlier statements by the DoH official, these key 
informants also expressed the view that LIFT, as a procurement process, 
required simplification and streamlining: 
 
“There is strong argument that says LIFT its not flexible enough.  But 
again some people do it pretty well, some people do not.  The DoH is 
looking at making the business case process much more streamlined and 
more flexible and a more commonsense approach really.  … that business 
case process is a pain in the bum.” 
 
This view of LIFT as a qualified success which required further refinement 
was further elaborated upon by the representative of Partnership UK [PUK 
representative], who noted that LIFT had by and large fulfilled its mission, 
but did not necessarily represent an optimal procurement process: 
 
“To me the overriding success of LIFT is that before you set up the LIFT 
programme there was limited private sector investment in primary health 
care facilities that was pretty much focused on affluent areas.  What LIFT 
was seeking to address was to get efficient investment in primary health 
care facilities into deprived areas, where the typical scenario was a sole 
practitioner operating out of the basement of a semi--detached or terraced 
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house in pretty grotty circumstances.  If you look at the facts, a billion 
pounds of investment has been delivered from a new supply market, into 
areas that had never previously attracted investment and they are one 
stop shops with different practices coming together.  So the overarching 
success so far is, forget individual VfM for the moment, actually we have 
delivered new primary health care facilities in areas which never previously 
had it.  So the overarching objective has been achieved.  Then comes the 
secondary question of whether the methodology that has been used is 
better than the alternative?  Well, I think it is better than PFI, but it is not 
ideal.  I am not sure you should be comparing it against design and build, 
or individual procurements or open market operating or anything else, 
because PFI would never have been the right solution for that.”    
 
Further on, in the same interview, this informant noted that there were also 
questions about LIFT having achieved some of the broader objectives of 
strengthening strategic planning in the primary care sector: 
 
“I always hoped that LIFT would deliver the original objective and deliver a 
lot more.  I think its capability to deliver a lot more has been constrained.  
To me it was always more than just delivering that initial billion pounds of 
primary health care--it has done that and I think they would have 
struggled to deliver that through any other means.  But the potential for 
LIFT is greater and that has been held back and the great thing about it is 
that that potential has not gone, it is just sitting there.” 
 
This view contrasted with the NHS Confederation representative [NHS Conf 
representative] who expressed doubt as to whether PCTs should focus on 
these broader planning issues:  
 
“We are not in the business of property management, we are in the 
business of providing clinical care.  The problem is that PCTs, even after 
their mergers a couple of years ago, are still a bit small so they are 
inevitably going to have to rely on external advice and they get a bit 
through Partnerships for Health. … it does not make sense to say you 
should do something which you are not very good at.  There is plenty of 
evidence that when we try to do it ourselves we do not do it terribly well.  
Now that is not to say the private sector automatically does better.  They 
need managing better, undoubtedly, and we could probably structure 
some of these procurement methods better.” 
 
Taken together, these views were indicative of disagreements about the 
current and future role of PCTs in this area, which appear to underpin some 
of the disagreements about the efficiency and efficacy of LIFT as a 
procurement method.  Speculatively speaking, this situation could be taken 
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to reflect a situation where LIFT as a policy was introduced without the role 
of key players having been fully clarified or agreed upon; thus giving rise to 
widely divergent expectations for this policy instrument together with 
similarly contradictory evaluations of its success.   
 
This point was further illustrated by the way some of the key informants 
who described how, in their opinions, PCTs, who had engaged, or were 
planning to engage, in LIFT, viewed these schemes.  Thus, one of the 
Community Health Partnership [CHP representative 1] representatives noted 
that: 
 
“We did six national workshops which took in all 10 SHA areas and we said 
to people, do you think LIFT worked for you? Most of them said it did.  
Next we asked who was interested in LIFT.  …  About 80% of people put 
their hand up.”  
 
This contrasted sharply with the senior law firm partner [Law firm 
representative] who suggested that only a minority of PCT were satisfied 
with LIFT: 
 
“I would say that a few think that LIFT works for them.  Yes about 20 or 
30% would say that their LIFTCo does a good job for them.  And often, 
that is because they know that they are being paid and they do not care.  
They think we have that expertise and we pay them to do it, otherwise we 
are not going to get these buildings.  Others really resent the idea that 
they are paying out these fees.” 
 
Another area in which there was some level of disagreement concerned the 
issue of competition and private sector interest around LIFT.  Again, 
informants working for, or advising, government tended to view this issue 
as largely resolved with the DoH representative suggesting that “we have 
managed to make it financially attractive to all sides”.   This contrasted with 
the NHS Confederation representative [NHS Conf representative] who 
suggested that competition around LIFT was limited and also proposed that 
it had been declining for some time:  
 
“I suspect the LIFT market is declining because there just is not the deal 
flow and I suspect what will happen, is that we will see some of the LIFT 
companies merging or being taken over in effect.  …. if you go back to 
when I started doing this, so late 90’s early ‘00s, if you did a procurement 
you would get somewhere between 4 and 6 companies bidding, credible 
companies.  Now you are looking at 2; and 2 is not terribly competitive.”   
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Regarding the contribution of LIFT to an overall emerging health strategy, 
there was some consensus that this issue had not yet been fully clarified.  
Again, this theme was addressed with some candour by the senior DoH 
representative [DoH representative] who noted that there was a need to 
clarify the role of LIFT and other procurement mechanisms within a future 
strategy for primary care: 
 
  “Rather than sort of stream off and go to something like an independent 
treatment centre type approach with GPs, we do need to sit back and think 
about primary care and LIFT in general.  That is the bit I keep coming 
back to, where does LIFT fit within our overall strategy around primary 
care?  This is the one thing I am not sure we have quite got right.” 
 
Similarly the Partnership UK representative [PUK representative] suggested 
that LIFT should evolve as part of a new primary care strategy: 
 
“We do not know fully where primary care is heading.  But LIFT has a lot 
of potential. I would push for more investment through it.  I would push 
the community hospital programme through it, including the polyclinics.  I 
mean essentially you have got two things, you have got a very capable 
team in PFH that has a proven track record in delivering small schemes 
locally--you do not see many of those in the public sector--and you have 
got an established infrastructure and delivery platform locally.”   
 
Overall this analysis indicated that views around the effectiveness of LIFT 
were rich and nuanced.  While a minority of primarily non-governmental 
informants doubted that LIFT was an efficient means of procurement, the 
majority of informants suggested that, particularly with further refinement, 
LIFT-based approaches had considerable potential for the future.  In parallel 
with these generally positive views with regard to potential of LIFT-based 
approaches, there was, however, a general acknowledgement that LIFT had 
yet to be embedded in a broader strategy for the future of primary care 
provision. 
 
Needless to say, the short summary of these views cannot do full justice to 
the nuanced positions taken by most key informants.  However, there is 
again evidence of a relatively pronounced split, whereby LIFT is seen in 
considerably more positive terms by those key informants who are 
associated with government as compared to others.  This split is again 
confirmed, albeit less clearly, by the contents analysis presented below, 
which again relies on nine text segments of topical statement of more than 
500 words which were excerpted from the interview transcripts. 
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Table 4.2, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘effectiveness’ text 
segments, standardized scores and significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certainty+ 
DoH 
representative  
 
 
-0.17 
 
1.56* 
 
-.077 
 
-0.91 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
-0.47 
 
0.06 
 
0.35 
 
-0.25 
 
+* 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.76 
 
-0.13 
 
0.37 
 
0 
P-UK 
representative 
 
 
2.13* 
 
-0.12 
 
0.06 
 
0.54 
 
+* 
PFU 
representative 
1 
 
1.19* 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.20 
 
1.52* 
 
+* 
PFU 
representative 
2 
 
-0.07 
 
0.79 
 
-0.30 
 
0.51 
 
+* 
NHS Conf 
representative 
 
 
-0.60 
 
-0.68 
 
-0.73 
 
-0.57 
 
-* 
Law Firm 
representative 
 
 
-0.21 
 
0.42 
 
-1.00 
 
0.15 
 
0 
Bank  
representative 
 
 
1.20* 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.93 
 
0.46 
 
+* 
+ As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
 
Looking at significant positive results first, it can be noted that these occur 
exclusively in connection with government officials and advisers and the 
bank representative.  As concerns non-composite variables, this applies to 
the ‘praise’ variable in case of the P-UK representative, the PFU 
representative 1 and the Bank representative as well as the ‘satisfaction’ 
variable in case of the DoH representative and the ‘accomplishment’ 
variable in case of the PFU representative 1.  In case of the composite 
variable ‘certainty’ significant positive scores can also be found for CHP 
representative 1, the P-UK representative and the PFU representative 1, the 
PFU representative 2, and the Bank representative 1.   
 
Taken together these results indicate that there is a significantly greater 
incidence of affirmative and positive verbiage associated with the 
effectiveness of PFI amongst interviewees associated with government.  
However, there is no clear pattern as to which type of underlying pattern 
these statements attach themselves to (such as ‘praise’ or 
‘accomplishment’) which may be due to the relatively high level of 
reflexivity with which all of the interviewees have approached this group of 
questions.   
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4.2.3 Partnership and Skill Requirements – Key Informant 
Views 
Previous research on PFI-based procurement has tended to highlight the 
difficulty these types of public private collaborations pose in terms of the 
creation of ‘genuine’ partnerships (see, e.g., Asenova and Beck, 2003a, b; 
Asenova et al., 2004).  These problems have been attributed to a large 
degree to the very different set of skills that public and private sector 
organisations bring to public private partnerships as well as specific 
characteristics of the procurement process.   Specifically, there is significant 
evidence that because private sector companies and/or consortia are 
typically involved in bidding for, project managing or constructing numerous 
projects, substantial inequalities are created with public sector clients, who 
are often involved in only public private partnership. 
 
Based on these considerations, this group of questions was aimed at 
exploring how key informants viewed the development of partnerships 
within the LIFT context, and specifically the issue as to whether current 
levels of experience and skill allowed public sector managers to become 
genuine partners to their private sector counterparts in LIFT projects.  
Specifically, this group of questions explored whether it can be assumed 
that members of the public sector have a sufficient understanding of the 
LIFT process to make educated choices and/or whether this understanding 
was potentially undermined by the complexity of these schemes.  
Furthermore, this analysis sought to assess whether, in the view of the key 
informants, public sector managers received sufficient guidance and support 
when engaging with LIFT.  Lastly, key informants were asked whether they 
felt that there were cultural, educational or behavioural barriers to such 
partnering on either side, and if so, how these could be overcome. 
 
With regard to the issues of partnership, there was some consensus that 
partnering was easier in the LIFT context as compared with other forms of 
public private partnership.  However, this view was usually qualified by the 
fact that most key informants expressed concerns about the levels of 
complexity that the LIFT framework appeared to inevitably impose on public 
sector managers. 
 
Again, this issue was expressed concisely by the senior DoH official [DoH 
representative] who suggested that LIFT had encouraged the creation of 
genuine partnerships to a far greater degree than earlier schemes: 
 
“The way we have tried to structure the governance of LIFT has created 
far more genuine partnership than we have ever had with PFI.  The whole 
way we got the LIFTCo structure working at a local level with all the 
different parties involved is a very different sort of partnership model.  … 
you also have got more parties involved in LIFT than you do in a standard 
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PFI scheme where basically you have just got the hospital involved and a 
whopping great big contractor and probably a facilities person.”    
 
This view was echoed by one of the Community Health Partnership 
representatives who suggested that, as a rule, existing LIFTs tended to 
work as partnerships, but that issues remained in relation to the locus of 
decision making: 
 
 “Most LIFTs are genuine partnerships.  A proper LIFTCo, a good LIFTCo 
will act as a partnership.  But this still leaves questions open about that 
relationship.  So if a Client turns round and says no, that is what we want, 
then the LIFTCo will invariably say well of course if that is what you want 
then we will deliver what you want.  What we are saying is we think there 
is a better way to do it.  Now that means you have got to have a grown up 
relationship with the client.  The client has got to be grown up and 
commercially aware and actually accept that they might know more than 
we do.”   
 
Similarly, the bank representative [Bank representative] noted that 
successful partnerships involved a mutual acknowledgement of differences 
in working patterns: 
 
 “The private sector works in different ways and the public sector is 
different; due diligence is different, you know.  The private sector respects 
the processes the public sector has to go through and I think the public 
sector does understand some of the processes that the private sector has 
to go through.  Overall, they work quite well together and it is really down 
to the individuals involved.” 
 
Responding to the same issue, one of the representatives of the Public 
Finance Unit [PFU representative 2] suggested that ‘partnership working’ 
was achieved more easily where smaller PCTs co-operated with smaller 
private sector organizations: 
 
“You need the right engagement locally. That is often more difficult with 
larger companies but its not impossible. If they have got the right people 
and they are encouraging the joint venture and enabling it to have its own 
identity.  It needs people at ground level to be able to make a decision, 
and the smaller organisations find that easier.  Probably a bit more 
education is required for larger organisations that will tend to see LIFT like 
a project, whereas smaller organisations will understand that the LIFTCo is 
a company, and they will need to look after its business holistically rather 
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than as a series of projects.  The larger companies are not necessarily an 
obstacle, they just take a bit longer getting there sometimes.”   
 
As concerns the issue of potential skill gaps, a number of key informants 
highlighted that this was still a serious issue.  This view was exemplified by 
the representative of the Private Finance Unit [PFU representative 2] whose 
statements implied that there was a further need for reform in central 
government: 
 
“You need to just keep working on the skill issues.  I try and bring people 
in from the private sector on secondments and contract basis to learn from 
them.  It is specific skills that they have to learn, but it is not impossible. 
We are not incompetent, we just need to learn different skill sets.  …But 
we are our own worst enemy.  We tend to employ people for a two year 
period and they have to move to a new job, because of a new challenge in 
the public sector, whereas in the private sector it is much more job 
specific.  You know you get your rewards for being good at that job and 
you specialise.  Whereas we value generalists in management.  In the civil 
service, most departments move people on every two years and it is 
deemed to be a good thing to be a generalist.  … It is a false economy.  
You need to spend more money on people who monitor the contract but 
actually a person monitoring the contract properly can save you their 
salary “X” times over by running that contract properly.” 
  
This view was mirrored by the DoH representative [DoH representative] 
who suggested that providing adequate support for the public sector was an 
ongoing issue: 
 
“We tried to work originally with Partnerships for Health.  We tried to work 
out a way of providing support throughout the process. But I am not 
totally sure that we have always had the right level of support for PCT 
level. Because PCTs handle large amounts of money and employ a lot of 
people, we sometimes have the wrong view about their abilities.  PCTs are 
organisations with big responsibilities, but not big organisations.  And part 
of the model we’ve got to continually work through with LIFT, is how do 
we provide support for PCTs?  If we ask them to do something how do we 
provide the support, and have they got the expertise to do it.” 
 
Highlighting similar issues, the representative of Partnership UK [PUK 
representative] suggested that these problems were best resolved by 
expanding the role of advisory organisations such as Partnership for Health: 
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“Public sector people tend to rotate at an alarming rate.  So even if you 
develop a skill in one person, they tend to move to a completely different 
job and that happens all over the place.  A PCT creates a LIFTCo once, 
whereas the private sector is doing it on multiple occasions. So PCTs 
probably have never done that before, whereas the private sector recruits 
specifically for people to have those commercial skills. PCTs will not often 
recruit specifically to handle these challenges, so they will just say who 
have we got who could do this?  Because of these skill gaps we the need 
organizations like PFH. … the PFH people are coming together and 
exchanging good practice.   We can afford this. It is a simple thing.  You 
can justify paying someone in a central unit who is actually quite 
experienced and quite senior, and costs quite a lot, if they are spread 
around 5 or 6 different LIFTCo-s, whereas one PCT looking at one LIFT 
arrangement is going to struggle to afford that sort of person.”   
 
One of the Community Health Partnership representatives [CHP 
representative 1] suggested that support and advice from central advisory 
bodies had to be supplemented by knowledge transfer activities: 
 
“We need to address the existing management training gap.  What is 
coming through for us is the need for more information to allow us to 
effectively train people who, maybe, are doing a partnership for the first 
time.”  
 
Moreover, the same Community Health Partnership representative 
suggested that:  
 
 “However, what we must not do is replicate the knowledge base of the 
LIFTCo inside the PCT.  There is no value in that, because all you are doing 
is paying twice.  PCTs need to feel comfortable that they have now 
outsourced their estates elements, that they have transferred the risk. The 
LIFTCo brings that added value and that knowledge.  … Some PCTs have 
almost man-marked person for person across the team so the public 
sector ends up paying twice.”   
 
This view contrasted with statements by the law firm representative who 
suggested that there was a need for public sector clients to closely scrutinize 
the activities of their private sector partners.  Moreover, the law firm 
representative [Law firm representative] generally shared the view that 
PCTs were, at times, ill-equipped to handle the demands involved in creating 
a LIFTCo, but argued that this situation was only partially alleviated by the 
involvement of advisors: 
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“There is an imbalance of skills between PCTs and the private sector. The 
PCTs then have to buy in those skills.  There is this idea that we can rely 
on LIFTCo advisors because their interests are always aligned.  Now, in my 
view, the interests are aligned for about 70% of the time, but on some 
really key issues, these interests are not aligned, because the PCT is their 
only customer and, ultimately, where the PCT is concerned as a customer 
and a supplier, the interests diverge.  I don’t think that that tension has 
been adequately resolved yet.  Sometimes it has, and people have given a 
good argument, such as I want a better bank document because this 
affects me. In some cases the PCT has not understood what a bad deal it 
was getting, and it says I have signed up to a standard document and 
everything is fine.  They think the private sector can do it all.” 
 
She further suggested that the way LIFTs were structured could give rise to 
conflicts of interest which could have been avoided had the PCT fully 
understood the implications of the deals they entered:  
 
 “Most problems come down to conflict of interest, and dealing with the 
conflicts or people recognising the conflicts in the different positions of 
their organisations. What happens if, hypothetically, a building was built 
and there was something structurally wrong with it?  Now I know this has 
happened on a couple of buildings.  In that situation the PCT has got two 
interests. First of all it is a minority shareholder.  But fundamentally it is 
the provider of health care in the area and the tenant.  If it goes to its 
LIFTCo and it says we have got a problem with a building, they may well 
have just voted on the board and decided that there is no problem, 
because they have been outvoted.  It gets to be a real problem because 
the PCT ultimately needs to sue itself.  So there is a real friction and a 
difficulty to deal with that issue.  I think that if the PCT was very 
sophisticated and understood the funding deal and the implications of 
funding deals, and management deals, they could avoid these problems.”  
 
While not necessarily sharing the negative views of the law firm informant, 
several other interviewees highlighted problems with regard to aligning the 
values and interests of different parties in LIFT projects.  This was 
exemplified by the statements of one of the Public Finance Unit 
representatives [PFU representative 1] who noted that there was a need for 
private sector partners to prioritise co-operation over competition: 
 
“I think the biggest obstacle is public sector people behaving like public 
sector people, and private sector people behaving like private sector 
people.  This is a new model, it should give people the confidence to work 
together in a new environment. If you replicate processes that go on in a 
competitive environment, you do not get good communication and that for 
me is the biggest challenge.”   
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The same informant suggested that there was a need for partners, 
particularly in the private sector, to avoid short-termism: 
 
“It is really about making that step from intense contract documents to a 
situation where everyone is happy.  It is about getting to that point and 
that is what everything should be aimed at: to recognise where your 
partner gains you will gain, if your partner loses you will lose.  If we can 
create that, then we get a model of public-private partnership where goals 
are aligned.  If we do not get that, and the private sector still considers 
the first projects to be the projects they have to make money on, then you 
never get there.” 
 
Interestingly, this view was closely related to statements by the Partnership 
UK representative [PUK representative] who highlighted the key role private 
sector participants played in creating genuine partnerships:  
 
“There are important differences in public sector values and private sector 
values. So the challenge is to make sure there is sufficient alignment of 
interest so that these differences do not actually matter.  The private 
sector’s is job is to earn a return for their shareholders, that goes without 
saying.  The public sector has no such aspiration.  But actually what both 
want, is to deliver high quality new facilities.  …  The challenge for LIFT is 
to get the private sector to recognise that they are in a partnership and 
that, if they go for a short term win in terms of profit, that is going to 
damage the partnership.”   
 
The latter statement, in particular, was echoed by the NHS Confederation 
representative [NHS Conf representative] who, while supporting 
partnerships in general, suggested that some private sector organisations 
misunderstood this relationship: 
 
“I am quite pro-partnership. I am sure you will get some fairly negative 
views from other people.  My view is that it is important for us all to 
deliver what we want, which is improved health outcomes and healthier 
people. We have as much interest in the private sector for doing that, 
because they have got to make a long term living out of this.  So if you 
were to turn round and start screwing the public sector for every penny 
they have got, you are never going to win another piece of work, and it 
does not take much of a grapevine to get the message around.”    
 
In summary, this group of questions highlighted two core themes.  These 
included, firstly, the need for ongoing improvements in the support and 
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resources made available to potential public sector clients, together with a 
refinement of the procurement mechanisms themselves.  Secondly, there 
was an implicit consensus across governmental and non-governmental 
informants that the success of LIFT-type approaches rested on a willingness 
of private sector parties to forgo short term profit maximization in favour of 
building long term working relationships.  It is interesting that both themes, 
refinement and simplification of process on behalf of clients and greater 
selectivity among private sector providers, resurface as a key motivation for 
the creation of Express LIFT as discussed in section 7.     
 
Overall, it is worth noting that the there was far less of a split of opinion 
between informants working for government or as advisors to government 
as compared to other key informants.  This is reflected in the DICTION-
based content analysis presented below, which reflects a lesser divergence 
of attitudes among informants across most variables.  In particular, the 
prevalence of negative signs on most non-composite variables is indicative 
of a situation where most informants actually view and describe 
‘partnership’ as a problematic issue.  Possible exceptions to this are the 
positive and significant scores in case of the ‘satisfaction’ variable for the 
PFU representative 2 and the ‘praise’ variable in case of the bank 
representative.  
 
 
Table 4.3, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘partnership and skill 
requirements’ text segments, standardized scores and significance 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
DoH 
representative  
 
 
-0.58 
 
0.15 
 
0.07 
 
-0.42 
 
+* 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.65 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.65 
 
0 
P-UK 
representative 
 
 
.074 
 
-0.68 
 
-0.59 
 
-0.21 
 
+* 
PFU 
representative 
1 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
PFU 
representative 
2 
 
0.17 
 
1.32* 
 
-0.53 
 
0.98 
 
+* 
NHS Conf 
representative 
 
 
0.38 
 
-0.68 
 
-0.39 
 
0.53 
 
0 
Law Firm 
representative 
 
 
0.00 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.48 
 
-0.26 
 
0 
Bank  
representative 
 
 
1.14* 
 
-0.68 
 
-0.74 
 
0.14 
 
+* 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
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4.2.4 Cultural Issues and Conflicts – Key Informant Views 
In recent years, a number of researchers have explored the cultural 
implications of partnership working (see, e.g., O’Toole, 1993; Hebson et al., 
2002).  This literature has generally tended to highlight cultural differences 
between public and private sector managers (see also Poole et al., 1995) as 
well as investigating their implications on partnership working (Osborne, 
2000). This subsection was originally intended to cover a broad range of 
issues relating to the interviewees’ views on differences in the values, beliefs 
and cultures of the public and private sectors and their impact on 
collaboration and partnership.  However, since these issues are now covered 
in greater detail in section 5 (‘Managing Cultural Diversity in LIFT 
Partnerships’) which is based on separate case-specific interviews, this brief 
subsection focuses primarily on the issues of cultural conflicts and conflict 
management in LIFT projects.  The reason for this particular focus is that 
the issue of conflict was addressed by almost all informants, most of whom 
attached particular importance to mechanisms for conflict management. 
 
Taking a relatively unusual view as compared to other interviewees, the DoH 
representative [DoH representative] attributed potential conflict between the 
public and private sector to the public sector’s seeming obsession with 
contracts and contractual terms.  This, he suggested, was due primarily to 
the accountability requirements faced by public sector organisations and in 
particular the threat of audit: 
 
“The public sector does tend to come in thinking “contract” when they are 
dealing with the private sector. If you look at the ways different private 
sector organisations work together, it is almost that, if you pick up the 
contract and look at it, you have sort of failed. …  Now I do not think we 
have quite got that.  I don’t know how much of it is a cultural issue, and 
how much of it is just the way the accountability structures in the public 
sector work. …  But when something goes wrong, and you have to appear 
before Public Accounts Committee, or you have the National Audit Office or 
the Audit Commission over you, it is their immediate thing to look back to 
the contract.  So there might be something more fundamental within the 
public sector about relationships with the private sector due to the 
accountability process.” 
 
By contrast to this view, the Partnership UK representative [PUK 
representative] saw the principle challenge of LIFT framework in getting the 
private sector to avoid adversarial attitudes in order to build long term 
relationships with the public sector:  
 
“What the private sector should be looking for is a win/win scenario where 
the it makes a return but recognises that a fair and reasonable return over 
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the long term is better than just going for the quick buck because they are 
never going to get another deal.” 
 
The same informant further argued that unproductive conflicts around LIFT 
projects could be avoided if the public sector placed less emphasis on 
competition: 
 
“It is a difficult concept.  Effectively the public sector is saying that, if you 
create a good partnership you will get better long term VfM as opposed to 
competing for everything at every possible opportunity.  But it makes 
people nervous when you do not compete. ….  I think there is too much 
competition, certainly with the initial bidders.  There were 19 different 
consortia that won the 42 deals.  …   In my mind the ideal supply market 
would have been 8 consortia with the highest market share being about 
20%, maybe a couple at 20%, and a few at 10-15% and in that way you 
are creating companies that have critical mass, in terms of numbers of 
LIFTCo-s which they control.  That would encourage them to invest in 
central resources and all the rest of it.  The problem, when you have 19 
different ones, is that there are not enough companies that have sufficient 
critical mass to invest in it as an industry.”   
 
Noting that obstacles and conflicts around LIFT project originated from both 
public and privates sector attitudes, one of the PFU representatives [PFU 
representative 2] suggested that LIFT required a change in the attitudes of 
both groups.  This is included a recognition by the public sector that the 
private sector needed to be profitable, and a recognition by the private 
sector, that it was more useful to aim for repeat business rather than quick 
returns: 
 
“The hard bit for the public sector is to recognise that profit is not a dirty 
word for example.  They have to make a profit and they are not going to 
be here if they do not.  And similarly from the private sector’s point of 
view, to understand that it is not about cost, but about overall cost and 
value.  And most importantly the private sector needs to recognise the 
rewards for them are through the repeat business, without competition.  
And that only comes from a satisfied customer.  It’s no good relying on 
contracts to get in.”  
 
Focusing on the operational side of LIFT contracts, the NHS Confederation 
representative [NHS Conf representative] noted that working under the new 
regime brought significant changes to all parties which could give rise to 
conflicts: 
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“Let us just say it is something trivial like you do not get your bins 
emptied …  Most people would not do anything about it in the public 
sector. The culture should be, we have a payment mechanism and we 
have a system when you have to report this to the healthcare centre and 
nothing will happen until you do that.  And that is a very alien culture for 
the NHS.  But to make it work that is how you have to do it.  Now that is a 
very trivial example, but you see it an awful lot and then you end up with 
a kind of precedent because your partner turns round and says well you 
have not been reporting any of these things, we do not know about it and 
there is no system here.  You might argue that could be over–
contractualised, which I think is possible. They think it is perfectly normal 
to report things and log them and then act on the log, whereas we think it 
is perfectly normal just to have a chat with Joe down the corridor saying, 
can you do it?”   
 
While this interviewee suggested that the initial adjustment to different 
working practices was a major source of problems in the early days of LIFT, 
he suggested that these problems had now been largely overcome:   
 
“We had to learn on both sides.  It was quite confrontational and quite a 
stark distinction emerged in the early days, but I think it developed and 
changed over time.  …  I think it was very much a learning thing, it was 
about realising that it is not helpful to distinguish ourselves and we are all 
actually part of the NHS.” 
 
In contrast to the previous interviewees, the law firm representative [Law 
firm representative] was far more critical about the possibility of LIFT to 
overcome competitive and adversarial attitudes.  Specifically, she suggested 
that there was an implicit limit to public sector learning in this context, 
because, ultimately, a highly effective public sector would disincentivise 
private sector participation in these projects: 
 
“I think PCTs suffer from a lack of confidence in their own abilities.  …  You 
know, an effective PCT with good representation and a good 
understanding of the deal should be able to get a good deal out of its 
LIFTCo.  But you can see that there is a perverse effect; the more efficient 
you are, the more you disincentivise the private sector. I have had this 
discussion with people in the DoH. People know about these issues; you 
may not hear them.” 
 
Excepting the last interviewee, there was a notable consensus among the 
interviewees that the successful, conflict-free, implementation of LIFT 
required a change in culture.  However, several informants felt that this 
cultural change had not yet progressed far enough and that existing 
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adversarial and competitive attitudes continued to hamper the 
implementation of LIFT.   
 
This was reflected in the DICTION output which, while not following a clearly 
discernable tended to show negative signs for a great number of variables, 
such as ‘praise’, ‘satisfaction’, ‘inspiration’ and ‘accomplishment’.  A unique 
outlier to this was one of the CHP representatives, which could be attributed 
to the fact that this interviewee cited a number of successful examples of 
collaborative approaches to the management of LIFT projects.  
 
Table 4.4, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘cultural issues and 
conflicts’ text segments, standardized scores and significance 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
DoH 
representative  
 
 
-1.28* 
 
-0.85 
 
-1.00 
 
-1.20 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
-1.18* 
 
-0.20 
 
-0.88 
 
-0.60 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
6.80* 
 
-0.42 
 
0.80 
 
-1.03 
 
0 
P-UK 
representative 
 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
PFU 
representative 
1 
 
-0.46 
 
-0.68 
 
-0.53 
 
0.42 
 
+* 
PFU 
representative 
2 
 
-0.10 
 
0.32 
 
-0.76 
 
-0.11 
 
+* 
NHS Conf 
representative 
 
 
0.31 
 
0.64 
 
-0.73 
 
0.16 
 
0 
Law Firm 
representative 
 
 
0.92 
 
-0.33 
 
0.35 
 
0.76 
 
0 
Bank  
representative 
 
 
0.35 
 
-0.85 
 
-0.68 
 
0.90 
 
+* 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
 
4.2.5 Targeting and Local Impact – Key Informant Views 
Issues relating to the targeting of primary health care services have been by 
a number of researchers in the recent and past (see section 1.1. 
‘Background’).  However, relatively little has been written about the 
potential economic impact of health care investment in the UK (see section 
3).  This section analyses the views of key informants with regard to the 
targeting and local impact of LIFT.  This set of questions was based on 
ongoing debates about the willingness of the private sector to invest in 
areas where potential returns from property may be limited as well as more 
general doubts about the ability of public private partnerships to service 
these areas.  In addition, the team sought to investigate the perceptions of 
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key informants with regard to the local impact of LIFT projects.  
Interestingly, the expectation that LIFT generates positive benefits to local 
areas was part of a number of early policy documents (see section 1), but 
appears to have received less attention later on in the implementation of the 
LIFT initiative.    
It should be noted at the outset that a number of key informants, including 
the law firm and bank representatives, chose not to comment on issues of 
targeting as they felt that their knowledge of these areas was limited.  
However, this was largely compensated for by the full and nuanced 
statements made primarily by key informants associated with government 
and advisory bodies.  
 
Regarding these key informants, there was some consensus that LIFT had 
originated from a perceived need to improve primary care facilities, 
particularly in deprived urban areas.  In addition, most key informants 
agreed that this had largely been accomplished during the earlier phases of 
the LIFT roll-out allowing the scheme to move on to other areas.  
 
These developments were described by the DoH representative [DoH 
representative] as follows:  
 
“Targeting deprived urban areas was where we started off, … that is where 
the whole concept of LIFT came from.  If I go back to the original policy 
thinking, it was very much about that problem.”  
 
This view was reiterated by one of the Public Finance Unit [PFU 
representative 1] representatives who suggested that, in terms of targeting, 
LIFT had achieved its initial goals early on, allowing the scheme to be 
applied to areas of rural deprivation.   
 
“We have got 47 LIFT companies, and the vast majority of those are in the 
lowest deprived areas, highest index of multiple deprivation areas 
predominantly for that reason.  LIFT was developed to increase or improve 
infrastructure in the poorest areas because there was no way on earth that 
in parts of Lambeth for instance, you would get a third party developer 
wanting to own land.  You could not sell it on for housing afterwards 
because nobody would want to live there, not residential, so how would 
you get round it?  So that is really why places like Liverpool, Newcastle, 
Manchester, Leeds, most of London, started LIFT companies in the poorest 
areas.  ….  What we’re seeing now is the next draught of LIFT companies 
coming out and they are into rural deprivation so you have got Norfolk and 
York to a certain degree.  There are many areas of rural deprivation which 
now have LIFT projects.  Derbyshire is a good example of this. … LIFT 
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started off as being about poor quality primary care premises in urban 
areas.  But now it has gone well beyond that.” 
 
While broadly agreeing with this view, another Public Finance Unit 
representative [PFU representative 2] suggested that, despite these 
accomplishments, there were still areas of need where LIFT-type approaches 
could play a major role.  In his view this included, in particular, those under 
doctored areas where there was a lack of office rental equivalents:  
 
“All the LIFTs are targeted at areas of urban or rural deprivation.  There is 
a map that shows the concentration in the North East, the North West and 
Cornwall.  There are a few outliers.  By and large the rural areas and 
Surrey and Sussex have not been touched, but all the major conurbations 
have got them.  I accept that, since LIFT was conceived, property prices in 
certain parts of inner cities have really rocketed, so that the market would 
have adjusted to allow things in places like Manchester.  But then 
Liverpool still is a declining city and other parts of the country will also find 
it difficult to build.  Also there are problems in areas where there is not a 
great deal of office rental equivalents such as Cornwall and Norfolk. …. In 
terms of targeting in the right place, there is the concept of underdoctored 
areas, which are deemed to be areas in which there is insufficient GP 
coverage in ratio per capitation.  Today 80% of those are covered by 
LIFTs.  We were talking about how we can roll out LIFT further.  We are 
talking about developing ways in which a LIFT is piggybacked out of its 
current area into a surrounding area in a way that there is a chance for 
local companies to win it.”   
 
Looking at the future of LIFT, the NHS Confederation representative [NHS 
Conf representative] proposed that LIFT had now moved well beyond 
geographic targeting and that some LIFT projects had now emerged in 
relatively affluent areas.  He further suggested that LIFT, as a procurement 
mechanism, was still developing in the sense that some LIFTCo-s were now 
involved in the creation of multi-purpose service facilities which included 
social and/or mental health services.   Although this informant felt that there 
was a possibility that these developments were driven by private sector 
partners seeking to secure a stream of deals, he felt largely positive about 
these changes:  
 
 “LIFT was targeted at deprived areas and there is no doubt that the first 
wave of LIFT schemes were in deprived … Nowadays LIFT has moved on 
and you only have to look at a map and say well that is obviously not a 
deprived area.  What I find interesting is not so much where LIFT schemes 
are now being developed but what these schemes cover.  We are now 
seeing LIFT being used for more than just a very straightforward 
replacement of old tatty GPs surgeries into Health Centres and we are 
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seeing combined health and social care centres or even some mental 
health type facilities. In some sense it is because these PCTs have already 
done their procurement so they might as well use it for other purposes.  
But you could argue that it is more positive; that people like LIFT and 
therefore want to use it in interesting ways.” 
 
Responding to claims that property prices in London had hampered the 
introduction of LIFT in areas of need, one of the Community Health 
Partnership representatives [CHP representative 2] argued that this was not 
necessarily the case.  According to his views the greater London area had, in 
fact, been targeted by a large number of projects, but there was less 
awareness of this on account of the fact that the area was rarely perceived 
as one unit: 
 
“There is this real undersold story in London as to the actual amount of 
infrastructure that has been delivered and the amount of investment that 
has gone into London.  When you look at London purely from an objective 
manner, it is actually no worse than in some of the other areas, but it does 
not speak as an area.”   
 
Regarding the issues of regional ownership and involvement, there was a 
broad consensus that this had by and large been accomplished.  For 
instance, one of the Community Health Partnership representatives [CHP 
representative 1] noted that successful LIFT projects were often seen as a 
form of regional accomplishments by both public and private sector 
partners: 
 
“One of the things I find is that when I go out to the regions, is that they 
are very regionally focused.  They are very proud of their region and very 
quick to shout about the successes in their region; this applies to the 
private sector as well.” 
 
Similarly, another Community Health Partnership representative suggested 
that many LIFTs had been able to draw on local expertise and leadership 
[CHP representative 1].  He cited a number of examples suggesting that, 
where this had been the case, there where significant benefits to in terms of 
the contribution of LIFT projects to regeneration and community 
development.   
 
“What you tend to find is that the LIFTCo itself reflects the area. Liverpool 
is a great example of this.  It is a big region.  The CEO comes from a 
regen background. He has got immense knowledge and he is very well 
tapped into the local Council and the local PCTs because he has worked 
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with them for years. He also has a property understanding, so he gets 
estate, he gets building, he gets planning, and that is excellent.” 
Although the number of statements relating to issues of targeting was, as 
previously noted, more limited than in the case of the other topics, there 
was a broad consensus that LIFT projects had indeed been successfully 
targeted to areas of greatest need.  These generally positive views on this 
topic are reflected in the DICTION analysis of these text segments, with 
output being characterized largely by positive scores and several 
significantly positive outputs.  
 
Table 4.5, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘targeting and local 
impact’ text segments, standardized scores and significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
DoH 
representative  
 
 
0.11 
 
0.73 
 
-0.55 
 
0.04 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
0.70 
 
0.73 
 
0.06 
 
0.07 
 
+* 
P-UK 
representative 
 
 
2.45* 
 
0.06 
 
0.56 
 
1.54* 
 
0 
PFU 
representative 
1 
 
1.55* 
 
0.15 
 
-0.76 
 
1.39* 
 
0 
PFU 
representative 
2 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
NHS Conf 
representative 
 
 
0.45 
 
0.15 
 
0.30 
 
-1.00 
 
0 
Law Firm 
representative 
 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
Bank  
representative 
 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
 
This is particularly noticeable where the significant positive scores in case of 
both the ‘praise’ and ‘accomplishment’ variables for the P-UK representative 
and the PFU representative 1.  The scores are indicative of a strong 
underlying support for the view that LIFT had delivered at, or beyond, 
expectations in this respect.  
 
4.2.6 Value for Money and Related Financial Issues – Key 
Informant Views 
The issue of VfM has attracted a host of research contributions, many of 
which have focused on the PFI in the health care sector (for a recent 
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contribution, see, e.g., Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin, 2008).  This group of 
questions was therefore aimed at exploring issues related to VfM money and 
other financial issues associated with LIFT.  Specifically, the key informants 
were asked whether they perceived LIFT projects as providing for money, or 
otherwise, and which evidence they could cite in support of their views.  In 
addition, the informants were asked whether they felt that the performance 
of LIFT projects in terms of VfM was widely and evenly distributed.  
Focusing on methodological issues, the informants were further asked 
whether they felt that there were difficulties in evaluating the VfM aspects of 
LIFT projects and, in particular, whether it was appropriate to draw 
comparisons with non-LIFT projects.  Lastly, the key informants were asked 
to describe the potential impact of LIFT on issues of affordability as well as 
any indirect financial advantages to LIFT in terms of issues such as the 
timely completion of projects within existing budgetary parameters. 
 
Regarding the issue of VfM in general the DoH representative [DoH 
representative] responded relatively cautiously by stating that this had been 
the case if the speed with which these facilities were procured was 
considered: 
 
“I think LIFT has been VfM because it has allowed us to significantly 
improve Primary Care premises, no question about that at all. I think we 
have done it quicker than we would have done by other mechanisms.  
Although it is always difficult when you are comparing with some sort of 
counterfactual, I think we could have done it more efficiently.  There was 
the NAO report a couple of years ago, on LIFT, it was pretty positive about 
how well the LIFT model works.”  
 
While this informant suggested that there was no evidence that speedy 
construction resulted in higher returns to the private sector, he implied that 
there was a need for more detailed analysis beyond the six case studies 
conducted by the NAO (2005a, table 10). 
 
This view was mirrored by one of the CHP representatives [CHP 
representative 1] who suggested that, apart from the speedy delivery of 
facilities, one of the advantages of LIFT was that it had created greater 
awareness about possibilities of value creation:   
 
“LIFT has brought a much broader view of value to infrastructure in 
Primary and Social Care.  We tend to think that VfM really just exists at 
the competitive tender process where the margin is quite small for 
improvement or loss.  But VfM is created in different places in the 
development of a scheme right back to needs assessment, outcomes, etc.” 
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This view was echoed by another CHP representative [CHP representative 2] 
who suggested that, apart from requiring accurate needs assessment, LIFT 
allowed for improved value creation on account of the requirement for 
partners to jointly decide on a number of deals over time: 
 
“Value is about outcomes, not about the cost … When you know what the 
needs are and the services required to meet the need, then look at what 
you need in order to deliver services and if it is a building, work with your 
LIFTCo and make sure that building exactly what you need.  … You can 
have disagreements with your Client, your PCT, your Local Authority and 
the LIFTCo going backwards into its supply chain; you have this chain of 
relationships that gets stronger over time because you are delivering more 
and more.”   
 
Expanding on the idea of ongoing collaboration as a source of value 
creation, the same informant noted that the absence of joint decision 
making was a key impediment to value creation in LIFT projects: 
 
“Where some LIFTCo-s fall down, and it is by no means the majority, just 
a handful, is when they completely step out of it and say to the client you 
know what, take your Tenants Requirements and just take them straight 
to the supply chain and the builder and architect … That is not what LIFT 
was about.  LIFT is about taking the problem off the PCT and delivering a 
solution that they need.  When this happens you start getting the 
arguments based around cost because the LIFTCo does not offer VfM, and 
it is not seen as that extra department which the PCT does not have.” 
 
Taking a potentially more radical position, the NHS Confederation 
representative [NHS Conf representative] suggested that LIFT and similar 
approaches could create value because they allowed the NHS to move its 
estate outside its core business, where it could be more effectively managed 
by the private sector: 
 
“One paper we have been working on most recently is in effect saying why 
does the NHS own these assets at all? Why on earth do we have to be 
involved? …  Capio do not own any of their hospitals, any of the big office 
companies, they do not own anything … We should think a little more 
about why you really honestly have to own a building. …  We have sold off 
most of our surplus estate. The problem is, are we getting the best deal 
for that and there is an argument actually if you went down this property 
development type route, is the best deal actually to change its use into 
residential or whatever? It might be better to do that than take a rental 
stream just actually sell it outright.  In some ways partnership is actually 
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quite helpful in that it allows you to be a bit more interesting and 
innovative in how you deal with these things.” 
 
The bank representative viewed the issue of VfM as being largely related to 
the cost of finance [Bank representative] and, as such, a matter of prudent 
financial engineering. 
 
“Most of these projects are highly geared which means that if a project 
costs £20M and that’s all costs including advisors, interest costs, the 
works, there's a rough rule of thumb, very rough, £18M of that would 
come from the bank.  The other £2M would come from the private sector 
partner, your equity provider, and some would come from the PCT.  The 
PCT owns the other bit, the LIFTCo obviously is owned 60:20:20.  Now we 
go to the LIFTCo and flow down, so you end up with a gearing ratio of debt 
to equity of round about 90:10; so 90% bank debt, 10% equity.  It is a lot 
higher than you would normally see.  Corporate gearings are often only 
around 30 or 40%.  Property deals maybe 60 or some go up to 80, but 
90:10 is very very high and it is a very small amount of equity. … It is 
about VfM; bank debt is a lot cheaper than equity so therefore the more 
bank debt you can get into a deal, the cheaper it is for the PCT.” 
 
The same informant further suggested that another major element in 
achieving VfM, from the standpoint of financiers and investors, concerned 
the contractual allocation of risks.  This typically involved a transfer of most 
risks to private sector partners: 
 
“I think risk allocation in LIFT is probably reasonably fair because the cost 
risk for construction is fully passed on to the private sector and the cost 
risk of operations is passed onto the private sector.  The delivery risk is 
passed onto the private sector and the only risks that the PCT retain are 
risks that could not sit with the private sector …  It would not be fair for 
the private sector to take on board risks with adverse weather or strikes 
because its something they cannot control.  The only people, not that the 
public sector control can control them, but at least it is a risk that the 
public sector is aware of and a risk that obviously no private sector could 
put a fair price on.  I think that is the key for VfM.” 
 
According to this informant, any serious deviation from these typical 
financial structures and risk allocation arrangement would adversely impact 
on the value of such deal for financiers and investors and potentially act as 
deal breaker.  This would apply in particular to additional risk transfers to 
the private sector which would be likely to significantly increase the financial 
cost of projects.   
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The question as to whether the performance of LIFT projects in terms of VfM 
was evenly distributed was addressed by one of the PFU representatives 
[PFU representative 2].  While noting that, as a whole, most LIFT had 
achieved VfM criteria, this informant felt that there were some projects 
where this had not been the case: 
 
 “There are some buildings that are outstanding VfM and … there are 
others that are probably only average or poor VfM.  That is no different 
from other attempts at building and signing agreements … The real 
question is whether the mechanisms are in place to learn from that.”  
 
The PFU representative further suggested that the financial success of LIFT 
projects was largely a “people issue” rather one of delivery mechanisms:  
 
“It is not the delivery method that is at fault … it is people and the 
knowledge of what you want.  LIFT offers you that because it is a continual 
cycle you have got the chance to re-learn; as opposed to, we build a new 
wing of a hospital and then no-one ever does anything like that again.” 
 
This view was contradicted by the Partnership UK representative [PUK 
representative] who felt that the financial success of LIFT project was 
influenced by systemic factors such as the bargaining power of public sector 
organisations.  Specifically this informant noted that VfM was affected by 
the degree of leverage exerted by public sector clients which, in turn, was 
related to their size: 
 
“The PCT is much less powerful in dealing with a relationship than the 
Department.  If, as an example, Laing are an investor which they are in 
six LIFTs, well the fact is that Laing are also bidding on acute hospitals, 
and bidding on this and that so you know. A little old PCT managing its 
relationship with Laing is going to be much less effective than someone 
sitting in Central Department even if it is PFH.  I think the Department just 
needs to use that greater leverage.” 
 
Expanding on this line of argument, the same informant suggested that the 
ability of PCTs to strike effective deals was hampered by the restructuring of 
PCTs and uncertainty over future deal flows: 
 
“The fact that in the course of LIFT we have been through two major 
restructurings of the PCTs is unhelpful to say the least.  I think the fact 
that we have gone through major policy shifts in terms of the way that 
healthcare is delivered in the community is difficult to cope with.  … If you 
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are looking parochially at the LIFT programme, actually the best scenario 
would have been a continuous predictive investment programme.  
However, there has been a hiatus in investment in the last two years 
around the community hospital programme. The whole point of the LIFT 
programme was that it was set up to deliver predictable investment and 
provide a mechanism for good strategic planning.  If the policy 
environment is shifting at a national level it is very difficult to do local 
strategic planning with any confidence … when we talk to the private 
sector they will just say there has not been enough of a deal flow.”   
 
A broadly similar view was expressed by the Law firm representative [Law 
firm representative] who suggested that the VfM of a LIFT depended to a 
significant degree on the financial and legal astuteness of individual PCTs:  
 
“People say it is expensive, and when they are saying it is expensive they 
do this because they are looking at the machinations behind the deal; 
there are complicated money arrangements behind these LIFT projects.  I 
am not saying that they cannot work, but the PCT has to be sophisticated.  
The PCT have to understand the importance of what terms it has got from 
the bank for its future projects.”   
 
A number of informants addressed other potential impediments to value 
creation.  Apart from the issue of partnership discussed above, these views 
typically focused on the issue of flexibility, which a number of informants 
saw as a key to value creation.    
 
This view was exemplified by one of the CHP representatives [CHP 
representative 1] who suggested that some LIFT project suffered from over-
specification on account of compliance requirements with regulatory 
guidance such as the Health Building Notes:   
  
“It is not LIFT that specifies the building.  It is the DoH that specifies it 
with its Health Building Notes …  The LIFTCo is building to the quality that 
the PCT has told it has to build to by its governing body which is the 
Department.  A LIFTCo could build a very low spec building but the PCT 
through its approvals process has to demonstrate that the LIFT structure 
has been delivered to the standard as prescribed by HTMs and HBNs ...  A 
LIFTCo as a private company can deliver anything.  It is what the PCT as 
the tenant is allowed to ask for, and that is either because it has to comply 
with DoH specifications or it has to ensure that it is not challenged under 
Public Sector Procurement rules.”  
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Similarly, another CHP representatives [CHP representative 2] suggested 
that impediments to VfM often arose from the inflexible attitudes of PCTs 
towards commissioning, and suggested that it was essential for successful 
LIFTs to adopt flexible solutions: 
 
“If the tenant’s requirements are wrong then LIFTCo to a certain degree is 
screwed, because it gets the blame for building a building that no-one 
wants.   Actually I can take you to buildings that are non-LIFT where 
exactly the same happens.  As an example, a PCT says right we have got 
a shortage of dentistry, we have got loads of revenue, we want 5 dentistry 
booths built into that LIFT premises.  The LIFTCo says right, not a 
problem. Three quarters the way into the build, the PCT decides that it 
does not want to commission dentistry anymore.  The LIFTCo then gets 
the blame for a building with 5 dental suites that are completely empty.  … 
Invariably the LIFTCo should be looking at building a flexible buildings 
knowing that the needs of that community will change over time, because 
you want that building to last 20 or 30 years, that is the whole point of it!”   
 
Similar comments were made with respect opening hours with the CHP 
representatives in particular which highlighted the need for LIFTCo-s to 
adopt flexible and where possible, future-proof solutions. 
 
With regard to the question of how VfM of LIFT projects could be assessed, 
there was broad agreement among most of the key informants that this 
presented significant difficulties.  This issue was expressed in different 
terms as well as being attributed to different causes by the informants.  
 
One example of an informant who warned against comparing the cost of 
LIFT and non-LIFT projects was the DoH representative [DoH 
representative], who emphasized both the difficulties of separating out 
different types of cost and of comparing different types of facilities and 
management approaches: 
 
“It is very difficult for people to separate out the expense of the process 
from the fact that you are actually moving from pretty crappy premises 
into something that is fit for purpose and is a modern set of premises; and 
people, when they compare costs are not comparing like with like. This is 
similar to new PFI hospitals where you know that you are paying more for 
something that is new, that is quality, than you were for something that 
was something totally hopeless.  The other element is the extent to which, 
and this again is within both PFI and LIFT, you are actually tied into 
continually maintaining the quality.” 
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This view was echoed by one of the PFU representatives [PFU representative 
1] who suggested that it was difficult to assess the intangible components of 
VfM: 
 
 “VfM is meant to take intangibles into consideration.  There is price which 
is the cheapest but VfM is a much broader range of measures … VfM for 
me includes all the things that you are talking about so better quality of 
care, better outcomes, better working and buildings.  Some of those you 
cannot price so in a sense you price what you can price, you value what 
you can value but then it might give you a result where the cheapest is 
not much different from the – how can I put it?  If you do all those things 
you can price by costing or giving a value …   Even though it still might 
show that the one with the cheapest construction costs is still overall 
cheapest you can then reverse it all by saying, ah, there is always the 
intangibles that we have got, we cannot price, that we think it is worth 
paying for.”   
 
Given these difficulties this informant concluded that it was important to 
base decisions regarding VfM on defensible choices which were based on an 
understanding of desired outcomes: 
 
“The system is that if you want to pay more for a product that gives you 
better tangibles and better intangibles and if you say that this is why we 
are doing it, then the system allows you to do it.  The system allows you 
to buy Audis rather than Fords if you want to on the basis you believe it’s 
going to give you better value over time and the PAC, as long as you sit 
down and you make that conscious decision, then they will back you on 
it.”   
 
Taking an even more critical position towards the issue of VfM, the NHS 
Confederation representative [NHS Conf representative] suggested that, 
although it was worthwhile assessing some intangibles, VfM itself was 
possibly not a useful concept: 
 
“It is very difficult to prove the outcomes are the result of whatever they 
are a result of … I mean you cannot necessarily prove that giving a new 
building will improve health outcomes, but there must be enough 
evidence, or I hope there is enough evidence out there, where you can 
look at it sort of historical examples and say before and after.  If I was the 
DoH … I would be looking and saying, actually, it is a good thing to 
refurbish or replace our estate because we can demonstrate, okay within a 
big margin for error, … that at least you are healthier and you live longer 
and you pay more taxes and at a very macro level, it might actually be 
beneficial. … I do not think VfM is helpful in achieving this.  I mean you are 
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just doing comparison of funding routes basically and say we will make a 
few slightly spurious assumptions about how much risk there is, it is all 
very subjective.  But it misses the point about actually this is about will 
our staff be happier?  Will our patients be happier/healthier? …  We do not 
really quantify any of that so in that sense it is very difficult to know what 
VfM means.” 
 
As regards the issue of affordability, there was some agreement that there 
was a financial burden associated with LIFT projects.  However, virtually all 
of the interviewees who addressed this issue noted that the cost of LIFT 
projects had to be assessed in the context of the comparative benefits this 
type of procurement was likely to deliver.  This view was expressed by the 
Partnership UK [PUK representative] representative who stated that: 
 
“Part of the problem with affordability is that you do pay for what you get. 
Undoubtedly one of the objectives of the programme was to produce 
decent facilities, well we now have much better facilities than previously 
existed.  One of the things that I am slightly nervous about is cost 
comparisons, whether you are comparing apples and pears. …  Sustainable 
solutions do not come cheap.”  
 
In addition to this, the same interview suggested there were examples 
where private sector initiatives led to reductions in cost: 
 
 “The interesting thing about this is that there are some deals where the 
private sector has done a larger development than the Primary Health 
Care requirement so they might have built some social housing or they 
maybe have done a retail development …  That is something that would 
never have happened within a public sector context.  And that will bring 
down the cost of Primary Health Care, and social housing will create a 
community asset which would otherwise not have been produced so you 
get those sorts of things that need to be taken into account.”   
 
The NHS Confederation representative [NHS Conf representative], 
meanwhile, expressed concerns over the affordability of LIFT projects, but 
argued that these problems where not specific to LIFT: 
 
“There is a big issue in affordability.  And I am not sure it is got anything 
to do at all with LIFT, PFI or anything.  The problem we have is that, if you 
want decent facilities, they cost money and I think no-one has really 
grasped that.  The fact that if you are going to design things that are 
therapeutically healing environments, that can be put to a different use 
when you no longer need them, that has a cost attached to it.” 
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While this interviewee was keen to highlight the potential benefits of newer 
and potentially expensive facilities, he regretted that the DoH had not 
undertaken more research in identifying the benefits of these investments.  
 
“Looking at these key informants interviews as a whole, it is fairly clear 
that the majority of the interviewees took a relatively unenthusiastic view 
of the financial benefits of LIFT.  In particular, there was a remarkable 
absence of any expectation that LIFT projects would lead to major cost 
savings or show significant gains in terms of VfM vis a vis potential 
alternatives such as the public sector comparator.”   
 
This pattern was confirmed by the DICTION analysis of the interviews 
which, while not following any particularly pronounced pattern, showed that 
even interviewees for governmental organization, or organizations affiliated 
with the government, took a mixed view of the financial aspects of LIFT.  
This was particularly pronounced in case of the DoH representative, whose 
statements yielded significant negative scores for ‘praise’, ‘accomplishment’ 
and ‘certainty’.  Meanwhile, significant positive scores could be detected for 
the one of the CHP representatives for ‘accomplishment’ and ‘certainty’, the 
PFU representatives for ‘satisfaction’ and ‘accomplishment’, and ‘certainty’, 
respectively.  This pattern was not necessarily surprising, given that one of 
the primary tasks of the CHP and PFU representatives is to promote the 
financial attractiveness of LIFT.  This situation would also explain the 
unusually high positive score for the ‘praise’ variable in case of the bank 
representative.   
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Table 4.6, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘value for money and 
related financial issues’ text segments, standardized scores and 
significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
DoH 
representative  
 
 
-1.03* 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.70 
 
-1.20* 
 
-* 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
-0.63 
 
0.62 
 
-0.02 
 
1.36* 
 
+* 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
-0.84 
 
0.77 
 
-0.76 
 
-0.75 
 
-* 
P-UK 
representative 
 
 
0.24 
 
-0.60 
 
0.28 
 
0.03 
 
0 
PFU 
representative 
1 
 
0.80 
 
1.66* 
 
0.65 
 
054 
 
0 
PFU 
representative 
2 
 
0.05 
 
0.74 
 
-0.43 
 
1.02* 
 
+* 
NHS Conf 
representative 
 
 
0.24 
 
-0.60 
 
0.28 
 
-0.03 
 
0 
Law Firm 
representative 
 
 
-0.93 
 
-0.68 
 
-1.11* 
 
-0.33 
 
0 
Bank  
representative 
 
 
2.65* 
 
0.52 
 
-0.93 
 
0.84 
 
0 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
 
 
4.3 User Interviews 
The majority of the user interviews were conducted during the middle and 
end-phase of the project in 2008.  This meant that some of these interviews 
already reflected the impact of the recent crisis.  The research team would 
have liked to investigate user views on the effects of the crisis and its 
potential implications on the future of LIFT in greater detail, for instance by 
introducing a specific set of new questions investigating these issues.  
However, it was felt that this was not possible, as it would have introduced 
some asymmetry to this interview series which could have made their 
analysis significantly more difficult.  Nonetheless, where interviewees 
referred to the crisis as part of their views, this was included in the analysis. 
 
As a general rule, the interviews discussed in this section cover a variety of 
LIFT users ranging from CEOs of major LIFT companies to practice 
managers.  The principal criterion for selecting interviewees was that they 
possessed intimate knowledge of operational LIFT projects.  In addition, an 
attempt was made to ensure that there was a sufficient geographic spread 
among these interviewees as well as a sufficient representation of urban 
and rural participants.  Lastly, in selecting the user interviews discussed in 
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this section, an effort was made to avoid duplication with the case studies 
discussed in the consecutive sections.  This meant that the majority of user 
interviews discussed in this section were conducted in areas other than the 
core case studies.  In the few instances where this was not the case, these 
interviews were conducted separately from the case study, with the 
interviewees being asked prior to the interview to express their general 
views and experiences in relation to LIFT.   
 
Overall this section pertains to eleven user interviews, including seven with 
public sector employees and four with senior private sector representatives. 
All eleven interviews were taped and professionally transcribed and lasted 
between forty minutes to over an hour.  The public sector representatives 
included a Partnership Director from an urban PCT in the North West [Part 
Dir, urban NW], the Associate Director of an urban PCT in the South West 
[Assoc Dir, urban SW], the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East 
Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl], the Project Director of a mixed rural and 
urban PCT in the North West [Proj Dir, mixed NW], the Project Director of a 
predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl] and 
two Practice Managers working in the same PCT [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1 
and 2]. 
 
The private sector representatives included the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in 
an urban PCT in the North West [CEO, urban NW], the CEO of a LIFTCo 
operating an urban PCT in the South West [CEO, urban SW], the CEO of a 
LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the West Midlands [CEO, urban W Midl] 
and the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the North East [CEO, 
urban NE]. 
 
In terms of the timing of the respective LIFT schemes, the interviewees 
were distributed as follows: 
 
urban PCT in the North West     first wave 
urban PCT in the South West     third wave 
rural  PCT in the East Midlands    third wave 
mixed urban and rural PCT in the North West  third wave 
predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands  second wave 
urban PCT in the West Midlands    second wave 
urban PCT in the North East     second wave 
 
Although the researchers would have wished for the inclusion of 
interviewees from a fourth wave project, the given distribution of user 
interviewees reflects the relative concentration of LIFT schemes in the 
second and third waves.  
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As far as possible, the user interviewees were asked questions which were 
similar to those given to the key informants. However, due to their different 
experiences, their responses varied greatly.  Specifically, while some 
interviewees addressed general policy issues, others tended to focus more 
strongly on their own experiences.  Following a pilot interview, it was 
decided that the same basic orientation and order of questions as in case of 
the key informant interviews could be maintained.  This approach facilitated 
the comparison of key informants and user interviews which is discussed in 
the conclusion of this section (subsection 4.4 ‘Stakeholder Views: 
Concluding Remarks’) as well as the application of DICTION as a means of 
supplementary contents analysis.   
 
4.3.1 LIFT and Policy Learning – User Views 
Following the layout of the previous subsection, this part focuses on user 
views with regard to LIFT as an incidence of policy learning and/or a policy 
innovation.  Since many of the user interviewees were primarily familiar 
with LIFT from an operational rather than a policy perspective, this 
subsection focuses on a limited number of issues.  These issues include user 
views with regard to workability of LIFT as a policy instrument, desirable 
future developments in this area in general, and the specific issue of uptake 
and interest among public and private sector parties.  Due to the relatively 
brief statements which the interviewees made with regard to this issue, a 
computer aided content analysis has been omitted from this subsection. 
 
Regarding the role of LIFT as policy innovation, the Partnership Director 
from an urban PCT in the North West [Part Dir, urban NW] felt that LIFT was 
an important part of urban regeneration.  Specifically she suggested that 
LIFT was most successful where it was a part of broader strategic 
regeneration activities: 
 
LIFT works well where there is a strong need for regeneration and a strong 
City Council does help.  If you look across at Liverpool, Manchester, Salford 
you know, go across to Sheffield, Leeds, you look at the development of 
these cities and it has been absolutely tremendous.  There is a great 
ambition and desire and that is helpful. London has developed tremendously 
but it is probably been more of a private sector boom.   
 
While acknowledging these broad successes, the same interviewee noted 
that it was far more difficult to pinpoint the advantages of LIFT where these 
initiatives had not been part of broader strategic initiatives.  
 
This view was echoed by the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East 
Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] who argued that LIFT had to be embedded 
in a broader strategic context: 
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“LIFT works well when you have a need and plans, and a strategy about 
where you want to go with your services.  There has got to be a map of 
current services and a strategy around future services.”   
 
While welcoming the overall strategic direction of LIFT, this interviewee 
noted that the NHS had yet to fully adopt the requisite strategic outlook in 
which LIFT had to be embedded: 
 
“The one good thing about Darzi is that it horizon scans and we are not 
good at that in the NHS and then when we do it, we are not good at 
following it through. Sometimes it is because of other demands for 
organisational change.  But anyway, I think that is what LIFT genuinely 
needs.  …  If you can get that, LIFT can thrive on a number of things, not 
just in terms of providing buildings but by being a facilitator in achieving 
that and the estates part of it, the advice part of it, and everything that 
comes with it.” 
 
The view that LIFT utilisation had yet to evolve into a broad movement 
toward strategic planning in primary care closely mirrored earlier 
statements by key informants such as those of the senior DoH 
representative.   
 
Arguing that LIFT in its traditional form represented a complex and, at 
times, difficult procurement mechanisms, the Project Director of a mixed 
rural and urban PCT in the North West [Proj Dir mixed NW] welcomed the 
introduction of Express LIFT: 
 
“If I could do LIFT again, we would have gone through the Express LIFT 
process.  I think the central procurement of getting people on the 
framework and then your PCTs, and being then able to get those people 
who have already been through a gateway, a much better process. It 
reduces time and reduces legal costs and things.  This is a much better 
way to take the process forward.”   
 
This view was echoed by the Project Director of a predominantly rural PCT 
in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl] who argued that LIFT was a 
broadly sound procurement mechanisms which should adapted to future 
needs rather than discarded or displaced by alternative strategies: 
 
“To come back to that point, if LIFT had not been invented, how would we 
have done what we wanted to do?  The fact is that somebody actually put 
in the 2000 NHS plan that we would invest £1B in primary care, at least 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
98 
somebody at that stage strategically recognised that something needed to 
be done.  LIFT might not be overall the best mechanism but at least it was 
a mechanism that got something achieved and in the future, if we want to 
do something, then it’s about adapting that. Not as we tend to do, saying 
oh it has not worked so let us start something else off, because actually 
that will have its own pitfalls.  It is about shaping LIFT to do something 
and I think it is a mechanism that can be extended, and some of the Local 
Authority projects are things into which it can be extended once you have 
got the company.”  
 
However, the same interviewee was critical of the contractual part of the 
LIFT procurement process: 
  
“PPPs for very small premises were being treated as a major PFI and I 
think that is where it did go slightly astray.  You have got two very 
different risk profiles and some of our advisors were seeing PPP primary 
care premises akin to PFI for a significant hospital.  We were saying hang 
on a minute, those are very different risk profiles in primary care 
premises.  Things like Community Hospitals sit somewhere in between, but 
actually we were putting perhaps too much belt and braces in but what 
that is--but you learn that as you go along.”   
 
While most of the public sector interviewees felt that LIFT required only 
minor modifications, this was not necessarily the view of the private sector 
interviewees.  Thus the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the 
North East [CEO, urban NE] noted that LIFT, in its current form, was overly 
bureaucratic and complex: 
 
“I think the LIFT process and the documentation around it is incredibly 
complex.  I understand why.  It has to protect all the interests but that 
puts a lot of people off because they cannot get their head around it.  The 
other thing that is incredibly complex is that, until you have done an 
outline design, got some initial costings, and you know roughly what its 
going to look, feel and be like, you cannot run a first cut of a financial 
model which means you cannot tell them what the price is.  I could do that 
almost like a fag packet appraisal, a development appraisal saying around 
£14 sq. ft, but am not allowed to.”     
 
This view closely mirrored the statements of some of the key informants, 
such as the NHS Confederation representative, who had also noted that the 
complexity of LIFT posed problems for both private and public sector 
representatives.   
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
99 
Similar views were expressed by another CEO [CEO, urban W Midl] who 
argued that LIFT lacked flexibility both in terms of project design 
development and in terms of the way the schemes were governed.  
Regarding the issue of project development, this interviewee felt that there 
was currently an excess of regulation which undermined the possibility of 
local approaches: 
 
“We have to match a national standard no matter what, and there is little 
flexibility at a local level.  I mean the reason that I am always given by 
PFU and the people who make these kinds of decisions is that they do not 
think the PCTs are knowledgeable enough to understand what the private 
sector is doing and the private sector might be trying to pull the wool over 
their eyes.  I mean why would a LIFTCo want to do that?”   
 
The same interviewee noted further that, from the standpoint, this issue 
was aggravated by the standard lease contracts prescribed by central 
government:  
 
“Another issue is the Lease Plus agreement.  The biggest change in policy 
that has had the biggest impact was the change in the version of the 
Lease Plus Agreement and that has caused us quite a lot of issues really.  
People talk about LIFTCo needing to be flexible but do not afford us the 
level of flexibility and I am not quite sure how that is reconciled at 
Departmental level.  It is very centrally governed, it is a dictate you know, 
it has come down from the centre saying you will use that version of the 
Lease Plus Agreement ...  So probably the biggest issue that we have in 
our LIFT companies is not having local flexibility.  Having too much 
determined by the centre.  As the relationship matures, a LIFTCo should 
be able to deliver a very appropriate product for the type of individual 
scheme that they are doing at a local level, but the paperwork does not 
really let you, it is very standardised at the moment.” 
 
Overall there was some indication that public and private sector 
interviewees felt that LIFT had yet to accomplish its full potential as an 
integrated procurement strategy.  In addition, both public and private sector 
interviewees felt that LIFT, in its current form, was overly complex and 
bureaucratic.  However, while most public sector interviewees noted that 
these problems could be overcome through minor modification and, in 
particular the introduction of Express LIFT, some of the private sector 
interviewees suggested that LIFT suffered from more fundamental 
problems.  In particular, there seemed to be some consensus among private 
sector interviewees that, primarily due to over-regulation, LIFT eroded 
opportunities for flexible local arrangement and approaches.   
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Regarding the issues of uptake and private sector competition, there was 
some consensus that private sector interest in LIFT had insured sufficient 
participation in the bidding process.  Thus the Project director of a 
predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl] noted 
that even at the early stage of LIFT there was sufficient interest to allow for 
competitive bidding to take place. However, the same interviewee 
suggested that private sector participation could adversely affected by 
overly tight time frames: 
 
“There was a fair amount of interest from people.  We actually got down to 
6 expressions of interest that were put in; two were not of a particularly 
good quality.  I think part of the difficulty was that at that stage … it was a 
very tight time schedule, with 12 projects in parallel. I think that probably 
cut down the people who might have been interested.”   
 
While most public and private sector interviews agreed with the view that 
there was adequate private sector interest, they expressed doubt as to 
whether this would be the case in the future.  This view was expressed, 
among others, by the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East Midlands 
[Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] who made the following statement:   
 
“I think in the past bidding was very competitive. …  We were looking at 
the redevelopment of a community hospital and we certainly saw a lot of 
competition around that.  We felt that we got VfM around that particular 
case.  …  I am not sure whether the competition is there now but that is a 
reflection of the economy, not necessarily anything to do with dynamics in 
the north of the county or LIFT in particular.  I think beforehand we had 
seen the competition there.”   
 
Similarly, the Project Director of a mixed rural and urban PCT in the North 
West [Proj Dir, mixed NW] felt that that there was a dilemma between 
ensuring adequate private sector competition and controlling cost, which 
was likely to become more pronounced in the future: 
 
“Where you have a LIFTCo who has a private sector partner who is a 
constructor, a builder, who is either the sole private sector partner or a 
part private sector partner, and they are also the builder of the building for 
LIFT, I think that that creates tremendous stresses in terms of are we 
getting VfM or not.  I have seen a few examples where the construction 
prices proposed by those companies have been a problem in that they are 
too high, or perceived to be too high.  There are some big issues there. I 
think they will be dealt with by the fact that, after five years, they have to 
be market tested and everybody is just about starting to go through that 
now if they have not already.  Also the economy will have an impact on 
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this--but the problem there is that some private sector players will be 
reluctant, or unable, to take the risk of being involved.”  
 
By contrast to these views, several of the private sector interviewees 
suggested that competition around LIFT was not a major issue and that the 
success of LIFT project depended primarily on the level of partnership or 
cultural fit which could be achieved; rather than the number of competitors.  
This view expressed most clearly by the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in an 
urban PCT in the North East [CEO, urban NE] who also highlighted the 
importance of involving locally committed partners: 
 
“Government ends up being overly bureaucratic to try and ensure that 
there is a certain outcome but at the end of the day it is about whether 
the bidding teams have the right cultural fit for what you are trying to 
achieve for your business from.  ‘S developer’ [name of a private 
developer] who had a big part in that original LIFT sort of, led the team 
that bid to be a partner of the NHS.  There is nothing he would not do for 
this City and the number of times he falls on his sword on commercial 
deals because he wants what is right and he is not going anywhere.  … He 
wants it done right and he wants the NHS to have an improved estate and 
he is passionate about it and that has influenced everybody else so the 
whole team gets it and I have never heard anything cynical or crass 
coming from the supply chain.”    
 
Despite some positive comments, there was some evidence that both public 
and private sector users were more critical toward LIFT as a policy 
instrument than the policy makers and advisers interviewed in the ‘key 
informant’ subsection (with the possible exception of statements by the Law 
Firm representative discussed in the ‘key informant’ subsection).  In 
particular there was a tendency among users on both sides to stress the 
issues such as complexity, lack of flexibility, bureaucracy and over-
regulation which they believed to be associated with LIFT.  This situation 
may be due to a number of factors.  One possibility is that several key 
informants may have based their positive view of LIFT on their previous 
experience with PFI, while many of the user interviewees could not draw on 
such a comparison.  Another, equally likely, explanation is that some of the 
key informants, particularly at government level, were unfamiliar with the 
relatively high level of complexity LIFT posed for users on the ground, and 
hence tended to underestimate the bureaucratic and regulatory burden 
which had been associated with this form of procurement. 
 
4.3.2 Effectiveness of LIFT – User Views 
In line with the previous analysis of key informant interviews, this part 
sought to gauge whether, and in what respects, LIFT users viewed the 
scheme as a success or otherwise.  While the researchers sought to pose 
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questions similar to those discussed with the key informants, there was 
again a tendency among user interviewees to emphasis areas which differed 
from those discussed by the key informants.  This was particularly 
noticeable with regards to issues such as resourcing, the length and risk 
associated with leasing arrangement, and the complexity and inflexibility of 
the procurement process; all of which appeared to be of central importance 
to public and private sector LIFT users.  
 
Regarding the overall view of LIFT, most user interviewees tended to 
suggest that LIFT had been successful in terms of its immediate goals of 
procuring and improving primary care facilities.  This view was expressed, 
among others, by the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East Midlands 
[Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] who suggested that LIFT had brought important 
private sector skills to the PCT:  
 
“The big advantage was that it was a means of bringing investment into 
the Primary and Community Care sector at a time when it was desperately 
needed.  It has brought some skills into the NHS which we have not got 
probably and if I think of site procurement, site identification, putting sites 
together, that sort of negotiation which we did not have, to make sure we 
get buildings into places where we want them.  It has given us a 
framework to take those developments forward.  … I think it was a vehicle 
that was needed at the time, it’s making its inroads and we must be at 
about 250 premises. … I bet if you went round all the PCTs and said, 
would this have been done?  The answer would be no.”   
 
While agreeing with this positive view of LIFT, the Partnership Director from 
an urban PCT in the North West [Part Dir, urban NW] felt that the overall 
success of LIFT was often overlooked on account of relatively minor 
complaints: 
 
“I think LIFT has been a tremendously successful vehicle.  It could be 
more successful if we take what works well and expand that.  I think it 
delivers reasonable value as well and it is important that it is perceived as 
such.  People very much look at small things, like a couple of  benches 
being in what they believe to be the wrong position, rather than focusing 
on what the shift has been between facilities that were in place to what is 
now present.” 
 
This view was echoed by the Associate Director of an urban PCT in the 
South West [Assoc Dir, urban SW] who suggested that the key advantages 
of LIFT were often too subtle to be broadly acknowledged: 
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“LIFT works in a certain way in terms of how the building is maintained in 
its best condition, in terms of who owns the building and so on and so 
forth. But because that is quite a subtle argument it is often lost and 
people still come back to the fact, well of course these LIFT buildings they 
are really fancy and they are really expensive.” 
 
A broadly similar view was taken by the practice manager of a 
predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl 1] 
who highlighted the benefits of LIFT in terms of improved patient services: 
 
“For us for this partnership has been a giant leap forward.  We were in a 
small old house, we had completely outgrown it.  We only had three 
consulting rooms and we had five GPs so they were hot-seating all the 
time.  To be honest the place was falling down around us.  The patients 
were not getting the service they deserved and it was not like a clinical 
environment at all in terms of contamination control and all these issues, it 
was extremely difficult to meet all the requirements because of the 
resources we had. Since we have moved we have increased surgery time 
and the amount of surgeries we have got going, we have extended hours 
and done a whole host of things, we have taken on additional services 
because we have the space.  In actual fact we have probably got one and 
a half to twice the space we had in our old premises and yet we are only 9 
months into this building and we want more and that is how it has been, 
because we now realise how we can develop and increase the services we 
provide and it’s been great.” 
 
Similarly a practice manager working for the same PCT [Pract Mgr, rural W 
Midl 1] commented enthusiastically on the additional services which had 
become available to patients on account of a LIFT project: 
 
“We have taken on more patients, list size has grown.  Patients have come 
here because they do live locally and maybe their neighbour is a patient 
here and oh you know they have got a lovely new building and lovely 
doctors and we have got lady doctors as well which some patients prefer 
to see a female than a male. … We do advanced access appointments so 
there are always appointments on the day and we do a triage service as 
well but these are services that we have had a long time.  …. It has 
enabled us to increase the teaching activities so we can do more training, 
and the nurses do more services, they do some smoking cessation clinics 
and some weight clinics.  We now have two healthcare assistants whereas 
we only had one part-time one before because our healthcare assistants 
can deal with things now which means that the more experienced nurses 
can get on with doing the more complex stuff for which they have been 
trained, so they can do a lot more chronic disease management, again 
taking that away from the GPs.”  
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While acknowledging the overall success of LIFT both in terms of facilities 
procured and services offered, the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the 
East Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] suggested that the effectiveness was 
at times adversely affected by a lack of strategic vision: 
 
 “We have got shareholding arrangements, we have got a vested interest, 
but LIFT needs to link to our space and our strategic plan.  What we need 
is more of a clear joined up approach … what we cannot have is a 
fragmented approach across the County.  I think what we need is one 
strategy around what is commissioned, what services do we want, what 
does that mean for buildings as a provider, what services are you going to 
provide, what is your risk profile like with your commissioners and what 
does that mean for the buildings?  And perhaps the one way of managing 
the risk is to push the risk of the assets onto a third party.” 
  
Interestingly, this view was echoed by some of the private sector 
interviewees who suggested that it was important to take a strategic view 
on service needs, even if this were to lead to disagreement with the PCT.  In 
this context, the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in an urban PCT in the North 
West [CEO, urban NW] noted that this process often involved reducing the 
size of a scheme: 
 
  “To make LIFT work you have to be very clear with the users upfront 
about their requirements, what they want the scheme to deliver, not what 
they feel like and look like but, what you want it to deliver is a first point.  
Being explicitly clear about challenging the requirements and driving the 
scheme down in size if you need to.  Also really drilling down into the 
personal behaviours … and seeing how that can be made to work rather 
than assuming it will work because you want the same thing.” 
 
Arguing along different lines, the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in 
the North East [CEO, urban NE] noted that LIFT procurement was often 
hampered by the inability of PCT to engage in long term planning: 
 
“Not everybody is in a position to do long term planning, and it is difficult 
for us to get really stuck in if we are not sure if there is going to be more 
than one scheme. The basis on which we are competitive and efficient for 
the NHS means that everybody is taking risks, all of us taking chances, not 
charging them too much money upfront, because we bear the cost until 
they have got approval basically.”  
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In addition, the same interviewee noted that problems arising from a lack of 
planning were of particular concern at the early stages of LIFT procurement, 
as they could prevent the progression of projects: 
  
“I cannot really spin the repeat business line with my supply chain when I 
do not know whether I am going to get more than one building off them.  
So things have to be costed and paid for because they could just take our 
intellectual property and run with it with a different delivery model so it s 
difficult to get that first scheme going.  Once you have got the first 
scheme going, it is a lot easier but to break the cycle.”  
 
While most user interviewees were relatively positive in terms of the 
quantity and quality of services provided, this was not the case with regard 
to other issues such as resourcing, leasing and, in particular, bureaucracy. 
 
Regarding resourcing issues, a number of public and private sector 
interviewees noted that lack of clarity over resource implications of LIFT 
projects was one of the factors that constrained effective procurement.  This 
view was expressed, among others, by the Partnership Director from an 
urban PCT in the North West [Part Dir, urban NW] who suggested that 
involvement in LIFT had created unique resource requirements on several 
levels which PCTs had found difficult to meet: 
 
“I think one of the main issues has been resourcing and we would have 
needed a far clearer understanding of the availability of resources.  
Because of this, we have compromised on a number of sites.  It is 
important to make sure you put the right resources in the right place to 
really take things forward.  That becomes one of the constraints. This 
includes, financial, human, intellectual, the whole piece.” 
 
Similarly, the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East Midlands [Assoc 
Dir, rural E Midl] commented that, when compared to the private sector, the 
resources available to a PCT were often inferior and insufficient: 
 
“I do not think we have been able to call on the resources that perhaps a 
private company would, in terms of the marketing analysis, in terms of 
promoting itself, advertising itself.  We could have done a bit more around 
market sensitivity analysis, opportunities, land acquisition maybe and that 
type of thing.  The resources we have are sometimes a little bit back room 
and perhaps we should push them a bit more to the forefront.” 
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While most public and private sector interviewees appeared to agree that a 
lack of access to resources by the public sector could adversely affect the 
effectiveness of LIFT schemes, views with regard to the impact of leasing 
arrangements were more divided.  Thus one of the public sector 
interviewees, namely the Partnership Director from an urban PCT in the 
North West [Part Dir, urban NW], suggested that she did not view the 
existing leasing arrangements as problematic: 
 
“If you have located the facilities in the right place and you have done the 
right work upfront then a 25 year lease is not actually an issue.  I think it 
is just working through that sensibly and understanding what the impacts 
are and having flexibility to deal with that  … so you can change a Health 
Centre into an office, after 10 years.” 
 
Other public sector interviewees, like the Associate Director of a rural PCT in 
the East Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl], noted that the existing leasing 
arrangements created inflexibilities which could adversely affect future 
developments:  
  
“I think we need more freedom with things like national agreements and 
the leases.  I think the LIFTCo needs a bit more freedom to act like any 
other private developer.  The Lease Plus Agreement and some of the lease 
agreements are helpful in some ways, but they probably tie their hands in 
another.  Particularly as future providers will not want to take on big long 
leases.  The arrangement needs to be more flexible and more competitive 
particularly around the smaller end of the market around primary care.”   
 
Interestingly, these views were echoed by a number of private sector 
interviews.  For instance, the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in an urban PCT in 
the North West [CEO, urban NW] suggested that the length of the existing 
contract could become a problem once the planned provider commissioner 
split was implemented further: 
 
“The length of the contract could become a problem for the PCTs.  There is 
still some work to do in terms of how the provider commissioner splits it, 
because I suspect providers will not be taking 25 year contracts … and 
that is linked to discussions of where the Estate sits, whether it sits with 
the provider or commissioner arm of the organization.” 
 
Similarly, the CEO of an urban PCT in the West Midands [CEO, urban W 
Midl] whose misgivings about the Lease Plus arrangement have already 
been discussed in the previous subsection, noted that there were ongoing 
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problems in attracting GPs to new premises on account of inflexible and 
complex leasing arrangements: 
 
“We have had one building where the GPs just dug their heels in and 
refused to move in.  The new building would be a fantastic opportunity, 
but we have got a group of GPs that are steadfastly saying we are not 
moving in.  It is because they just were not engaged in the process and 
given a lease by the PCT almost at the 11th hour that was 200 pages long 
or something ridiculous, which takes some chewing for a small business.”   
 
This view was echoed by the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the 
South West [CEO, urban SW], who suggested that the existing Lease Plus 
agreement was not fit for purpose: 
 
“The complexity that is involved in a Lease Plus Agreement is completely 
way beyond what is needed for the scale of development and investment 
that is going into an individual scheme.  If our bread and butter schemes 
are sort of £5 million buildings, the fact that we have got a lease plus 
agreement that is almost as complex as a PFI set of paperwork, that might 
be used on a multi hundred million pound hospital, does not seem right.  
You know the payment mechanism is as complex, and requires as much 
detail to describe it and it does not feel like the balance has been got right 
in that regard.”    
 
The same interviewee suggested that these problems were aggravated by 
variations in these agreements which made it difficult for the private sector 
to economise on legal expenses: 
 
“One of the key things we were looking for at the outset of LIFT was the 
idea of consistent contract agreements because being able to pull it off the 
shelf and use a deal that we have already previously agreed was the way 
to get things to happen quickly.  But every tranche of schemes we have 
placed here has been on a different version of the lease plus agreement.  
So that benefit has just never materialised so we are always into quite 
expensive and long discussions with lawyers and financial advisors on 
every deal.  Until that settles down, you will never realise that benefit 
which is one of the driving forces behind LIFT.  Maybe it will in time, the 
trouble is the longer it takes before it does settle, the more the pipeline 
may have dried up.” 
 
While a number of interviewees expressed concerns over resourcing issues 
and leasing arrangement, the universally most critical comments related to 
the perceived inflexible and bureaucratic nature of the LIFT procurement 
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process.  Interestingly, this issue cuts across virtually all interviews 
irrespective of their position and/or the timing of their engagement with 
LIFT.   
 
One of the informants who strongly expressed his dismay with the 
procedural ballast of LIFT was the Project Director of a predominantly rural 
PCT in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl]:  
 
“I think the steps they took with the business case approval and the new 
standard documentation was absolutely crass.  There is no two ways about 
it … they were doing something which just did not reflect the type of 
projects we were talking about.  I think where LIFT is difficult is where you 
do have a really small scheme which you need as part of the network, and 
it is a sledgehammer to crack a nut when you get all the legal stuff to go 
with it.”   
 
Having participated in the first wave of LIFT projects, the Associate Director 
of an urban PCT in the South West [Assoc Dir, urban SW] complained that 
there had been an initial lack of guidance to help PCTs cope with the 
complexities of LIFT procurement: 
  
“One of the things we felt we suffered from was the fact that the process 
had not really been established.   Therefore, we were having to wait for 
that and we went through quite a difficult period where we appeared to be 
being told that LIFT would not work for this sort of scheme, and that we 
needed to use PFI documentation.  We actually lost something like a year, 
really, in that dialogue, and interestingly, eventually, we were told that we 
could go ahead with LIFT.” 
 
Although acknowledging that this situation had now improved, the same 
interviewee suggested that LIFT procurement still encountered bureaucratic, 
barriers which, at times, could only be overcome through external 
intervention: 
 
“Even with a 30 million or 40 million scheme, it feels that the process is a 
bit disproportionate.  I think everyone grapples with how do you get good 
due diligence and good checks and balances, without it being so big that 
actually it kills the scheme.  There have been a few points where our 
scheme could have been easily killed off had it not been for some quite 
forceful interventions which were outwith any process.”  
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This view was mirrored by the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East 
Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] who took a fairly pessimistic view about 
the future use of LIFT-type approaches: 
 
 “It is difficult when you have only known one model to then say whether it 
is good or bad …  But I certainly think LIFT feels cumbersome and I think 
that might restrict the LIFTCo in some ways and I think it certainly 
restricts us.  Like I say LIFTs are going through a process of trying to 
diversify, but I am not sure they will be able to do it.  I am not sure the 
market is there for it and the appetite is there for something that is so 
cumbersome.  And that would probably be the single thing for me.  It 
needs to be a bit more flexible and it needs to be able to move a bit more 
and respond and react to political changes, organisational changes as well. 
It is always going to be a moving market.”   
 
Interestingly, complaints about the bureaucratic burden associated with 
LIFT were even voiced by the practice managers who had otherwise been 
fairly enthusiastic about their projects.  Thus one of the practice managers 
[Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1] noted that: 
 
“Moving here was almost like an audit process for us.  It was so in terms 
of registrations, patients registered and it has been the same for all the 
practices.  Then we had to go through another audit of all the people we 
have on our lists again since we had to clear up certain errors.” 
 
Lastly, all of the private sector interviewees suggested, in some way or 
another, that the LIFT procurement process was overly complex and 
bureaucratic.  This view was exemplified by the CEO of a LIFTCo operating 
an urban PCT in the South West [CEO, urban SW] who strongly criticized 
existing arrangements:   
 
“I think one of the failings with LIFT at the moment is it is just too damned 
complex.  It takes too long to get what are essentially very simple 
buildings, well, fairly simple buildings delivered, and it should not be that 
difficult.  So from that respect the cost of them can look high to people 
who are used to looking at existing buildings.  … that makes it difficult for 
people to consider that we should be used more broadly to deliver 
schemes for Trusts and Local Authority and whatever else. … We are being 
forced to work in a system that is far too complex and therefore more 
costly than we would like it to be.” 
 
Overall, there was a strong indication that both public and private sector 
interviewees were relatively confident that LIFT had been able to achieve its 
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principal goal of ensuring improvements in the quantity and quality of 
primary care facilities.  However, both groups of interviewees tended to 
qualify these views with observations about the inflexibility and complexity 
of the existing arrangement.  This consensus stands in marked contrast to 
the key informant interviews, where LIFT was seen in considerably more 
positive terms by those key informants who were associated with 
government as compared to others.   
 
This relatively high level of consensus in combination with a relatively high 
degree of indecisiveness was confirmed by the DICTION output, which 
produced an unusually small number of significant scores for the non-
composite variables (4 in total).  Even in the few cases in which significant 
positive scores were identified for non-composite variables, such as in cases 
of ‘satisfaction’ for the Project Director mixed NW [Proj Dir, mixed NW], the 
case of ‘inspiration’ for the Project Director rural West Midlands [Proj Dir, 
rural W Midl], and ‘satisfaction’ for the CEO urban West Midlands [CEO, 
urban W Midl], the same interviewees show near-significant negative score 
on other relevant variables.  
 
Table 4.7, DICTION output, User Interviews, ‘effectiveness’ text 
segments standardized scores and significance 
 
Interviewee Prais e Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
Part Dir urban 
NW  
 
 
0.16 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.78 
 
-0.27 
 
0 
Assoc Dir 
Urban SW 
 
 
0.67 
 
0.66 
 
-0.65 
 
0.86 
 
0 
Assoc Dir 
Rural E Midl 
 
 
-0.54 
 
0.29 
 
-0.67 
 
-0.97 
 
0 
Proj Dir  
Mixed NW 
 
 
0.85 
 
1.15* 
 
-0.94 
 
0.52 
 
0 
Proj Dir 
Rural W Midl 
 
 
-0.98 
 
-0.10 
 
3.87* 
 
-0.83 
 
-* 
Pract Mgr 
Rural W Midl 
1 
 
0.12 
 
0.49 
 
-0.66 
 
-0.74 
 
0 
Pract Mgr 
Rural W Midl 
2 
 
0.60 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.94 
 
-0.16 
 
0 
CEO 
Urban NW 
 
 
-0.93 
 
-0.68 
 
-1.11* 
 
-0.33 
 
0 
CEO  
Urban SW 
 
 
-0.52 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.43 
 
0.88 
 
0 
 
CEO 
Urban W Midl 
 
 
0.99 
  
4.09* 
 
-0.98 
  
-1.01 
 
+* 
CEO 
Urban NE 
 
 
0.69 
 
0.12 
  
-0.53 
 
-0.45 
 
0 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
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4.3.3 Partnership and Skill Requirements – User Views 
This group of questions was aimed at exploring how interviewees viewed 
the development of partnerships within the LIFT context.  In addition the 
questions of this subsection gauged user views with regard to skill 
requirements and skill levels among public sector managers and their 
impact on partnership.   
 
On the whole there was a strong consensus among public and private sector 
interviewees about the importance of strong and committed partnerships in 
the LIFT context.  In addition, public and private sector interviewees 
indicated that LIFT presented unique challenges to the skills of their peer 
group.  These views contrasted markedly with those of the key informants 
who tended to attribute skill shortages almost uniquely to the public sector 
and, at the same time, presumed that the private sector was fully equipped 
to handle these matters.  While it is possible that this difference already 
reflects the repercussions of the recent economic crisis in terms of declining 
confidence in the private sector, it is also plausible that actual involvement 
of the user interviewees in LIFT projects helped temper their view with 
regard to alleged skill differences and inequalities.  The latter explanation is 
supported by the fact that several of the user interviewees placed strong 
emphasis on the need for mutual trust and respect as well as expanded 
collaboration and information sharing as a means for enhancing the success 
of LIFT schemes.  
 
Representative of the view that partnership was essential to success of LIFT 
projects, the Partnership Director from an urban PCT in the North West 
[Part Dir, urban NW] stated that partnership involved a sharing of skills 
between the sectors, rather than the dominance of one over the other:     
 
“I think within LIFT it is a partnership and in terms of what makes a 
partnership work, you have got to have a common objective, you have got 
to have respect for each others points of view, you have got to have the 
ability to communicate, you have got to understand each others principles 
and defend those principles and you have got to have a route to resolve 
issues; that is the important fundamental.  Once you  have got that 
common objective then … you have got a relationship that will go forward 
and you can use the skills as they exist in each of the areas.  I think its a 
little naïve to expect any one party to have all the skills.  It is about 
partnership and sharing those skills to deliver benefits to all the partners.” 
 
Arguing along similar lines, the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East 
Midlands [Assoc Dir, E Midl] suggested that there was not necessarily a 
skills imbalance but rather a skill differential between the public and private 
sectors: 
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“I worked in the private sector for two or three years before I came into 
the NHS.  Instead of skills imbalance we should probably speak of 
differential skills, definitely.  Different skills, different mentalities, different 
cultures, different philosophies …  Whether that means we have got the 
wrong skills, culture to work with LIFT, I doubt that.  … You will normally 
be clear what industry you are in, and the processes and transactions 
within that. With the NHS you have to be a lot more generalist. We have 
to be a lot more ready for change and we have to be a lot more used to 
change. Okay patient care is at the heart of it but the tools we've got and 
the tools we’re allowed to use to get there change frequently.”   
 
Both views were supported by the statements of a Project Director from a 
predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl] who 
argued that the uniqueness of LIFT posed challenges to both public and 
private sector participants:  
 
“I think the private sector partners were much more used to doing 
commercial deals than we were.  Having said that they were also having to 
learn about what LIFT would mean in practice …  what the long term 
partnerships was going to be because I do not think their mode was not 
really partnership. Their mode was: We will do a PFI, get in, do it and then 
someone else will take it on so they were very much one offs.  Therefore 
there was that exploration phase, using an analogy it was rather like 
creating a marriage because there was courting time and then you were 
making a commitment but you knew damn well that it was not just going 
to last for 18 months or two years, but actually you are looking at 
potentially 50 years plus …They were having to bring in people themselves 
who had that sort of community partnership type focus to give them the 
skills that they wanted.” 
 
This position was mirrored by the view of the Associate Director of an urban 
PCT in the South West [Assoc Dir, urban SW] who suggested that both the 
public and private sector had to expand their skills in order to deal with the 
challenges of LIFT partnership.  Looking at the public sector side, this 
interviewee further suggested that the need for new skills within the public 
sector was best addressed through the recruitment of individuals with a 
private sector background into this sector: 
 
“We have brought in someone from a commercial background to help us 
with that dialogue, and that has paid dividends. I have not talked to many 
colleagues, they may have done that themselves to start with … but I 
would certainly urge others to do that. I think you need someone in who is 
equally au fait with how the private sector works.” 
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Arguing from a private sector perspective, the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an 
urban PCT in the South West [CEO, urban SW] suggested that it was 
important for the public sector to feel confident about the deals it was 
involved in.  He further suggested that both external advisors and advisory 
organisations such as Partnership for Health played a key role in ensuring 
that there was an atmosphere of trust:  
 
“The PCT would not be as knowledgeable a client as the private sector 
would whose main interest is understanding the commercial deal that is on 
the table …  So there would just be a natural difference in experience 
because the PCT does not have a lot of people who are used to doing a 
commercial deal like that.  When it comes to negotiating, sometimes the 
points that the PCT find they feel anxious about, the private sector might 
sometimes be surprised …  The thing that the PCT rely on, apart from 
external advisors that it might buy in to help it, is Partnerships For Health 
as the custodian for the contracts and the lease-plus agreements in the 
first place.  I think that relationship is extremely important for the PCT to 
feel secure in signing up to a deal and not feeling exposed.” 
 
This view was shared by the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in the North East 
[CEO, urban NE] who further suggested that there were significant 
opportunities for trust building and cost saving, if different parties to a LIFT 
agreement were able to share external advisors: 
 
“Every so often we challenge and we irritate the lawyers by challenging 
why they have to do it in this way.  We were desperate to try and save 
costs in the NHS. We said to them: One of our significant costs is lawyers 
on each deal, it i not a huge cost but in the grand scheme of things we pay 
for a lawyer, the bank has a lawyer, the NHS has a lawyer all working on 
the same contract documentation and it just seems ridiculous because 
actually.  These deals have been done now seven times so all the 
problems have been worked through and it seems daft really but we were 
told hard and fast that we cannot … share lawyers.  We were happy to go 
with their lawyers and for us to pay them, it was not about getting them to 
use our lawyers, but they just would not do it and they could not do it they 
said. I think another LIFTCo has done it, so these things are probably 
urban myths.” 
 
With regard to the issue of consultation, most of the senior user 
interviewees tended to suggested that their LIFT projects had provided 
adequate opportunities for consultation for relevant stakeholders.  This view 
was exemplified by Partnership Director from an urban PCT in the North 
West [Part Dir, urban NW] who suggested that consultation was an integral 
part of the LIFT procurement process: 
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“In the past we have always taken consultation very seriously …. For the 
schemes we are looking at now, we have refined that engagement process 
and are engaging very early on with the local people about what makes 
sense.  At the same time we are being careful that we have got some 
framework within which we know we can operate when we go out because 
there is always the risk that you get a huge list of things that you cannot 
deliver.” 
 
This view was confirmed by both practice managers who noted that they 
had considerable input during the project phase [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1 
and 2].  However, one of the practice managers [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1] 
noted that this was now no longer the case: 
 
“We do not have a great deal of contact with LIFT at all.  We are kept 
away from that and the Project Manager sees to that side of it.  I do know 
because the Project Manager and her team works across the road … I 
meet them occasionally but in relation to this build we have nothing to do 
with them.” 
 
Looking at these interviews as a whole, there was strong evidence that 
public and private sector interviewees perceived close partnerships as key 
to the success of LIFT schemes.  At the same time, there was an indication 
that virtually all interviewees felt that creating strong partnership was not 
easy and required considerable effort from all parties.  As part of this view, 
most, if not all, of our interviewees rejected the notion that the public sector 
lacked the skills to play a significant role within these partnerships.  These 
findings significantly deviated, not only from the key informant interviews, 
but also from an extensive literature academic and public policy literature 
(Gershon, Bates) which has highlighted skill imbalances between the public 
and private sectors as a key problem of PPP procurement and management.  
Although some of this could be attributed to recent events, such as the 
credit crunch, which appear to have reduced the general confidence in 
private sector skills, a more likely explanation is that these views are 
reflection of the leveling effects of real world experiences with partnerships.  
This would fall in line with earlier research (Asenova and Beck, 2003a) 
which has indicated that, although the public sector often enters 
partnerships with less initial experience, this situation changes over time as 
public sector partners gain relevant experiences during the operational 
phase of these projects.    
 
The DICTION output for the ‘partnership and skill requirements’ text 
segments confirmed the general impression that partnership was perceived 
as a problematic area that required work and effort from all parties.  This 
was illustrated by, among others, the fact that all interviewees showed 
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negative scores for the variable ‘inspiration’ and predominantly negative 
scores for ‘praise’.  In addition, the fact that both practice managers showed 
significantly negative scores for ‘inspiration’ [Proj Dir, rural W Midl 1] and 
for one of them [Proj Dir, rural W Midl 1] significantly negative scores for 
‘praise’ and ‘accomplishment’, could be taken as indication for the fact that 
this area was perceived as being particularly problematic by these two 
interviewees.  This pattern is likely to reflect the fact that working within 
LIFT partnerships created particular difficulties for those operating at the 
ground level of practice management.    
 
 
Table 4.8, DICTION output, User Interviews, ‘partnership and skill 
requirements’ text segments, standardized scores and significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
Part Dir urban 
NW  
 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
Assoc Dir 
Urban SW 
 
 
-0.86 
 
0.20 
 
-0.80 
 
0.24 
 
0 
Assoc Dir 
Rural E Midl 
 
 
0.08 
 
0.52 
 
-0.80 
 
0.50 
 
+* 
Proj Dir  
Mixed NW 
 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
 
~ 
Proj Dir 
Rural W Midl 
 
 
-0.54 
 
0.26 
 
-0.50 
 
0.87 
 
+* 
Pract Mgr 
Rural W Midl 
1 
 
-0.73 
 
-0.08 
 
-1.11* 
 
-0.01 
 
+* 
Pract Mgr 
Rural W Midl 
2 
 
-1.85* 
 
-0.05 
 
-1.20* 
 
-1.72* 
 
0 
CEO 
Urban NW 
 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.33 
 
-0.13 
 
0 
CEO  
Urban SW 
 
 
-0.15 
 
0.09 
 
-0.35 
 
1.54 
 
+* 
 
CEO 
Urban W Midl 
 
 
-0.76 
  
-0.19 
 
-0.70 
  
0.33 
 
+* 
CEO 
Urban NE 
 
 
0.34 
 
0.23 
  
-0.50 
 
-1.02* 
 
0 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
 
 4.3.4 Cultural Issues and Conflicts – User Views 
Following the layout of the ‘key informant’ subsection, this brief analysis 
focuses primarily on issues of cultural conflicts and conflict management in 
LIFT projects; with the topic of cultural differences and diversity being 
discussed in greater detail in section 5 (‘Managing Cultural Diversity in LIFT 
Partnerships’).  Due to the relatively brief statements which the 
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interviewees made with regard to this issue, a computer aided content 
analysis has been omitted from this section. 
 
Representative for several other public sector interviewees, the Associate 
Director of a rural PCT in the East Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] 
suggested that differences in value orientation between public and private 
sector organizations were not necessarily a source of conflict.  However, this 
interviewee felt that the public and private sector had to deal with different 
types of uncertainties which could create difficulties in goal alignment: 
 
“I am not sure whether the fact that we have got very different goals and 
different aims creates conflicts.  I also could not say whether it has any 
impact on LIFT really.  … In a private company you have always got the 
risk of the marketplace but you can set yourself a plan based on 
influencing factors of the marketplace.  In the NHS we can set ourselves a 
10 years plan based on the influencing factors of the marketplace, but we 
are always going to have to take account of the political agenda.  We can 
see that at the moment with the credit crunch on.  Obviously this affects 
the private sector … but there are political agendas and that makes it 
difficult to predict our policies.”   
 
This view was echoed by the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the 
South West [CEO, urban SW] who argued that it was important for both 
sectors to recognize the uncertainties and resource constraints they faced: 
 
“The way the partnership comes out is how you deal with issues and 
problems. Both parties do need to respect the others position.  The private 
sector does have to respect the difficulties that the PCT is working with; all 
the issues of the NHS where policy changes are the law and wholesale 
changes in the organisation come round very quickly.  At the PCT, as 
much as we would like them to prevent policy changes coming through 
which affect the way that we are working with them, we have to 
understand that they cannot do that.  So we have to respect that they 
have got limits to what they can do.  The PCT also has to respect the 
commercial pressures that we are under to deliver a scheme to them, to 
maintain it, to keep it in good condition and to be able to make decisions 
about what represents VfM.  That means understanding principles of 
business beyond what an individual brick might cost.  It is about 
understanding complex deals … how the costs are developed and how 
those costs and providing a reasonable return to investors is important in 
making sure the deal goes ahead at all.  It has got to work both ways and 
you do need that respect and understanding.”   
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Focusing on the issue of conflicts, the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in an 
urban PCT in the North West [CEO, urban NW] similarly suggested that the 
constraints which both sectors faced was often the root cause of debates.  
The same informant further suggested that these issues could be resolved 
within strong partnerships by focusing on possible resolutions: 
 
“Some of the constraints we are facing, in terms of external directives and 
financial resources, certainly will lead to concerns and debate but that is 
where the partnership has to have a framework for resolving that conflict. 
So you have to build that trust and that trust bounds you.  You have to 
say right, we recognise that constraint there, but we want to find a 
resolution that can be explored in terms of parties involved.”   
 
Following a similar line of argument, the Associate Director of a rural PCT in 
the East Midlands [Assoc Dir, E Midl] suggested that there were no inherent 
conflicts between the private sector partners and PCTs as long as all parties 
had an interest in ensuring future growth: 
 
“It is just a fact of life in business that you have to make a profit to keep a 
business working properly.  In the discussions we have had about the 
business plan for LIFTCo with the PCTs, everybody wanted the LIFTCo to 
remain as an entity which is growing and right for the future.  … We know 
that the number of LIFT schemes will slow down in the next three years, 
but we want the LIFTCo to stay as a vital organisation, growing and 
changing rather than rather than just being a company that just looks 
after the existing buildings.”  
 
In highlighting the issue of resource constraints, several informants implied 
that there was a possibility that the joint management of LIFT schemes 
would become more difficult in the future when planned changes were 
implemented or constraints became more pronounced.  This view was 
expressed explicitly by the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East 
Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E Midl] who suggested that:  
 
“We are seeing a big push for lots of diversity and polarity of providers. I 
think that presents them with problems as well, because traditional 
providers are going to be a lot less prepared to take risks.  I think they 
have to be more flexible to meet demands of commissioners and they 
have to be more flexible to tender for services and be prepared to even 
risk losing services. I really don’t think that will work in LIFT’s favour 
either.  All of this could give rise to new types of conflicts which we are not 
prepared for.”    
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Although there was a broad consensus that the current governance 
structure of LIFT projects provided for adequate means of conflict 
resolution, this was not necessarily the case with regard to conflict 
resolution mechanisms at the ground level.  Thus one of the practice 
managers [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1] noted that: 
 
“Other than talk there are no mechanisms in place for conflicts resolution.  
We also have not had an official building meeting.  Our steering group, 
when we were the steering group prior to coming in here, is now going to 
form up under another title.  I am not quite sure what it is yet, and I think 
we are due to meet for the first time because they said they would let 
things settle down and there would be problems initially.  If we have the 
meeting too early it would not give them chance to iron out.”  
 
Overall, there was some indication that most senior user interviewees felt 
that the governance structure of LIFT schemes provided for adequate 
means of conflict resolution.  However, these views were often tempered 
with the proviso that this situation could become more unstable and difficult 
on account of future constraints faced by both the public and private 
sectors.  In addition, the small number of practice managers who  were 
interviewed in this context indicated that they were not necessarily satisfied 
with existing provisions for conflict resolution and noted that the creation of 
appropriate committees had been delayed.   
 
4.3.5 Targeting and Local Impact – User Views 
Following the structure of the key informant interviews, this subsection 
analyses the views of user informants with regard to the targeting and local 
impact of LIFT.  Specific areas of interest included how users viewed 
willingness of the private sector to invest in areas where potential returns 
from property may be limited.  In addition, the team sought to investigate 
the perceptions of interviewees with regard to the local impact of LIFT 
projects.   
 
It should be noted at the outset that a number of user interviewees chose 
not to comment on issues of targeting as they felt that their knowledge of 
these areas was limited.  However, this was again largely compensated for 
by the full and nuanced statements made primarily in particular by those 
users who had experience with multiple or heterogeneous localities.  Due to 
the limited number of interviewees commenting on this issue, a computer 
aided content analysis has been omitted from this subsection. 
 
Working in a city with large wealth differentials, the Associate Director of an 
urban PCT in the South West [Assoc Dir, urban SW] noted that his PCT had 
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made a concerted effort to locate LIFT projects in the most deprived areas.  
Specifically, this informant suggested these location choices had been self-
evident on account of the fact that these areas also had the poorest 
buildings: 
 
“The poorest buildings were in the poorest areas anyway, and our city its 
often referred to as two cities in one in the sense that there are some very 
affluent areas, and some very poor areas with some of the highest indices 
of deprivation that you will find nationally.  So, on the whole, in fact all 
four of the buildings are on the sites of the buildings they replaced, 
because the buildings were largely in the right place.” 
 
This view was mirrored by the Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East 
Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E midl] who suggested that targeting deprivation 
had not only been a key but also continued to inform ongoing activities: 
 
 “Certainly as we have thought about our commissioning strategy, health 
inequalities has been our number one priority. Now that knocks on to our 
estates strategy or how we want our providers to look and we want them 
to do …” 
 
Further on in the same interview, this informant qualified his view by 
explaining that the effort to target deprivation within his old PCT was 
probably less obvious now as it had been merged with a rural area:   
 
“For the old PCT deprivation was a key factor.  If you look now at our new 
PCT … you would probably think well why did you do that?  But for that 
particular locality at the time it was the right thing to do.”   
 
While discussing the complexities the merger of PCTs had created for his 
area, the same informant noted that that the rurality of the new PCT 
created particular challenges in terms of commissioning: 
 
“Rurality … is a challenge for us, we have to take account of our rurality, 
you look at the diversity of our population and you look at the inequities in 
our population all of which creates challenges to us as a commissioning 
organization. … We have not got any big urban areas.  Obviously one large 
city … and if you look at the LIFT schemes that is probably where they 
have benefited most from the volume.  But in terms of need, the County 
would have presented many opportunities.”  
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These views contrasted to some degree with those of the Project Director of 
a mixed rural and urban PCT in the North West [Proj Dir, mixed NW] who 
suggested that his PCT had taken issues of deprivation into account but 
noted that the characteristics of the existing estate had also played a role: 
 
“Deprivation played a big role, but I think the other aspect is assessing the 
quality of existing stock, existing estate.  It has always been a bit of a 
combination of deprivation, having to improve health, having to change 
services to help make people healthier and prevent illness. … In a lot of 
cases in our area the quality of the estate has been very poor and there 
has been a lack of investment historically and also hardly any money put 
into maintenance. So those two features alongside an increased budget 
have really enabled the PCTs to start moving.”  
 
Addressing the issue of developing LIFT projects in deprived areas, the 
Project Director of a predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, 
rural W Midl] noted that involving the local population of such areas often 
posed particular difficulties:  
 
“To give them that vision and start saying it will be different and, yes, 
there is some trauma to deal with; like we have just knocked your pub 
down.  I think in … deprived areas, people have got low expectations 
about what they can get.  It is important to raise their expectations and 
get them to realise there are ways of doing things and getting involved in 
the process and engaged in what is happening.  The other partners also 
have to get involved in that.” 
 
Speaking from the private sectors perspective, CEO of a LIFTCo operating in 
an urban PCT in the North West [CEO, urban NW] noted that deprivation 
and need had been a central criterion for LIFT procurement. However, the 
same informant further suggested that he had observed that exceptions to 
this could be made where PCTs saw unique opportunity for development: 
 
“Deprivation and health need is always on top of the list.  There are 
schemes that come up that may not score highly on those premises but 
are opportunistic, you know, if there is a very exciting scheme and we 
might be able to engage with sports or engage with leisure.  Then clearly 
we do not rule that out, but ultimately GPs and deprivation and health 
need is the PCT’s top priority.” 
 
The same informant further discussed his belief that deprived areas in 
particular benefited from integrated design of LIFT facilities and stressed his 
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company’s efforts to promote facilities which promoted joint service 
provision: 
 
 “The projects we have done in our city are full Joint Service Centres.  We 
opened a scheme a matter of weeks ago.  There is one reception, one 
building, a library, one stop social services,  the waiting area is library 
space … It is a total sea change in how we have done the buildings.  The 
library is the obvious way for drawing people in routinely.  If the Council 
do not want a library in that locality, we are still looking at how do we 
make that a non clinical or non institutional environment, and how do you 
draw people in on a more routine basis.”   
 
Arguing along similar lines, another CEO working in an urban PCT in the 
South West [CEO, urban SW] argued that some of the opportunities for 
joined up development had not materialised for a number of reasons.  
These reasons included, among others, GP resistance, the lack of availability 
of suitable land and competition with residential developers in inner city 
areas:   
 
“With regard to deprivation, there are some big opportunities that have 
not necessarily been tackled yet.  I know when we were trying to get the 
first schemes … we went to some of the more deprived parts and we were 
talking to GPs in Health Centres owned by the PCT.  Sometimes it was a 
real struggle to convince the GPs that they wanted to be part of LIFT.  … 
There were opportunities discussed with certain schemes which did not go 
ahead …  because it was difficult in the time that was available to get buy-
in from the GPs to take part.  … There are undoubtedly still some very 
high priority schemes out there which have not been tackled yet for 
various reasons … such as that there is not the land available to actually 
redevelop on.  There are pressures, particularly in inner city areas where 
land, any free land could be sold for residential. We are always competing 
with residential property prices at well over a million pounds an acre even 
in more deprived parts.”  
 
In addition, the same informant noted that the cost of land in these areas 
created affordability issues which could adversely affect the targeting of 
these areas: 
 
“Even before anything else, the cost of putting a new facility in is pretty 
high and there is no answer to that in terms of being able to deal in 
reduced land values.  Even if it is PCT owned land and they have to sell it 
to the LIFTCo, they still have to sell it at market value which means I have 
to charge them a rent having bought the land off them at market value.  
That is an expensive way to proceed.  That is part of the accounting rules, 
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which I understand why they are there, but it makes it more difficult to 
make these deals work.  Again there is always a principle behind LIFT that 
we could do more third party development to offset some of these costs, 
which you can only do if there is sufficient land available to build extra 
houses on, and we have never found a site that is big enough to do 
anything other than put the Health Centre on with the parking it needs 
and put a pharmacy in there.”    
 
Further on in the same interview, this informant suggested that having 
targeted inner areas had created uncertainties which primarily affect the 
PCT: 
 
“The private sector has not struggled to invest in any of these schemes 
because it has taken the PCT as the main tenants so the covenant 
strength is through the PCT being able to pay the rents.  The difficulty is 
more about making it affordable for the PCT.  Trying to maximise the 
residual value that we are demonstrating in each scheme that we build is 
something we have to work quite hard on.  But it is guesswork, you know, 
what is the worth of that piece of land in 30 years time. It is whatever we 
can convince the bank that they will take a risk against lending us against 
a preferred value.  There has not been any issue about the private sector 
wanting to invest, it is more trying to make it affordable for the PCT.” 
 
Despite critical comments regarding the problems of targeting deprived 
areas in inner cities in particular, there was some consensus among public 
and private sector user interviewees, that where LIFT projects had been 
successfully developed, this had typically resulted in significant benefits in 
terms of regeneration.  Positive statements about these benefits, moreover, 
were made by informants working in both rural areas with only one or two 
interviewees stating that they lacked the information to comment on this 
issue. 
 
One example of informants highlighting these benefits included the Project 
Director of a mixed rural and urban PCT in the North West [Proj Dir, mixed 
NW] who noted that new LIFT buildings had had a major positive impact on 
formerly deprived areas: 
 
 “Our new buildings have hugely contributed to regeneration.  There is one 
example where both the existing old health centre and the library were in 
a very deprived shopping area and it was appalling.  The whole lot was 
terrible. We have put the new health centre there and it has made a 
massive difference to regenerating that area. Off the back of it, the LIFT 
are bidding to be the developers to redevelop all the shops.  In another 
area we were able to develop a health facility adjacent to a primary 
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school, link the two things together with a sort of drop off centre like a 
campus which has made a big difference to regeneration.  Anywhere we 
did a facility this has contributed in one way or another to the 
regeneration of a deprived area.” 
 
When queried about the issue of employment generation, several 
informants noted that number of additional local jobs created by these jobs 
had perhaps been small, but that the economic benefits of this should 
nonetheless not been underestimated.  This view was again exemplified by 
the Project Director of a mixed rural and urban PCT in the North West [Proj 
Dir, mixed NW] who recalled how the creation of new facilities had led to 
recruitments form the local population: 
 
 “There are some good examples of our contractors using local employment 
during the construction phase so they could potentially be short term.  But 
nonetheless they have taken on a few trainees as well.  I do not know if 
they have stayed with the company but the fact that they took them on 
and helped to train them up is great.  There will be some other small 
elements of local employment and perhaps extra receptionists or staff to 
work in the new centres.  Although it tends not to be loads of new jobs 
because a lot of people relocate from other facilities, but you will get the 
odd couple of jobs.  I recall some of the parents dropping kids off at the 
school adjacent, when they knew the new facility was going up, they 
turned up and knocked on the site office to say have you got a job?  One 
of the ladies turned up in her nightie with her slippers on and got a job--
she must have been quite impressive--as a receptionist for the building 
site.  That has happened on quite a few occasions and there have also 
been jobs with security as well because security firms recruit local people.”  
  
While generally very positive about these developments, the same 
informant noted that the recent economic downturn had made things more 
difficult and stated that he was unsure whether other planned developments 
would go ahead: 
 
“It has been slightly messed up, that second part of the project, because 
of the change in economic conditions.  Macroeconomics meant that the 
land values have all changed so it has not gone as fast as it should have 
done to regenerate the shops because the people who were going to 
develop the shops, the land values changed.  So it is extremely difficult.”  
 
These comments were mirrored by several of the private sector 
interviewees, who, like the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the 
West Midlands [CEO, urban W Midl] noted that the investment of their 
company had been closely aligned with the activities of the LA: 
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“Our investment has targeted the most deprived communities that have 
the poorest health outcomes, that have got the poorest economic 
indicators, totally aligned with the investment that the Local Authority is 
making in housing.  So there is no area of the City … where the Local 
Authority is not developing with us.  The strategy is about joint investment 
into those areas and that is why it makes so sense. … It has been a very 
logical public health based series of investments that we were making 
where primary care was poorest in terms of supply, highest degree of 
single-handed practices, all the usual kind of stuff you would expect to 
see.  There is a real logic behind what we are planning to do and it makes 
it quite easy to deliver as a LIFTCo.  We believe in the logic, and we can 
already see the value that that is bringing.”  
 
Overall there was a broad consensus that LIFT projects had been targeted 
to the areas most in need of investment.  These views, however, were 
tempered by the observation of some public sector interviewees that 
targeting had become obscured through PCT mergers which had change the 
boundaries in which LIFTCo-s operated.  Similarly, on the private sector 
side, interviews operating in areas of high and growing land value noted 
that their situation could militate against the targeting, or affordability of 
LIFT schemes.  Lastly, several interviewees stressed the adverse impact the 
economic downturn was already having on the development of planned 
schemes and, in so doing, highlighted the vulnerability of these projects to 
complex macro and micro economic factors.   
 
4.3.6 Value for Money and Related Financial Issues – User  
 Views 
This group of questions was aimed at exploring issues relating to VfM for 
money and other financial issues associated with LIFT.  Specifically, the 
users interviewees were asked whether they perceived LIFT projects as 
providing for money, or otherwise, and which evidence they could cite in 
support of their views.  The informants were further asked whether they felt 
that there were difficulties in evaluating the VfM aspects of LIFT projects 
and, in particular, whether it was appropriate to draw comparisons with 
non-LIFT projects.  Lastly, the key informants were asked to describe the 
potential impact of LIFT on issues of affordability.  
 
As in the case of the key informants, the user interviewees tended to agree 
that LIFT schemes provided VfM, but qualified their views with statements 
about difficulties in measuring this purely in cost terms.  This view was 
exemplified by the Partnership Director from an urban PCT in the North 
West [Part Dir, urban NW] who emphasised the advantages of LIFT schemes 
in terms of service delivery: 
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“Yes I think our buildings are VfM.  I think if they were not affordable they 
would not happen … I think there is always a question as to how you 
measure value.  When you are looking at value, the first thing people tend 
to look at--because it is quite tangible--is cost.  That is clearly a very 
important element but if you were to look at some of our recent schemes. 
We have just opened two joint service centres, which I think if you looked 
at the actual base cost, you would say those are expensive.  I think you 
need to look at … what the buildings are, what they are doing and how 
they are bringing together services.  It is a true partnership between the 
PCT and the City Council, the building will become one facility, one joined 
up facility for the delivery of services that will benefit the community in 
terms of library, internet café, council services one stop shop, GP services, 
rehabilitation facilities, audiology, dentistry, etc.  And when you see a 
building that is completely integrated, when you see as you walk in, it is 
not about services that just happen to be co-located, it is about the 
operation together connected, you walk in at reception and you can book 
an appointment with your GP and check out a library book at the same 
time.  That is fantastic and people have got one staff room, and 
understand what else is there in the building, how one service might 
support the other services and the opportunities for cross referrals.”  
 
This view was echoed by the Project Director of a mixed rural and urban 
PCT in the North West [Proj Dir, mixed NW] who argued that the VfM of 
LIFT projects had to be assessed in relation to the additional benefits these 
projects provided: 
 
“I think one of the problems with LIFT is that when you look at some of 
the headline figures for lease costs per square metre, or how much a 
building is costing per year, a lot of people try to relate that to other 
commercial buildings that they have got … or compare it to third party 
developments like GP practices and they say wow that is a lot more 
money.  So there is an education issue around about what LIFT includes 
compared to other schemes and the LIFTCo need to be in a position to 
break that down and say, this third party development here is different to 
what the LIFT building is because of X, Y and Z.  There are all sorts of 
extras you get, all the maintenance is included, law changes are included, 
you get insurance and the specification of the building will be higher as 
well.”   
 
Similar views were expressed by some of the private sector interviewees, 
who, like the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the South west 
[CEO, urban SW], argued that debates over VfM often overlooked the 
benefits of LIFT projects in terms of improved maintenance and improved 
services: 
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“VfM is not easy to measure, because there are many different views 
about what value you are trying to deliver.  You could say that there is 
VfM in terms of that if you did not build it through LIFT, it would not get 
built at all.  It is sometimes difficult for the PCT to understand VfM in 
terms of we are providing a building where we are taking the risk on the 
maintenance and lifecycle costs for 30 years.  So we have to show what 
our costs are in their plan and the PCT would not typically think about 
budgeting maintenance costs for any of its buildings for that period of 
time.  They do not really have a concept of whole life cost and … typically 
look at comparing it with what they currently spend on a building.  …  
Overall, the total cost of putting the building up is outweighed by the cost 
of operating that building over 25 years by at least, you know, 5 to 1 or 
more.  … I think all of those things need looking at.  How are you going to 
measure that?  You can measure it in the cost of bricks, but really what 
you want to measure is health outcomes.  How on earth do you do that?”  
 
Arguing along similar lines, the Project Director of a predominantly rural 
PCT in the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl] suggested that the 
prerequisite of VfM in LIFT projects was that existing opportunities were 
fully exploited and the buildings were adequately maintained in the future: 
 
“LIFT is VfM, if you have the means to get the GPs making good and 
positive use of it, and the PCT services making good and positive use of it 
and ensuring that that buildings assets are sweated.  I mean we provided 
for the fact that it would be open 70 hours a week in the first instance.  
One of the other bits which relates to VfM is that, no matter what happens 
with public sector budgets, you can guarantee those buildings are going to 
be maintained.  Providing you have got a good maintenance bit in your 
contract, you can guarantee it.”   
 
While agreeing with the notion that measuring VfM was difficult, the 
Associate Director of a rural PCT in the East Midlands [Assoc Dir, rural E 
Midl] suggested that it was difficult to evidence this beyond the formal 
approval process: 
 
“We have very set and strict processes around any business case 
regardless or whether it is LIFT or not and we will go through the same 
process … we will go to outline business case, full business case, we will do 
the work to ensure we are getting VfM for patients and so on and so forth.  
Even the smaller schemes LIFT have done for us have gone through a 
similar process, obviously on a smaller scale.  We have also heavily 
involved our own estates department who had the experience … But 
whether LIFT itself represents VfM that is the thing I am still unsure of.  
There are intangibles in the Lease Plus Agreement and we need to see in 5 
years how that is working and how much benefit it has given to us 
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because I guess you could almost do a discount and cash flow …  There is 
certainly a perception out there around the VfM issue.  But to be fair to 
them, I am not so sure we have ever evidenced it.  We can certainly show 
to the public that we have met our processes and ticked our boxes around 
VfM but about LIFT itself I am not sure.” 
 
While most of the public sector interviewees expressed some concerns over 
costs, this was not necessarily the case with the private sector interviewees.  
Thus, several private sector interviewees suggested that cost issues were 
mostly attributable to a lack of clarity or excessive ambition on the side of 
the public sector client.  This view was exemplified by the CEO of a LIFTCo 
operating in an urban PCT in the North West [CEO, urban NW]: 
 
“When you are absolutely clear what you want and absolutely clear what it 
should deliver, there is no reason why LIFT cannot do that for you.  Some 
of the issues that have been attached to LIFT are not LIFT issues. They are 
about people not understanding what they are asking for, like asking for a 
Landmark building when they do not actually want one.  I know of an 
example where they ended up with a huge atrium which was costly and 
unnecessary.” 
 
This view was mirrored by the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in 
the West Midlands [CEO, urban W Midl] who suggested that it was often the 
private sector which encouraged the adoption of cheaper solutions: 
 
“If you specify a tin shack, the market will give you a price for a tin shack.  
It depends what you want.   …  We are constantly saying to PCTs that we 
think there is a cheaper alternative you could consider which would not 
give you a worse outcome.  It would give you an equal standard but it’s a 
cheaper alternative.  We are constantly having that dialogue as we 
develop these buildings.  We go to the construction market with every 
single project, which is quite labour intensive but it does give you sharp 
prices that are very open and transparent, you know they are there on the 
table--so they can make the right decision.”  
 
Another private sector interviewee, the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in an 
urban PCT in the North East [CEO, urban NE], suggested that there was a 
possibility that once all costs were considered, LIFT schemes were actually 
cheaper than older facilities: 
 
“I think you pay for what you get.  I think the reality is that the NHS does 
not really know what it is paying for its shoddy old stock and a few 
LIFTCo-s have now done comparisons and found LIFT to be cheaper 
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actually.  Whether you agree with the inputs is another issue.  I think the 
problem for Local Authorities is that they do not necessarily know what 
they are paying for … because they are paying through dozens of 
budgets.”  
 
However, in further discussing the issue of cost control, the same 
interviewee suggested that perhaps not all LIFT companies were similarly 
cost conscious and noted that much of this had to do with the specific 
relationship the company maintained with a socially responsible local 
building firm: 
 
“I know that some of my peers in the LIFT network have entirely different 
relationships with their shareholders and their construction arm. … I worry 
about what will happen if we choose a different firm …  So far we had a 
consensus that, if we keep doing a good job for the NHS and we are 
getting the best deal, we will have repeat business.  But I do not know 
what happens when people are in it for the quick buck.”     
 
Although most interviewees avoided discussing the potential adverse effect 
of shareholders on the cost of LIFTs in any detail, there were several public 
and private sector informants who, like the previously quoted interviewee, 
touched on this issue.  On example of this was the Project Director of a 
mixed rural and urban PCT in the North West [Proj Dir, mixed NW] who 
implied cautiously, that there was a temptation for shareholders to push for 
‘healthy’ returns especially in the early phase of a project.  This informant 
therefore argued that it was advisable to approach the issue of shareholding 
and contract awards cautiously:  
 
 “I can see a lot of logic if the private sector partner is not the 
shareholders, the private sector shareholders are not the construction 
company or they may be but you do not use them at the outset as the 
builder; that is a much better situation to be in, I think.  Our own situation 
is like that: We have not got a builder, we use mid-size construction 
company and we are quite happy with it, as we have been able to reduce 
the construction costs which is probably almost unique in LIFT.  If they 
would have been a shareholder, it might have been a different story.  So I 
think that is a big issue for LIFT.” 
 
Another, perhaps less important, financial concern which was raised by 
some public sector interviewees related to the issue of billing delays.  This 
issue was discussed, among others, by the two practice managers working 
for a predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 
1 and 2].  Thus, one of these practice managers [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1] 
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noted that delays in billing had made it impossible for him to assess costs 
and forced him to speculate about future expenses:  
 
“I cannot give you any detailed information on costs because we have not 
had any bills yet.  I am putting aside money to meet all our expected costs 
but I would think that cleaning services would be on a par … In relation to 
telephones, I would expect to make a saving there because we had our 
own exchange if you like, and we were direct customers with BT whereas 
here we are taken in on the bigger scheme of things and it’s all networked 
and all works with computers as well so… so I would expect to see a 
saving there.  As for utilities it remains to be seen.  Bit scary on that one 
…” 
 
Upon further prompting, the same practice manager noted that this problem 
had persisted for some time and was shared by other practices in the area:  
 
 “We have gone eight months now and we have not a clue what the utilities 
is going to be.  I am putting aside money every month because I have got 
no choice but I think that when you speak to my colleague this afternoon, 
she will tell you that she has been in there for about 18 months, and she 
still has not got any bills in relation to some services …  I cannot really 
understand what the problem is or what a lot of the delay is, they must be 
paying the bills because the electric company and gas company do not 
keep pumping it in, do they, unless they are receiving payments.” 
 
In addition, the same practice manager noted other concerns over a lack of 
control over expenses, which arose in connection with shared areas: 
 
“On a number of occasions I have lodged a complaint if you like about the 
temperature of the waiting room downstairs because that has just been 
roasting hot and we are trying to sort of keep our place at a nice workable 
temperature, because at the end of the day I will pay an element of that 
bill.  The bill for the whole building will be taken and then it will be 
apportioned by space. So there is an issue there.” 
 
This view was echoed by another practice manager [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 
2] who also had not received service bills for a lengthy period: 
 
 “I have no idea whether these premises are reasonable financially.  We are 
almost two years on and we still have not had our first year’s service 
charges …  I do not quite know why the hold up is, we have been asking 
them hundreds of times. … Previously we just paid our own phone costs 
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and phone maintenance, so that is something now that comes within our 
service costs. We had to do some clever budgeting really and do best 
guestimates of what we think it is going to cost.  We always knew it was 
going to cost us more money.” 
 
Taken together, these interviews gave a very mixed picture of how LIFT 
users perceived the VfM aspects of their schemes.  While the majority of 
public and private sector LIFT users, with the exception of the CEO of a 
LIFTCo operating in an urban PCT in the North East [CEO, urban NE], 
appeared to acknowledge that these projects were potentially more costly 
than conventional buildings, they typically attributed this to improved 
service delivery and/or maintenance.  However, even where these provisos 
were made, several informants suggested that it would be difficult to 
evidence the benefits of LIFT quantitatively; beyond assurances that 
existing procedural guidelines for VfM for money exercises have been 
followed.  In addition, at least some of the informants felt that the desire of 
shareholders to secure adequate returns particularly during the early years 
of a scheme could adversely impact on the costs of LIFT projects.  Lastly, 
our admittedly small and potentially unrepresentative sample of practice 
managers highlighted concerns over delayed billing.   
 
These patterns are roughly confirmed by the respective DICTION output 
which shows significant negative scores for a number of variables and 
respondents.  These include the Practice Manager Director working for a 
predominantly rural PCT in the West Midlands [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl 1] for 
the ‘praise’ variable; the Project Director working for a rural PCT in the West 
Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl], both Practice Managers working for the 
same PCT [Pract Mgr, rural W Midl, 1 and 2] and the CEO of a LIFTCo 
operating in an urban PCT in the North West [CEO, urban NW] for the 
‘inspiration’ variable; the Project Director of a predominantly rural PCT in 
the West Midlands [Proj Dir, rural W Midl] and the CEO of a LIFTCo 
operating an urban PCT in the North East [CEO, urban NE] for the 
‘accomplishment’ variable.   
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Table 4.9. DICTION output, User Interviews, ‘value for money and 
related financial issues’ text segments, standardized scores and 
significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certaintyx 
Part Dir urban 
NW  
 
 
0.30 
 
-0.25 
 
-0.43 
 
.020 
 
0 
Assoc Dir 
Urban SW 
 
 
0.23 
 
0.56 
 
-058 
 
-0.48 
 
0 
Assoc Dir 
Rural E Midl 
 
 
0.17 
 
1.54* 
 
-0.62 
 
-0.04 
 
0 
Proj Dir  
Mixed NW 
 
 
0.25 
 
-0.23 
 
0.14 
 
0.54 
 
0 
Proj Dir 
Rural W Midl 
 
 
-0.44 
 
0.40 
 
-1.56* 
 
-1.14* 
 
0 
Pract Mgr 
Rural W Midl 
1 
 
-1.05* 
 
0.14 
 
-1.11* 
 
-0.70 
 
0 
Pract Mgr 
Rural W Midl 
2 
 
0.15 
 
0.38 
 
-1.01* 
 
-0.42 
 
0 
CEO 
Urban NW 
 
 
0.12 
 
-0.27 
 
-1.07* 
 
0.15 
 
0 
CEO  
Urban SW 
 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.43 
 
-0.85 
 
1.29* 
 
0 
 
CEO 
Urban W Midl 
 
 
-0.12 
  
0.77 
 
-0.60 
  
1.52* 
 
0 
CEO 
Urban NE 
 
 
-0.28 
 
1.15* 
  
-0.84 
 
-1.06* 
 
0 
x As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
~ Results omitted due to lack of data. 
  
Meanwhile the number of significant positive scores is much smaller, 
including the Associate Director of a rural  PCT in the East Midlands [Assoc 
Dir, rural E Midl] and the CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the 
North East [CEO, urban NE] for the ‘satisfaction’ variable; the CEO of a 
LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the South West [CEO, urban SW] and the 
CEO of a LIFTCo operating an urban PCT in the West Midlands [CEO, urban 
W Midl] for the ‘accomplishment’ variable.   
 
The notable feature of the DICTION scores is the lack of consistency 
horizontally by respondent. Most see some positive and negative aspects of 
LIFT in VfM terms. Reconsidering the quoted evidence above in conjunction 
with the DICTION evidence, it would appear that respondents might be 
positive about the process but not about the outcome, or vice versa 
(contrast praise and inspiration with satisfaction and accomplishment 
respectively). For example, the urban CEO’s are satisfied but not inspired, 
and satisfied but not praiseworthy suggesting they are happy with the 
outcome but not the process. 
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Complicating this pattern is tentative evidence of a spatial divide in opinions 
concerning VfM. Rural respondents (such as Rural West Midlands) were 
significantly negatively disposed to their scheme’s accomplishments 
compared to the significantly positive results for at least some of the urban 
respondents. Urban NE is the only exception to this, where the respondent 
took a negative view of accomplishment, but was nonetheless significantly 
positive about satisfaction.  A possible reason for this divergence of views is 
evidence that urban practices deliver services at lower cost per patient than 
rural practices as a result of their greater capacity to combine GP practices 
in a single location (see subsection 6.3). 
 
4.4  Stakeholder Views: Concluding Remarks 
The previous subsections indicated that key informants and user 
interviewees tended to differ in how they view the partnership aspects and 
cultural issues surrounding LIFT.  Specifically there was evidence that key 
informants viewed cultural differences between the public and private 
sector, as well as a potential lack of commercial skills within the public 
sector as a more severe impediment to partnership working than user 
informants did.  This pattern suggests that many PCTs may indeed have 
indeed coped successfully with many of the challenges as well having been 
able to learn from these partnerships.  This finding would contradict some of 
the earlier literature on partnership working which has suggested that PPPs 
continue to be hampered by skill differentials and resultant inequalities in 
bargaining (see e.g., Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin, 2003; and also Pollock, 
2004) while confirming  earlier research which has highlighted the learning 
abilities of the pubic sector (see, e.g., Asenova and Beck, 2003a).  These 
issues are therefore examined further in section 5, which analyses the 
cultural characteristics of LIFT projects in greater detail with reference to 
categories such as synergy, segregation, domination and breakdown.  
As far as VfM was concerned, there was considerable uncertainty in the 
responses. For many, VfM was beyond quantification either because 
outcomes could not be measured or because they lack the means to 
compare like with like. Several users were pleased with their new facilities, 
but at the same time felt that they had accrued perhaps significant and as 
yet unknown costs. One reason for this is was a pattern of delayed billing, 
which may have been a function of financial arrangements between LIFTCo-
s and PCTs aimed at enticing practices to subscribe to the new 
arrangements.  As far as LIFTCos and PCTs are concerned there was little 
evidence of delayed billing, indeed as discussed in section 6 later on, LIFTCo 
revenue had built up faster than anticipated in the first three years of 
operation. A possible explanation is therefore that PCTs either induced 
delayed billing or lacked of capacity to cost accurately. Overall, considering 
that LIFT is fundamentally a financial vehicle, the lack of concern with cost 
from most of the informants was surprising. In view of the concerns raised 
by the Public Accounts Committee as early as 2005 about the lack of 
quantitative evidence concerning VfM (see subsection 6.2), a similar lack of 
awareness from key stakeholders and end users can only add to these 
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problems and ultimately calls into question the long-run financial viability of 
the scheme or its suitability for more widespread implementation. In 
summary, whilst there is some evidence of satisfaction with the benefits, 
there is a disjuncture with costs, such that VfM is not well understood. The 
question of VfM therefore remains an important topic for research, which is 
explored further in section 6. 
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Managing Cultural Diversity 
5.1  Background  
NHS LIFT companies are local joint ventures between private sector 
property development agencies, local health services, local authorities and 
central government (Partnerships for Health), bounded by a long-term 
partnering agreement to deliver investment and services in local primary 
care facilities. Unlike traditional public–private partnerships, public sector 
partners are active, responsible and accountable members of the private 
company and are shareholders and directors of that company in their own 
right.  LIFT projects, therefore, represent a complex of interest groups 
brought together to serve a common purpose. 
 
The public and private organisations which comprise a LIFT partnership each 
have their own distinctive norms of behaviour, shared values and acceptable 
working practices--ultimately different organisational cultures. Previous 
research has identified the many ways in which culture can create barriers 
to collaboration between organisations, and yet how, at the same time, the 
knowledge and repertoires embodied in cultures can provide a valuable 
resource for relationship building and partnership working (see, e.g., 
Asenova et al., 2002).  
 
This section explores the role of culture in facilitating (or impeding) 
successful LIFT partnerships.  Firstly we unpack what is meant by 
organisational culture and introduce some of the key concerns with using a 
cultural approach to understanding inter-organisational relations.  We then 
explore key informants’ views on how culture affects LIFT partnerships, 
drawing on freshly collected qualitative data, before going on to examine 
how cultural diversity has been managed in four LIFT partnership case 
studies. 
 
5.2  The Nature of Organisational Culture  
The notion of ‘organisational culture’ became prominent in the management 
literature of the 1980s and has increasingly found its way into the discourse 
of those who advocate organisational change in health systems.  
Notwithstanding its widespread use by researchers, managers, and 
policymakers, the concept of organisational culture has no broadly agreed 
meaning and is far from being conceptualised universally (Alvesson, 2002).  
For example, Ott (1989) lists 74 elements of organisational culture which 
have been put forward by various authors, while a review of the 
organisational culture literature by van der Post et al. (1997) identified over 
100 dimensions of culture.  Any such definitional problems are confounded 
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by the fact that there is little agreement on the meaning of either of the 
underlying concepts, ‘organisation’ or ‘culture’.  For example, a critical 
review of dimensions associated with the term ‘culture’ by Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn (1963) identified 164 unique definitions of the term, the overall 
number almost reaching 300. 
 
In broad terms, the study of organisational culture focuses on that which is 
shared between people within organisations, for example: 
 
 beliefs, values, attitudes and norms of behaviour 
 routines, traditions, ceremonies and rewards 
 meanings, narratives and sense-making. 
 
Such shared ways of thinking and behaving help define what is legitimate 
and acceptable within an organisation; they are the social and normative 
glue that holds an organisation together, and in colloquial terms  ‘the way 
things are done around here’.  Culture is a lens through which an 
organisation can be interpreted both by its members and by interested 
external parties through an appreciation of an organisation’s symbolic codes 
of behaviour, rituals, myths, stories, beliefs, shared ideology and unspoken 
assumptions.   
 
Perhaps the most critical cleavage in contemporary definitions is that 
identified by Smircich (1983); who treats culture as a property of an 
organisation (something it ‘has’) or something that the organisation ‘is’.  The 
former approach defines culture as the values and beliefs in an organisation 
that organisational members have in common. Thus, this approach treats 
culture as a variable or attribute, alongside organisational structure and 
business strategy that can be managed or manipulated to improve 
performance.  In contrast the latter approach implies the existence of fewer 
levers by which management might secure change, since the entire 
organisation is seen as a cultural system in itself with analytic interest 
focused primarily on how it is accomplished and reproduced.  
 
Culture is also gen erally con sidered as a mu lti-layered an d mu lti-level 
phenomenon; with the most commonly cited conceptual framework being  
Schein’s (1989) distinction of artifacts, values, and basic assumptions which 
is illustrated in figure 5.1.  Artifacts that form the top level of an 
organisation’s culture  are the most visible an d t angible man ifestations 
thereof.  The second level is made up of values which underlie and influence 
behaviour.  Un like a rtifacts wh ich can  be perceiv ed as ‘what is’ , v alues 
represent ‘what ou ght to be’; th ey incorporate mora l and ethical codes,  
ideologies, and philosophies.  The final level forms the basis for real cultural 
understanding; it comprises basic underlying ass umptions: e nshrined 
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fundamental be liefs, valu es and perceptions that impact on individuals ’ 
thinking, behaviour, and feelings.  This  level differs from val ues, which are 
espoused, in that assumptions are th ose values which have become so  
internalised as to drop out of consciousness (Schein, 1989).  
 
 
 
 
e 5.1 Schein’s Levels of Organisational Culture and their Interaction 
 
Level 1: Artefacts and Creations
Level 2: Values
Level 3: Basic Assumptions
Visible but often 
not decipherable
Greater level 
of awareness
Taken for granted
Technology
Art
Visible and audible behaviour patterns
Testable in the physical environment
Testable only by social consensus
Relationship to environment
Nature of reality, time, and space
Nature of human nature
Nature of human activity
Nature of human relationships
 
Adapted from Schein (1989):14
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Dimensions of organisational culture identified in the literature as being 
important mediating factors in facilitating (or impeding) successful alliances, 
partnerships and joint ventures, include: 
 
 attitudes towards cooperation and team working 
 beliefs about the motivations and working practices of partners 
 perceptions regarding the trustworthiness of partners 
 assumptions concerning the competence and skills of partners  
 attitudes to risk taking and dealing with change and uncertainty 
 the influence of professional norms and working practices 
 values relating to ethical conduct   
 views relating to appropriate arrangements for conflict resolution  
          and dispute settlement. 
 
Child and Faulkner (1 998) have  develo ped a useful typology to assess 
approaches to managi ng inter-organisational relationships and partnerships 
in t he f ace of  cu ltural div ersity.  T heir analy sis is st ructured by  tw o 
fundamental choices.  The first conc erns whe ther one sub-group’s c ulture 
should dominate, as opposed to striving for a balance of contributions from 
the contributory cultures.  The second rel ates to the decision to ei ther 
integrate different subcultures (in or der to derive synergy between them) 
versus a preference segregating the various cultures within the partnerships 
(with the  ai m of  avoi ding confl ict or efforts devoted to cul ture 
management).  These strategic partnership choices give rise to four possible 
bases for accommodating  cul tural di versity: synergy, domination, 
segregation or breakdown (see figure 5.2).  The first three offer some scope 
for establ ishing a c ultural fi t, w hilst the fou rth may gi ve ri se to seri ous 
dysfunctional consequences. 
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Figure 5.2: The Meeting of Cultures: Achieving a Cultural Fit 
 Integration between cultural groups?  
Yes                                                         No 
 
Domination 
by one sub 
culture? 
 
 
 
No 
1)               Synergy 
The objective is to meld both 
partners’ cultures and to 
achieve the best possible fit 
between the two.  The best 
elements are combined with the 
objective of making the whole 
greater than the sum of its 
parts.  
2)            Segregation 
Here the aim is to strike an 
acceptable balance between 
different cultures by virtue of 
maintaining separation rather 
than seeking integration.   
 
 
 
 
Yes 
3)           Domination 
This is based on recognition 
that integrating organisational 
cultures may prove impossible 
and accepts the right of 
dominance of one sub-group’s 
culture.   
4)             Breakdown 
This occurs when one culture 
seeks domination, integration 
or mutually acceptable 
segregation but fails to secure 
the acquiescence of the other 
organisational culture.  
 Yes No 
 Integration 
Derived & expanded from a classificatory scheme on strategic alliances developed 
by Child and Faulkner, 1998. 
 
 
The theories and conceptual frameworks outlined above for understanding 
culture and cultural diversity in inter-organisational alliances informed the 
design and data gathering during the empirical phase of the project, to which we 
now turn.  
 
 
5.3  Key Informant and User Views on the Role and    
      Impact of Culture in LIFT Partnerships 
 
This section pertains to the interviews discussed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 
(‘Key Informant Interviews’ and ‘User Interviews’).  These interviews were 
supplemented by a number of case-specific telephone interviews which are 
discussed in the consecutive subsection 5.4 (‘Case Study Based Views on 
the Role and Impact of Culture in LIFT Partnerships).   
 
There was a general view across key informants and users that public and 
private partners had different cultures, values and motivations for being 
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involved in a LIFT Partnership.  PCTs and other public sector organisations 
were characterised as being motivated by the opportunity to improve the 
delivery of health care services provided to the local population.  Private 
sector providers, on the other hand, were (unsurprisingly) believed to be 
motivated by the opportunity to make a profit from the company.  However, 
there appeared to be a broad consensus that although public and private 
interests differed, they could, in successful partnerships be aligned in the 
pursuit of developing high quality local premises which would benefit the 
local community.  This view was expressed by, among others, the 
Partnership UK representative [PUK representative] who highlighted the 
importance of interest alignment between the sectors:  
 
“I think there are complete differences in public sector values and private 
sector values, so the challenge is to ensure there is sufficient alignment of 
interest for those interests not to matter.  So the private sector’s job is to 
earn a return for their shareholders; no public sector has no such 
aspiration, but actually what both want is to deliver high quality new 
facilities and there is a total alignment of interests there.” 
 
Arguing along similar lines, the Partnership UK representative [PUK 
representative] suggested that the public sector’s approach to 
commissioning had already become similar to that of the private sector: 
 
“The public sector is becoming much more like the private sector in 
knowing what it wants to do and wants to deliver and I think that is a 
whole new set of skills that have developed over the last 10 years as we 
have moved into contracting in the broadest sense of the word.” 
 
There were mixed views in terms of whether the different cultures and 
motivations of partners were adversely affecting relationships within LIFT 
schemes.  Most thought that public and private organisations worked 
together well in the vast majority of LIFT partnerships, not least because of 
the hard work of key individuals involved in the process.  It was also 
pointed out that General Practitioners themselves, operated small 
independent businesses and that as such their business culture and 
motivations may not be that far removed from those of private sector 
partners.  This view was expressed by, among others, the bank 
representative who noted that both sector collaborated effectively:  
 
“The private sector respects the processes the public sector has to go 
through and I think the public sector does understand some of the 
processes the private sector has to go through.  Overall they work quite 
well together and it’s really down to the individuals involved.” 
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This view was echoed by the DoH representative [DoH representative] who 
suggested that collaboration was perhaps easier in primary care on account 
of the commercial outlook of GPs: 
 
“There is a key difference between hospitals and primary care in that GPs 
are actually self-employed, they are small businesses.  This is really 
helpful when we engage with them.” 
 
Meanwhile the Partnership UK representative [PUK representative] 
suggested that one of key factors linked to successful partnerships was the 
ability of private partners to resist the urge to seek to maximise their short 
term profit at the expense of establishing good long-term relations between 
partners, which may be more beneficial in the long run because of the 
possibility of regaining business:     
 
“The challenge for LIFT is to get the private sector to recognise that they 
are in a partnership and that if they go for short term win in terms of 
profit, that is going to damage the partnership and what they should be 
looking for is a win/win when the private sector makes a return but 
recognises that a fair and reasonable return over the long tem is better 
than going for a quick buck because they’re never going to get another 
deal.” 
 
Similarly, the DoH representative [DoH representative] noted that both the 
public and private sectors had to recognize each others’ interests around 
partnership working: 
 
“There is a fear of being open with one another and the difficulty of 
understanding what the other party needs from it….The hard bit for the 
public sector is to recognise that profit is not a dirty word and to recognise 
that they have to make a profit …and most importantly the private sector 
needs to recognise the rewards for them are through repeat business 
without competition.” 
 
A key identified difference between public and private partners was that the 
former has a focus on the needs of the community rather than those of 
professionals working within the facilities.  This was thought to require a 
cultural shift on behalf of private sector in order to accommodate the 
priorities of the local community in influencing how LIFT partnerships 
operated.  In this context the CEO of a LIFTCo operating in the West 
Midlands [CEO, urban W Midl] suggested that the private sector had to 
cultivate an awareness of the community it was operating in:   
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“The thing the public sector brings to the table is increasingly an emphasis 
on engaging with people and the Central Government policies have driven 
in that direction over the last few years.  Certainly for the private sector 
partner in my LIFTCo that has meant quite a dramatic change in the way 
they operate in developing these new buildings, in that in the past I think 
it was always seen as it was the professionals that told you what they 
needed and you delivered a building solution …now increasingly the public 
sector are pushing is towards a community facing model, where, yes, it is 
important to have the right environment for professionals to provide 
clinical services, but it must be cognizant of the community that it is 
operating in.  So we are seeing our bigger buildings increasingly shaped by 
the community’ desire for a facility that means something for them.” 
 
 
5.4  Case Study Based Views on the Role and Impact  
       of Culture in LIFT Partnerships 
As highlighted above, LIFT projects join together in common enterprise a 
range of organisations with different cultures, values and established ways 
of working, not least how inter-organisational relationships should be 
nurtured and managed. 
 
In the empirical phase of the project we were, therefore, interested in 
exploring how cultural diversity was managed in the case study sites.  To 
explore this issue in some detailed, it was decided that separate interviews 
should be conducted on this matter once the core aspects of the case study 
fieldwork had been concluded.  These case-specific telephone interviews, 
therefore, were conducted during the months of March and April 2009, that 
is at a time when the case studies themselves had been completed for some 
time.  The purpose of this approach was to give some of the case studies 
interviewees a period of reflection during which they were able to view 
some of their own interview transcripts and were able to place their own 
organization in a specific cultural context.  For the purpose of the 
supplementary interviews each of the case study specific interviewees was 
also given a copy of some parts of the case study analysis.  The purpose of 
these supplementary case-specific interviews was to allow key users from 
each of the case study locations to place each of the case studies in a 
specific cultural context.  To focus these supplementary interviews, each of 
the participants was given a copy of Child and Faulkner framework (see 
Figure 5.2) and asked to describe her or his organisation in relation to these 
categories.  Overall, these supplementary interviews were conducted for 
three of our four main case studies, all four of which are discussed in fuller 
detail in section 7 (‘Case Studies’), and involved between one and two key 
informants to the case study.  These interviews covered the following case 
studies: Urban North East LIFT (see also subsection 7.2), rural East 
Midlands (see also subsection 7.3), and urban South West LIFT (see also 
subsection 7.5); but not mixed East Midlands LIFT (subsection 7.4), where 
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it was impossible to obtain an additional interview with the individual in 
question due to retirement.  
 
5.4.1 Cultural Issues, Urban North East LIFT  
Urban NE LIFT is a second wave LIFT scheme, which saw financial close 
towards the end of 2004 and saw capital investments in excess of £17 
million.  The principal informant for the purpose of these interviews was the 
Director of Finance of this urban NE PCT [Fin Dir, urban NE] who had also 
made a major contribution to the case study analysis (see section 7, 
subsection 7.2). 
 
In terms of the Child and Faulkner’s framework, staff at this PCT positioned 
themselves somewhere in the top half (i.e. no dominance by one 
organisational culture) between Box 1 (Synergy) and Box 2 (Segregation).  
This was expressed by the interviewee [Fin Dir, urban NE] as follows:  
 
“I do not think that there is one dominant culture.  I think we are probably 
between box 2 and box 1 (relating to Figure X).  I would not say we have 
got absolute synergy, but I would probably say that we’ve got more 
synergy than segregation if that makes sense…I do not think there is 
much in terms of breakdown.” 
 
There was a belief on the part of PCT staff that following an initial phase of 
misunderstandings and subsequent learning and renegotiations that their 
private sector partner was now quite sensitive to the value and ways of 
working in the health service and that this had enabled a strong bond to be 
forged between LIFT partners [Fin Dir, urban NE and associated staff]: 
 
“I think their values (private sector) are quite public sector…. they 
(values) have become very intertwined.” 
 
“I think there is a better understanding of public sector governance which 
I know on occasions has been a bit of a frustration to the private sector.” 
 
There was a general feeling among PCT staff that there had developed a 
degree of trust between public and private partners and that both 
recognised that the success of the project depended upon them working 
together and following a common agenda.  Nevertheless it was felt that 
there did remain some suspicion about each others’ motives which formed a 
backdrop to negotiations [Fin Dir, urban NE and associated staff]: 
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“There is a level of trust now and if any thing went horribly wrong we 
would have to help each other out - one party would not leave the other to 
flounder as it would not do either of us any good.  So if something major 
happened we would try to help each other out and not just turn to the 
legal documents … There are always people on both sides of the camp who 
either do not trust the other party, or certainly from the PCT side there are 
people who consider that that the private sector is just out for a quick 
buck and their fine words mean nothing.”  
 
Overall the PCT staff were very happy with the relationship that had 
developed with their private sector partner and during the interviews LIFT 
project was frequently cited as a model that other projects should follow.  
This view was expressed again most explicitly by the Director of Finance 
[Fin Dir, urban NE] who doubted that other PCTs had as good a relationship 
with their LIFTCo: 
 
“I think we are an outlier, but an outlier in a positive sense, because I do 
not think most places have the strong relationships and partnership 
arrangements that we have. …  We are probably more advanced and more 
integrated and are working in a true partnership way than a number of 
LIFT companies.” 
 
5.4.2 Cultural Issues, Rural East Midlands LIFT  
Rural E Midl LIFT is a third wave LIFT scheme which, after merging with the 
PCT of a unitary authority, saw capital investments of almost £42 million.  
The principal informant for the purpose of these interviews was the Director 
of the county PCT [PCT Dir, rural E Midl] who had also made a major 
contribution to the case study analysis (see section 7, subsection 7.3). 
 
Staff from the PCT believed that their organisation was in the top half of the 
diagram (i.e., that no one organisation dominated the Partnership) and was 
positioned somewhere between Box 1 (Synergy) and Box 2 (Segregation) in 
Figure 5.2.  There was a strong feeling that, although there needed to be a 
melding of cultures between partners to manage the cultural diversity, there 
also needed to be some form of separation so that PCTs for example could 
focus on addressing the needs of their patients and the wider health 
community.  This was expressed by the Director of the PCT [PCT Dir, E Midl] 
who highlighted the dual role of the PCT as partner and customer: 
 
“I would say that we are in the top half between segregation and synergy.  
We would not have got to financial close with our private sector partner if 
there was any degree of melding cultures, and get the best combination 
out of the team.  But there is a slight feeling within the PCT about 
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difficulties.  We are partners in LIFT but also we are a customer of them 
(the private partner) so that is where there is separation, but still a feeling 
that there needs to be a degree of separation because we need to make 
sure that the PCT’s interests are safeguarded.”  
 
Although the ideal for the PCT would be to move across to Box 1 (Synergy) 
it was recognised that there would probably always be a degree of 
separation between public and private partners because each have different 
fundamental values. Again, this view was expressed most clearly by 
Director of the PCT [PCT Dir, rural E Midl] who noted that there was a need 
to understand differences in values while working for a common purpose: 
 
“For me it is about understanding each other’s values.  And in some area 
there are clear overlaps and similarities but there are some things where 
there are fundamental differences, generating surpluses and being part of 
a profit making chain somewhere along the line ….  So I think it is about 
recognising the common purpose, but also understanding that to some 
extent we have got different value bases.” 
 
5.4.3 Cultural Issues, Urban South West LIFT  
Urban SW LIFT is a third wave LIFT scheme, which saw financial close 
towards the end of 2004 and saw capital investments in excess of £28 
million.  The principal informant for the purpose of these interviews was the 
CEO of the urban SW LIFTCo [CEO, urban SW] who had also made a major 
contribution to the case study analysis (see section 7, subsection 7.5). 
 
The main interviewee in the supplementary interviews relating to urban SW 
LIFT believed that their LIFT Partnership could best be characterised as 
being in Box 2 (Segregation) although at times (and also perceived as the 
ideal situation to be in) was the partnership could be characterised as being 
in Box 1 (Synergy):  
  
“In our case there been on the whole a pattern of segregation.  Synergy is 
the ideal, but segregation is as good as its likely to get because there are 
different entities involved.  If you were applying this to one organisation 
with different partners it would be easier to arrive at synergy.  We have 
been aiming at segregation, where there is a balance between the needs 
of different parties.  We have different legal entities so there is a 
difference, and it is necessary to maintain a sense of independence, in a 
commercial, legal and business sense.” 
 
However, as a private sector partner, this interviewee [CEO, urban SW] 
highlighted that there had been times when the public sector had dominated 
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the relationship.  This was particularly the case when the public sector 
forced through initiatives (or suspended them) because of wider political 
considerations which the private sector partner found difficult to challenge: 
 
“On the whole, it has been the case that there has not been domination, 
although at times there has.  At the moment I can feel aspects of 
domination, that is because there are lots of pressures at the moment, 
economically, with policy changes, with political uncertainty.  That forces, 
or creates a sense that leads to domination or even breakdown, where 
there are stresses on the partnership.  You might get one organisation 
saying ‘we’ are going to focus on this now to the exclusion of all else … We 
go through different phases … I think the public sector dominates the 
private sector.  I have see this on a couple of schemes .. there is a certain 
jockeying for position…the public sector can go away and then turn around 
and say ‘we’ve decided we can not do that –so they are dominant if they 
want a redesign.” 
 
Apart from stressing the possibility of public sector domination, the above 
statements are interesting in that they indicate that the current economic 
climate may be changing the balance of power in favour of the public sector.  
While we have little evidence of the cultural effects of the credit crunch and 
the ongoing recession on relationship between LIFT partners, it stands to 
reason that these events will have far reaching effects on how future 
negotiation will be conducted, with a strong possibility that the public sector 
will be able to attract favourable concessions from its partners.  These 
possibilities, of course, will be constrained by the need for private sector 
partners to ensure their profitability during these difficult times. 
 
Expanding on the issue of cultural dynamic, the same interviewee [CEO, 
urban SW] noted that any pattern of domination by either sector was 
necessarily temporary.  Thus this interviewee explained further that 
relationships in the LIFTCo were dynamic and in flux and at different times 
either the public or private sector had been the stronger partner in 
determining how the LIFT project was run: 
 
“Within our activity the relationship could change at different times –and 
could be stronger or weaker depending on which stakeholder we are 
talking about. We are dealing with lots of stakeholders who represent 
other cultures, and the relationships are not fixed, for every individual for 
every organization.” 
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5.5  Discussion: LIFT and Cultural Diversity 
Conceptualising LIFT partnerships in terms of ‘organisational culture’ 
resonates with a wide variety of key stakeholders and forms an intuitive 
way for them to understand inter-organisational dynamics. Thus the key 
overall finding from the interviews with Key Informants and the case studies 
is that organisational culture matters, and is seen to matter in the formation 
and maintenance of LIFT partnerships. Managers at all levels in the public 
and private organisations recognised the significance of culture and were 
either trying to actively interested in shaping it or felt constrained by its 
pervasive influence on inter-organisational relations.  
 
We identified a range of key differences in the values, working practices and 
cultures of private sector organisations.  In some LIFT projects different 
assumed motives had created a degree of suspicion and lack of trust 
between partners, with public organisations sometimes uncomfortable with 
the underlying profit motive of private sector organisations, and private 
sector organisations worried about the perceived bureaucracy, ‘red tape’ 
lack of financial acumen and political interference under which public 
organisations laboured.  However, on the whole, the partners within LIFT 
projects appeared to be working together well and differences in culture 
were being managed and accommodated as partnerships matured.  
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6   Financial Analysis 
6.1 Introduction/Study Design and Methodology  
This section addresses the general question of whether the LIFT method of 
procurement represents good VfM. To do this, three case studies are used. 
These are urban NW LIFT, mixed West Midlands LIFT and urban NE LIFT . 
The first case, urban NW LIFT, was chosen because of the six studies in the 
NAO (2005a) report and Mahmood (2004), it contains the most detailed 
accounting data.  In particular Mahmood (2004, annexes III and IV) 
includes detailed ex ante pro forma profit and loss accounts and balance 
sheets.  These detailed figures can be used for two purposes.  To begin with 
they offer the opportunity to examine urban NW LIFT as a detailed financial 
case study.  Second, using the data in Mahmood (2004) in conjunction with 
NAO (2005), a detailed ‘base case’ replication of the NAO model can be 
constructed which reconciles to forecasted internal rate of return (IRR) 
outputs reported in NAO (2005, 36).  Using the base case model with actual 
accounting data for the three case studies for the first three years of their 
operation, adjusted IRRs can be calculated by modifying the base case 
model with outturn (i.e. full accounting data for the first three years) data.  
 
The remaining cases, mixed West Midlands LIFT and urban NE LIFT were 
chosen because mixed West Midlands LIFT was also included in the NAO 
(2005) and Mahmood (2004), and urban NE formed one of the case studies 
discussed in subsection 5.4.1 (‘Case Study Based Views on the Role and 
Impact of Culture in LIFT Partnerships’) and section 7 (‘Case Studies’, 
specifically subsection 7.2 ‘Urban NE LIFT’).  These choices allow in and out 
of sample comparisons of the NAO cases and allow the financial analysis of 
urban NE to be triangulated with the results of the interview evidence. 
 
In the detailed subsections that follow, subsection 6.2 provides an 
introduction to the financial analysis offering some explanation of its 
potential importance.  Section 6.3 presents an analysis of the urban NW 
LIFT as a case study.  Financial and accounting data is used in conjunction 
with desk research and press reports about the development.  The base 
case financial model and ex post financial model is presented and discussed.  
Section 6.4 presents further models in comparison with urban NW, mixed 
West Midlands and urban NE.  Reasons for differences in forecast and actual 
costs are examined.  In subsection 6.5 conclusions are drawn highlighting 
some of the reasons for the apparent high cost of LIFT projects. 
 
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
148 
6.2 Financial Issues Regarding LIFT 
Since the publication of the National Audit Office (NAO) report of May 2005 
on Local Financial Improvement Trusts (LIFT) in the NHS, there has been 
much debate concerning the scheme. When the NAO (2005) report was 
presented to the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts (CPA), it 
explained that there was considerable interest in the set up and ‘ongoing 
value for money’ and accountability arrangements, and argued that whilst 
not necessarily the best procurement method in all areas, in general LIFT 
offered ‘advantages over the alternatives’ (NAO, 2005, 2).  Because the 
NAO reached a conclusion supportive of the scheme whilst acknowledging 
the absence of quantitative evidence, the call for a credible system of VfM 
evaluation has intensified.  Pressure for such evaluations has come not only 
from LIFT stakeholders themselves, including investing organisations, but 
also from the UK’s senior institution of public accountability.1 As a specific 
form of public private partnership (PPP) for the design, construction, 
financing and operation of general practice health centres, these criticisms 
are similar to those levelled at PPP more generally.  These include excessive 
private sector returns (Toms et al., 2008), which may be the corollary of 
poor VfM outcomes.  In the absence of a financial evaluation model for LIFT, 
costs associated with the process remain open to questions that have been 
largely unresolved since the inception of the scheme,  in terms of set-up 
costs (Tyndale-Biscoe, 2003), operating costs (Comerford, 2004) and rents 
charged to tenants (Holmes et al., 2006).  Evidence from the House of 
Commons CPA suggests that primary care Trust (PCT) accommodation 
spending per patient registered with GPs in a LIFT development is up to 
eight times higher than total primary care spending on accommodation.2  
 
In view of these concerns it is surprising that the costs of LIFT have not 
been more systematically evaluated.  It is also surprising that post project 
evaluations have not been conducted.  A memorandum from the Centre for 
International Public Health Policy (House of Commons, 2006, ev.25) 
critiqued the NAO Report (2005) for not having done this, and now that the 
schemes are 4 years older it is even more remarkable that such analysis 
has not been conducted.  It was a recommendation of the NAO Report 
(2005) that the Community Partnerships for Health [CPH] should issue 
guidelines as to how such evaluations should be conducted (House of 
Commons, 2006, ev.29-30).  In the absence of these, meanwhile, it is 
                                                 
1 Please note that this chapter utilises footnotes and page numbers for non-
quoted references in order to facilitate an evaluation and replication of his 
analysis. LIFT Liaison for Business Investors (LOBI) Memorandum, CPA, 
minutes of evidence (ev.22); Report (House of Commons, 2006), 
recommendation 5, 5.  
 
2 CPA, Report (House of Commons, 2006) 10; the Mixed West Midlands 
example shows average annual cost per patient in the PCT to be £3.84 and 
£31.41 as the annual cost per LIFT registered patient, a ratio of 8.17:1. 
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
149 
important to provide some quantitative evaluation of LIFT scheme 
performances to date. 
 
These issues and debates in themselves would appear sufficient to generate 
a robust financial analysis by government agencies, even though one has 
not been carried out to date.  However, it is not simply a matter of finding a 
cheaper solution.  The VfM solution is not necessarily the cheapest, or 
indeed the one that produces the lowest private sector return, because any 
evaluation should also include risk transfer from the public to the private 
sector.  In the wider context of PPP there is little evidence that the 
substance of such risk transfers have been systematically evaluated (Pollock 
and Price, 2008).  Moreover, there is no clear pricing mechanism of such 
risk.  
 
For all these reasons, a financial evaluation of LIFT is potentially useful, 
particularly if risk transfer and cost/benefit considerations can be 
incorporated.  In the light of the issues raised above, the absence of 
quantitative data is surprising, and seems to both enhance the intensity of 
the debate whilst reducing the possibility of its conclusion.  In the absence 
of such evaluations, LIFT has generated considerable debate, which can 
perhaps move nearer to resolution if helpful figures can be provided.  
 
6.3  A Case Study of Urban NW 
The purpose of this subsection is to provide a detailed financial analysis of 
one LIFTCo (LIFTCo).  The urban NW LIFTCo was chosen primarily for 
reasons of data access and was at the time of writing still the only LIFTCo 
with sufficient public domain information to allow such an analysis to be 
conducted.  The case study is set out below in several subsections. The first 
subsection gives some background to the case study based on an overview 
analysis of the urban NW LIFTCo.  A second subsection then introduces an 
evaluative financial model, describing first the difficulties experienced 
obtaining financial data and then describing the construction of a model 
designed to overcome these problems.  Subsection three then presents 
results from analytical manipulations of the model showing in turn the 
comparative cost of the project using a public sector comparator, the 
realism of the projected assumptions pre-bid in terms of costs and, finally, 
to evaluate risk, a sensitivity analysis of the cash flows in the model.  Finally 
the above debates are reassessed in the light of the evidence presented. 
 
6.3.1 Background and Overview Analysis 
Urban NW LIFT was established on 11th June 2003 when X Group [name of 
local construction company] was appointed as the preferred bidder.  Three 
new health centres were scheduled to be open for patients in Town A 
(March 2005), Town B (May 2005) and Town C (June 2005).  It was in the 
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second wave of LIFT projects.3  In line with the general LIFT model, the 
urban NW LIFTCo is 40% owned by public sector stakeholders, including the 
local PCTs and the Partnerships for Health (now Community Health 
Partnerships), and 60% owned by the X Group, a major regional; 
construction and facilities management company.  The X Group was to 
provide all construction and facilities management services for the 25 year 
contract period.  Senior amortising debt provided the majority of the 
required finance (Mahmood 2004, 20), and Y Bank [name of a national Bank 
group] provided this funding (NAO, 2005, 25).  Construction began 
immediately at the financial close and the first facilities were typically in 
operation within 18 months.4 
 
Table 6.1 provides details of the three Health Centres funded by the 
scheme, including the approximate split of the £19.3m projected cost. It 
shows the size of the centre in terms of square meters and number of GPs 
and associated core provision.5  It then computes per capita cost measures 
with reference to the number of patients served and size of the practice, 
utilising revenue (annual projected cost to the PCT) and capital cost (initial 
cost of the investment). 
 
According to the CPA Report (House of Commons, 2006, table 3), at a cost 
of £32.88 per patient to the revenue budget of the PCT, LIFT is much more 
expensive in per capita terms than conventional procurement, for which 
there is an estimated per patient cost of £5.88.6  Considering the Health 
Centres individually, it can be seen that the cost per patient can vary 
considerably by location.  No doubt there are similar variations in 
conventional schemes, for the same reasons, such as local population 
densities.  Town A Health Centre, for example, in a more sparsely populated 
area, has a higher unit cost whether considered in revenue or capital terms.  
The corollary is that if LIFT is more expensive using this measure compared 
to conventional procurement, then the effect is likely to be amplified away 
from the main population centres, and if LIFT is to deliver VfM, then it has a 
better chance of doing so in the conurbations where economy of scale is 
more pronounced.  The K Health Centre [name one of the health centres], 
                                                 
3 NAO Memorandum, CPA, House of Commons, 2006, ev. 15.  
 
4 Second LIFT scheme signs (Local Improvement Finance Trust, UK National 
Health Service). Public Private Finance, November 2003, No. 78. 
 
5 The LIFT scheme is intended to attract a number of associated services, 
but for the purpose of the analysis at this stage the two core ones analysed 
were pharmacies and dentists. 
 
6 At a cost per square metre of £180, the scheme is similar to the Lyng 
Health Centre third party development (£195) and cheaper than the 
Oldbury Health Centre (House of Commons, 2006, ev.20), bearing in mind 
that such data is only available at scheme level for Urban NW and there is 
no information about rental charges for individual health centres. 
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which serves the large industrial town of Town B, is relatively efficient at a 
revenue cost of £25.31 per patient, uniting seven doctors’ practices and 
eighteen GPs under one roof.  It has also attracted core associated services 
highlighted as an objective of the scheme, and has both a pharmacy and 
dental practice on site.  Factoring in these benefits, it is in the interest of 
investors as well as PCTs to concentrate on urban centres since the per 
capita capital cost can also be reduced by achieving greater concentration in 
areas of higher population density. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Urban NW LIFT, Health Centres  
Health 
Centre 
Size 
Sq m 
GPs1 Services2 Number 
of 
Patients 
Initial  
Cost 
£m 
Cost 
per GP 
£ 
Cost 
per sq 
m 
£ 
Cost per patient 
£ 
            Capital Capital Capital Revenue3 
Town A 
Health 
Centre 
3,500 8 P  13,560 5.5 687,500 1,571 405. 60 46.35 
K  Health 
Centre, 
Town B 
 
4,650 18 D , P 33,000 6.3 350,000 1,354 190. 91 25.31 
Town C 
Health 
Centre 
5,500 15 P  28,000 7.5 500,000 1,363 267. 86 35.27 
Combined 
scheme 
13,650 41   74,560 19.34 470,732 1,413 258. 85 32.88 
 
Sources: Compiled from: This is Lancashire, 19th May, 29th October, 2005; Name 
of Local Newspaper, March 5, 2004, Contract Journal, October 29, 2003 CPA 
(House of Commons, 2006), ev 21, table 3. NHS. UK Service Directories. 
 
Notes: 
1. GPs in situ February 2009 
2. Services D = Dentist, P = Pharmacy, in situ February 2009. 
3. Estimated by allocating 2004/05 cost  (PAC, 2005/06, table 3, 10) by size 
pro-rata 
4. Initial cost at planning stage. Outturn cost = £23.9m (NAO/Operis models) 
 
6.3.2 The ‘Base Case’ Financial Model 
Previous Models, Data Sources and Commercial Confidentiality  
A major objective of the research is to assess whether or not LIFT 
represents VfM.  An important component of such an assessment is to build 
a financial model so that a base case for a planned LIFT project can be 
compared with alternative models, sensitivities can be manipulated to 
assess risk and risk transfer, and the model assumptions can be tested and 
modified in the light of ex post financial results.  Analysis of each of these 
aspects is presented in the financial case study of urban NW LIFTCo below.  
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Quantifying projects in this fashion is particularly valuable, in view of the 
absence of quantitative evaluations noted by the CPA. One member of the 
Committee described the NAO Report (2005) as ‘bereft of financial 
analysis…’ and lacking in independence.7 It is true that the Report (NAO, 
2005, table 10, 25) presented only limited figures, in the form of internal 
rates of return (IRRs) for six LIFT case studies.  The six case studies were 
East London and the City, Barnsley, Sandwell, East Lancashire, Barking and 
Havering, and Ashton, Wigan and Leigh.  Data for the IRR table in the NAO 
report was obtained from financial models developed by the Business 
Engineering firm Operis (NAO, 2005, Appendix 1, note 3).  A conclusion 
from the CPA report (2006, 5) was, therefore, that a ‘meaningful 
quantitative evaluation of the VfM of the LIFT programme and its schemes’ 
should be made as quickly as possible. 
 
A consequence of the NAO procedures is that there are no obvious sources 
of public domain information that might allow a robust and detailed 
assessment of VfM. Indeed the absence of comparable and timely data was 
a reason offered by the NAO to the CPA for not undertaking a financial 
analysis (House of Commons, 2006, ev.28).  Another consideration, 
according to table 10 (NAO, 2005, 25), is a note stating ‘our case studies 
are anonymous to protect commercial sensitivities’, so that it is not possible 
to match the reported IRRs to specific LIFTCo-s.  For the same reason the 
Operis financial models are not in the public domain. Appendix 1, note 3 
(NAO, 2005) also states that Arshad Mahmood also provided assistance with 
the financial analysis. As part of our investigation we requested the Operis 
models from the NAO who confirmed their commercial confidentiality.  Their 
spokesperson also confirmed that they had used Mahmood’s models and 
that there were small differences between the Mahmood and Operis models 
due to a four month time lag and that the Operis models were ‘tweaked’ to 
make them consistent.8  
 
In his MSc Dissertation, Mahmood (2004) provides detailed financial 
extracts from the six Operis/NAO case studies. For urban NW LIFTCo alone 
he includes an appendix showing pro forma profit and loss accounts (Annex 
III) and pro forma balance sheets (Annex IV).  He also details the input 
assumptions used in the models. Although the source of data is an 
unpublished dissertation, it is nonetheless appropriate to rely on it, not least 
because it has also been relied upon by the NAO.  It has been relied upon 
only as a data source, and its reproduction of unedited financial model data 
makes it a valuable source of public domain information in this respect.  It 
is sufficient for us to be aware that the model outputs from Mahmood’s data 
are very similar to the Operis results as admitted by the NAO above. 
 
                                                 
7 Jon Trickett, MP, CPA, (House of Commons, 2006) ev.9, qq.62, 65. 
 
8 Communication from the NAO, 15th October, 2008. 
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Equipped with model input data from Mahmood (2004) and the model 
outputs reported in NAO (2005, table 10), it is a relatively straightforward 
task to construct a financial model that reconciles the two.  For the urban 
NW LIFT case alone, this can be achieved using public domain information 
and therefore the commercial confidentialities that are of concern to the 
NAO can be respected.  The process is a matter of modelling a set of 
forecast cash flows that produce IRRs within the range of those reported in 
table 10.  Confidence in the model is made higher by the relatively narrow 
range of IRR outputs reported by the NAO.  The average IRR across the six 
case studies (including residual values) is 14.97% with a standard deviation 
of 0.5% (calculated from NAO, 2005, table 10).  Because table 10 also 
includes a residual value column and Mahmood (2004, Annex II-c) reports a 
residual value for urban NW of £8.25m, the model can be refined further by 
assuming that urban NW is case study 3, where the NAO report a residual 
value of £8.3m.9  If this assumption is valid then the cash flows need to be 
modelled to show an IRR excluding residual value of 14% and including 
residual value of 15.1%, which are the figures in NAO (2005) table 10 for 
case study 3. 
 
Financial Model Construction: Assumptions and Inputs 
The resulting financial model is presented in full in appendix 6.1. Generic 
input variables such as inflation, tax and debt amortisation rates are shown 
in the yellow zone of the model. Outputs are shown directly underneath in 
the red zone.  These are also set out in detail below in table 6.7.  Post tax 
nominal blended equity IRRs are highlighted as these figures can be 
compared directly with the NAO results in table 10.10  However, there are 
other permutations of IRR, such as project IRR, pre and post tax variants, 
real and nominal, including and excluding residual value, and the model was 
developed to allow the calculation of these potentially useful metrics. 
Detailed financial inputs are developed from the pro forma profit and loss 
accounts in Mahmood (2004, Annex III) which contain five years’ of forecast 
data at six monthly intervals and a total figure for the full 25 year life of the 
project by each category of income and expenditure.  Analysing these 
figures, apart from the first two years, when cash flows build up from a low 
start up base, almost all were inflated using an annual rate of 2.5%.  This 
                                                 
9 Table 10 (NAO, 2005) reports residual values in £m to 1 decimal place. It 
also reports the residual value as a percentage of construction cost. Dividing 
8.3m by the reported percentage of 38.9, gives an estimated construction 
cost of £21.33m.  This corresponds to the ex ante planning stage estimates 
of c. £20m given in the local press and to the scheduled expenditure in 
Mahmood (2004, Annex IV) of £23.9m, more closely than any of the 
inferred construction costs for the other five cases.  The assumption that 
case 3 is Urban North West is therefore a reasonable one to make. 
 
10 Blended equity IRR is defined as the rate of interest that balances the 
present value of cash outflows attributable to equity and subordinated debt 
from the project with the discounted cash inflows attributable to equity and 
subordinated debt of the investment. 
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value was, therefore, used as an input assumption in the model yellow zone 
and the cash flows forecasted for the remaining 20 years.  These were 
summed to give the total column and cross checked against the totals 
appearing in Mahmood (2004) Annex III.  In all cases there were fairly close 
correspondences.11  Depreciation is recorded in the model, but is ignored for 
the purposes of computing cash flows.  A further model subsection deals 
with balance sheet cash flows and these are computed for each item by 
taking the difference between the balance sheet values at corresponding 
year ends. For example, the expenditure on fixed assets is the difference 
between the values at the beginning of each year.  Depreciation is not 
charged to these accounts until the capital expenditure phase is completed 
(Annexes III, IV).  The value at the end of the project and cash 
received/repaid from/to lenders can be computed in similar fashion.  Debt 
amortisation assumptions were derived by computing annual repayments 
from the diminution in outstanding balance sheet debt in annex IV.  
Repayments were added to interest charges so that the total capital and 
interest charge for each year could be determined for each class of 
amortising debt.  Capital and interest payments were then forecasted using 
the assumption of this constant total cash payment.  The implicit rate of 
amortisation (or write down) of the outstanding capital balance is used to 
compute the capital repayment element for the remaining term of the loan.  
Bullet debt was treated as interest only.  The timing of these cash flows is 
important because it affects the lump sum repayable from the residual value 
at the end of the project and where using blended equity IRRs, because the 
model needs to obtain the remaining cash flow once payments to senior 
debt classes have been met.  
 
6.3.3 Model Results and Analysis 
The Base Case 
As can be seen from the red zone model outputs in appendix 6.1, post tax 
nominal blended equity excluding and including the residual value are 
13.9% and 15.1%.  The residual value inclusive result corresponds exactly 
to the 15.1% reported in table 10 NAO (2005) for case study 3 and the 
residual value exclusive result corresponds fairly closely to the 14.0% for 
the same case.  These results are merely confirmatory of the accuracy of 
model assumptions rather than of interest in their own right. 
 
More importantly, the model can be described as a robust base case, which 
can now be used to conduct a detailed VfM analysis.  There are three 
dimensions to this, analysed below in turn.  These are first, a comparison 
with alternative methods of finance, which can be achieved by substituting 
public debt finance into the base case model.  Second, the model 
assumptions are tested and reviewed in the light of ex post financial results.  
                                                 
11 There are some inevitable rounding differences and the net effect of these 
was to produce a total gross profit across the 25 years of £61.77m 
compared to the £61.9m reported in Mahmood (2004) Annex III. 
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Third sensitivity analysis is performed to provide an assessment of risk 
transfer.  
 
Public Finance Comparator 
A useful question to ask is would the project have offered greater VfM if 
conventional public sector debt had been used to finance the project.  The 
effect of such an arrangement can be computed by modifying the urban NW 
LIFTCo base case using the assumption of public sector debt finance for the 
entire project at 6%.  To arrive at the public sector cash flow in this 
scenario it is necessary to add back taxation to the project flows as this 
charge would not arise under public sector control.  Even so, under LIFT 
style finance, the taxation charge represents a contribution of the project to 
the exchequer, which is represented as earlier by using the post-tax cash 
flows for the computation of the blended equity IRRs.12  Although these are 
important methodological assumptions for the base case, in the urban NW 
example calculations, taxation is immaterial to the comparisons of pre and 
post tax IRRs and has relatively less impact when discounted on the public 
sector comparator since tax deferral has the effect of eliminating any tax 
charges to the project before 2018.  A further difference between public and 
private sector provision arises from the structure of repayment schedules.  
In the LIFT base case, capital repayment elements of senior and bullet 
debts are relatively slow so that most of the debt is not repaid until the later 
stages of the project.  Under public financial arrangements there would be 
nothing to prevent the use of project cash flows from paying down the debt 
more quickly, which is an assumption used here for comparison purposes.  
Alternatively, from a public sector point of view, the benefit of early debt 
redemption might be translated into a reduced requirement on the PCT 
budget for unitary change rentals.  From a private sector point of view, as in 
other PFI style activities, this benefit exists as an opportunity to realise a 
capital profit from debt refinancing.  
 
 
                                                 
12 To assess VfM as the absence of abnormal returns to the private sector, it 
is appropriate to compute such returns after any taxation contributions. 
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Table 6.2: Urban NW LIFT, Financing Cost Comparatives 
 £m £m £m 
 LIFT Public Sector Difference 
a) Gross cash flows    
Total interest charges 26.16 
 
10.38 15.78 
Taxation charges 7.66 Nil 7.66 
Net cost 18.50 10.38 8.12 
b) Net present value*    
Total interest charges 15.05 7.75 7.30 
Taxation charges 3.71 Nil 3.71 
Net cost 11.34 7.75 3.59 
 
Sources: model inputs (appendix 6.1 and table 6.7 below) 
 
Notes: * Computed using a discount rate of 6%. 
 
The differences occurring as a result of the public sector finance option are 
shown in table 6.2.  The table shows the respective costs of interest 
payments using LIFT and conventional public sector methods respectively 
and the differences between them allowing for the taxation contribution of 
the LIFT option, a) in terms of gross interest charges over the life of the 
project and b) as net present values using a 6% discount factor. As the 
table shows, the savings arising from the public sector alternative method of 
financing are significant in gross terms, amounting to £8.12m, or 34% of 
the total invested in the three health centres of £23.9m. This is the amount, 
or percentage reduction, in required borrowing had the project been funded 
through the public sector. In present value terms the saving is £3.71m, or 
15.5%, which represents the increase in wealth for the taxpayer that would 
have occurred has public finance been used. Or put another way it is the 
amount by which the taxpayer is immediately worse off as a result of the 
choice of the LIFT financing method.  
 
A possible criticism of this approach is that it does not correspond to the 
actual financing pattern of any current third party development (NAO 
Memorandum, House of Commons, 2006, ev.28). Whilst this is undoubtedly 
the case, there is no theoretical reason why a project should not be 
evaluated using an opportunity cost based discount rate for the alternative 
source of finance. Whether or not such a source of finance is actually 
available is a matter for regulation and policy. 
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Ex-Post Comparison 
Another method of evaluating VfM is to compare the forecasted financial 
performance implied by the modelling assumptions underpinning the 
decision to use the LIFT approach with the results that have been achieved 
since the decision was made. In the case of urban NW, the investment was 
made in 2004 and there are accordingly three full years of financial results 
available for the LIFCo SPV at the time of writing.13 The annual accounts for 
the LIFTCo were obtained and the proforma forecasts in appendix 6.1 
reformatted for comparative purposes using the same summary headings. 
Table 6.3 shows the results of this comparison. 
 
                                                 
13 Name of Company, source: Nexis UK. 
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Table 6.3: Urban NW LIFT, Forecast and Actual Performance 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT Actuals 
cumulative 
growth 
rate 
Date of Accounts 31/12/2007 31/12/2006 31/12/2005  07:05 
Total Sales 2,912,000 2,862,000 1,890,000 7,664,000 1.54 
Cost of Sales 726,000 723,000 419,000 1,868,000 1.73 
Gross Profit 2,186,000 2,139,000 1,471,000 5,796,000 1.49 
Operating Profit 1,374,000 1,332,000 884,000 3,590,000 1.55 
Nontrading Income 143,000 69,000 7,000 219,000 20.43 
Interest Payable 1,698,000 1,659,000 1,055,000 4,412,000 1.61 
Pretax Profit -181000 -258000 -164000 -603,000 1.10 
Taxation 69, 000 74,000 23,000 166,000 3.00 
Profit After Tax -250000 -332000 -187000 -769,000 1.34 
Dividends Payable 0 0 0 0  
Retained Profits -250000 -332000 -187000 -769,000 1.34 
      
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT Forecast   
 31/12/2007 31/12/2006 31/12/2005   
Total Sales 2,914,000 2,604,000 244,000 5,762,000 11.94 
Cost of Sales 910,000 895,000 612,000 2,417,000 1.49 
Gross Profit 2,004,000 1,709,000 -368,000 3,345,000 5.45 
Operating Profit 1,314,000 1,019,000 -1,058,000 1,275,000 1.24 
Nontrading Income 28,000 28,000 0 56,000 0.00 
Interest Payable 1,616,000 1,647,000 0 3,263,000 0.00 
Pretax Profit -274,000 -600,000 -1,058,000 -1,932,000 0.26 
Taxation 0  0 0 0  
Profit After Tax -274,000 -600,000 -1,058,000 -1,932,000 0.26 
      
ASSETS   
NET ASSETS 22,185,000 22,748,000 23,385, 000   
      
RATIOS      
Actual sales/ forecast sales    1.33  
Actual Return on capital 
employed 6.84% 6.16% 3.81% 5.60%  
Forecast return on cap 6.05% 4.60% -4.52% 2.04%  
      
Actual gross margin 75.07% 74.74% 77.83% 75.63%  
Forecast gross margin 68.77% 65.63% -150.82% 58.05%  
Sources: Nexis UK and appendix 6.1 
 
In general the financial performance of the LIFTCo has been stronger than 
predicted in the NAO/Operis model. Sales turnover to date is about 33% 
higher than assumed and the rate of profit margin is also at least six points 
higher (75.07% vs 68.77%) even in 2007 where the difference is the 
narrowest. There is a three point difference in return on capital employed 
(5.60% vs 2.04%).  
 
A notable feature is that, subject to the variation in gross margin, the NAO 
model is a good predictor for the 2007 results and the actual results appear 
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to be converging quite closely on the model parameters. Some confidence 
can therefore be attributed to the base model’s ability to predict the cash 
flows for the remaining 22 years of the project. A further step is therefore to 
recompute the base model using actual results for years 0-3 and forecasted 
results for years 4-25 inclusive. The full model is reproduced in appendix 
6.2 and detailed assumptions set out in table 6.7 below. The comparative 
model output results are shown in table 6.4.  
 
Table 6.4: Urban NW LIFT, Comparative IRRs for Base Model and 
Revised Forecast 
 Base model Revised model 
Nominal post tax blended 
equity excluding residual 
value 
13.90% 43.95% 
Nominal post tax blended 
equity including residual 
value 
15.00% 43.97% 
Sources: Nexis UK and Appendices 1 and 2. 
As table 6.4 shows, the IRRs are significantly higher in the revised model. 
The principal reason for this is the higher revenue and lower cost in the first 
three years. In the Mahmood/Operis model, the costs and revenues build up 
slowly using fast growth rates in the first three years, and then level off to 
inflation based 2.5% increases from then on. The actual results do not 
however reflect this pattern. There are two particular aspects. First PCT 
payments have come on stream more quickly than predicted. A possible 
interpretation of this is that it is a positive pay-off for the investors for on 
time completion against construction cost risk. More importantly, and 
having the greatest impact, operating costs (cost of sales) are 23% lower 
than predicted in the model. In combination with accelerated revenue, this 
accounts for the increase in gross profit and return on capital employed 
discussed above. Differences in cash flows in earlier years have a large 
impact on the IRR, whereas inaccuracies in later years have progressively 
less impact, which is why the of relatively small differences in accounting 
rates of return are amplified in the IRR differences in table 6.4. In VfM 
terms it would appear that realisable profits to investors are potentially 
much higher than the models in the NAO (2005) report would suggest. In 
summary, the evidence suggests that the models relied upon by the NAO 
are sensitive to assumptions about early years’ cash flow and that these 
should be scrutinised more closely, not least because short run cash flows, 
such as PCT payments are more easily predictable.  
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Sensitivity Analysis and Risk Evaluation 
LIFT is a type of design, build, finance and operate (DBFO) scheme, and it is 
therefore appropriate to analyse the risk of the scheme under these 
headings with reference to the cash flows that correspond most closely. The 
model analyses only the financial aspects of these risks. Table 6.5 shows a 
sensitivity analysis for urban NW LIFT using the base model in appendix 6.1 
and the revised model from table 6.4. The table facilitates comparison 
between the models used by NAO/Operis and the revised model which is the 
model that would have been used had early year revenue and costs been 
forecasted more accurately. As in the NAO Report (2005) the variants are 
computed without and with residual values (columns 1 and 2 respectively). 
 
 Table 6.5: Urban NW LIFT, Sensitivity Analysis 
 Base model Revised model 
 1 2 1 2 
Start value 14.06% 15.10% 43.95% 43.97% 
     
Design and construction 
risk     
Construction cost -3.01% -2.27% -6.49% -6.29% 
Year 1&2 revenues 0.67% 0.55% 2.50% 2.49% 
Year 1&2 costs -0.36% -0.30% -0.50% -0.50% 
     
Financing risk     
Interest rate -2.29% -1.70% -0.91% -0.90% 
     
Operating risk     
Gross margin 3.51% 2.91% 3.59% 3.59% 
Life cycle cost -0.35% -0.18% -0.12% -0.12% 
Hard FM cost -0.91% -0.62% -0.20% -0.20% 
Residual value N/A 0.06% N/A 0.00% 
 
Sources: Nexis UK and Appendices 1 and 2; Mahmood (2004). 
 
Notes: 
The table shows the pe rcentage increase in IRR for a 1% increase in the relevant 
cash flow category. 
1 = Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 
2 = Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR with RV 
 
IRR is highly sensitive to construction cost risk in all variants. If revised 
model assumptions are used, the risk is more than doubled, although the 
variation is to a much higher base IRR. Even so, the figures clearly 
demonstrate that the construction phase of the contract and the possibility 
of cost over-run is a very significant determinant of overall risk. That said, it 
should be noted that high sensitivities are partly that result of financing 
arrangements, since if a similar test is conducted on the project cash flows 
(as opposed to blended equity cash flows) the sensitivities fall to about a 
third of those reported in table 6.5. When these sensitivities are compared 
to impacts from other factors, it can be seen that construction phase risk 
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management should be of top priority to LIFT partners and investors. Such 
a conclusion is reinforced if the sensitivities of early phase cost and revenue 
variations are examined. All models are sensitive to revenue changes in 
years 1 and 2, and somewhat less so to cost changes. Taken together, it is 
clear that there is a very strong incentive for the LIFTCo management and 
investors to manage construction within budget and to build up early phase 
revenues as quickly as possible.  As the PCT is a stakeholder in the LIFTCo it 
has an incentive to ensure that revenues come on stream quickly and can 
do this for example by taking on the head lease in cases where the 
premises cannot be filled quickly with medical practices.  
 
Financing risk is also of some importance, and more so for the base model 
assumptions than for the revised model. Increases in interest rates have a 
disproportionate effect on IRRs. Because LIFTCo-s rely as in this case quite 
heavily on structured finance, they can achieve some insulation from 
interest rate risk increases, whilst downward movements in rates may 
create relatively profitable refinancing opportunities. 
 
As far as operating risk is concerned, all the models are equally and highly 
sensitive to changes in gross profit margin. As illustrated already in tables 
6.3 and 6.4, the seven point increase in gross profit is a major contributor 
to an IRR increase of approximately twenty eight points, which is in line 
with the sensitivities highlighted in table 6.5. Because, the NAO/Operis and 
Mahmood (2004) models use nominal rates, Mahmood argues that his 
calculations are sensitive to assumptions about inflation. However lease 
payments are inflated at 2.5% (the assumed increase in RPI) and therefore 
reasonably predictable after the first two years, and possibly before then as 
has already been suggested, the only risk from inflation comes from cost 
pressures exceeding the RPI and thereby eroding margins. The calculations 
in table 6.5 suggest that the risk in this respect is only moderate. Individual 
cost categories such as hard FM and life cycle costs were also analysed. 
Individually these are less sensitive and are of lower risk. Even if a poor 
design or construction therefore results in higher maintenance and asset 
replacement rates, they are not likely to affect the outturn IRR too 
significantly.  
 
Finally, residual value was also considered under the heading of operating 
risk. If the building is well maintained and regularly refurbished, the project 
should generate a relatively high residual value. In risk terms, generating a 
residual value is important because of the slow rates of senior debt 
amortisation and the use of bullet debt, which imply high outstanding debt 
balances at the end of the project. As can be seen from table 6.5 changes in 
the residual value do not have a significant impact on IRR. Mahmood (2004, 
35) draws the same conclusion. However, the implication of the NAO’s 
(2005, table 10) presentation, is that the residual value is a key sensitivity. 
However this does not turn out to be the case in either model, not least the 
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base model which has the same assumptions as those underpinning their 
own analysis. In fact, the residual value only appears sensitive in NAO 
(2005) table 10 because it is either included or excluded. As the above 
analysis shows, when variations in the level of residual value are examined, 
the sensitivities are insignificant. 
 
6.3.4 Discussion and Evaluation 
The major conclusion from the above analysis is that LIFT schemes can yield 
much higher investor returns than suggested by the NAO Report (2005). In 
that report, the six schemes reviewed all had very closely clustered returns, 
suggesting the likely variation from the 14% average benchmark would be 
unlikely. In contrast, the above results suggest that returns can be much 
higher and are indeed very sensitive to small changes in key assumptions. 
Those highlighted are the achievable gross margin, including the rate of 
early phase revenue growth. Possible reasons are the systematic over-
estimate of cost (by about 23% in this case) in the NAO/Operis models. 
Under the LIFT scheme such savings accrue to the investor rather than the 
taxpayer and therefore do not translate into VfM considerations. On the 
contrary the higher potential returns represent an excess profit possibility 
from the scheme at the expense of the taxpayer. Moreover, it is also clear 
that the cost of using direct public finance would generate substantial 
savings for the taxpayer.  
 
Such considerations do not necessarily translate into VfM without factoring 
in risk transfer. However, the NAO has stated that it identified no VfM 
concerns about the allocation of risk under the LIFT model (House of 
Commons, 2006, ev.29). Such concerns obviously do exist if there are 
potentially large profits to be made without an equivalent risk transfer. As 
has been shown by the sensitivity analysis, there are some important risks 
embedded in construction and financing activities. In order to realise the 
upside potential of LIFT, the LIFTCo management must ensure that facilities 
are constructed on budget. There is thus at least one powerful and positive 
incentive built into the scheme, and this may be one reason why LIFTCo-s in 
general have delivered on time. As was also noted however, capital costs 
per patient can vary considerably and there are dis/economy of scale factors 
that help detract/promote the efficiency of the LIFT model. Larger 
investments proximate to population centres also seem to be better at 
drawing in associated dental practices and pharmacies (East Midlands LIFT). 
Finally, sensitivities would be much lower in a public sector comparative 
case since the project IRRs are much less sensitive to construction cost 
over-runs than blended equity IRRs. 
 
Blended equity IRRs also amplify the risks associated with loan finance. 
Because cash from borrowings offsets major capital expenditure cash flows, 
the rate of profit, whether computed as an accounting rate of return or an 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
163 
IRR can be enhanced considerably because of the low net equity outlay 
required. The introduction of debt therefore merely introduces risk as 
possibilities that the distribution of project cash flows between debt and 
equity holders will vary in some measure other than planned. Because the 
public sector is a residual equity stakeholder under LIFT, it therefore faces 
financial risk arising from high borrowing that would not exist if it were sole 
owner and operator of the asset. In other words, although the blended 
equity IRRs are sensitive to interest rate changes, there is no transfer of 
risk away from the public sector as a result of these financial arrangements.  
 
The only remaining point to consider is the positive effects from leveraging 
other sources of local finance. For example, L Partnership [name of a 
regional development authority] contributed £723,604 to the K Health 
Centre project in grant aid in the hope that the centre will aid the 
regeneration of the town.14 However, such decisions are a function of the 
investment per se rather and the use of LIFT structured finance would be 
immaterial. 
 
In terms of evaluating VfM, evidence from this case suggests that LIFT 
offers considerable upside potential to private sector investors and 
conversely offers an expensive option to the taxpayer. In return for getting 
new facilities built and on time and within budget, the rates of return are 
about one and a half points higher on the NAO figures (House of Commons, 
2006, ev.26), or anything up to twenty eight points higher in at least one 
credible scenario presented here. Savings from using alternative direct 
public finance are conservatively estimated at £3.5m on this £20m scheme 
suggesting a national saving on tranche 1 alone of £124m. Of course, such 
extrapolations are dangerous on the basis of one case and further research 
is needed. The point has already been made about access difficulties and 
the paucity of public domain data, and this alone should increase the value 
of the study presented here. More importantly, by establishing a public 
domain and detailed base case, the possibility of similar evaluations for 
other schemes is now offered. 
 
6.4 Comparative Financial Models:  
      Urban NW, Mixed West Midlands and Urban NE  
The purpose of this subsection is to compare the internal rates of return 
(IRRs) across three different LIFTCo-s. These IRRs are also compared to 
those reported in NAO (2005). Two of the case studies, urban NW and 
mixed West Midlands featured amongst the six reported in the NAO report. 
The third, urban NE, was analysed so that the financial outcomes could be 
assessed in conjunction with the interview evidence on VfM gathered 
elsewhere in the report. Subsection 6.3 above has already considered urban 
NW, as the detailed accounting data required to build a base case that 
                                                 
14 This is Lancashire, 6th January, 2004. 
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reconciled to the NAO (2005) IRR outputs were only available for that case 
study LIFT (Mahmood, 2004, annex IV). Once constructed, such a base case 
can be modified using reasonable assumptions to reflect the financial 
circumstances of other LIFTCo-s. Although the precise inputs cannot be 
known from public domain information, these can be approximated and 
assumptions tested using sensitivity analysis. 
   
In the analysis that follows, each LIFT is considered in turn. The basis for 
each case is three tables: a model input table, an ex post profit and loss 
comparison, and the financial model. The latter, due to their size and detail, 
are shown as appendices, and key highlights reported in the narrative 
below. A further subsection then conducts a systematic comparison across 
the three cases. 
 
6.4.1 Urban NW: The Base Case 
Table 6.6 shows the breakdown of revenues, costs and margins, as forecast 
in 2004. These data provide some detail of the inputs used in the NAO 
(2005) report, which produced an IRR of 15.1% for urban NW. As can be 
seen from table 6.6, a striking feature of the forecast is the rapid build up of 
revenue from a low base in the first three years of the project. Once these 
inputs have been modelled, it becomes clear that the IRR is extremely 
sensitive to the assumed rate of growth and initial level of revenue. 
Pessimistic assumptions, for example about the 2005 inputs, have a 
powerful effect on levering down the IRR. The principal costs in arriving at 
gross profit are facilities management and administrative and secretarial. 
Assumptions about starting levels and growth rates also have significant 
impact on the IRR, albeit less so than the revenue assumptions. 
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Table 6.6: Urban NW LIFT, Revenue, Cost and Gross Margin 
Proforma P&L a/c 30/9/05 30/9/06 30/9/07 
    
Lease plus payments 98.00 2274.00 2576.00  
Third party revenues 24.00 53.00 54.00  
Recovery of pass through costs 80.00 182.00 186.00  
Recovery of utilities costs 42.00 95.00 98.00  
Total revenue 244.00 2604.00 2914.00 
Admin and secretarial 274.00 139.00 143.00  
SPV Management 21.00 49.00 50.00  
External fees 4.00 10.00 10.00  
Bank fees and charges 1.00 2.00 2.00  
Insurance 38.00  87.00 90.00  
Hard FM Operating Costs 174.00 380.00 381.00  
Pass through costs 58.00 133.00 136.00  
Utilities costs 42.00 95.00 98.00  
Total costs 612.00 895.00 910.00 
Gross profit -368.00 1709.00 2004.00 
 
Source: Compiled from Mahmood (2004, annex III). 
 
Using the data in table 6.6, the base case can be constructed by factoring 
other known inputs (for example debt ratios, interest costs, debt repayment 
schedules and residual values) and modifying remaining variables to 
produce an IRR of 15.1% as reported in NAO (2005, 26 and c/f. Mahmood, 
2004, 35). 
Model inputs and outputs for urban NW LIFTCo in terms of Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR without and with residual values are shown in table 6.7. 
In the urban NW case, the majority of the inputs are taken directly from the 
forecast accounting data in Mahmood (2004, annexes III and IV). Growth 
rates, for costs and revenues are calculated variables for the urban NW 
model, whereas they are input variables in other cases. They are shown 
here in the same format for consistency and comparability with other tables. 
 
Table 6.7 in conjunction with Appendix 6.1 can be used to generate further 
bespoke modelas that can be used to compute IRRs on the same basis as 
the Operis method. The required steps are as follows: 
 
1) Determine base case input assumptions (complete the input variables 
listed in table 6.7). 
2) Create columnar extensions for each flow category following the format 
in appendix 6.1. 
3) Use growth and amortisation rates, capital costs, debt finance splits and 
residual value assumptions to map cash flows in individual years (see 
alsp the descriptions on pp 154-55 above). Note: Include depreciation 
charges in order to forecast the cash flow consequences of tax deferral. 
4) Compute the belnded equity post tax IRR with and without RV using the 
definition in note 10 above. 
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Table 6.7: Urban NW LIFT, Model Inputs and Outputs 
Input variables Actuals 
Base 
case Base case assumptions 
Revenue starting 
value, £’000s 1,890 244 
Pro-forma P&L account (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex III)  
Cost starting value, 
£’000 419 612 
Pro-forma P&L account (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex III)  
Year 1 revenue growth  1.51 10.67 
Pro-forma P&L account (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex III)  
Year 1 cost growth  1.71 1.200 
Pro-forma P&L account (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex III)  
Year 2 growth, costs 
and revenues 1.081 1.11 
Pro-forma P&L account (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex III)  
Years 3-25 growth, 
costs and revenues  1.025 1.025 
Steady state inflation rate (Mahmood, 2004, 
32). 
Senior debt 
amortisation rate 0.96 0.96 
Pro-forma Balance Sheet (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex IV)  
Subordinated debt 
amortisation 0.93  0.93 
Pro-forma Balance Sheet (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex IV)  
Tax rate 0.27 0.27 
Estimated applying 2004-05 tax rates to 
average forecast annual profits  
Capital cost £’000s 23,498 23,501 
Pro-forma Balance Sheet (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex IV). Estimated by differencing balance 
sheet values 
First year 62.41% 62.13% 
Pro-forma Balance Sheet (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex IV) 
Second year 37.59% 37.87% 
Pro-forma Balance Sheet (Mahmood, 2004, 
annex IV) 
Residual value (RV) 
£’000s 8,250  8,250 Mahmood (2004, 45) 
RV/Cap cost 0.351 0.351 Calculated from above inputs 
Borrowing ratios*    
Senior debt amortising 80.00% 80.00% Mahmood (2004, 69) 
Senior debt bullet 9.00% 9.00% Mahmood (2004, 69) 
Subordinated debt 11.00% 11.00% Mahmood (2004, 69) 
Total  87.00% 87.00%  
Outputs 
Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR 
no RV 43.95% 14.00% Mahmood (2004, 35); NAO (2005, 26) 
Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR 
with RV 43.97% 15.10% Mahmood (2004, 35); NAO (2005, 26) 
 
Sources: LIFTCo actuals, Nexis UK. Forecasts per model calculated from figures in 
Mahmood (2004) and NAO (2005). Tax rates taken from: 
http://www.scopulus.co.uk/taxsheets/uktaxrates2004-5.htm#CorporationTax4-5 
 
Note: 
* Debt divided by capital cost 
 
Urban NW model results have already been reported in the detailed financial 
case study analysis for the urban NW LIFT and are not discussed in 
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individual detail again here. For the purposes of the comparative an analysis 
below however, the appropriate data is reproduced in table 6.8. 
 
Table 6.8: Urban NW LIFT, Model Forecasts and Actual Comparisons 
 Actuals   sum Forecast   sum diff 
Date of Accounts 31/12/2007 31/12/2006 31/12/2005  31/12/2007 31/12/2006 31/12/2005   
 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Total Sales* 3,055,000 2,931,000 1,897,000 7,883,000 2,942,000 2,632,000 244,000 5,818,000 2,065,000 
Cost of Sales 726,000 723,000 419,000 1,868,000 910,000 690,000 612,000 2,212,000 344,000 
Gross Profit 2,329,000 2,208,000 1,478,000 6,015,000 2,032,000 1,737,000 -368,000 3,401,000  
Depreciation 812,000 807,000 587,000 2,206,000 690,000 690,000 690,000 2,070,000 -136,000 
Operating Profit 1,517,000 1,401,000 891,000 3,809,000 1,342,000 1,047,000 -1,058,000 1,331,000  
Interest Payable 1,698,000 1,659,000 1,055,000 4,412,000 1,616,000 1,647,000 0 3,263,000 -1,149,000 
Pretax Profit -181000 -258000 -164000 -603,000 -274,000 -600,000 -1,058,000 -1,932,000  
Taxation 69,000 74,000 23,000 166,000 0 0 0 0 -166,000 
Profit After Tax -250000 -332000 -187000 -769,000 -274,000 -600,000 -1,058,000 -1,932,000 1,163,000 
          
Gross profit/Sales 76.23% 75.33% 77.91% 76.30% 69.01% 65.99% -150.81% 58.46%  
 
Sources: A ctuals take n from LIFTCo acco unts, Nexus  UK, forecasts per model 
input assumptions, table 6.8 and model in appendix 6.2. 
 
6.4.2 Mixed West Midlands LIFT, Financial Model 
Model inputs and outputs for mixed West Midlands LIFTCo in terms of 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR without and with residual values are 
shown in table 6.9. Two columns of figures show actual values that are used 
to update the model from published accounting data and the input columns 
show a base case constructed to approximate to the NAO models. 
Approximation is achieved by varying the inputs according to reasonable 
assumptions to produce the IRR outputs close to those relied upon by the 
NAO.  Model inputs are only allowed to vary within certain parameters, 
namely the post-tax blended equity IRR should correspond to the two 
figures (with and without residual values) shown in NAO (2005, 26). Debt 
ratios and residual values are known from public sources of information, so 
these are treated as fixed inputs. Other inputs are treated as fixed as far as 
possible and the year 1 operating cost starting value is set to correspond to 
year 1 actual values from the accounts. The procedure therefore allows as 
few inputs as possible to vary and these are marked with an asterisk in the 
input table. These consist of a starting figure for revenue and growth 
forecasts for costs and revenues in the early years of the project. The effect 
of developing the model in this fashion is to focus on the accuracy or 
otherwise of cost and revenue forecasts whilst holding other parameters 
relatively constant. 
As growth rates in the later years are known to be assumed stable, the 
model is naturally sensitive to changes in the early years build up. Because 
financial results for the early years of the project are available at the time of 
writing from published accounts, typically three years, a useful comparison 
can be drawn. A comparison showing the first three years from the base 
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case forecast model and the first three years actual trading results from the 
accounts is shown in table 6.10. 
From table 6.10, it can be seen that the model provides a reasonable 
approximation to the actual financial results. In addition to providing 
columns for each of the first three years of the project, the table also 
computes the summed values in each case and the difference between 
actuals and forecast is shown in the final column. Favourable variances 
against forecast are shown as positive figures and unfavourable variances 
as negatives.  
 
Table 6.9: Mixed West Midlands LIFT, Model Inputs and Outputs 
Input variables Actuals 
Base 
case Base case assumptions 
Revenue starting 
value, £’000s 839 404.5 
Variable adjusted to produce base case IRR 
(Mahmood, 2004, 35; NAO, 2005, 26)* 
Cost starting value, 
£’000 146 146 Set to equal 1st year actuals  
Year 1 revenue growth  1.715 4.400 
Simulated growth rates based on Urban NW 
base case and Mahmood (2004, annex III)* 
Year 1 cost growth  0.000 1.200 
Simulated growth rates based on Urban NW 
base case and Mahmood (2004, annex III)* 
Year 2 growth, costs 
and revenues 1.124 0.100 
Simulated growth rates based on Urban NW 
base case and Mahmood (2004, annex III)* 
Years  3-25 growth, 
costs and revenues  0.025 0.025 
Steady state inflation rate (Mahmood, 2004, 
32). 
Senior debt 
amortisation rate 0.96 0.96 
Urban NW base case, Mahmood (2004, 
annex IV) 
Subordinated debt 
amortisation 0.93 0.93 
Urban NW base case, Mahmood (2004), 
appendix 1 
Tax rate 0.27 0.27 
Estimated applying 2004-05 tax rates to 
average forecast annual profits  
Capital cost £’000s 15,420 18,508 Estimated as RV x 0.389 
first year 100.00% 100.00% All construction completed in first year 
second year 0.00% 0.00%  
residual value (RV) 
£’000s 7,200 7,200 Mahmood (2004, 45) 
RV/Cap cost 0.467 0.389 
Estimated comparing Mahmood (2004, 34) 
and NAO (2005, 26) case study 3 
Borrowing ratios    
Senior debt amortising 77.00% 77.00% Mahmood (2004, 69) 
Senior debt bullet 10.00% 10.00% Mahmood (2004, 69) 
Subordinated debt 0.00% 0.00% Mahmood (2004, 69) 
Total  87.00% 87.00%  
Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR 
no RV 20.63% 14.02% Mahmood (2004, 35); NAO (2005, 26) 
Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR 
with RV 21.21% 15.29%  
 
Sources: See table 6.7.  
Notes: 
* Variables  adjusted iterative ly to produc e a pproximations to IRR’s  reported in 
Mahmood (2004, 35) and NAO (2005, 26). 
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Table 6.10: Mixed West Midlands LIFT, Model Forecasts and Actual 
Comparisons 
 Actuals   sum Forecast   sum diff 
Date of 
Accounts 31/03/2008 31/03/2007 31/03/2006  31/03/2008 31/03/2007 31/03/2006   
 £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Total Sales 1,618,000 1,439,000 839,000 3,896,000 1,957,780 1,779,800 404,500 4,142,080 -246,080 
Cost of Sales 146,000 185,000 146,000 477,000 353,320 321,200 146,000 820,520 343,520 
Gross Profit 1,472,000 1,254,000 693,000 3,419,000 1,604,460 1,458,600 258,500 3,321,560  
Depreciation 973,000 720,000 292,000 1,985,000 452,320 452,320 452,320 1,356,960 -628,040 
Operating 
Profit 499,000 534,000 401,000 1,434,000 1,152,140 1,006,280 -193,820 1,964,600  
Interest 
Payable 1,008,000 969,000 572,000 2,549,000 1,238,893 1,289,376 0 2,528,270 -20,730 
Pretax Profit -509,000 -435,000 -171,000 -1,115,000 -86,753 -283,096 -193,820 -563,670  
Taxation 0 -16000 14,000 -2,000 0 0 0 0 2,000 
Profit After 
Tax -509,000 -419,000 -185,000 -1,113,000 -86,753 -283,096 -193,820 -563,670 -549,330 
          
Gross 
profit/Sales 90.98% 87.14% 82.60% 87.76% 81.95% 81.95% 63.91% 80.19%  
 
Sources: A ctuals take n from LIFTCo acco unts, Nexus  UK, forecasts per model 
input assumptions, table 6.8 and applied to model in appendix 6.3. 
 
Reviewing table 6.10 in conjunction with the output values in table 6.9, in 
general the LIFTCo has been more profitable than average levels suggested 
by the NAO Report models (2005, 26, table 10). Nominal Post-Tax Blended 
Equity IRRs are 20.63% and 21.21% without and with residual values 
respectively. The reason for this circa 7% premium is that operating costs 
(measured by cost of sales) have been much lower than predicted, and 
have shown no growth trend between 2006 and 2008. Lower than forecast 
revenues have been more than offset by lower costs, so that the average 
gross operating margin (gross profit/sales) is also circa 7% above the level 
implied by the model assumptions. Interest charges are as predicted and 
taxation does not have a large impact on the model or actual results. 
Depreciation is therefore the other major factor explaining the aggregate 
underperformance of actual results compared to the model predictions. 
Depreciation is an accounting transfer and does not affect cash flow directly. 
The depreciation values in the model assign the difference between the 
capital cost and residual value on a straight line basis over 25 years.15 
There is only an indirect effect on cash flow as the depreciation charge is 
included in the computation of early year losses to create a tax deferral 
effect in the model. Consequently, the timing of tax cash flows are affected, 
and these have a higher weight later in the model due to the deferrals. The 
higher levels of depreciation that are being charged in the first three years 
of the LIFTCo’s accounts would seem to be significantly greater than 
necessary to write off the asset cost over 25 years, suggesting that an 
accelerated depreciation policy is being applied.  
                                                 
15 The applied assumption is that tax and accounting depreciation rates 
correspond closely over the long run. 
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6.4.3 Urban NE LIFT, Financial Model 
Model inputs and outputs for determined on the same basis as mixed West 
Midlands above for the urban NE LIFTCo are shown in table 6.11. Similar 
assumptions are made except for certain non-simulated variables where 
input data is not available from Mahmood (2004) or NAO (2005). For the 
purposes of constructing a base case therefore, the average IRR’s without 
and with residual values were computed from NAO (2005, 26, table 10), 
thereby imposing the base case assumption that urban NE is an ‘average’ 
LIFT. No information was available for the estimated residual value, and 
these varied quite dramatically in the NAO (2005) report.16 However, if the 
residual value is adjusted to produce a similar differential to the without and 
with blended IRRs, it can be estimated by simulation. The resulting residual 
value is therefore the figure that corresponds to the average differential for 
a LIFT of the size of urban NE. Unlike mixed West Midlands capital cost is 
allocated across three years as the expenditure built up at approximately 
that rate in the LIFTCo balance sheets, reflecting the phased opening of four 
health centres, starting with #1 in December 2006 and ending with #4 in 
December 2007. The individual costs of these are summed together with an 
estimate of purchase and legal costs to compute total capital cost inputs.17 
Other inputs are determined in a similar fashion to the mixed West Midlands 
case. 
 
In similar fashion to urban NW LIFT and mixed West Midlands LIFT, a 
comparison showing the first three years from the base case forecast model 
and the first three years actual trading results from the accounts is shown in 
table 6.12. In the base case model the inputs must be constrained to a 
gross profit equivalent to 57% in order to produce IRRs as low as in the 
NAO Report. The actual gross profit for the first three years is 80.5%, which 
is similar to, if slightly lower than mixed West Midlands. A differential gross 
profit of circa 23% between the model and actual explains to a large extent 
why, when actual numbers are substituted into the first three years of the 
model, the IRR rises to circa 200%. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Ranging from 12.6% - 131% of land  and construction costs (NAO, 2005, 
p.26, table 10). 
 
17 Based on Mahmood (2004), the approximate costs for a LIFT of this siz e 
was £2.5m. 
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Table 6.11: Urban NE LIFT, Model Inputs and Outputs 
Input variables Actual 
Base 
case Base case assumptions 
revenue starting 
value 70  52.04 
Variable adjusted to produce base case IRR 
(Mahmood, 2004, 35; NAO, 2005, 26) 
cost starting value 18 18 Set to equal 1st year actuals  
year 1 rev growth 11.086 9.000 
Simulated growth rates based on Urban NW 
base case and Mahmood (2004, appendix 1) 
year 1 cost growth 7.722 15.000 
Simulated growth rates based on Urban NW 
base case and Mahmood (2004, appendix 1) 
year 2 growth 2 2 
Simulated growth rates based on Urban NW 
base case and Mahmood (2004, appendix 1) 
years 3-25 0.025 0.025 
Steady state inflation rate (Mahmood, 2004, 
32). 
senior debt 
amortisation rate 0.96 0.96 
Urban NW base case, Mahmood (2004), 
annex 4 
subordinated debt 
amortisation 0.93 0.93 
Urban NW base case, Mahmood (2004), 
appendix 1 
tax rate 0.27 0.27 
Estimated applying 2004-05 tax rates to 
average forecast annual profits  
capital cost 22,100 15,000 
Aggregated costs of Alexandra, Park, Calvert 
Lane and Longhill Health Centres + 
estimated legal fees 
first year 33.00% 33.00% All construction completed in first year 
second year 33.00% 33.00%  
third year 33.00% 33.00% Mahmood (2004, 45) 
residual value 9,393 4,200  
RV/Cap cost 0.425 0.280 
Variable adjusted to produce average 
differential in base case IRR (NAO, 2005, 26) 
Borrowing ratios    
senior debt 
amortising 92.00% 92.00% Urban NE LIFTCo balance sheets 
senior debt bullet 8.00% 8.00% Urban NE LIFTCo balance sheets 
subordinated debt 0.00% 0.00%  
Total  100.00% 100.00%  
Outputs    
Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR 
no RV 199.98% 12.95% 
Approximations to average IRR of the six 
NAO (2005, 26) case studies 
Nominal Post-Tax 
Blended Equity IRR 
with RV 199.98% 14.96% 
Approximations to average IRR of the six 
NAO (2005, 26) case studies 
 
Sources: See table 6.7.  
 
Notes: 
* Variables  adjusted iterative ly to produc e a pproximations to IRR’s  reported in 
Mahmood (2004, 35) and NAO (2005, 26). 
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Table 6.12: Urban NE LIFT, Model Forecasts and Actual Comparisons 
 
Sources: Actuals taken from LIFTCo accounts, Nexus UK, forecasts per model 
input assumptions, table 6.10 and applied to model in appendix 6.4 
 
6.4.4 Comparative Analysis 
Individual reasons for difference between the base case model and ex post 
adjusted models have been discussed. In general the LIFTCo-s are 
performing above the expected levels predicted in NAO (2005). Some of the 
general reasons for these differences are now explored.  
 
Gross Margins, IRR and After Tax Cash Flow 
A summary is provided in table 6.13 showing differences between forecast 
and ex post gross margins, IRRs and after tax cash flows for the three case 
studies and an overall average.  
Actuals Sum Forecast sum difference 
Date of 
Accounts 31/12/2007 31/12/2006 31/12/2005  31/12/2007 31/12/2006 31/12/2005   
Total Sales 1,543,000 776,000 70,000 2,389,000 1,405,080 468,360 52,040 1,925,480 463,520 
Cost of Sales 278,000 139,000 18,000 435,000 540,000 270,000 18,000 828,000 393,000 
Gross Profit 1,241,000 632,000 52,000 1,925,000 865,080 198,360 34,040 1,097,480  
Depreciation 510,000 328,000 133,000 971,000 432,000 432,000 0 864,000 -107,000 
Operating 
Profit 731,000 304,000 -81000 954,000 433,080 -233,640 34,040 233,480  
Interest 
Payable 982,000 465,000 25,000 1,472,000 854,076 891,392 0 1,745,468 273,468 
Pretax Profit -227000 -156000 -106000 -489,000 -420,996 -1,125,032 34,040 -1,511,988  
Taxation 167000 0 0 167,000 0 0 0 0 -167,000 
Profit After 
Tax -60000 -156000 -106000 -322,000 -420,996 -1,125,032 34,040 -1,511,988 1189988 
          
Gross 
profit/sales 80.43% 81.44% 74.29% 80.58% 61.57% 42.35% 65.41% 57.00%  
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Table 6.13: Comparative Gross Margins, IRR and After Tax Cash 
Flow 
 Urban 
NW 
Mixed 
West 
Midlan
ds 
Urban 
NE 
Case 
study 
average 
COMPARATIVE MARGINS* 
Average 3 year ex post 
gross margin % 
76.30 87.76 80.58 81.54 
Implied ex ante average 
margin per NAO model 
assumptions % 
58.46 80.19 57.00 65.22 
Difference % 17.84 7.57 23.58 16.32 
COMPARATIVE IRR** 
IRR adjusted for 3 years ex 
post data % 
43.97 21.21 199.98 88.39 
IRR implied by NAO 
assumptions % 
15.10 15.29 14.96 15.12 
Difference % 28.87 5.92 185.02 73.27 
COMPARATIVE AFTER TAX CASH FLOW† 
After tax non-balance sheet 
cash flows 3 years ex post 
£’000 
1,437 872 
 
649 2,958 
After tax non-balance sheet 
cash flows* for first three 
years per NAO assumptions 
£’000 
138 794 -648 284 
Difference £’000 1,299 78 1,297 2,674 
 
Sources: LIFTCo actuals, Nexis UK. Forecasts per model calculated from figures in 
Mahmood (2004) and NAO (2005). 
 
Notes: 
*  Profit after direct operating costs and before depreciation and interest 
charges divided by revenue 
**   Blended nominal internal rate of return. Rate of interest required to 
equalise the present values of post interest and tax cash flows, including 
residual value, attributable to equity and non-senior debt holders 
†  Profit after tax plus depreciation  
  
As can be seen from table 6.13, in no case is an ex post adjusted margin or 
IRR calculation below the forecast level implied by the NAO assumptions. It 
is difficult to infer too much from ratios since there is clearly scope for them 
to take on potentially unrepresentative large values, as is the case here with 
the very high IRR for urban NE. In purely cash flow terms however it is also 
clear that the after tax cash flows of all three projects are much higher than 
the cash flows implied by the Mahmood/NAO assumptions, which are 
needed to constrain the IRR to the 14-15% range. As table 6.13 shows, 
aggregate cash flows are £2,674,000 higher than implied by the NAO 
models across the three LIFTs. Only mixed West Midlands compares fairly 
closely with the original models, whereas in the other cases the NAO models 
were overly pessimistic.  
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Depreciation Charges 
One reason why the LIFT’s report low profits but high IRRs apart from the 
sensitivity of early years’ revenue and cost growth in the NAO models, is the 
use of accelerated depreciation. In two cases depreciation charges were 
much higher than required to write off the assets of the LIFT over 25 years 
factoring in the residual value. In the case of urban NE (where depreciation 
charges were not higher), depreciation may not have reached steady state 
by year three due to the slower build up of capital cost (33% per year over 
three years). In the case of urban NW and mixed West Midlands there 
appears to be systematic over-depreciation of the assets, leading to possible 
understatement of reported profits, undisclosed reserves and the possibility 
of a larger capital profit at the end of the project.  Theoretically, these 
reserves could be realised if the project were to be refinanced in the future. 
 
 
Table 6.14: Comparison of Required and Actual Depreciation Charges 
 LIFTCo  
 Urban NW Mixed 
West 
Midlands 
Urban NE Case study 
average 
Original cost of 
assets * 
23,498 15,420 22,100 61,018 
Residual value** 8,250 7,200 9,393 24,843 
Steady state 
actual 
depreciation 
charge† 
812 973 510 2,295 
Average 
depreciation 
charge required to 
write of assets 
over useful life‡ 
630 328 557 1,644 
Difference 182 645 -47 780 
 
*  LIFTCo balance sheets 
**   Model assumptions 
†  Year three depreciation charge 
‡ Original cost minus year one and year two depreciation minus residual 
value divided by remaining useful life (22 years). 
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Interest Charges 
Although predicted costs seem much lower for the LIFTCo-s, in practice 
when compared to the ex ante models, in the case of interest charges there 
is a possible tendency for costs to be higher or at least in line with NAO 
forecast model assumptions. Table 6.15 compares financial costs across the 
three cases. As noted above in the detailed urban NW case study, interest 
charges were particularly significant and high compared to the alternative 
cost of public sector finance. However, the pattern is not repeated in the 
other two cases. Mixed West Midlands is close to the predicted cost and in 
the case of urban NE, interest charges are lower, possibly as a result of a 
slower draw down of debt linked to phasing in construction. If financing 
costs do turn out to be higher than the NAO models, the result will be a 
redistribution of the profit as reflected in the ex post IRR’s in favour of the 
senior debt holders and at the expense of equity shareholders. The 
underlying profitability of the LIFT is not affected nor is there additional cost 
to the public sector. As noted in the urban NW, however, the charges shown 
in table 6.15 may be considerably in excess of the rates at which the public 
sector might borrow funds.  
 
Table 6.15: Comparison of Financial Costs 
 LIFTCo  
 East 
Lancs 
Mixed 
West 
Midlands 
Urban NE Case study 
average 
Interest charges, ex 
post three year 
average £’000 
4,412 
 
 
 
2,549 
 
 
 
1,472 
 
 
 
8,433 
Interest charges 
per NAO model 
assumptions £’000 
 
 
 
3,263 
 
 
 
2,528 
 
 
 
1,745 
 
 
 
7,536 
Difference £’000 1,149 21 -273 897 
 
6.5 Conclusions 
The strong general direction of the evidence in this chapter is suggestive 
that LIFT is an expensive form of procurement. Evidence discussed in 
Parliament in 2005 had already suggested this (see subsection 6.3.1), and 
this report offers some confirmation. In the case of urban NW, there is some 
evidence that although expensive in comparison to conventional 
procurement, per capita costs are lower where LIFT is delivered in areas of 
higher population density, due to their ability to attract greater 
concentrations of GPs. Such differences may explain why urban 
stakeholders are less satisfied with the process but happier with the 
outcome (see section 4, subsection 4.3.6). 
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An important reason for the overall cost differential in LIFT schemes when 
compared to conventional procurement is the level of interest charges. As 
the urban NW case demonstrates, these are much higher than conventional 
procurement (subsection 6.3.3) and also can overrun the assumptions in 
the ex ante planning models. In the latter case however there is no extra 
cost to the public sector and in the other two cases interest charges were 
more in line with overall expectations. 
 
A very significant cost to the public sector however, would occur in cases 
where excessive profits are available to private sector providers. The ex 
ante planning models examined by the NAO showed a reasonable range of 
IRRs (13-15%) for six case studies. Re-examining these with the benefit of 
three years actual financial data would suggest that the LIFTCo-s are easily 
exceeding these levels of return and by some considerable margin. Urban 
NW LIFTCo can perhaps expect an IRR in excess of 40% over the course of 
the project (subsection 6.3.3). Returns for mixed West Midlands are less 
than this and returns for urban NE are greater, but in all three cases, 
returns exceed NAO models by some degree (subsection 6.4.4). The 
reasons in urban NW are also present in the other cases, which are: faster 
build up of revenue in early years to forecast levels, lower operating costs in 
facilities management and administration, leading to higher gross profit 
margins. Apart from construction cost, the financial models are most 
sensitive to changes in assumptions affecting gross margin. Residual value, 
which attracted some attention in the ex ante models, is immaterial at the 
higher levels of IRR at which the case study schemes seem to be operating 
ex post. Compared to the difference of gross profit against forecast, 
operating profit margins and net profit margins have smaller differentials 
due to the use of accelerated depreciation (in the case of urban NW and 
especially mixed West Midlands, see subsection 6.4.4) and higher than 
predicted interest charges (in the case of urban NW, see subsection 6.4.4).  
 
The analysis of these three case studies suggests that, in general terms, 
LIFT is expensive. But is it, therefore, poor VfM? The interview evidence 
suggests that many key stakeholders felt that LIFT offered important 
benefits and many of them also believed that these were difficult to 
quantify. Many also had a perception of the cost of LIFT, but offered very 
little quantitative evidence in support of their perceptions. This chapter has 
suggested a methodology and provided evidence against which the benefits 
highlighted elsewhere can now be assessed. 
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7 Case Studies  
7.1  Case Studies: Study Design and Methodology 
This section pertains to the four case studies that, together with the 
‘stakeholder’ chapter of section 4, form the analysis of the qualitative 
fieldwork conducted by the research team.  Although initially the team 
hoped to conduct a greater number of case studies, this was not feasible on 
account of the reluctance of LIFTs and PCTs to engage, despite repeated 
requests, in this process.  However, the LIFTs and PCTs that did participate 
in this research project did so with enthusiasm and, most importantly, gave 
the research team access to large number of diverse stakeholders who, in 
turn, provided extensive, detailed and knowledgeable interview data.   
 
On the whole, each of the case studies entailed circa eight interviews (more 
than 30 interviews in total) which involved public and private sector staff 
with functional responsibilities for the areas of finance, project 
management, estate management, as well as directors and/or assistant 
directors of PCTs.  In addition, the team was able to interview a number of 
centre and practice managers who provided valuable information on various 
operational aspects of their LIFT facilities.   
 
Following the format of the stakeholder section (section 4), all interviewees 
were contacted well in advance of the interview.  This typically involved the 
interviewees being sent a letter describing the purpose of the study and the 
nature of the study, i.e., our position as a group of university researchers 
conducting a project funded by the SDO.  Once initial agreement to be 
interviewed was gained, the interviewees were usually contacted by 
telephone and given a brief summary of the questions they should expect to 
be asked, as well as pertinent information about the interview process.  As 
part of this pre-negotiation phase, most interviewees agreed to be 
interviewed at their place of work for a period of forty minutes to one hour 
with the interviews being taped and subsequently professionally transcribed.   
 
For reasons of consistency all interviews were conducted by the same 
research team member.  Moreover, all interviews were professionally 
transcribed, again by the same professional transcription company 
throughout the study.  As a further quality control measure all interview 
transcripts were individually checked by the interviewer for potential 
transcription errors.  Although these measures helped ensure that high 
quality interview transcripts were obtained which could have been subjected 
to computerised content analysis. However, the thematic heterogeneity of 
the interview responses made this impossible.  While this may initially be 
considered a disadvantage, it has to be acknowledged, that this 
heterogeneity is itself the reflection of the specific subject expertise of the 
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informants which has to be seen as an advantage to the study.  This 
advantage is reflected in particular in the fact the interviews allowed for 
specific comparisons of processual and operational aspects of individual case 
studies which could, in turn, be linked to the characteristics of the 
underpinning partnership. 
 
As previously mentioned, the team made an effort to stratify its case 
studies among rural and urban, as well as northern and southern, locations.  
As a result the four case studies include a LIFT scheme in the urban North 
East LIFT [urban NE LIFT] (subsection 7.2), one in the rural East Midlands 
[rural E Midl] (subsection 7.3), one in a mixed area in the East Midlands [E 
Midl LIFT] (subsection 7.4), and one in an urban area in the South West 
[urban SW LIFT] (see subsection 7.6).   
 
In terms of timing, the first case study interviews were conducted in ‘urban 
South West LIFT’ in November 2007 up until July 2008.  This lengthy period 
of interviews for urban SW LIFT, however, was not due to delays, but rather 
to the fact that key participants in this scheme were particularly helpful to 
the research team and continued to make available additional interviewees 
over time.  This was followed by interviews in ‘rural E Midl’ and ‘mixed E 
Midl LIFT’ which were conducted during the months of September to 
December 2008.  The last set of case study interviews involved ‘urban North 
East LIFT’, with interviews conducted from November 2008 to February 
2009.  The latter interviews, in particular, provided interesting insights into 
user views on the actual and potential future impact of the current economic 
crisis on their partnership (see also section 9, ‘Express LIFT’).   
 
While differing in terms of location and levels of urbanity or rurality, the four 
case studies also differed significantly terms of the levels of investment 
undertaken.  Specifically, the investments undertaken in mixed East Midl 
LIFT and rural East Midl which jointly amounted to circa £42 million, far 
exceeded the levels of investment undertaken in urban South West LIFT 
(circa £28 million) and in urban North East LIFT (circa £13.5 million).   
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
179 
In terms of timing the four case studies were stratified as follows (year 
representing approximate date of financial close): 
 
urban  PCT in the North East [urban NE LIFT]   second wave      end 2003   
rural PCT East  Midl [rural E Midl]   third wave  merger with 
         existing LIFT  
mixed PCT East Midl [mixed E Midl]   third wave      end 2004 
urban PCT South West [urban SW LIFT]  third wave  middle 2004 
        
While the team would have liked to have included case studies from the first 
and fourth waves, this was sadly not possible.  In any case, the analysis of 
interviews from the stakeholder and case studies sections (see sections 4 
and 7) highlighted that the differences resulting from the phasing of LIFT 
schemes were negligible in comparison to those which arose from an area’s 
rurality. 
 
7.2 Case Study - Urban North East LIFT 
The Urban North East LIFT is located in a city of roughly 250,000 
inhabitants.  According to the 1991 census, the city had a relatively small 
population of slightly less than 2% of people from black and minority ethnic 
backgrounds.  More recently, the city underwent significant changes in 
terms of its ethnic diversity, with recent estimates showing a population of 
about 4% black and minority ethnic (BME) residents.  A significant 
proportion of this appears to be due to the settlement of asylum seekers 
and refugees in the city. 
 
The number of sole occupied households in the city exceeds the national 
average of 30% by several percentage points, as does the percentage of 
inhabitants with a long-term limiting illness which amount to almost 21% 
(as compared to 18.2% for the population of England and Wales). 
 
The city has a high birth rate and high teenage conception rate in relation to 
the national average.  In terms of under-19 conceptions per 1000 
population, the city reports a figure of nearly 70 (which compares to 42.3 
nationally).  These factors have results in a skewing of the demographic 
profile of the city towards the younger age ranges relative to other cities of 
a similar size. 
 
The city’s economy is dominated by low wages, areas of high 
unemployment and inactivity rates and, for those in employment, low 
value/low paid professions.  In 2007, the city’s unemployment rate 
amounted to nearly 5.7% which compared unfavourably to the national 
average.  These conditions have contributed to the status of city as one of 
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the 10 most deprived of 354 English districts (by average of ward scores).  
Almost half of the people in the city live in electoral wards that are amongst 
the 105 most deprived wards in the country. 
 
The city is currently serviced by a single PCT which was established in 2006 
with the merger of two existing PCTs.  The city’s single PCT has a budget of 
nearly £500m (as at 2008/09) and employs over 1,500 members of staff. 
 
The PCT area includes six completed and operational and the planned LIFT 
facilities.  These include, firstly, a multipurpose health centre which offers 
minor surgical procedures, baby/child health clinics, a range of therapy 
services, dental surgery and an integrated on-site pharmacy.  The centre 
which resulted from a capital investment of slightly more than £2 million 
also serves as a base for district nurses and health visitors serving the local 
population and includes modern public library facility.    
 
A second health centre involved an investment of slightly less than £2 
million.  This facility accommodates two practices with six consulting rooms.  
The centre also provides a range of therapy services, out-patient clinics with 
visiting health staff, clinical and treatment rooms for visiting healthcare 
professionals, consulting and treatment rooms for teams of nurses who run 
a range of clinics for people living in the area and additional office space  
 
The third centre is a primary care "spoke" within the city's health and 
community infrastructure.  It accommodates GPs, seven modern and fully 
accessible consulting rooms and two treatment rooms for both doctor and 
nursing consultations and treatments and training facilities for medical 
student undergraduates on placement from the nearby medical school.  
 
The fourth centre supports general practitioners community health and 
nursing services. It provides accommodation for GPs, a new "Darzi" 
practice, and office accommodation for local NHS.  
 
The fifth centre was been developed as a designated "primary care plus 
centre" within the city's health and community infrastructure.  It replaces 
four existing single-handed GP practices and was developed to 
accommodate the following services: GPs, some specialist nursing services, 
minor surgery, allied health professions, diagnostic testing, a pharmacy, 
dental services and a modern library including internet access.  
 
The sixth centre involved an investment of circa £2 million and constituted 
the first LIFT building in the area which housed health and council facilities 
under one roof.  The centre provides accommodation for GPs, consulting 
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rooms and treatment facilities and a base for community and nursing staff 
covering the local population. 
 
Facilities currently under construction include a new centre which joins up 
health, council and community services in a building which is expected to 
cost slightly less than £15 million.  This centre is the largest facility set to 
be delivered by the LIFTCo to date, and completes the first tranche of the 
city's NHS LIFT programme.  The centre is expected to house GPs, a 
pharmacy, council customer service centre, health visitors, dental suite and 
dental training, intra oral x-ray, podiatry, ultrasound, diagnostic x-ray, 
school nurses, treatment suites, computer/seminar suite, meeting rooms, 
offices, a cafe and adult learning facilities.  
 
Another planned centre is currently under construction in the North pf the 
city where it forms part of a new village centre.  This centre will provide 
accommodation for GPs (with extended opening hours between 8 am and 8 
pm, from Monday to Friday, as well as Saturday mornings), a pain 
management clinic, community gynaecology, and speciality services in for 
ear, nose and throat, neurology, and mental health. 
 
Another development which is currently under construction is scheduled to 
house a relocated GP practice and other associated health services, such as 
new training facilities for GPs, accommodation for and an ambulance 
standby point. 
 
There is also a plan for a city centre facility which recently obtained 
planning permission from the City Council, following a formal public 
consultation.  This centre is scheduled to include two city centre-based GP 
practices, as well as a range of other health services.  
 
7.2.1 Methodology - Urban North East LIFT 
As previously stated, the team conducted its fieldwork at urban North East 
LIFT from November 2008 to February 2009.  In this context, the team was 
able to interview six individuals who were involved in the management of 
LIFT projects in a number of different capacities, including the PCT’s 
Director of Finance and the CEO of private sector LIFTCo partner.  
 
Specifically, interviews were obtained with the following individuals: The 
Director of Finance of the PCT [Fin Dir, urban NE], the Director of Provider 
Services [ProvS Dir, urban NE], the PCT’s Estates Manager [Est Mgr, urban 
NE], the PCT’s Assistant Director of Facilties  [Asst Dir Facl, urban NE], a 
PCT Project Manager [Proj Mgr, urban NE], the CEO of the private sector 
LIFTCO partner [CEO, urban NE].  Although the balance of the interviews 
was skewed towards public sector representatives (with five as against one 
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private sector informant), this was partly offset by the seniority of the 
private sector informant as well as the fact this interviewee participated in a 
very lengthy and informative interview which exceeded two hours.  
 
7.2.2 Background - Urban North East LIFT  
The fieldwork provided strong evidence that the involvement of urban NE 
PCT in LIFT was, from the public sector perspective, primarily driven by a 
history of under-investment, a need to upgrade existing facilities and a lack 
of alternative means of finance.  However, while the public sector attempted 
to target areas of greatest need and deprivation, its decisions also appear to 
have taken into account practical aspects such as GP interest and site 
availability.  In addition, there is evidence that the decision of the PCT to 
invest via LIFT was facilitated by strong private sector interest in the area.    
 
In contrast to mixed East Midl PCT (see subsection 7.4) where public sector 
informants described their involvement in LIFT as an enthusiastic buy-in 
which had been based on prior experiences with PFI, public sector 
informants from urban NE PCT tended to describe their involvement with 
LIFT as a primarily pragmatic decision.  Accordingly, the Director of Finance 
of the North East PCT [Fin Dir, urban NE] noted that his PCT became 
involved in LIFT because the appalling conditions of their primacy care 
facilities could, at the time, only be addressed through partnership with the 
private sector:   
 
“It was really a very pragmatic decision.  Our Primary Care estate was and 
in some parts maybe still  … appalling.  GP surgeries worked out of end 
terrace Victorian houses and in many areas the conditions were … 
absolutely appalling.  The prospect for NHS capital funded schemes was 
very slim.  The Government, I guess it was about the time of private 
finance, did not want to spend tax payers’ money on NHS capital building 
things, so things went down the PFI route.  Then LIFT came into being, as 
the kind of Primary Care equivalent of the PFI … If we wanted to improve 
… buildings the only real way to do it was through LIFT. That was why we 
put the application in.”  
 
This view was echoed by the PCT’s Estates Manager [Est Mgr, urban NE] 
who suggested that there had been a history of underinvestment in primary 
care facilities in the area which had become of considerable concern: 
 
“We had those sort of okay type buildings which had been done in the 70s 
and had not really moved with the times. … We had something like twenty 
odd practices operating out of old houses that were in a terrible state.  
There had been many years of under-investment in these premises 
because they were independent GP contractors and they were not putting 
the money into them.”   
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The same informant further suggested that, although there was some 
hesitation to involve private finance, urban North East PCT ultimately came 
to see this as the only means for required capital investments: 
  
“Although private finance had its critics, and the critics said in the longer 
term it may cost more, the fact is without it we would never have got off 
the ground, and we would still have been operating out of these old 
houses.”  
 
Although most public sector interviewees from urban North East PCT 
described their involvement with LIFT as being based, in part, on the 
absence of alternatives, there was a tendency to take a more positive view 
with regard to the bidding process.  In particular, several public sector 
interviewees noted that they had been positively surprised by the level of 
interest from private sector bidders as well as the nature of the proposals 
submitted.  This view was exemplified by the PCT’s Assistant Director of 
Facilities [Asst Dir Facl, urban NE] who noted his astonishment with the 
level of interest the LIFT bidding process attracted: 
 
“We were really surprised by the number of expressions of interest we 
received. I think we got seven in the end.  I think our city was seen as 
somewhere that had a lot of regeneration still left in it so it was perhaps a 
good place to get into.  We got quite a lot of interest from the big players, 
certainly more than we expected to.” 
 
While taking a generally positive view of the competitive process through 
which his PCT had procured its facilities, the same informant [Asst Dir Facl, 
urban NE], nonetheless, noted the location of LIFT facilities in the area 
involved compromises which, at least in one case, diverted investment from 
areas of greatest need:    
 
“The choice of schemes that went forward in the OJEU and the original 
SSDP was kind of a combination of areas that desperately needed new 
Primary Care premises, GPs who were prepared to embrace the concept 
and go with it, and site availability.   Having said that, they are all in 
reasonable locations and with the benefit of enormous hindsight, there is 
only one we would probably put in a slightly different location.” 
 
Overall, urban NE PCT represents an interesting case, in which an area 
which experienced high levels of need appears to have opted for LIFT 
primarily because this was the only option for attracting a high level of 
investment over a short time period.  While the literature has discussed this 
pattern in some detail (see, e.g., Aldred, 2006, 2007) it is important to note 
that urban NE PCT is the only one of our four case studies where public 
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sector informants expressly noted an initial reluctance to engage with 
private sector finance.    
 
7.2.3 Procurement - Urban North East LIFT 
While most of the public sector informants of urban NE PCT expressed 
relatively positive views about the initial procurement process as well as 
their eventual choice of a private sector contract partner, this was not the 
case with regard to the contractual framework which LIFT had imposed on 
them.   
 
These concerns were expressed by, among others, the private sector 
interviewee [CEO, urban NE] who compared LIFT to her previous experience 
in regeneration: 
 
“It is amazing anything ever gets done.  The NHS is pretty similar to that.  
Some of their individuals are very dynamic but there is the process and 
bureaucracy that ties their hands and the worry about doing something 
wrong; this innate fear of taking risks that some of the key people have.  
But we muddle along because we know that is what they have to do, we 
know the procedures.” 
 
Additional concerns about the contractual framework underpinning LIFT 
were expressed in some detail by the Director of Finance of urban NE PCT 
[Fin Dir, urban NE], who noted that issues of risk allocation and risk pricing 
had been a point of contention in negotiations with the private sector 
partner.  However, he said that both the public and private sector had 
become more proficient in working with these constraints: 
 
“The contractual framework is quite restrictive.  You cannot vary some of 
the contractual framework.   I think it is partly around keeping central 
control of the whole LIFT programme by the DoH.  But it can be a 
frustration sometimes.  In the earlier days of LIFT there were some 
partnership tensions.  It was difficult to reach agreement because of the 
legal framework.  Part of LIFT is about individuals taking risks that can 
manage that risk, and some of the contractual requirements required the 
private sector to carry risk, which, okay, they kind of priced for in the 
overall scheme of things. But they felt they could not actually influence or 
manage that risk.  But the contractual framework was fixed, there was no 
variation.  It has not been a show stopper in any of our schemes.  It is just 
now recognised that we just need to work around it or one of the parties 
might need to take a bit more risk.”  
   
Although several of our informants felt that LIFT suffered from excessive 
central control and bureaucracy, some of the interviewees suggested that 
this was a part and parcel of partnership working.  This view was expressed, 
among others, by the PCT’s Assistant Director of Facilties [Asst Dir Facl, 
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urban NE] who suggested that the amount of documentation required for 
LIFT might be a necessity for ensuring the cooperation of all parties: 
 
“The amount of documentation to close a LIFT building is absurd and it 
takes a lot of time just to put it all together and a lot of trees to print it all.  
This is silly. But I am not sure all the parties could get as comfortable with 
the deal if there were not all that documentation in place.” 
 
While the public sector respondents differed in their evaluation of LIFT 
bureaucracy in the context of the initial procurement of facilities, virtually all 
of them took a critical view towards the exclusivity requirements of the LIFT 
contract.  This view was expressed most openly by the Director of Finance 
[Fin Dir, urban NE] who described these requirements as a downside of 
LIFT: 
 
“It is fair to say that the exclusivity clause has thrown up several issues 
over the last couple of years.  Because the LIFT contract was very 
prescriptive and was not something we could opt out of so it was a 
necessary evil.  If you want the whole package you have to take a bit of 
downside.  So I think with hindsight we might have wanted a higher limit 
on the exclusivity, I think it is at £25K for any minor works at this time.” 
 
This view was echoed by the PCT’s Director of Provider Services [ProvS Dir, 
urban NE] who suggested that inflexibility of the LIFT contract had required 
the PCT to plan and assess its needs carefully: 
 
“We have worked hard to really embed a project and programme 
management approach.  Also, being clear about the multi-dimensional 
approach to the development of the LIFT building.  The specification is 
really important to meet the nature of the services.”   
 
7.2.4 Learning and Understanding - Urban North East LIFT 
There was a broad consensus among the public sector informants that their 
involvement with LIFT had a presented them with a steep learning curve.  
Within this consensus, they differed in terms of what they described as 
being most helpful in dealing with the demands LIFT had posed for them.  
Thus, a small group of interviewees cited external advice as one of the 
principal means for accessing necessary expertise.  Meanwhile, a number of 
informants noted that some of the requisite expertise had become available 
to them via their involvement with their private sector LIFT partners.  The 
latter statements closely matched the cultural analysis of section 5 
(subsection 5.4.1) which described urban NE LIFT as being positioned 
between Synergy and Segregation.     
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Representative for the view that their LIFT involvement presented a steep 
learning curve to PCT staff, the Director of Provider Services [ProvS Dir, 
urban NE] noted that this represented unique challenges: 
 
“When we started commissioning through LIFT, I absolutely did not have a 
clue.  I had to learn it in the last year and pick it up, about the partnership 
approach and some of the ULPs and some of the terms, the under leasing 
arrangement, you know what does that mean?  Some of that I just had to 
learn as I was going along.”  
 
This view was echoed by the Director of Finance [Fin Dir, urban NE] who 
argued that much of the required knowledge had become available to the 
PCT through outside consultants, while the PCT itself focused on its core 
activities: 
 
“I do not think the PCT needs to have architectural skills or financial 
modelling skills, because that is not our core business.  So what we are 
doing is we are buying that expertise ….  We have business development 
skills, skills relating to developing tenants’ requirements, in other words 
knowing the Health business and how that translates into requirements for 
facilities.”  
 
Meanwhile, the PCT’s Estates Manager [Est Mgr, urban NE] noted that, 
although there was only limited official guidance, his team had been able to 
draw on the expertise of its private sector partner: 
 
“I think for anyone coming in new to the process there is not a lot of 
guidance and it is a case of a steep learning curve.  But we have got a 
pool of expertise within our private sector partner and I find that quite 
helpful in some of the big schemes that I have done. 
Because our partner is a construction company, I was able to draw on 
such a variety of expertise within that industry that we certainly did not 
have internally.  Without that it would have been dragged out and would 
have taken an awful lot longer as an individual to do … I think that is really 
the advantage of the exclusivity arrangement.” 
 
Similarly, the PCT’s Assistant Director of Facilities [Asst Dir Facl, urban NE] 
noted that collaboration with the private partner had allowed the PCT to 
build a dedicated team of experts who were proficient in continuing this type 
of work: 
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“What we have tried to achieve is having a dedicated team that learns 
with the LIFTCo and its supply chain, and in theory, if I moved on, there 
would be other members of the team that would have a level of history 
and a level of knowledge that they would be able to step into my shoes 
and its kind of a succession planning.”   
 
This notion of mutual learning was amplified by the private sector 
representative [CEO, urban NE] who noted that her organisation also 
learned from NHS staff who, in turn, benefited increasingly from a large 
knowledge sharing network: 
 
 “The NHS locally is quite innovative in that it deals a lot in common sense.  
Something makes sense and they can prove a business case for it so they 
can see that its VfM in the long term and deal with whatever issues it 
needs to deal with.  There has not been much that we have been stopped 
from doing.  I sometimes feel almost conversely, because the NHS has 
more opportunity to go to all the innovation conferences and seminars 
where you might have the gem of an idea. … For them what is important is 
being able to commission a scheme.  So often we learn as much from 
them, because they are in that big network.”   
  
Overall there was a strong indication that, although urban NE PCT may 
perhaps have entered the LIFT process more reluctantly than other PCTs, 
there is now a feeling that the organisation has developed a detailed and 
valuable understanding of the LIFT procurement.  Additionally, it is 
interesting to note that both public and private sector informants felt that 
this understanding had developed as a part of mutual collaboration and 
information sharing.   
 
7.2.5 Partnership - Urban North East LIFT 
The previous section, as well as the cultural analysis of section 5 
(subsection 5.4.1), has already indicated that both the public and private 
sector value the relationship that has developed around LIFT in urban NE 
PCT.  This view was generally confirmed by most informants.  However, a 
number of informants noted that this relationship had taken some time to 
develop and had required both parties to overcome frustrations in order to 
gain a greater understanding of the specific constraints which they faced.  
Moreover, one of the PCT informants implied that there was now a danger 
that this partnership had become too close and that there was a need for 
the PCT to maintain a broad focus on health care provision beyond its 
immediate involvement with the LIFTCo. 
Speaking for a number of public sector informants who stressed the 
importance of the good working relationship their PCT had achieved with its 
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private sector, the Assistant Director of Facilities [Asst Dir Facl, urban NE], 
noted that the PCT made every effort to involve the LIFTCo in its decisions: 
 
“We treat our partnership as sacrosanct.  If we can do something with the 
LIFT Company involved we will attempt to do it that way, providing there 
are no absurd additional costs involved.  So in some cases we have taken 
leases and the LIFT Company is paying the head lease with a direct path 
through to a sub lease to us.  We do that just to maintain that partnership 
and the perception of partnership within the City.” 
 
Further on, the same informant suggested that the shared philosophy of the 
PCT and its private partner had made it possible to avoid conflicts and focus 
on future developments: 
 
“Partnership and understanding and shared philosophy are an enormous 
bonus.  It is strange for me when we I go to national LIFT events, hearing 
some of the tales people tell about the falling out and the lack of 
movement between public and private sectors.  We just do not approach it 
that way and I think it has made us a lot stronger and more able to see a 
programme going forward.” 
 
This view was echoed by the PCT’s Director of Finance [Fin Dir, urban NE] 
who suggested that the progress that had been made in this area had 
largely been due to the strength of this partnership.  Interestingly, the same 
informant noted that this level of partnership, as yet, did not extend to the 
Local Authority and other health organisations (see also subsection 7.4 
where a similar statement was made in connection with mixed East Midland 
LIFT): 
 
“The relationship between our private sector partner and the PCT is 
absolutely crucial and if you have got a good working relationship and a 
good partnership then you can deliver LIFT.  … I have no experience of it, 
but I think if you did not have that good partnership then it would be 
difficult to make LIFT work.  I was going to say that an added bonus would 
be greater Local Authority involvement and maybe that of other Health 
players, but you have got to start somewhere.”  
 
The private sector informant [CEO, urban NE] similarly proposed that a 
working partnership not only required effort and time but also openness and 
transparency: 
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“I think it is only a partnership because we work at it, and we work really 
hard at it.  We spend a lot of time with the NHS who are our main partners 
…  We are open and transparent and very honest with our key customer 
and we share things with them and it means that we are not behaving in 
the way that you see some private companies do to try to get public 
contracts. … That kind of openness and transparency filters right down 
through our supply chain and it leads to a kind of team ethos.” 
 
In connection with this discussion of partnership, a number of public sector 
informants also highlighted the crucial role of trust.  This was exemplified by 
the PCT’s Assistant Director of Facilities [Asst Dir Facl, urban NE] who noted 
that gradual elimination of mistrust among key stakeholders had played a 
crucial role in the development of this partnership: 
 
“There are people within the PCT who consider that the private sector is 
just out for a quick buck and the fine words mean nothing and so forth.  
And equally, I am certain there are people in the private sector side who 
think we are just a complete set of morons with horribly bureaucratic 
processes, and sometimes they are right!  I think the people who are most 
involved have very much got over that perception and there is a lot of 
respect.” 
 
This view was mirrored by the Director of Finance [Fin Dir, urban NE] who 
noted that it had taken some time to build the current relationship.  This 
being said, the same informant suggested that this process ultimately had 
become a major factor in the efficient procurement of facilities with which 
urban NE PCT prided itself:    
 
“I think we have got a very solid and effective partnership now, but it has 
taken a few years to shake down.  There is a better understanding of 
public sector governance which I know on occasions has been a bit of a 
frustration to the private sector … We have now got a good understanding 
of where each of the parties is coming from and what each party’s limits 
and boundaries are.  You only have to look at what we have delivered.”  
 
Similarly, the PCT Project Manager [Proj Mgr, urban NE] noted that the 
existing relationship played a key role in facilitating communication around 
procurement issues: 
 
“If this relationship was not in place, our LIFT would not have achieved 
what it has done.  It is very much a trust thing. Our private sector 
partners in the LIFT Company let us speak directly to a lot of their 
contractors.  They are quite happy because they know that everybody is 
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familiar with the process and if there were any issues it could be raised 
informally and it would be dealt with.”   
 
Although there was a broad agreement among public and private sector 
informants that urban NE PCT had achieved a strong partnership around 
its LIFT schemes, some informants noted that it was important for the PCT 
not to lose its focus on health care provision in general.  This view was 
expressed explicitly by the Director of Finance of the PCT [Fin Dir, urban 
NE] who concluded one of the interviews by stating that it was important 
to recognize that LIFT was only one part of the PCT’s activities:  
 
“LIFT is just one element of a fairly big business and so we are not solely 
focused on delivering LIFT.  It is very important and we put a lot of time 
and effort into it but there are other pressures and priorities.  The 
private sector, as a company, just focuses on delivering one thing.”  
 
Overall, there was strong evidence that the key stakeholders of urban NE 
LIFT felt that their collaboration was grounded in a strong partnership which 
had developed over time on the basis of growing mutual trust.  However, 
these generally positive views did not preclude more critical attitudes 
toward the cost aspects, which are discussed in greater detail in the 
consecutive subsection. 
 
7.2.6 Cost Issues - Urban North East LIFT  
Urban NE LIFT was the only case study area for which the research team 
obtained sufficient data to conduct a preliminary analysis of cash flows (see 
section 6).  This preliminary analysis, which was grounded in a number of 
assumptions, indicated that private sector profits associated with urban NE 
LIFT considerable exceeded the typical profitability the NAO (2005a) 
identified for LIFT schemes (specifically it suggested a differential gross 
profit of circa 23% as compared to the NAO estimate of 14 % to 15 %, see 
section 6, subsection 6.4.3). 
 
While the urban NE LIFT informants were not aware of the potentially higher 
cost estimates which are part of the financial analysis conducted by our 
team, it was noticeable that they tended to take a less enthusiastic view of 
the cost aspects of their LIFT involvement.  This view was expressed among 
others by statements which indicated that there were compensating benefits 
to the potentially higher costs of these facilities, or alternatively, that a 
reliable cost estimate could only be conducted after several years. 
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
191 
Representative for the first view, the Director of Finance of urban NE PCT 
[Fin Dir, urban NE] noted that the cost of LIFT facilities had to be seen in 
relation to the quality of the build and the level of long-term maintenance 
obtained: 
 
“We need to be clear what we are comparing LIFT with.  Prior to LIFT 
when Government money, Treasury money, was used to build hospital 
buildings or community premises, it was on the basis of you built them 
and then did not do anything to them for 50 or 60 years so they either fell 
down, needed a big refurbishment or you just replaced them completely.  
LIFT is a different concept.  The significant difference with LIFT is that the 
quality of the building delivered on day one is the quality you will get at 
the end of year 25.” 
 
Despite this positive view, the same informant [Fin Dir, urban NE] noted 
that LIFT projects could pose a challenge to affordability in the future:  
 
“From a Finance Director’s point of view LIFT is a double-edged sword.  It 
is a fixed commitment and you cannot change it when you think money is 
a bit tight.  But you have the high quality premises, so you just need to 
look at other things and get efficiency elsewhere.” 
 
This view was mirrored by the PCT’s Estates Manager [Est Mgr, urban NE] 
who suggested that it was important to assess the long-term life costs of 
these facilities:  
 
“On the face of it, LIFT buildings look expensive in terms of the cost per 
square meter but in terms of life cycle costs I think they probably hold 
their own.” 
 
Taking a different view on the long-term costs of LIFT facilities, the PCT’s 
Assistant Director of Facilities [Asst Dir Facl, urban NE] noted that LIFT 
procurement was costly, but suggested that there was a strong possibility it 
would become cheaper over time as overhead costs declined: 
 
“It has been an expensive process in that we were buying advice in. As we 
go through scheme by scheme, the amount we have to spend on this 
advice is reducing itself.  With the legals for example just do a delta view 
against the previous close and if it has been accepted before, it will be 
accepted again.  This will make an enormous impact on the amount that 
we are spending on each financial close.”  
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This view was echoed by the private sector representative [CEO, urban NE] 
who suggested that costs of LIFT project in the area were already declining, 
allowing the LIFTCo to invest in additional improvements: 
 
“Our FM costs have got cheaper because they only need so many 
operatives.  You get to a critical mass point with buildings where the 
operatives that you need for the first three buildings can see you for 
another seven.  But what we have done on every scheme, at the NHS 
request, we have improved the spec, like adding in green sustainability 
measures …”  
 
7.2.7 Outcomes and Views on the Future - Urban North East 
 LIFT 
Despite uncertainty about costs issues, virtually all respondents judged the 
outcomes of their LIFT engagement positively.  There is strong possibility 
that these views are related to the particular situation of this PCT, which 
was described as follows by the PCT’s Director of Finance [Fin Dir, urban 
NE]:   
 
“We have been fortunate to be in a financial position where we can keep 
that order book going, because we want to transform the healthcare 
landscape of our city.  I know that sounds a bit grand, but that is what we 
need to do and that is what we are committed to doing.  Then, of course, 
we are contributing to wider regeneration at the same time.”   
 
Despite a generally optimistic view, a number of public sector informants 
stressed that some of the contractual issues might have to be revisited in 
the future. This view was again exemplified by the PCT’s Director of Finance 
[Fin Dir, urban NE] who suggested that changes in primary care would have 
to be reflected in future service agreements:  
 
“There are a number of issues we have not come across yet. Like how do 
we deal with reconfiguration of buildings, when we want to continue to 
provide services from a set location but the services and our requirements 
change and we want to deliver things in a different way. … You can 
anticipate there will be financial and legal issues about having to 
renegotiate the contract or amend the contract, because no matter how 
good we might think we are, none of us can foresee exactly what we want 
in 25 years time.”   
 
Similarly, the PCT’s Estates Manager [Est Mgr, urban NE] suggested that 
there was a possibility of future disagreements as risks materialised over 
time: 
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“It will be interesting to see how this business of risk plays out: Whose risk 
it is and the cost of fixing that risk, .. it will be interesting to see how that 
changes, because obviously as buildings age more things go wrong.  
Whether we get into more arguments about whose risk it is … that may 
happen.” 
 
 
7.2.8 Summary - Urban North East LIFT 
Urban North LIFT presents the perhaps unusual case of a PCT which, while 
initially reluctant about public private partnership, enthusiastically embraced 
LIFT schemes as a part of a broader regeneration agenda.  This 
regeneration agenda, together with an urgent need for primary care 
facilities, appears to have facilitated collaboration with a private partner, 
which virtually all interviewees described as a strong working relationship. 
 
Despite these developments, it appears that a number of public sector 
informants remain concerned about cost issues associated with LIFT 
procurement in their area.  These concerns appear to be temporarily 
ameliorated by the assumption that the costs associated with these projects 
will decline.  From the perspective of an external observer, it stands to 
reason that, although this LIFT currently presents itself as a strong 
partnership, this situation could change rapidly if the PCT were to face 
serious expenditure constraints.  
 
 
7.3  Case Study - Rural East Midl LIFT 
Rural East Mid LIFT is a large rural county in the heart of England. The 
population of the county is around 730,000, with a very small Black and 
ethnic minority population of 1.5% that is well below the national average. 
The percentage of the population with long term limiting illness is around 
20% and, as such, exceeds the national average. Large parts of the county 
are rural, and the main industries are agriculture and quarrying/mining. In 
the more urbanised areas of the county the main occupations are 
manufacturing, distribution and catering, and public sector employment.  
Unemployment at around 3% is below the national average.  
 
The PCT covers the whole of the county apart from one large city which has 
a PCT of its own. The PCT was established on 1st October 2006, following 
the merger of six smaller PCTs which had each covered separate districts 
within the county. The PCTs in the southern part of the county had been 
part of LIFT prior to 2006, but the PCTs from the northern part of the county 
had not. 
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7.3.1 Methodology - Rural East Midl LIFT  
Interviews in rural E Midl LIFT were conducted during the months of 
September to December 2008 with eight interviewees.  These included the 
PCT’s Assistant Director/LIFT Board member [Asst Dir, rural E Midl], the 
Director of Commissioning [Dir Com, rural E Midl], an Assistant Director of 
Finance [Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl], a Project Director [Proj Dir, rural E Midl], 
a Project Manager [Proj Man, rural E Midl], an Estates Manager [Est Mgr, 
rural E Midl], a Commissioning Manager [Coms Mgr, rural E Midl], and a 
Director of Provider Services [Dir ProvS, rural E Midl]. 
 
Unfortunately, despite repeated requests to a number of people over a 
period of time, it did not prove possible to include private sector or LIFT 
company representatives in the fieldwork.  
7.3.2 Background - Rural East Midl LIFT  
The background to LIFT in the PCT in its current incarnation is quite 
complex. Prior to 2006, the county had six separate, small PCTs, and three 
of these were involved in LIFT and had schemes under way, but three had 
no involvement at all. Upon merger of the PCTs to create one county-wide 
organisation, it had been agreed that the exclusivity agreement would 
continue to apply to the geographical area which previously had been 
covered by the southernmost PCTs, but not to the north of the county. The 
Assistant Director of Finance [Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl], explained the 
outcome thus: 
 
“We went from 6 PCTs into one.  We are now responsible for LIFT to be 
the preferred provider for the boundary of the south of the County for 
those old three PCT boundaries.  North of the County we don’t have any 
obligation.  Obviously there are opportunities for LIFT itself in the north to 
put in a tender like any other provider, but it is only the southern half of 
the county where we are bound by the LIFT agreement.” 
 
This had led to some complications regarding one scheme which was well 
advanced in terms of planning and development, as the project manager 
[Proj Man, rural E Midl], who took on the scheme in the new PCT explained: 
 
“We picked it up in the middle.  … it was their flagship scheme and they 
were desperate that it continued.  It was well advanced, the business case 
was done, all the LIFT bits were running alongside of it.  From the new 
PCT’s perspective, it was a case of reviewing the scheme and saying well 
okay that might have been top priority in [the old PCT],  how does it fit 
within what the PCT here wants to do?  There was also the politics.  There 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
195 
were already highly raised expectations which would have made it very 
difficult to shut the scheme down so it was at an advanced design stage 
and from a Provider perspective it was more or less done.  So I don’t think 
it was a typical kind of LIFT scheme.”  
 
This statement highlights some of the challenges and difficulties faced by 
this PCT which were compounded by the merger of these organisations and 
the implications of that for staffing. 
 
The Assistant Director of Finance [Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl] felt that this 
start to LIFT had not been helpful:  
 
“I am not so sure whether, as a PCT, we had a co-ordinated enough 
approach.  Still now I am not so sure whether we fully understand and 
recognise and identify clearly enough the benefits of it for us to want to 
push it and use it.” 
 
He also felt that the setting, i.e. being a large rural area, had challenges of 
its own, and that these applied to PCT business as a whole, not just LIFT: 
 
“You look at the diversity of our population, and the inequalities, all that 
presents challenges to us as a commissioning organisation and will present 
the same challenges to LIFT.”   
 
This background in terms of the nature of the way LIFT was established, 
and the issues arising from the merger, had an impact on both the 
procurement process and staff attitudes.  This is explored further below. 
 
7.3.3 Procurement - Rural East Midl LIFT 
On establishment, the new PCT was faced with an ongoing procurement 
process which was not of their choosing. It caused problems in that projects 
were part way through the planning and procurement process at the point 
of restructuring, which had an impact, as the Project Manager [Proj Man, 
rural E Midl] explained: 
 
“The restructuring does cause problems because every time they 
restructure, basically this project was almost put on hold while they 
restructured in order to then reassess what they wanted to do  …  But the 
last people involved in the project wanted was yet another delay while 
they reassess, because every time they delay, they were adding more cost 
and the chances are the project becomes unaffordable.” 
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Another tension was that the PCT had a very experienced Estates 
department, and some people in the PCT felt that the in-house department 
were more skilled than the LIFT CO, certainly when it came to building 
regulations and design issues that were specific to health [Proj Man, rural E 
Midl]: 
 
“Our estates department has some really good people who almost can 
quote verbatim the requirements and building regulations because they 
have been dealing with it for years. The Architects and the Designers come 
out and say we have done this, but that does not meet the requirements.  
It was almost like we know what were doing and these people have no 
clue what they are talking about because they are not even using half the 
right documents to design this building.  And then they are expecting us to 
sign it off without any arguments and we are actually saying well this 
needs changing, that is wrong etc. because they have not got the 
knowledge of our Estates department, so that was a big tension as well.”  
 
The Estates Manager [Est Mgr, rural E Midl] felt that LIFT had brought some 
knowledge to the PCT but that the Estates Department was still needed by 
the PCT to make sure that LIFT were correctly advising the PCT: 
 
“LIFT have brought some knowledge to the projects and to the PCT, but I 
think probably due to their lack of experience and our probably greater 
experience of the requirements, there has been some added value.  I think 
still some of the work is a compromise because it had been developed to 
such a stage that we could not change certain things without going back to 
planning consent or starting again with a different site.”   
 
He conceded that elements of the buildings were good, although he had 
reservations: 
 
“The quality of the construction is quite good.   I have got reservations 
about some of the design I think.  There are some things that could be 
designed better and reduce the ongoing running costs.” 
 
There was quite a high degree of scepticism about the LIFT process, and 
whether it was really necessary, with several interviewees (who had 
originally been with the northern PCTs) feeling that it was a system almost 
foisted upon the PCT that they had to accept, whether or not it was any use 
or could produce anything innovative.  For instance the Commissioning 
Manager  [Coms Mgr, rural E Midl] noted:  
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“The LIFTCo is a mechanism to procure a building.  It might be a more 
efficient way of doing it, but it is the only game in town though to be 
honest.  It is about making the best fit of it with what we have got.”  
 
Similarly the Director of Commissioning [Dir Com, rural E Midl] noted:  
 
“This constant drive for the building rather than the service existed before 
PFI, and was true in PFI and its true in LIFT.  LIFT is just an interesting 
vehicle by which we make flawed decisions based upon shiny new 
buildings not services.  If this was about co-location with the Local 
Authority we would have done this better and, if we had worked rationally 
on our estate with Local Authorities we might have found that we never 
needed LIFT capacity in the first place.  I am not saying we won’t find 
some fixes but they become post-hoc rationalizations.”  
 
In practice, this lack of planning led to under utilisation of buildings, which 
had cost implications which are discussed below [Est Mgr, rural E Midl]: 
 
“Most of the LIFT buildings that are currently in use are under utilized. I 
am not sure whether that is a design for future expansion of services.  It 
probably will work out quite well but I think that’s probably not particularly 
planned.” 
 
7.3.4 Learning and Understanding - Rural East Midl LIFT 
There was a great deal of dissatisfaction expressed with the preparation and 
learning that was available (or rather, not available) to staff, which was 
probably a function of the circumstances surrounding the introduction of 
LIFT to the new PCT at the time of its creation.  Most interviewees felt 
unprepared, and noted that they had had to glean knowledge themselves, 
on an individual basis. An example of this was the Commissioning Manager 
[Coms Mgr, rural E Midl]:  
 
“We were pretty much all dropped in it.  All of us ...  There was a box of 
paperwork that was cheerfully handed over to me, sort of “ha, you’re it 
now”, but no there wasn’t anything on LIFT and how LIFT works.”   
 
Similarly the Assistant Finance Director [Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl] noted:  
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“I was in at the deep end around LIFT, particularly with my first LIFT 
Board meeting.  I had done the personal reading around LIFT’s principles 
and what it meant, but I certainly lacked the strategic knowledge at that 
point over where we were going as a PCT and what LIFT would be looking 
for from us.”   
 
The greatest help for the Project manager [Proj Man, rural E Midl] was that 
coming into the new PCT from one of the old “north” PCTs, he had been able 
to tap into experience from people who had worked in the old “south” PCTs: 
 
“Fortunately we had this LIFT team in place so they could guide us at the 
beginning, and you slowly pick it up until you eventually take over.  But 
we’re still learning what LIFT is all about and I am not even sure we 
understand what LIFT is actually all about anyway, even now.”   
 
He went on to say that he felt this situation mean that the LIFTCo and the 
private sector partners had an advantage over the public sector: 
 
“It is very much that they had the power at the beginning because they 
had all the knowledge, whereas now I think we have learned from all the 
problems.  It is the classic you learn from your mistakes and problems – 
had it all gone smoothly we probably would not have learned half as much, 
but we learned so much we are in a position to say we will do it this way, 
rather than say OK we will do as you say.”   
 
The PCT had relied on the LIFTCo certainly in the early stages to be the 
“expert”, but as knowledge amongst PCT staff grew, there had been times 
when they had been, as the Commissioning Manager [Coms Mgr, rural E 
Midl] mentioned, able to challenge this LIFTCo: 
 
“I think one of the major problems about the LIFTCo is that you kind of 
accept that they are the experts.  We are a part of the LIFTCo. so they are 
working for us.  I think we do hand a load of responsibility over to them 
and say well, if that is what you say then that must be true.  But I think 
that was not quite the case when we squeezed another couple of million 
quid out of the builders.”  
 
This has implications for the relationship between the two sectors, which is 
discussed below. 
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7.3.5 Partnership - Rural East Midl LIFT  
Section 5 (subsection 5.4.2) identified the cultural characteristics of the 
partnership underpinning rural East Midl LIFT as being positioned between 
Synergy and Segregation with no single organisation dominating the 
partnership.  This is confirmed by the statements from  most of the 
informants.  However, unlike urban NE LIFT (see previous subsection), 
informants from rural East Midl LIFT noted that this partnership had 
developed only recently following a period when there had been concerns, 
among public sector participants, that the private sector had an advantage 
and dominated the relationship.  
 
This was expressed by the Project Manager [Proj Man, rural E Midl] who 
suggested that the relationship between the PCT and the LIFTCo was, 
following initial tensions, now working well:  
  
“We do have an overlap on the estates side, because we've got a good 
estates department, and that causes tensions … When it first started it 
was very much antagonistic but as we got through more and more 
problems, they started working together as a team. So now the Estates 
department and LIFTCo and the designers all get together around a table 
and talk about things and they'd often design something and then say, is 
this ok?  So I think that process did evolve to replace all sorts of conflicts.”   
 
As we found in the previous study, the key to reaching a good working 
relationship revolved around individuals having good communication, and 
developing shared values over time. Again this commented on by the 
Director of Provider Services [Dir ProvS, rural E Midl]: 
 
“I think the personalities are much of a greater issue than public v private.  
I think it comes down to shared vision and communication.”  
 
The challenge for some revolved around the complex nature of the 
relationship between the PCT and LIFT, with the PCT at times facing in two 
directions, one as a client of the LIFTCo, and the other as LIFTCo 
shareholder. The same informant [Dir ProvS, rural E Midl] highlighted this 
potential conflict: 
 
“The biggest issue for me is that sometimes there is a slight real or 
potential conflict of interest in that this PCT is a significant partner in 
LIFTCo.   … I sometimes feel it is very difficult to say who is absolutely 
safeguarding the PCTs interest as a client in this, because we are also a 
partner in LIFT.  That is what I really struggled with.”  
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Unfortunately, as were we unable to carry out interviews with any LIFT Co 
representatives, we were unable to obtain any private sector views on 
partnering and the relationship between the LIFT Co and the PCTs. 
 
7.3.6 Cost Issues–Rural East Midl LIFT 
The views of rural E Midl interviewees on cost issues were similar those 
expressed by informants from urban NE LIFT (see section 7.2.6) in that 
additional costs were seen as a reflection of improved maintenance and 
service provision.  Representative for these views, the Project Manager [Proj 
Man, rural E Midl] noted that a balance between VfM and the quality of the 
development had to be achieved:  
 
“You are going to a brand new building that is being maintained to a high 
standard and one of the issues is, we want it to be cheaper or as good 
value as the current model.  But then you have to take into account that 
often on the current model your maintenance is basically just a lick of 
paint here and there, and the buildings are crumbling and you are just 
making it look fit, rather than keeping it up to standard.” 
 
However, several informants, including the Assistant Director of Finance 
[Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl], expressed doubts about affordability and VfM: 
 
“I am not sure if it is affordable.  … There is a perception that LIFT is an 
expensive model and are we sure that we want to pay for that model 
anyway in terms of VfM, could we do with a lesser model?  I am not so 
sure, I have not really seen any evidence of any real cost benefit 
analysis.”  
 
This was echoed by Director of Provider Services [Dir ProvS, rural E Midl],  
who was worried about the costs of the new facilities:  
 
“Off the top of my head, affordability – the current health centres are 
costing me a lot of money in terms of the empty space and I can quantify 
what those costs are.”  
 
Overall there was evidence that informants from rural E Midl LIFT were 
more critical toward the affordability aspects of LIFT than those from urban 
NE LIFT, which might partly reflect that LIFT-related synergies are more 
difficult to exploit in a rural context (see also subsection 4.3.6). 
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7.3.7 Outcomes - Rural East Midl LIFT 
Overall, the interviewees were sceptical about the benefits that LIFT had 
brought, and in some cases wondered whether it had been necessary at all.  
This view was expressed by, among others, the Project Manager [Proj Man, 
rural E Midl]:  
 
“It was successful in that we got to financial close.  I would not necessarily 
say it is better than anything else and I think you could have got to the 
same point without using LIFT. I am not sure what LIFT is offering other 
than access to funding. There must be other ways of accessing funding 
without tying yourself into a 25 year contract, so I am not sure LIFT is 
necessarily giving you great benefits.”  
 
The interesting point made earlier about this PCT, in that after the merger 
of the smaller PCTs in 2006 half the new PCT was tied to exclusivity whilst 
the other was not, seemed to be offering some evidence as to the 
unattractiveness of LIFT as the Director of Commissioning [Dir Comm, rural 
E Midl] notes: 
 
“I tell you what it really makes stark, is that the ones in the North are not 
beating a path to get into LIFT.  The LIFTCo did not suddenly become 
something that rolled out in the north with impunity.  We still don’t have 
LIFT in the North which is probably the worst condemnation I can give to 
LIFT in that given a free run and no great opposition; it hasn’t managed to 
manoeuvre itself into a presence in the North.”   
 
Much of the dissatisfaction was a result of the perception that the buildings 
were not being well used, and that this was as a result of a flaw in the 
planning process, whereby the activities that were going to take place in the 
building had not been sufficiently thought through [Dir ProvS, rural E Midl]: 
 
“What we’ve had is quite a big negative reaction to the fact that these 
fabulous new large facilities have opened and there doesn’t seem to have 
been anything going on in them.   There is a lot of empty space.  And the 
population have actually picked up on that And that to me just highlights 
the fact that there was no clear service plan sitting behind those 
buildings.”  
 
It was suggested that this, again, was partly due to the reorganisation. The 
people who had planned the original schemes had been based in the old 
southern PCTs, whereas the people now working on LIFT had come from the 
old northern PCTs. Thus, the people making decisions about services now 
were not the ones who had done the original plans. This highlights one of 
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the key problems for PCTs generally, where reorganisation and personnel 
change have an ongoing impact on development and service planning. 
 
Some of the spare capacity related to future developments, but there was 
some disappointment that working practices were not changing, and indeed 
a building per se would not bring about changes in service provision that 
might otherwise be desirable.  This was expressed by the  Estates Manager 
[Est Mgr, rural E Midl] as follows: 
 
“There is a lot of spare capacity built in and because of the nature of how 
we use our buildings, a lot of them are sessions that they use so many 
hours a week. We need to be better at planning to get maximum use out 
of them. When you have spent £25m on a building you should not shut it 
up all weekend.”  
 
Similarly the Commissioning Manager [Coms Mgr, rural E Midl] noted:  
 
“If you have got three GP practices in a new facility it does not change a 
thing except it smells of new paint.  It does not change the way they work, 
or integrate them one with another and it does not integrate them with the 
community hospital.  So the levers for change are not in the building.”   
 
On the whole, the staff who worked in the buildings and the patients who 
used them seemed to be satisfied with them. The concerns lay at more 
strategic levels, and were about decisions about use of space. It was felt 
that this would come about in the long term, though Assistant Director of 
Finance [Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl]: 
 
“LIFT has encouraged joined up thinking, not forcing us but encouraging 
and influencing us and going down a route of joining up our thinking and 
putting in place some sort of strategy and plan.  It probably has increased 
cost but it comes back to the cost benefit.  That’s not necessarily a bad 
thing if it’s brought more benefit, more quality, that’s the equation I'm 
unsure of.”   
 
7.3.8 Views on the Future and Summary 
Overall, the doubts about LIFT led to some scepticism about whether it was 
a good system and whether the PCT would want to do more with it that it 
had to.  This was stated forcefully by the Assistant Director of Finance [Asst 
Fin Dir, rural E Midl]: 
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“I just do not think we are sufficiently positive about it to want to put 
ourselves in a position of wanting to say yes, we will look to LIFT to be a 
preferred provider, rather than go out and test the market.  I don’t think it 
has gained itself that gold badge enough for us to want to push it where 
we don’t have to.  It has worked well, we can see the benefits of it, but I 
think there are some questions around, not just the VfM aspect, but 
around the lease agreement and the lease plus agreement.” 
 
Similarly, the Project Manager [Proj Man, rural E Midl] suggested that 
support for the LIFTCo was limited because half of the county would be 
using LIFT, through no choice of their own, and half would have the option: 
 
“There is the feeling in the PCT that if we did not already have LIFTCo we 
probably would not need it because our estates department covers all of 
the county but now we are kind of stuck with LIFTCo and anything in the 
South has to go through them.”   
 
Additionally, the Assistant Director of Finance [Asst Fin Dir, rural E Midl] 
suggested that there could be an issue in the future for the LIFT company of 
not having enough of a pipeline of work coming through from the PCT, 
which would force them to rethink their role: 
 
“In some ways it is probably an issue more for LIFT. Is there a market out 
there not just for the big developments?  We know there are not too many 
big developments on the order book, we might need to diversify.”   
 
Overall, then, there was reluctance to engage any more with LIFT than was 
strictly necessary, and doubts over whether there would be enough of an 
order book for LIFT to continue as it currently exists. Again, because we 
were unable to interview LIFT Co representatives, it is not possible to say 
whether their view matches that of the public sector. 
 
7.4  Case Study - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
Mixed East Midl LIFT is located in a mixed urban and rural area in the 
Midlands of England.  It includes a city with a population of slightly more 
than 200,000 inhabitants, together with an outlying rural area.  The area 
historically had a high level of industrial employment which centred on the 
aerospace and rail industries.  The historical decline of industrial 
employment in the area has given rise to a relative high level of 
unemployment in excess of 6%.  This is accompanied by a relatively high 
rate of sole occupied households which currently exceed 30%.  The Black 
and minority ethnic population is around 15%.  The percentage of 
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individuals with a long term limiting illness in the PCT area amount to nearly 
20% and, as such, exceeds the national average.   
 
The area is currently serviced by a single PCT which emerged from the 
merger of two existing PCTs.  Prior to this merger, both PCTs already had an 
integrated management structure which jointly developed its strategic 
health plan.  The current PCT boundaries exceed those of the local authority 
and include a population of nearly 300,000.    
 
The PCT area includes two completed LIFT projects which opened in 2007 
and 2008 respectively.  The more recently completed project houses a 
range of community health services under one roof, including a GP practice, 
chiropody, dentistry and phlebotomy, along with a purpose-built 
physiotherapy gym and training kitchen.   
 
7.4.1 Methodology - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
As previously stated, the team conducted its fieldwork at Mixed East Midl 
LIFT from September to December 2008.  In this context, the team was 
able to interview eight individuals who were involved in the management of 
LIFT projects in a number of different capacities, ranging from the Assistant 
Director of the PCT to Practice and Centre Managers.   
 
Specifically, interviews were obtained with the following individuals: The 
Assistant Director of the PCT who was also a LIFT board member where he 
represents the PCT equity share [Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl], the 
Assistant Director of Finance of the PCT [Asst Fin Dir, mixed E Midl], the PCT 
Estates Manager [Est Mgr, mixed E Midl] and the Assistant Estates Manager  
[Asst Est Mgr, mixed E Midl], the former Project Manager for one of the LIFT 
schemes [Proj Mgr, mixed E Midl], the Primary Care Manager and former 
project manager [PrimC Mgr, mixed E Midl], the Centre Manager of one of 
the LIFT buildings [Cent Mgr, mixed E Midl], and a Practice Manager 
working in a LIFT building [Pract Mgr, mixed E Midl].  Sadly, no private 
sector representative agreed to be interviewed and, therefore, the views of 
the Assistant Director of the PCT who also served as LIFT board member 
[Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl] must be taken as a proxy for those of 
the private sector partner. 
 
7.4.2 Background - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
The fieldwork provided strong evidence that the involvement of mixed East 
Midl PCT in LIFT was driven, in part, by the perception of a number of key 
stakeholders that were capable of handling the potential complexities of this 
procurement process.  This view, in turn, was based on the experience a 
number of PCT staff had gathered earlier in connection with the 
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procurement of a PFI hospital.  Specifically there was an expectation that 
the PCT could draw on the experience of its staff members who had been 
involved in this hospital project in a consultative and commissioning 
capacity, as well as other staff who had been involved in project 
management.  This observation closely mirrors early research into PFI 
uptake by Beck and Hunter-Beck (2003) which highlighted that the best 
predictor for the involvement of an organisation in PFI procurement was 
previous experience with this procurement mechanism.   
 
The influence of the area’s previous experience with PFI was highlighted, 
among others, by the Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst Dir/Board Mem, 
mixed E Midl] who noted that the PCT had become interested in LIFT soon 
after it was launched.  The same interviewee further suggested that the PCT 
had taken a strategic view from the outset which saw LIFT involvement as a 
means of centralizing resources: 
 
“When we concluded the PFI deal for the hospital in 1998, LIFT was 
something that the PCTs wanted to pursue.  But they had limited 
resources and it was a bit of a scattergun approach. I was asked to 
basically pull the resources together, put it into one central place and see 
if we could launch the whole LIFT project, which we subsequently did.”   
 
This view was echoed by the Assistant Director of Finance [Asst Fin Dir, 
mixed E Midl] who suggested that the decision to engage in LIFT was aided 
by the participation of a staff member who had been involved in the 
procurement and management of the local PFI hospital: 
 
“We decided very early on that we would like to have somebody involved 
who had a lot of experience of PFIs.  That is why he was invited to 
participate because they were working on the hospital PFI at the time.” 
 
The same interviewee [Asst Fin Dir, mixed E Midl] further suggested that 
there was a high level of support for engagement with LIFT within the PCT.  
This support was primarily based on the view, by the PCT’s management, 
that there was both a need to improve the existing building stock and to 
take a systematic approach to the procurement of primary care facilities: 
 
“The feeling at the time was that we were quite excited that there was a 
new vehicle that was going to be available for PCTs that might potentially 
speed up the process of planning our buildings and trying to get some 
structure in terms of having a planned process that would refurbish and 
renew our buildings that we had got in Primary Care over a period of 
time.” 
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According to the same interviewee [Asst Fin Dir, mixed E Midl], this 
enthusiasm for LIFT was shared widely by public sector organisations in the 
area and, in particular, all the local authority partners who would potentially 
benefit from the process: 
 
“We had a huge participation right across the local economy so because, 
at that time.  There were actually 13 member organisations that were 
going to be involved in LIFT.  That included all the Local Authority partners 
so we had a huge interest and a lot of participants in that process to make 
sure we got the right partner in the end.”  
 
With regard to the issue of GP interest, the Primary Care Manager [PrimC 
Mgr, mixed E Midl] working at one of the LIFT buildings noted that there 
had been considerable demand for shared facilities which facilitated the 
planning process:  
 
“One, there was very little land around for buildings and two, the actual 
cost was high.  We were getting new GPs coming and they did not want to 
buy into the business, they wanted to be taken on as a salaried GP. Just 
by chance, we knew that just behind one of the streets there was a big 
plot of land … We contacted the Council and they said yes, we would love 
a community facility on that site. …  Then we found out from the PCT that 
they were actually looking to build a LIFT building on that site and would 
we be prepared to be party to it.  So a meeting was called … So that is 
how we got involved in the LIFT scheme initially.” 
 
Overall, there was strong evidence that this LIFT project commenced 
against the background of enthusiastic support by a number of 
stakeholders, as well as with broad support from members of the local 
communities.  This observation stands in some contrast to research which 
suggested that some PCTs engaged with LIFT reluctantly, and did so solely 
because it was the only available means for improving primary care facilities 
(see e.g., Aldred, 2007). 
 
 
7.4.3 Procurement - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
Although there was evidence that the involvement of mixed East Midl LIFT 
in the LIFT procurement took place against the background of strong local 
support, a number of interviewees highlighted that their experience with the 
process had not necessarily been a positive one.  Additionally, there was 
evidence that some of the interviewees took very different views on the 
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procurement and project management process and in particular the level of 
participation afforded to them. 
 
This issue of differential views is perhaps best illustrated by contrasting the 
statement of the Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed 
E Midl] and the Project Manager for one of the LIFT schemes [Proj Mgr, 
mixed E Midl], with those of other interviewees.  Thus, the Assistant 
Director of the PCT noted that the project team had placed great emphasis 
on stakeholder involvement in order to avoid conflicts from the outset: 
 
“It is all about communication.  It is about involvement, communication 
and making sure there's enough actual input going into the scheme.  And 
then the conflict and surprises are minimised.” 
 
Similarly the Project Manager for one of the LIFT schemes [Proj Mgr, mixed 
E Midl] suggested that the PCT had made a major effort in involving 
stakeholders, even though this often involved complex negotiations: 
 
“As project manager my job was to make sure the right people were 
around the table. It was complicated in the sense it was a multifunctional 
building, so there was a GP surgery and they were out of my control in a 
way but I did end up picking up a lots of axes to grind!  But I made sure 
that the people who would be actually using the building were involved in 
the discussions.”   
 
This view contrasted with the statements of Practice Managers [Pract Mgr, 
mixed E Midl], who conceded that his practice had been involved in the 
planning stages but noted that some representatives had been 
overwhelmed by this process: 
 
“There was somebody from the Practice that went at all the planning 
stages, but at every meeting there were different people there from all 
these different departments, and it was a bit overwhelming really.” 
 
The same interviewee [Pract Mgr, mixed E Midl] further suggested that 
some of the consultation had been perfunctory particularly when it came to 
details of building design.  This, in his view, had resulted in number of 
inappropriate arrangements: 
 
“We work here, we know what it is like and these architects going, oh it is 
going to be lovely. But they do not listen to us.  We need to see our 
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patients and you can have one of these board things that calls the patients 
in, but not everybody can read.  You will be able to call them in then, well 
we cannot if we cannot see them, we would have to leapfrog onto the desk 
and call them over!  It is not on.  We've got one receptionist, she is only 
4’5” or something and she really literally cannot see …” 
 
Similarly, the Centre Manager of one of the LIFT buildings [Cent Mgr, mixed 
E Midl] suggested that the level of consultation had not been far reaching 
enough: 
 
“There should have been more ground staff on the planning personally, 
especially reception staff who are in the building all the time and are 
running a lot of the rooms.” 
 
While taking a generally more favourable view of the procurement process, 
Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl] conceded 
that some of the aspects of LIFT procurement were problematic.  
Specifically he suggested that the duration of LIFT projects could be a 
challenge for the private sector partner:  
 
“I will tell you about one of the biggest areas of conflict.  With the best will 
in the world, a LIFT scheme takes a while to dream up, to procure, to 
consult on, to sign a contract and to build.  What will happen is the private 
sector will want you to give them a plan and say build this.  If the whole 
process lasts say three years, personnel change in the NHS, thinking 
changes, NHS care delivery changes.” 
 
This view was echoed by the Assistant Director of Finance [Asst Fin Dir, 
mixed E Midl] who noted that the duration of the LIFT procurement process 
could create problems for private sector partners: 
 
“You have got your strategy, and you are following that through to build 
up a business case for how you are going to procure a building and what 
that building is going to serve, and then you have got to formally sign that 
off.  Then implementing it takes a very long time.  Whether you could 
shorten that to any extent with the rules and regulations that are in place, 
I am not too sure.  It is a long process but in some respects it needs to be.  
The private sector does not like this and I can understand why.” 
 
Lastly, a number of interviewees expressed their dissatisfaction with the 
signing off of one of the projects and specifically the lack of information 
which was provided at this stage.  This view was expressed by the Assistant 
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Estates Manager [Asst Est Mgr, mixed E Midl] who noted that a lack of time 
prevented some stakeholders from fully assessing the implications of the 
agreements they had signed: 
 
“One of the problems is that when the financial documents and the 
drawings were all signed off, I do not think the people really understood 
what they were doing.  They were not trained enough to be able to – and 
that is not a criticism of them … Also there was an issue of time.  The 
information was not there so they were not aware of what they were 
doing.  They were not aware of how much accountability that could have.”  
  
In summary, the analysis of the procurement process at mixed East Midl 
LIFT provided a mixed picture.  Although there had been enthusiastic 
participation in the scheme, a number of local stakeholders felt that levels 
of consultation had not been adequate.  At the managerial level, there was 
similarly a concern that the duration and complexity of the procurement 
process created problems.  These problems, accordingly, extended to issues 
of collaboration with the private sector which was adversely affected by the 
duration of the procurement process as well as creating uncertainty about 
potential future policy changes.   
 
 
7.4.4 Learning and Understanding - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
Apart from concerns over inadequate levels of consultation and the 
excessive complexity of the LIFT procurement process, a number of 
interviewees expressed concerns over the adequacy of skills which were 
available to PCTs when engaging with LIFT.  These views generally touched 
on two areas of skilling.  The first of these concerned the difficulties 
organisations within the NHS encountered in retaining the skills which had 
been gained in the context of public private partnership.  The second issue 
concerned the problem of commercial skills within the NHS.  
 
The issue of skill retention was addressed at some length by Assistant 
Director [Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl] who argued that DoH should 
create special mechanisms for retention of staff and the sharing of 
partnership skills between PCTs: 
 
“I think we are absolutely awful in the NHS with using expertise that we 
have honed and grown.  Sometimes we just lose it out the NHS, 
sometimes the private sector take it. Once you have well trained people, 
next thing you know they are working for the private sector and they use 
us as a knowledge pool.  … So I think from every active LIFT company 
project manager or public sector director, the DOH should actually buy out 
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a few days a month for those people, compensate their PCT and get them 
to help feed some of those knowledge successes and mistakes into areas 
where they have not got the knowledge.  I think it would be so cost 
effective to do that …  Also, the PFU should bear some responsibility for 
this in terms of not having developed this idea.” 
 
This view was mirrored by the Primary Care Manager [PrimC Mgr, mixed E 
Midl] who argued that there was a great need for the sharing of information 
and joined up thinking: 
 
“There have been quite a number of LIFT projects happening and I think 
there needs to be some joined up thinking about people’s experience and 
what they could do to improve it.  LIFT needs to learn from its mistakes 
and try to address that in some way if they can.”   
  
While a number of interviewees felt that one of the principal difficulties with 
LIFT was a lack of information sharing, there was also the suggestion that 
organisations within the NHS lacked requisite commercial skills.  This view 
was again expressed by the Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst Dir/Board 
Mem, mixed E Midl] who argued that NHS organisations often struggled with 
the need to make speedy decisions: 
 
“There is a lot of quality knowledge in the NHS.  What the NHS is not good 
at is applying it on a commercial basis.  In the commercial sector they 
wear a watch, in the NHS we wear a calendar. We have got to be able to 
match them on commercial decisions, commercial options, business plans, 
we've got to work at their timetable.  Our knowledge base is fine, we are 
often overawed at their speed.” 
 
Interestingly, the view of this interviewee [Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed E 
Midl] that the knowledge base of NHS organisations equipped them 
sufficiently to engage in LIFT procurement was not shared by number of 
other informants.  Thus, the Assistant Estates Manager [Asst Est Mgr, mixed 
E Midl] noted that the private sector had been more efficient in ensuring the 
full utilization of new projects: 
 
“When it comes to finding the right mix of occupants, that is probably 
where the private sector was far more skilled, because they were able to 
look at it as a building as opposed to individual services.  We had to learn 
very quickly.” 
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Similarly, the Primary Care Manager [PrimC Mgr, mixed E Midl] suggested 
that the PCT lacked experience in building design and had to rely on the 
private partner to bring in this expertise:  
 
“If we did not hire a Project Manager who knew all about Building 
Regulations and Health and Safety and Work Ergonomics and all of this, I 
would have had to make sure that I was up to speed on those which would 
have been an impossibility.  On a positive side for LIFT, we did not have to 
worry about anything like that because you were paying for that through 
the scheme.” 
 
While this informant [PrimC Mgr, mixed E Midl] was generally positive about 
the LIFT procurement process, he, nonetheless, expressed concerns over 
the fact that some of the services the private sector partner had provided 
had come at a cost, which the PCT had not been sufficiently aware about: 
 
“We need a lot more information about costs.  With some of the 
difficulties, and definitely some of the costs, we need to know what to 
account for and bear in mind that this may inflate your cost dramatically 
by £XX a month ...”  
 
Overall, there was a strong view among most informants that involvement 
in LIFT had presented a steep learning curve for the PCT.  However, most 
informants felt that the PCT had coped adequately with these demands.  
Meanwhile a number of interviewees expressed concerns about how future 
changes would impact on current arrangements, and, in particular, about 
how the existing expertise which the PCT had developed around partnership 
working could be fully utilized and retained.  In addition, some interviewees 
indicated their uncertainty over issues of cost and suggested that there was 
a need for a greater awareness and information sharing among PCTs.   
 
7.4.5 Partnership - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
There was a strong consensus among all interviewees that a working 
partnership with the private sector was essential to the success of LIFT 
schemes (note, no supplementary culture interviews we available for mixed 
E Midl LIFT, see section 5).   
 
Speaking for a number of informants, the Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst 
Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl] noted that, in his experience, a working 
partnership required a close alignment of goals: 
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“To get a partnership to work you need people of similar status, having the 
same vision, usually with the same timescale and priorities.”   
 
Expanding on the issue of equality, the same informant [Asst Dir/Board 
Mem, mixed E Midl] suggested that a strong knowledge base within the 
public sector facilitated partnership working and that the NHS had to place a 
greater emphasis on providing pubic sector managers with these skills:      
 
“With PCTs in particular it has not been top of the DoH’s priorities and 
therefore they have been in the past led too much by the private sector.  I 
think it is essential that you have intelligence on the NHS side, you have 
good service planners, you know what accommodation you require that’s 
fit for purpose, and not just let a developer say well I did one down the 
road like this and therefore this is the one for you.  They often do have 
templates that they want to corral you into. I do believe that a public 
sector Director and the project manager from the NHS needs to have the 
skill set to be able to work with people across the table otherwise they will 
be led rather than do the leading.” 
 
This view was shared by other informants, who, like the Assistant Estates 
Manager [Asst Est Mgr, mixed E Midl] suggested that partnership often 
involved a learning process where different organisations came to 
understand the constraints under which other organisations operated: 
 
“The private sector could not understand that people round the table could 
not just make that decision and that was maybe where we clashed a little 
bit. But once they got their heads around how we had to work and we got 
our heads round how they worked, it made things a little bit easier. Also, 
they are employed to do that job and for the most part we are pulling it in 
as part of our day job and that is probably a major difference.”   
 
Lastly, the PCT Estates Manager [Est Mgr, mixed E Midl] noted that the 
close contacts which many staff had established with their private sector 
partners now made collaboration much easier: 
 
“It always works better when you know people.  You can get on the phone 
and start talking to them … I think we would probably still go through the 
same process, but that is the process we have to follow through LIFT.”  
 
Taken together, our interviewees generally felt that their LIFT was backed 
by a strong partnership which was based on mutual respect and 
understanding.  However, there was also a consensus that building this 
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partnership had taken some time and that it was only in recent months that 
the PCT had been able to reap the full benefits of this collaboration. 
 
7.4.6 Cost Issues - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
Due to issues of commercial confidentiality the team was unable to obtain 
estimates about the capital and operating costs of LIFT facilities within 
mixed East Midl LIFT.  As this problem had been anticipated by the research 
team, a special effort had been made to investigate how different LIFT users 
evaluated the expenses associated with these projects and how they judged 
their potential implications on affordability.  While these subjective 
statements cannot replace a detailed financial analysis of cash flows (as 
presented in section 7), they, nonetheless, give an important indication of 
how satisfied users are with the financial aspects of their schemes and, 
more importantly, how these levels of satisfaction differ across various 
stakeholders. 
 
Overall, the views of most of the senior interviewees within mixed East Midl 
LIFT with regard to the VfM aspects of LIFT closely mirrored those of the 
key informants (see subsection 4.2.6 and also subsection 4.3.6) in that this 
group highlighted the need to contextualise potentially higher costs in the 
context of improved maintenance and service delivery.   This position was 
exemplified by the Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst Dir/Board Mem, 
mixed E Midl] who highlighted the fact that LIFT projects entailed more than 
the provision of built structures: 
 
“I think the biggest misconception both from PCTs, Strategic Health 
Authority and the public is it superficially can look expensive but what you 
must remember is this.  If you are building a development, a builder builds 
a house, a LIFT developer builds a home and so there are so many more 
things in a home than just a house, and that is why there is a difference in 
price.” 
 
This view was expanded on by the Assistant Director of Finance [Asst Fin 
Dir, mixed E Midl] who suggested that the cost of LIFT projects was justified 
because it was largely driven by long term maintenance: 
 
“LIFT includes a lot more than a standard procurement.  LIFT is a fully 
managed building.  In some respects when you try to compare against 
other methods, you are comparing chalk and cheese … And it is getting 
that understanding of what exactly you are buying because on the last day 
that we walk away after 25 years, the building should be in the same 
condition as it was on day one.” 
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By contrast, there was a tendency in those interviewees who were perhaps 
more closely involved with the operation of specific projects to be more 
critical of the costs aspects of their projects.  This critical attitude was 
exemplified by a former Project Manager for one of the LIFT schemes [Proj 
Mgr, mixed E Midl] who suggested that the cost of the building he had 
procured was excessive: 
 
“It is a purpose built new building which I do not think the PCT could have 
afforded without LIFT, whether it is worth paying over the odds over a 
period of years I do not know.  Personally, I would not touch it with a 
barge pole!  … Because I think it is expensive.  I think it is a good building 
and well maintained, but a bit like hire purchase, you pay a lot more for 
what you get in the long run but it is a means to an end.”  
 
Similarly, a Practice Manager working in a LIFT building [Pract Mgr, mixed E 
Midl] suggested that he suspected the new premises to be expensive.  
However, his main complaint was that he had not been billed by the PCT for 
a lengthy time period (see also section 4.3.6 where a practice manager 
working in the West Midlands discusses a similar problem with regard to 
utility bills): 
 
 “Budget forecast: Rubbish!  It has been brought up time and time again.  I 
probably contact the PCT on a weekly basis and do not get any response.  
It is as though they have no idea and I am running a business here, I am 
accountable to the Partners of which I am one, it is my money. At the end 
of last year, I had to make a guesstimate of how much money I had to set 
aside, and I had to account for that to the accountant and the Partners 
who say well why are you putting that much money aside?  Well, because 
I have no idea how much the LIFT building is going to cost.  It just makes 
me sound like an amateur of which I am not.  But it is best guess and here 
we are a year later and I am still at that position, pathetic.” 
 
Taken together, our interviews on the issues of cost and VfM indicated that 
this was less of a concern to senior management within mixed East Midl PCT 
who typically attributed additional costs to improved maintenance.  
However, as observed elsewhere, there was a tendency among those 
closely involved with the project management or operational side of LIFT 
projects to view this as a major problem.  
 
7.4.7 Outcomes - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
The previous section highlighted that LIFT users were highly divided with 
regard to the cost aspects of their LIFT projects.  This, interestingly, was 
not the case when we queried our interviewees about how they viewed the 
overall outcome of their involvement with LIFT.  Apart from a minority of 
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interviewees, who argued that levels of consultation had been insufficient, 
most informants noted that they were happy with their LIFT schemes.  This 
included a number of informants who suggested that LIFT had brought 
significant improvements to service levels and patient care in East Midl PCT 
which, in turn, was reflected in high levels of patient satisfaction.  
 
This pattern was exemplified by the Assistant Director of the PCT [Asst 
Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl] who expressed his satisfaction with the high 
level of investment his LIFT Co had brought to the area: 
 
“I think you only have to look at the portfolio of schemes we have 
produced: £60 million worth of buildings; we are the now second largest 
property company in the area and we were nowhere 5 years ago.  I think 
it has been highly successful.  … If we exploit all the strengths of LIFT then 
we can make some huge differences to some really grotty accommodation 
… and we can deliver far better patient care.”  
 
This view was echoed by the Primary Care Manager [PrimC Mgr, mixed E 
Midl] who argued that LIFT had made it easier for the PCT to recruit GPs, 
which in turn, had positively affected levels of care in the area: 
 
“It is now much easier to recruit GPs. Yes they may have a higher cost, 
but you know no-one has to find a hefty lump sum to invest in a Practice.  
So that was a bonus for them and is a bonus for us in terms of what our 
patients get.” 
  
Similarly the Centre Manager of one of the LIFT buildings [Cent Mgr, mixed 
E Midl] suggested that staff working in her facility were highly satisfied with 
their new building: 
 
“Most people were so pleased to get into a brand new building because the 
majority of staff here worked in really terrible buildings, including myself, 
it was an atrocious building.  Everybody was really pleased.” 
 
Another Practice Manager working in a LIFT building [Pract Mgr, mixed E 
Midl], who had been highly critical toward the financial aspects of this 
facility, similarly suggested that the new environment had had a positive 
impact on staff: 
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“It is a lovely building that can work very well, and the staff within the 
building work very well together, they gel very well which was a bit of a 
concern that I had.” 
 
This view was broadly echoed by the Primary Care Manager [PrimC Mgr, 
mixed E Midl] who argued that, although there were problems with some of 
the facilities, these were minor when compared with the advantages which 
they offered: 
 
“The buildings are beautiful and you have got to remember that there is 
only a limited amount of money and you cannot have all singing and all 
dancing and what we had before, you know, vast improvement and 
fantastically so.  And so although these are problems, the car park is not 
quite right and the air conditioning is not quite right, but you think it is 
going to be part and parcel of a new building.”    
 
In addition to expressing their satisfaction with their new buildings, a 
number of interviewees in East Midl PCT suggested that the new 
investments had improved patient care and satisfaction.  This view was 
exemplified by the Centre Manager of one of the LIFT buildings [Cent Mgr, 
mixed E Midl] who suggested that the primary benefactors had been 
patients: 
 
“The patients love it and they are very pleased, we have a comments box 
and we get a lot of really positive comments, because it is in a very poor 
area and they’ve had a very poor clinic before with limited services.  So for 
the patients I think it is really good VfM, for us who pay the bill, I am not 
really sure.  I do not think we have been in long enough to realise.” 
 
A practice Manager working in a LIFT building [Pract Mgr, mixed E Midl], 
meanwhile, suggested that the new facility had allowed his team to expand 
the quality of patient services: 
 
“It is much better, it is cleaner so patient perception is that they are 
getting a better service and patient list size has grown phenomenally.  I 
think that is also because people are coming in for other things and seeing 
that there is a doctor’s surgery there so register while they are there for 
other things.  We have also extended our opening hours from what we had 
before and so we are open until later at night on two nights, so we are 
catering for the additional patients.  It is all good from the patient point of 
view.” 
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Similarly, the Estates Manager [Est Mgr, mixed E Midl] noted that the 
integrated management of the new LIFT facilities had allowed the PCT to 
increase the utilization of available facilities and increase service provision: 
 
“One of our new facilities is completely full.  It is being used from 7–7.30 
in the morning right through to 10 o’clock at night now.  We have put 
more services in, dental, the Out of Hours service, until 10 o’clock at night 
so we are utilising them as much as possible.” 
 
Despite these generally positive views with regard to the facilities which had 
been procured through East Midl LIFT, a small number of informants felt 
that the procurement process could have been improved through better 
stakeholder involvement.  This view was exemplified by a Practice Manager 
working in a LIFT building [Pract Mgr, mixed E Midl]: 
 
“Our say was miniscule.  Our waiting area is nowhere near the reception 
counter and this was pointed out and nothing was done about it, oh it will 
all be alright and actually it is not alright.  We were completely 
overwhelmed by the big boys and our suggestion would have been much 
better.” 
 
Similarly, the Centre Manager of one of the LIFT buildings [Cent Mgr, mixed 
E Midl] noted that greater attention should have been paid to future users 
during the planning process:  
 
“The people who are making the decision are not working in the building 
and do not always see the issues, no matter how much you tell them.  The 
Centre Manager should have a little bit more say over what should be 
bought and paid for.” 
 
It was interesting to note that, despite a number of minor complaints, there 
was a broad consensus that the facilities which had been procured through 
LIFT in mixed East Midl PCT had brought major improvement in a number of 
areas including access, working conditions and the quality of patient 
services.  This result should not be taken as self evident, since a number of 
past research projects tended to identify major weaknesses in facilities 
procured via public private partnership (see, e.g. Hudson, Capper, Holmes, 
2003).   
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7.4.8 Views on the Future - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
The final section of this case study concerns the views of staff at mixed East 
Midl LIFT with regard to the future of their own LIFT as well as LIFT in 
general.   
 
On the whole most interviewees were optimistic about the future of their 
LIFT, with some informants advocating their own experiences as a model for 
others to follow.  However, at the same time, a number of informants 
expressed their concerns over future uncertainties which could arise from 
fundamental changes in primary care and/or major political changes.  
 
As an example of informants who saw the mixed East Midl experience as 
exemplary, the Assistant Director of this PCT [Asst Dir/Board Mem, mixed E 
Midl] noted that he would like to see LIFT expand across the whole NHS:  
 
“I think LIFT-type approaches happen to be the best approach we 
currently have.  This is because with LIFT, the PCT can keep some real 
control of it in the future through their public services Director and their 
equity stake. I think they should embrace it and I would like to see LIFT 
expand across the whole of the UK.” 
 
While being generally positive about LIFT, the same informant [Asst 
Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl], however, noted that there was a need for 
greater commercial awareness and closer involvement with other 
organisations: 
 
“I think for it to go to the next level, we have got to be more commercially 
focused, we have to offer even better VfM, it has got to get slicker. PCTs 
have to get more involved, otherwise LIFT will just stay a very nice large 
property company for the next 25 years, rather than actually grow in the 
way that it could.  LIFT could become a huge player over the next 5 years 
if it gets its act together, and the Strategic Authorities and PCTs give it the 
support they need to.” 
 
Following on from the this line of argument, the same interviewee [Asst 
Dir/Board Mem, mixed E Midl] argued that there could be major efficiency 
gains in expanding the existing LIFT into neighbouring areas: 
 
“I would like to see us and the two neighbouring PCTs as a very minimum 
coming together.  Although there would be less jobs for people around the 
table, that is the price we have to pay … So if you bring your resources 
together they can tackle more easily the areas that need LIFT schemes 
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that are currently not covered.  And you would have less bureaucracy, less 
overheads, less AGMs, less sets of books, less sets of accounts, without 
necessarily compromising anything …” 
 
In contrast to the optimistic views about the future of LIFT and PPP in 
general, several informants expressed their doubts as to whether these 
approaches would be suitable to the primary care needs of the future.  This 
view was exemplified, among others, by former Project Manager for one of 
the LIFT schemes [Proj Mgr, mixed E Midl] who noted his uncertainty about 
the future viability of these approaches: 
 
“Who knows what situation we are going to be in next year, let alone in 25 
years’ time.  But you have to wonder whether PFIs and LIFT are a good 
thing for Health Services to be spending its money on.” 
 
Similarly, the Assistant Director of Finance of the PCT [Asst Fin Dir, mixed E 
Midl] expressed her doubts about the future appropriateness of the facilities 
which had recently been procured via LIFT in the area: 
 
“You could say is Primary Care going to be the same in 25 years?   
Whether we will still need the same building in 25 years time I do not 
know.  I suppose there is an argument that we should be looking that far 
ahead, or perhaps adopt more flexible solutions.”   
 
Lastly, the Estates Manager [Est Mgr, mixed E Midl] noted that there had 
been insufficient involvement by the Local Authority, and argued that this 
situation have to be remedied in the future if the LIFTCo were to expand its 
activities further:   
 
“I think one thing I would do is get the City Council or the Councils on 
board a lot earlier as part of the planning.  There have been quite a few 
problems, well there still are problems with the Council and getting them 
to understand these problems is very important.” 
 
This statement closely matched the views the earlier view of the Assistant 
Director of the PCT and other senior PCT officials who noted that potential 
synergies with local organisation had not been fully exploited on account of 
a lack of Local Authority involvement. 
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7.4.9 Summary - Mixed East Midl LIFT 
Mixed East Midl LIFT present a unique case study for a number of reasons.  
Unlike many other PCTs, mixed East Midl LIFT appears to have entered the 
LIFT procurement process with a great deal of enthusiasm which was 
grounded primarily in what key stakeholders perceived as positive earlier 
experiences with a PFI project in the area.  Based on these experiences, 
mixed East Midl PCT felt that it was well qualified to cope with the 
challenges posed by the LIFT procurement process.  Although several 
members involved in the LIFT procurement process felt that this had been 
an unusually complex and bureaucratic process, they were generally 
satisfied with its outcomes.  This satisfaction extended to issues such as the 
quality of the facilities which had been procured and their location as well as 
the impact which the availability of these facilities had on patient services 
and satisfaction.   
 
Notwithstanding a widespread perception that the new facilities had allowed 
for an extension of patient services, a number of informants expressed 
concerns over the cost of the new buildings.  These concerns focused on 
building cost as well as operating costs, with on of the informants voicing 
complaints about delayed billing.  Moreover, a number of informants 
working in, and managing, LIFT facilities expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the nature and level of consultation which had accompanied the design 
process.  This was paralleled by the perception, by PCT senior managers, 
that there had been insufficient involvement of, and collaboration with, the 
local Authority.   
 
7.5 Case Study - Urban South West LIFT 
Urban South West PCT services the largest city in its region, with a 
population of over 400,000.  Black and minority ethnic residents make up 
about 11% of the population which is close to the average for England of 
11.3%.  One person households exceed the average for England and Wales 
(30.0%).  This is also the case for the percentage of working age people 
with a long term limiting illness, which exceeds 12%.  The student 
population in the city is unusually high, exceeding 25,000 during term time.  
The unemployment rate was below the national average with 4.5% for June 
2007-08.  
 
The city has deprivation ‘hot spots’ which are amongst some of the most 
deprived areas in the country, yet are adjacent to some of the least 
deprived areas in the country.   In contrast, GDP per capita makes it one of 
the most affluent cities in England after London and Nottingham.  With a 
long history as a seaport, the city is a centre for aerospace and defence 
industries, and the financial sector is also a major employer. 
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The city is services by urban South West PCT which was formed on 2006 
through the merger of the two PCTs that had previously covered the city. 
The new PCT covers the same area as the City Council.  The PCT established 
a LIFT company in early 2004, as part of the third wave of LIFT. 
 
To date there have been three schemes replacing old health centres on the 
same or nearby land, and one refurbishment of an old hospital which had 
previously been used as student accommodation.  This facility is now a 
primary care centre also housing the student medical service and offices. 
There are two projects at different stages of development.  Two of the three 
new builds have been in areas of deprivation, one in a more mixed area.  
 
Scheme 1 replaced a building that was felt to be overcrowded, extremely 
busy and totally inadequate for the range of primary and community care 
services provided there.  No space was available within the building to allow 
for the future expansion of services and many parts of the building were in 
need of major repair or replacement.  The centre housed two General 
Practices serving as well as district nurses, health visitors, speech and 
language therapists and community-based midwives.  Services provided at 
the Health Centre included general medical services, ante and post natal 
clinics, mother and baby clinics, family planning sessions, podiatry, welfare 
rights advisory services and drugs counselling.  These services have all now 
been transferred to the new building. 
 
Scheme 2 replaced the existing Health Centre and expanded the existing 
site by acquiring an adjacent piece of land.  
 
Scheme 3 was built by undertaking a land swap with an adjacent piece of 
land currently owned by the City Council.  In addition to health facilities, a 
library will be built on site. 
 
7.5.1 Methodology - Urban South West LIFT 
The team conducted fieldwork in relation to ‘urban South West LIFT’ in 
November 2007 up until July 2008, making this the first area of study.  As 
part of the case study analysis, interviews were undertaken with eight 
individuals, including: The PCT’s Director of Strategic Planning [Dir StratP, 
urban SW], on two occasions with the PCT’s Associate Director [Assoc Dir, 
urban SW], the PCT’s Director of Provider Services [Dir ProvS, urban SW], 
the PCT’s Director of Finance [Fin Dir, urban SW], the Business Manager for 
one of the LIFT developments [Bus Mgr, urban SW], the Project Manager for 
one of the LIFT developments [Proj Mgr], a Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, 
urban SW] and, on two occasions, with the CEO of the LIFT company [CEO, 
urban SW].   
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While the balance of informants was again skewed towards the public 
sector, this was in part compensated for by the fact that the private sector 
representative [CEO, urban SW] was available for extensive interviews on 
two occasions.   
 
 
7.5.2 Background - Urban South West LIFT 
Compared to other PCTs, a high proportion of the primary care 
infrastructure in urban SW was owned by the PCT.  Therefore the primary 
focus of LIFT investment was on the replacement and refurbishment of PCT 
owned facilities.  The private sector partner chosen to be part of the LIFTCo 
was a partnering organisation rather than a building company, who had a 
large construction firm in their supply chain.  
 
At the outset there was a strong expectation that this arrangement would 
bring innovative solutions to primary care estate problems.  This 
expectation was expressed by the PCT’s Associate Director [Assoc Dir, urban 
SW] as follows: 
 
“We were sold on the idea that this partnering organisation would open up 
possibilities that we had not thought of, particularly in our city where 
property is very expensive, hard to come by in the city centre. Some of 
the other partners in that supply chain … opened up the door to do 
innovative things in terms of developments … that we would not as a PCT 
be able to access.”  
 
This view, however, was not universally accepted by PCT stakeholders.  
Thus, the Project Manager for one of the LIFT developments [Proj Mgr, 
urban SW] expressed doubts about how innovative the LIFT company had 
actually been: 
 
“My impression is that they do not come up with solutions that are that 
creative.  I read about LIFT schemes elsewhere, and about primary care 
development, and I think we are coasting a bit.  I think they could be 
more innovative.”  
 
The CEO of the LIFT Co [CEO, urban SW], meanwhile attributed a potential 
lack of innovation to circumstances which were outside the private sector’s 
control, including lack of access to suitable land or development 
opportunities: 
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“We never found a site that was big enough to do anything other than put 
the Health Centre on with the parking it needs and put a pharmacy in 
there.  Not because we did not want to, but because there just was no 
scope on the available sites.”  
 
In addition, the LIFT Co [CEO, urban SW], felt that there were aspects of 
working with the public sector that themselves caused delays and 
frustrations, but that these were outside the PCT’s control: 
 
“We are looking for the PCT to manage the impossible; policy changes, 
NHS design guidance, public sector approval processes, all of which are 
naturally subject to public accountability and scrutiny and therefore 
somewhat bureaucratic, slow and unwieldy.”   
 
The LIFT process itself was also felt to be a potential barrier. Thus the LIFT 
CEO [CEO, urban SW] expressed concerns that standardised 
documentation, which would lead to the more efficient development of 
subsequent schemes, had not materialised: 
  
“Every tranche of schemes we have placed has been on a different version 
of the lease plus agreement.  So that benefit has just never materialised 
so we are always into quite expensive and long discussions with lawyers 
and financial advisors..  Until that settles down, you will never actually 
realise that benefit which is one of the driving forces behind LIFT.”   
 
Overall there was a strong perception that the expectations of what LIFT 
could deliver, in terms of finding innovative solutions to estate problems, 
had not been matched by the reality.  This view was expressed by, among 
others,  the PCT’s Associate Director [Assoc Dir, urban SW]: 
 
“What we started to realise was that actually, the private sector doesn’t 
necessarily have that capacity to move quickly and take risks any more 
than we do.” 
 
 
7.5.3 Procurement - Urban South West LIFT 
Once the PCT had decided to form a LIFT company, the LIFT ‘route’ was 
perceived to be the only way that developments would take place, although 
there had been one non-LIFT development in the city during the lifetime of 
the LIFT company (a refurbishment of an old swimming pool, carried out by 
a GP practice in association with a local charity).  
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Speaking for one of the practices who went into Scheme 2 wanting to 
improve their facilities, a Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, urban SW], noted 
that their involvement with LIFT had not been entirely voluntary: 
 
“We did initially look at the GPs doing the building themselves, taking out 
a mortgage and actually producing the building but we were told 
categorically by the PCT that we would not be supported because they had 
just signed up to LIFT for the next 25 years and therefore that was the 
only way to go.”  
 
Both PCT and private sector interviewees also felt that there had been 
difficulties in the decision-making process early on, partly because the PCT 
was representing several other stakeholders.  This was highlight by the CEO 
of the LIFTCo [CEO, urban SW]: 
 
“The difficulty is to make decisions early.  This means that you have to 
have certainty about things that can be quite difficult to pin down, because 
usually they are dealing with quite a range of stakeholders and they 
cannot corral all these people easily and force them to make a decision 
and stick to it.”  
 
Similarly, the Business Manager for one of the LIFT developments [Bus Mgr, 
urban SW] noted that it had been difficult to reach consensus during 
meetings: 
 
“I have organised several user meetings to contribute towards the 
footprint of the inside of the building, getting their approvals,  involving 
various consultants to advise on various other technical aspects of the 
operational design, things like room weightings, soft FM planning, and 
involving where necessary the Health planner to look at various other 
services which we might have to put in to the centre and also working with 
other departments such as Commissioning to get some clarity around what 
level of activity we are projecting for the Health Centre.  We have had 
some difficulty around that.”  
 
Other challenges in the development process revolved around finalising 
designs, especially for the content of the buildings, and there could be a 
conflict between pressure to finalise the design process in order to get to 
financial close, and users’ desires to make changes in the design. In this 
context the Project Manager for one of the LIFT developments [Proj Mgr, 
urban SW] made the following comments: 
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“There were elements of the design process that had had to be 
compromised, and there was a point at which the design process was 
frozen; if the LIFT company felt they had spent enough on the design 
process, they froze it and said we have got to stop here, we have got to 
stop doing the finances, we have got to get financial close.  And there had 
been a lot of iteration and there had been a lot of compromise.  But after 
financial close there was still the expectation on the users side that they 
would be able to refine and improve this design.  It was very difficult to do 
that after financial close.”  
 
Occasionally the need for design change could come about because of a 
policy change; for example, new guidance for infection control, which was 
issued shortly after the plans for one building had been finalised, meant that 
the floors needed changing. This raised a question for one interviewee [Proj 
Mgr, urban SW] about whose responsibility it was to make such changes in 
design: 
 
“I think LIFT’s supply team should have picked this up.  I think the 
designers should have been advising us if the floor needed changing rather 
than us advising them.”   
 
Another potential problem concerned the decision-making chains alluded to 
above, where the PCT was representing a number of other stakeholders. It 
was felt to be vital, and very difficult, to get the details right, i.e. once the 
decision to build the building had been taken, most people’s concerns were 
with the contents, the facilities, and the rooms that would be available to 
them.  One of the Project Manager for one of the LIFT developments [Proj 
Mgr, urban SW] made the following comments: 
 
“There is so much detail there were things we missed in the chain, and it 
is basically a chain from the architect to the tenant’s rep to tenants, and 
back.  At each stage there is a risk that someone will assume that 
someone else has logged the right preference and the right option, or that 
someone has told the users why we have chosen a particular measure.”  
 
However, several interviewees, including one of Project Managers [Proj Mgr, 
urban SW] commented that the building company had been very helpful 
and supportive: 
 
“The contractors were absolutely fantastic, just brilliant … that relationship 
was excellent, they could not have done more to make it go smoothly.”  
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Despite the difficulties, which almost always revolved around the details, 
staff and patients were happy with the buildings once they were opened.  
This was commented on by one of the Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, urban 
SW]: 
 
“It is a great building and its lovely and there is going to be lots of 
opportunities for development but it is big and it just means that people 
have to walk a lot further and look at the signage a lot more deeply than 
they used to, and some of them, the elderly particularly, are finding it a 
little bit difficult.”  
 
Similarly the PCT’s Director of Provider Services [Dir ProvS, urban SW] 
suggested that the projects had achieved a high level of satisfaction among 
users:  
 
Without exception really all the people who have moved from a building 
into a LIFT building have gone from something which is absolutely terrible, 
horrible, damp, falling down, not fit for purpose, not nice to work in, to a 
brand new building so of course they will really like it.”  
 
7.5.4 Learning and Understanding - Urban South West LIFT 
As in several of the previous case studies, a number of interviewees at 
urban SW LIFT commented on the process of learning about LIFT, and the 
challenges of dealing with an entirely new way of doing things.  This was 
exemplified by a Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, urban SW] who made the 
following comment: 
 
“I would love to go back to the beginning again because now I know so 
much more. … I have learnt a huge amount, you know the questions to 
ask, the things to look for, the way to manage it better … all that sort of 
thing.”  
 
For many people, LIFT had been a steep learning curve, mainly because it 
introduces new ways of working and new forms of partnership to the NHS, 
which meant that not only detailed planning processes had to be learnt, but 
also that the PCT had to understand how to work in partnership with the 
private sector.  The PCT’s Associate Director [Assoc Dir, urban SW] 
commented on this issue as follows: 
 
“The main learning points for us are around being an informed client, 
making sure that we know what we are asking for, getting the right advice 
to help us to do that even if it takes longer and costs more.  
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Understanding that we are in a commercial relationship, in other words 
however much of a partnership it is, at the end of the day LIFT and their 
supply chain are in it, there is a profit to be made. There is no problem 
with that, I think we just need to recognise that there is that motivation 
out there.” 
 
The same informant [Assoc Dir, urban SW], meanwhile, noted that his 
concerns that organisational learning could be improved: 
 
“I think we could have done a better job between us of formally learning.  
I think that in a way because there has been continuity that has stopped 
there being perhaps such an overt process because it would be ‘well, we 
won’t do that again.’”   
 
Within the PCT, however, it was felt that there was neither time nor capacity 
to carry out this kind of evaluation and review.  This view was expressed, 
among others, by one of the Project Managers [Proj Mgr, urban SW]: 
 
“We do not really have the capacity to sit down and say “what are the key 
lessons from last time, what do we want to make sure that we learn next 
time?” and that is very frustrating but that’s very much within the PCT.”  
 
Similarly, the Business Manager for one of the LIFT developments [Bus Mgr, 
urban SW] suggested that there had been little time for reflection about 
outcomes:  
 
“Everyone seems to be so swamped doing their own thing, no-one has 
actually stopped to review after the project has been completed.  Saying 
right, how can we make sure that someone else who may come along is 
better equipped from the get go to pick up a project and run with it.  
There is very little of that.”  
 
This organisational memory loss could be frustrating for the private sector, 
particularly when combined with personnel changes in the PCT; the amount 
of staff turnover which could sometimes be exacerbated by organisatonal 
changes within the NHS meant that stability tended to come from the 
private sector side.  This issue was commented upon by the LIFT CEO [CEO, 
urban SW] as follows:  
 
“One of the difficulties for our PCT is that they have quite a turnover in 
their estates team. So on all the four jobs we have done, there is not 
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anyone really who has got experience from the PCT side on delivering all 
four schemes.  The people that have got experience are on the private 
sector side because I have been involved all the way through and my 
supply chain has been involved all the way through.”  
 
7.5.5 Partnership - Urban South West LIFT  
Section 5 (subsection 5.4.3) identified the partnership of urban SW LIFT as 
being characterized by Segregation with some elements of Synergy. This 
was confirmed by most informants who described the relationship between 
the public and private partners as good but arm’s length.  Specifically, it 
was noted by several informants, including the that the LIFTCo CEO [CEO, 
urban SW], that a lack of continuity had prevented close working 
relationships from evolving:  
 
“There are only a few key people who have been common to a lot of these 
schemes all the way through.  I have a very good working relationship 
with them in terms of being able to share and explain detail, but there are 
not many of them.”  
 
For both parties there was an awareness that a partnership was a 
continuing process which required an effort to make it work.  This was 
explained by the PCT’s Associate Director [Assoc Dir, urban SW] as follows: 
  
“So I think that is a lesson for any partnership scheme, particularly LIFT 
schemes, which is that you have to work at partnerships; there have been 
tensions between us, and there continue to be, and they have been 
resolved and continue to be resolved but you have to put time and effort 
into that partnership working.” 
 
Similarly, the LIFTCo CEO [CEO, urban SW] suggested that relationship 
development was a continuous process: 
 
“I think we work very well in terms of our relationship with the PCT and we 
understand what they need.  We continually work to give them a solution 
that meets their needs; we have to try and understand, and almost better 
than they understand it themselves.”   
 
7.5.6 Cost Issues - Urban South West PCT 
One of the major concerns about LIFT for most respondents was cost.  
Specifically, at a practice/project level, there was a sense that individual 
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developments were, as one Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, urban SW] noted, 
costly for the business: 
 
“It is costing us a lot more to be in the building, and we knew it would, we 
sat down and talked about it and knew we had to do it that way.”  
 
The Director of Finance [Fin Dir, urban SW], meanwhile, noted, that higher 
costs had to be seen in the context of the quality of the new buildings:  
 
“For each clinic, or the health centres we are renting at the moment we 
are paying £600K-£700K per year.  That is a lot more than the capital 
charges ever were.  But they are great buildings.” 
  
Similarly, the PCT’s Director of Strategic Planning [Dir StratP, urban SW] 
noted that cost issues had to be contextualized within accounting 
procedures:  
 
“My gut reaction is that it does not always appear affordable. If I espouse 
being rational and using economic appraisal, then I have got to live by the 
consequences of that which say actually LIFT is good VfM.  And that has to 
with life costs and the risk transfer.”  
 
However, the same question led the Director Finance [Fin Dir, urban SW] to 
reflect about whether LIFT buildings were too good: 
 
“Where I have a problem with affordability is that I think we have almost 
bought too good a product.  I think the health centres are excellent 
buildings, very well maintained, well constructed, well designed etc but we 
do not need that level of sophistication in primary care I don’t think.  You 
could have a building which is a bit cheaper but perhaps not quite so 
splendid.”  
 
There also appeared to be mixed feelings within the PCT about whether the 
PCT were procuring what they actually needed, or whether the buildings had 
been built to too high a specification, and too spacious.  In this context the 
PCT’s Associate Director [Assoc Dir, urban SW] made the following 
observations: 
  
“I think we have probably got some over-designed buildings now.  
Beautiful and spacious. One of our emerging issues is where we have 
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over-specified … with the clinicians sitting around the table aspiring 
beyond what they had the means to do.”  
 
However, the same interviewee noted that this meant that there was 
flexibility in future developments and scope for putting in additional 
services, something which both the provider arm of the PCT and the users 
of the building were aware had not yet happened. 
 
 
7.5.7 Outcomes - Urban South West LIFT 
In general, there was a high level of satisfaction with the LIFT buildings 
urban SW LIFT had procured. Staff were reported to be happy to work in 
them, and patient satisfaction was reported to be good on the whole. Even 
the otherwise critical Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, urban SW] commented 
positively on this fact: 
 
“It has been a very positive experience and we are very pleased to be in 
there I think we will manage to keep everybody and make everybody 
happy.”  
 
However, there was a sense that there had been missed opportunities in 
terms of developing new ways of providing services, or new services per se, 
and this links with the perceived lack of innovation mentioned above.  Again 
it is worth quoting the aforementioned Practice Manager [Pract Mgr, urban 
SW]: 
 
“One of the things we really wanted when we first started talking about 
the building was to have some kind of wholefood café, because we thought 
if we cannot teach our population how to eat healthily what are we here 
for if we cannot do something along those lines?  There was nothing in our 
area, there are a couple of greasy spoons but there is nothing on the 
healthfood front at all and we thought if nothing else it would provide 
sustenance for the people working in the building, so it would be a 
relatively good business opportunity and that was not taken up.”  
 
Part of this was felt to be due to planning processes for the earlier schemes 
not being detailed enough, a problem which, according to the Director of 
Finance [Fin Dir, urban SW] had been resolved by the time the later 
schemes were being planned: 
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“In our first two tranches we built buildings that were too big.  We did not 
have a good enough handle on the services that were going to be 
provided.  And by that I mean, how is each room going to be used?  Is this 
the way we want it to be used?  I would say for the two schemes which 
are on the table at the moment, we are doing a much more detailed job 
because we have gained experience during the period.”  
 
It could be argued that many of the perceived problems with LIFT stem 
from inexperience early on, and a lack of organisational learning, a situation 
which should be resolved as more LIFT schemes are completed and 
experience builds up, especially in the public sector.  
 
7.5.8 Views on the Future - Urban South West LIFT 
The key issue facing this relatively small PCT and LIFTCo such as this one, 
was how to continue work into the future. Within the PCT there were mixed 
feelings about LIFT, although realistically it was unlikely that the following 
scenario, suggested by the Director of Strategy [[Dir StratP, urban SW], 
would occur: 
 
“I think there are senior people who, if we ditched the LIFT and we did not 
do any more LIFT, would not be bothered.”   
 
For the CEO of the LIFTCo [CEO, urban SW] the main issues were not so 
much policy changes but rather the need to ensure an ongoing pipeline of 
work: 
 
“What happens in a year, two years, five years time?  The answer is that 
one expects that the pipeline is not infinite in capacity, so we would expect 
that there would be a slowing down of the work that the PCT will put our 
way.  So the big question is … what happens in two years, five years 
time?”   
 
Lastly, a number of informants, including the PCT’s Associate Director 
[Assoc Dir, urban SW] raised questions remain about the value added by 
LIFT:  
 
“Has LIFT added something different?  Is there a value over and above 
decent buildings? I think so far we don’t know. It’s too early to say and it 
doesn’t feel like something deeply innovative has happened.”   
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7.5.9 Summary - Urban SW LIFT 
Urban SW LIFT represents an instance in which both public and private 
sector stakeholders value the existing partnership without perceiving their 
relationship as particularly close.  In line with this perception, most 
stakeholders viewed past projects as a success, with the proviso, that there 
had been no particularly innovative or novel solutions.  This situation is 
attributed primarily to local constraints which relate to the high costs of 
property in this relatively compact city.  Although there appears to be on 
the public sector side no strong commitment to LIFT, several informants felt 
that their experiences had been valuable and could contribute to 
improvement in commissioning/procurement in the future.  In this context, 
one particularly appears to be the need to avoid the overspecification of 
facilities, which adversely affects affordability.   
 
From the private sector point of view, the key concerns to relate to issues of 
continuity and the future deal flow in this area, which appear to be 
indicative of potential sustainability issues which affect smaller LIFTCo-s 
such as this.   
 
 
7.6  Summary - Case Studies 
The case studies presented in this section describe the very different 
experiences of four areas with LIFT. Urban North East LIFT presented the 
perhaps unusual case of a PCT which, while initially reluctant about public 
private partnership, enthusiastically embraced LIFT as a part of a broader 
regeneration agenda.  Together with an urgent need for improvement in 
local primary care facilities, this regeneration agenda appears to have 
facilitated the creation of what virtually all interviewees described as a 
strong partnership which additionally benefited from buy-in by a number of 
Local Authority stakeholders.   
 
This contrasted sharply with rural East Midland LIFT where several public 
sector informants suggested that the PCT had not benefited significantly 
from its involvement with LIFT.  These views were based on a number of 
factors including the specific challenges of rurality in the area, the 
perception that the PCT already possessed a strong and competent estates 
department, the under-utilisation of new LIFT facilities and the limited 
impact of LIFT on working practices which appear to have highlighted issues 
of cost and affordability.  Taking these factors together, there was some 
indication that the development of this LIFTCo was hampered by a lack of 
development opportunities which are more typical of urban areas (see also 
4.3.6 which indicated a tentative urban/rural divide in term of VfM 
perceptions), as well as the PCTs unique administrative context, which 
meant that parts of the county effectively inherited LIFT on account of a PCT 
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merger, without having been initially involved in its creation and without 
being currently governed by its exclusivity agreement.   
 
Perhaps differing from the experiences of both of these areas, mixed East 
Midl LIFT appears to have entered the LIFT process enthusiastically on the 
basis of previous experiences with a PFI hospital.  This enthusiasm for LIFT 
seems to continue to shape the views of public sector stakeholders who 
expressed their belief that LIFT had, particularly in urban areas of the PCT, 
contributed significantly to improvements in the quality of facilities and 
services which would have not have otherwise been possible.  
Notwithstanding these positive views, a number of informants voiced 
concerns about insufficient levels of consultation as well as a lack of 
involvement from Local Authority stakeholders. 
 
Lastly, urban South West LIFT represents the completely different set of 
experiences of a relatively small LIFTCo operating in a compact city with 
historically high property prices.  While the majority of interviewees from 
this area viewed past LIFT projects as a success, these views were 
tempered by suggestions that the solutions that had been adopted had not 
been particularly ‘joined-up’ or innovative.   This situation was typically 
attributed to the lack of available land and high land prices, which also gave 
rise to concerns over the sustainability of this LIFTCo. Moreover, there was 
a perception among senior PCT stakeholders that some of the LIFT facilities 
had been over-specified on account of a lack of cost-awareness among 
clinicians.   
 
As a commonality, informants from all four case studies suggested that they 
were part of working partnerships which they had come to value as a major 
resource.  This perception, interestingly, included both rural East Midland 
LIFT, which was probably the least enthusiastic LIFT participant, and urban 
South West LIFT, where informants described their relationship as being  
arm’s length rather than being based on close personal contact and 
collaboration (as had been the case for urban NE LIFT and mixed E Midl 
LIFT).  Moreover there was a common view that it had taken an effort to 
create these partnerships and that the LIFT approach to procurement, 
despite being bureaucratic and complex, had encouraged this type of 
collaboration between the public and private sectors.  This finding should be 
given some significance, particularly in light of earlier research on PFI which 
indicated that these collaborations had often given rise to adversarial and 
litigious relationships (e.g., Asenova and Beck, 2003a). 
 
Another common theme concerned the widespread belief, among informants 
from all four case studies, that LIFT had led to significant improvements in 
the quality of buildings and patient services as well as creating improved 
working conditions for staff.  This view is confirmed, albeit in a limited 
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manner, by the survey data presented in Appendix 7, which reports high 
levels of patient satisfaction for two LIFT areas (which include two practices 
within urban NE LIFT).   
 
Notwithstanding these positive aspects, it is important to note that public 
sector informants from all four locations expressed concerns over cost and 
affordability aspects of LIFT projects.  These concerns ranged from issues of 
over-specification and under-utilisation to issues of short-term budgeting 
and long-term affordability and sustainability.  Although these concerns 
were widespread, it was interesting to note that they rarely gave rise to 
fundamental objections to, or a rejection of, LIFT as a procurement 
mechanism.  Indeed, where informants voiced a critique of LIFT, this was 
typically based on the belief that the PCT already possessed requisite estate 
skill and could have made necessary procurements without LIFT (as, e.g., in 
rural East Midland LIFT).   Similarly, although urban NE LIFT was identified 
in the Financial Analysis section (section 6, subsection 6.4.3) as having 
created relatively high returns for the private sector partners, concerns over 
VfM in this LIFT were, if anything, less pronounced than in other case study 
areas (with several urban NE LIFT informants suggesting that costs would 
decline in the future).   This indicates that, at least at present, stakeholder 
perceptions of local LIFTs are driven predominantly by views on the extent 
and quality of facilities procured as well as perceptions with regard to the 
functioning of the existing partnership.  Although it is probably 
unreasonable to attribute these attitudes vis-à-vis the VfM aspects of LIFT 
to a lack of financial foresight and prudence among PCT stakeholders, it is 
worth noting that the financial governance of LIFT may well be suffering 
from a lack of financial monitoring and forecasting which may adversely 
affect future developments in this area.   
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8 Summary - Policy, Management and 
Research Implications 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This research project was tasked with investigating the role and 
effectiveness of LIFT in the development of enhanced primary care 
premises and services.  As a procurement method which had evolved from 
PFI, the LIFT initiative was established in 2001 with the aim of developing 
a new market for investment in primary care for the regeneration of local 
care facilities via the creation of new surgeries, clinics and health centres 
(Appleby, 2001). Research by the National Audit Office (2005)  
suggested that LIFT was a potentially attractive means for securing value 
for money. However, other researchers noted that problematic issues 
related to the set-up, implementation and governance of LIFT Companies 
could adversely affect these outcomes (see, e.g. Aldred, 2007; 2008). 
 
 
This design of this research project was based on a set of original 
policy questions specified by the SDO. These included: 
 How should public-private partnerships be 
developed and established? 
 What are the grounds or circumstances in which public-
private partnerships are desirable, which stakeholders 
should be involved, and what are the criteria by which their 
performance should be measured? 
 What are the organisational and behavioural factors that 
influence the relationship between a public organisation 
and its private partner(s)? 
 What factors underpin the most effective working 
arrangements and performance of public-private 
partnerships? 
 What are the implications of public-private partnerships for 
the governance of public services, and what governance 
arrangements should be put in place for public-private 
partnerships? 
 What are the actual and potential conflicts of interest and 
problems which arise in relation to operating public-private 
partnerships and how should these be managed? 
 
 
The aforementioned policy questions were addressed in this study through 
a mix of theoretical work, literature review and empirical study; with 
interview analysis and financial analysis playing a central role in shaping 
our conclusions.  The following section summarises our key findings in 
connection with these objectives. 
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8.2 Summary of Key Findings and Implications for  
      Policy and Management in the NHS 
 
Policy Question 1 
How should public-private partnerships be developed and established? 
Within the limitations of our revised study design (see section 2) this report 
found evidence that LIFT had created the organizational and institutional 
framework for effective partnership working within the NHS (see sections 4, 
5 and 7).  Although a significant number of user informants expressed the 
view that LIFT posed a significant administrative burden as well as a 
challenge to the skills of public sector managers, there was a broad 
consensus that these problems were alleviated through collaboration with 
private sector partners within the LIFT framework.  Overall, both public and 
private sector informants tended to view their LIFT partnerships as an 
effective resource and a means for clarifying and aligning potentially 
conflicting goals.  This finding appears to contradict earlier research which 
highlighted problems with partnerships working in the context of PFI and, as 
such, lends support for the view that public private procurement and 
collaboration is more effective within a framework of long-term contracting 
and repeated purchases.   
 
Notwithstanding these positive observations, there were indications that 
public private partnership within the NHS could be improved in a number of 
ways.  These included a greater focus on knowledge sharing amongst public 
sector managers who had participated in LIFT projects and the creation of 
specific administrative mechanisms which would allow senior public sector 
LIFT managers to share their experiences with ‘novices’.  Additionally, there 
were some concerns among public sector informants with the ongoing loss 
of LIFT relevant knowledge amongst senior public managers on account of 
the completion of projects, retirement and/or the movement of these 
individuals to the private sector.  Lastly, a number of public sector 
managers expressed the view that advice and support by organizations such 
as Community Health Partnership or Partnership UK was not an adequate 
substitute for improved lesson learning among senior public managers. 
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Policy Question 2 
What are the grounds or circumstances in which public-private partnerships 
are desirable, which stakeholders should be involved, and what are the 
criteria by which their performance should be measured?  
 
Both our stakeholder and our case study analysis (sections 4 and 7) 
highlighted a number of factors which influenced the effectiveness of LIFT 
partnerships.  These included, above all, the development of strong 
commissioning and strategic planning skills among senior public sector 
managers, without which the joined-up and synergetic development of LIFT 
projects is less likely to materialize.  These findings were underpinned by 
the fact that most public sector LIFT users reported that it was relatively 
easy to procure quality facilities via LIFT, while having difficulties in doing so 
in a joined-up and strategic manner; and even more so with a potentially 
valuable participation and buy-in from Local Authority stakeholder.  Also, 
there was a suggestion that some LIFT users felt that the creation of new 
facilities had not resulted in changes in working practices and service 
improvements which these facilities would have permitted.  This situation 
suggests that there may be a case for creating incentives for managers to 
pursue and implement strategic approaches to procurement which favour 
joined-up solutions and explicitly reward improvements in service provision.  
 
In addition to the issue of integrating LIFT procurement in a broader service 
strategy, there was an indication that the effectiveness of LIFT could be 
hampered by circumstances beyond the immediate control of PCTs.  Thus 
there was a strong indication that it was more difficult to achieve VfM 
through the co-location of services in rural areas, on account of a lack of 
demand in areas of limited urban density.  Additionally there was an 
indication that the development of innovative LIFT projects could be 
hampered by high property prices and a lack of availability of land.  Lastly, 
a number of informants suggested that PCT mergers (and related policy 
changes) could adversely affect the support for, and targeting of, LIFT 
facilities.  
 
As regards stakeholder involvement in LIFT projects, there was some 
consensus that this issue had been adequately addressed by most PCTs.  
Notwithstanding these positive views, a number of informants felt that local 
user involvement could be improved (e.g., by involving practice managers 
and reception staff in the design of facilities) and that LIFT managers should 
attempt to secure a broader level of involvement from Local Authority and 
NGO stakeholders.  
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Policy Question 3 
What are the organisational and behavioural factors that influence 
therelationship between a public organisation and its private partner(s)? 
 
Our study suggested that organisational culture matters, and is seen to 
matter in the formation and maintenance of LIFT partnerships (see section 
5). Managers at all levels in the public and private organisations recognised 
the significance of culture and were either actively interested in shaping it 
or felt constrained by its influence on inter-organisational relations. In some 
LIFT projects different assumed motives had created a degree of suspicion 
and lack of trust between partners, with public organisations being 
sometimes uncomfortable with the underlying profit motive of private sector 
organisations, and private sector organisations worried about the perceived 
bureaucracy, ‘red tape’, lack of financial acumen and political interference.  
However, on the whole the partners within LIFT projects appeared to be 
working together well and differences in culture were being managed and 
accommodated as partnerships matured; with partnership working being 
facilitated by the fact that public sector managers had gained a significant 
understanding of strategic and financial management issues, while some 
private sector managers had had prior experience in working with, or for, 
the NHS.    
 
Where relationships between public and private sector partners were less 
amicable, this was typically due to external factors such as problems 
created by PCT mergers or policy changes, and/or a lack of 
available/affordable land for innovative developments.  Also, there was 
some concern, both among public and private sector informants, that a 
future lack of deal flows and cuts in public sector funding could re-invigorate 
cultural tensions and organizational mistrust. 
 
Policy Question 4 
What factors underpin the most effective working arrangements and 
performance of public-private partnerships? 
 
Our study noted that working arrangements around LIFT were facilitated by 
a number of factors including the presence of significant deal flows and 
opportunities for the adoption of innovative and commercially attractive 
solutions (which were more likely to materialize in urban areas and, in 
particular, in areas with significant regeneration potential).  Additionally 
there was an indication that LIFTs schemes benefited from being paired with 
local regeneration activities. 
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Further to this, there was a suggestion that private sector participants were 
more likely to become involved in LIFT where PCT were able to present 
detailed long-term strategic plans for future improvements.  Local demand 
for LIFT facilities, meanwhile, depended largely on the availability of 
alternative accommodation for GPs, with areas of population growth and 
high property prices being the most likely to attract GP demand.    
 
Policy Question 5 
What are the implications of public-private partnerships for the governance 
of public services, and what governance arrangements should be put in 
place for public-private partnerships? 
  
Although our study found existing governance arrangements around LIFT to 
be largely to the satisfaction of both public and private sector participants, a 
number of public sector informants expressed concerns over the cost and 
affordability implications of LIFT.   Given these concerns and the 
quantitative financial analysis presented in section 6, we would suggest that 
there is a potential need to strengthen the financial governance of LIFT 
schemes; with a view toward overcoming the current disjointed view, 
whereby the success of LIFT projects is seen, by both public and private 
sector stakeholders, largely in isolation of financial parameters.   This would 
involve the establishment of systematic frameworks for the monitoring of 
LIFTCo cash flows (in line with the analysis presented in section 6) as well 
as improvements in the ability of PCTs to forecast future LIFT related 
liabilities and assess their long-term implications.   Additionally, there is a 
potential need for PCTs to establish frameworks for the assessment of 
various VfM aspects of LIFT projects, which, while not neglecting potential 
added benefits of this projects (in terms of co-location, maintenance, etc.), 
analyse cost and benefits in a rigorous quantitative fashion.  At this stage, 
the team would recommend the creation of a PCT LIFT Finance working 
party.  This working party would aim at bringing together Finance Directors 
from all LIFT schemes (or their representatives) with accounting academics 
and representatives from professional organizations in order to establish 
templates for the cost benefit analysis of LIFT projects and frameworks for 
the continuous monitoring of LIFTCo cash flows.   
 
As a spin-off of this study, members of this research team are already 
developing a specialized financial management course for senior NHS staff 
who are engaged in, or are planning to be engaged in, public private 
projects.  This course will have the potential to create certificate level 
qualifications for these managers as well as creating the basis for future 
discussions within the proposed working party framework. 
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Policy Question 6 
What are the actual and potential conflicts of interest and problems which 
arise in relation to operating public-private partnerships and how should 
these be managed? 
 
This study found that most LIFT stakeholders felt relatively comfortable with 
their existing roles within LIFT schemes.  These views extended to those 
public sector representatives who maintained a dual role within PCT 
management and LIFTCo boards.  However, there is a possibility that these 
positive views of LIFT governance were based, at least partially, on a lack of 
understanding of the financial implications of LIFT (see previous point and 
section 6) and the inadequacy of existing financial auditing and monitoring 
requirements.   It might therefore be advisable for the DoH to investigate 
whether additional reporting requirements could/should be imposed on 
private sector LIFT partners with a view toward securing a more transparent 
assessment of the costs and benefits of individual LIFT projects as well as 
the cash flows of LIFTCo-s.   
 
8.3 Challenges to Project Delivery 
The main challenges to the completion of this project arose from the 
multidisciplinarity of the initial research design.  This multidisciplinarity was 
based on the recognition that the effectiveness of LIFT could not be 
understood from any single perspective, but rather required a bringing 
together of different types of qualitative and quantitative analysis (see also 
the PI’s earlier study on PFI, Akintoye, Beck et al. 2001, which successfully 
employed a similar methodology).  As a consequence of this approach, the 
research team faced two difficulties.  The first of these concerned the 
collection and analysis of data for the different components of this study.  
The second challenge involved a process of triangulating these different 
types of information and, in particular, addressing locational mismatches 
which had arisen during the study on account of differential data availability. 
 
8.3.1 Data Components 
At the outset of the study, the team was able to interview a wide range of 
senior key informants who were willing and able to provide well informed 
views.  Similarly, the second stage of case unspecific (or user) interviews 
was able to draw on a number of volunteers from the public and private 
sector.   However, later on in the project the recruitment of LIFT projects for 
case study investigation proved exceedingly difficult as a number of PCTs 
withdrew their initial consent for collaboration within a more in depth 
analysis.  Eventually, however, the team was able to recruit four LIFTs for 
this phase of the project, which, together, provided a remarkably diverse 
and informative cross-section of these schemes. 
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As regards quantitative financial data, it was clear from the outset that it 
would be difficult to find matching financial data for the planned case 
studies (see section 6.3.2 which describes how the NAO refused to provide 
this data because it was the commercially confidental property of its 
subcontractor Operis).  Eventually, however, a team member was able to 
conduct a detailed cash flow analysis for three LIFTCo-s which included one 
of the case studies (urban NE LIFT).    
 
Similarly, difficulties were encountered in securing a supplementary culture 
interview from mixed East Midland LIFT as well as private sector 
participation for the rural East Midland LIFT and the mixed East Midland 
LIFT case studies.    
 
8.3.2 Data Triangulation 
This study would clearly have benefited from a close match of all 
components of study, including cultural analysis, financial analysis and case 
studies.  This was sadly not possible, both on account of a reluctance of 
PCTs to participate in the case study phase of the project and on account of 
the scarcity of available financial information on LIFTs.   
 
With hindsight, however, this data mismatch created fewer information gaps 
than initially anticipated, predominantly because the multidisciplinary design 
of the study allowed the researchers to substitute and interpolate between 
different segments of the project.  However, what became painfully clear to 
the team towards the end of this study was that the existing time frame of 
two years was too short for this undertaking and that this study should have 
been more realistically budgeted for three years.      
 
Notwithstanding these observations, the authors would like to conclude that 
this undertaking has been a thoroughly enjoyable experience, which was 
enhanced by real world relevancy of the topic and the possibility of future 
policy relevant publications drawing on this research.   
 
 
Published Papers 
 
Fitzsimmons D., Brown S. and Beck M. 2008. Does the UK Local Finance 
Improvement Trust (LIFT) Initiative improve risk management in 
public-private procurement? Journal of Risk and Governance 1(2). 
 
Fitzsimmons D., Beck M., Toms S., Brown S., Mannion R. and Lunt N. 2008. 
UpLIFTing PFI: does LIFT improve public-private procurement? The 
Systemist 30(2). 
 
Brown S. and Beck M. 2009. Value for money and public-private 
partnerships in the UK: the Local Finance Improvement Trust (LIFT) 
Initiative in Primary Care. Public Sector Management (forthcoming) 
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Planned Papers 
 
Mannion R., Lunt N., Beck M., Toms S. and Brown S. 2009.  Managing 
cultural diversity in public-partnerships: the case of the Local Finance 
Improvement Trust (LIFT) initiative in Primary Care.  Public Money and 
Management. 
 
Conference Presentations 
 
Fitzsimmons D., Beck M., Toms S., Brown S., Mannion R. and Lunt, N. 
"UpLIFTing PFI: does LIFT improve public-private procurement? 
UK Systems Society International Conference, September 2008, Oxford 
University. 
 
Beck M., Fitzsimmons D. and Brown S. Does LIFT improve risk management 
in public-private procurement? 2008 PAC Conference, September 2008, 
York University. 
 
Beck M., Toms S., Greener I., Mannion R., Brown S., Fitzsimmons D. and 
Lunt N. “The role and effectiveness of LIFT in the development of enhanced 
primary care premises and services” SDO Conference, June 2009, 
Birmingham. 
 
ESRC Bid in preparation 
 
Beck M., Toms S., Asenova D., and Bailey S. “Procurement of public sector 
infrastructure: the evolving plurality of methods”  
 
8.4 Research Agenda 
Although this study suggests that LIFT has brought improvements to 
partnership working in the NHS, it also provides evidence that the 
management of these public private partnerships still presents unique 
challenges.   Specifically, there seem to be a number of gaps in the 
understanding of local partnerships and their economic, social and financial 
implications that warrant further investigation.  These include: 
 
The role of health care investment in urban and economic regeneration: 
This study has highlighted the potential benefits of embedding LIFT 
investment in a broader regeneration context (see, e.g., section 7.2), 
alongside the concerns of several stakeholder that these synergies have 
hitherto not been adequately exploited.  We therefore suggest that there is 
case for studying in detail a small number of LIFT schemes where there is 
evidence of broader regeneration activities together with Local Authority 
buy-in, with a view to identifying the factors which have facilitated these 
processes.   Where possible these studies should identify quantifiable gains 
in terms of employment generation, training and improvements in social 
indicators, together with an assessment of levels of investments (i.e. gauge 
the effectiveness of these activities along a number of indicators).  It is 
expected that such an analysis, which could be conducted in collaboration 
with organizations such as CHP who already have experience in this area, 
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will lead to the identification of example or pathfinder projects in this field 
which could serve as a guidepost to other PCTs. 
 
Effective health care investment in rural areas:  This study has highlighted 
potential deficiencies of LIFT in terms of meeting rural investment needs 
(see, e.g., 7.3).  In particular there was evidence that LIFTCo-s found it 
more difficult to provide commercially viable and joined-up solutions in 
these areas.  Additionally, our analysis suggested that this may have led to 
a situation where LIFT-type investments achieve less VfM in these important 
and frequently ‘under-doctored’ locales.  We would therefore suggest that 
there is a need to investigate, perhaps in conjunction with key policy 
stakeholders, alternative approaches for primary care investment for these 
areas. This could initially take the form of a literature review which would 
then branch into interviews and focus groups with key policy makers.  
Additionally, this analysis could investigate experiences from other 
European countries, and in particular Scandinavia, with a view to learning 
potential lessons.    
 
Scale and value for money in primary care investment: During our 
interviews a number of stakeholders emphasized the importance of scale for 
achieving VfM in LIFT projects and PPPs in general (compare e.g., case 
study 7.4 with 7.5).  In particular there were suggestions that a LIFTCo 
would benefit from operating within large PCTs and/or from operating 
across several PCTs.  While this proposition is economically plausible, there 
is at this stage no evidence with regard to the optimal size of these 
operations.   We would therefore suggest an investigation of the financial 
and VfM performance of LIFT schemes (possibly in conjunction with 
stakeholder satisfaction) across different sized undertakings with a view to 
identifying potential relationships.  This analysis could follow the template 
established section 6 of this study and, like the previous two suggestions, 
create potentially valuable insights for the operation of Express LIFT.    
 
Enhanced decision criteria for the procurement of PPP facilities and services 
(fit for purpose procurement):  As one of its key findings, this study has 
been able to document a widespread sense of unease and uncertainty 
among LIFT stakeholders with regard to the VfM aspects of LIFT schemes.  
This uncertainty typically manifested itself in statements where informants 
described these facilities as costly and then highlighted potential advantages 
in terms of the quality of buildings, joined-up working, intangibles or 
improved maintenance (see, e.g., 4.2.6 and 4.3.6).  Additionally several 
informants suggested that the VfM of LIFT projects had been adversely 
affected by over-specification (see 7.5.6).  This situation must be 
considered as highly unsatisfactory from a decision-making and 
procurement perspective.  At this stage there is a substantial literature on 
shadow pricing and related models which allow decision makers to 
quantitatively assess the benefits of such solutions vis a vis alternatives 
(see, e.g., Riddington, Beck and Cowie, 2004 for an application to health 
and safety).  Similarly, such decision-making processes would benefit from 
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a clear understanding of what levels of maintenance are desirable and how 
these should be priced.  We would therefore suggest that a study be 
undertaken which firstly surveys the literature on available pricing models, 
and secondly develops a template or guide which identifies how these can 
be applied to the LIFT and PPP context at different stages of the 
procurement process (see, e.g. the flowcharts developed in connection with 
PFI procurement by Akintoye and Beck et al. 2001).  This analysis could be 
supplemented by a potentially more complex survey of the literature on 
measurable benefits of facilities and service improvements to health which, 
in turn, could be factored into these costing models.   
 
Enhancing the financial transparency of LIFT/PPP:  In line with the previous 
point, this study has highlighted an urgent need for the enhancement of the 
financial monitoring and governance of LIFTCo-s (see section 6).  As a final 
suggestion, the team would therefore advocate a three-pronged research 
agenda.  Firstly, there is, in our view, an urgent need to retroactively 
investigate the financial performance of all LIFTCo-s (for which such data 
can be obtained) with a view toward disseminating this information to PCTs 
and relevant DoH stakeholders.  This analysis could largely follow the 
example set out in section 6, and although time consuming, would provide 
valuable insights to policy makers at various levels.  Secondly, there is a 
case for developing a financial monitoring template which would allow 
individual PCTs to assess LIFTCo cash flows on an ongoing basis.  Thirdly, 
there might be a case for a broader research agenda which would review 
the existing financial governance of PPPs with a view toward creating 
enhanced frameworks of accountability and financial control.  
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Addendum - Express LIFT 
Following the completion of four waves of LIFT schemes in 2007 (the last 
project being South West Hampshire LIFT with a preferred bidder date of 
1/08/2007), the DoH announced in 2008 its intention to replace LIFT by its 
new Express LIFT framework.   This framework envisaged the creation of a 
list of approved private sector partners, each of whom were expected to 
have had a demonstrated a track-record of delivering the services required 
of a successful LIFT Company.  Following the creation of an initial shortlist 
of 14 companies, the DoH announced on March 16 2009 a list of seven 
successful bidders.   
 
One of the stated objectives of Express LIFT is to accelerate the 
procurement process and reduce costs to bidders.  There is an expectation 
that the new process will cut the length of time for completion on bids to 
four to five months, with local procurements being completed within about 
four to six weeks rather than two years as is currently the case.  The policy 
objective falls closely in line with statements by both key informants and 
user interviewees of this study that the existing LIFT process was 
excessively bureaucratic, complex and time consuming.   It also mirrors the 
statements by some senior key informants (who had been interviewed in 
2007) that there was an intention to simplify the procurment process and 
that there was a perception that the large number of companies operting 
within LIFT prevented the creation of a critical mass of health investors  
([PUK representative], 4.2.4). 
 
Following the format of section 4 (‘Stakeholder Views’), this addendum 
briefly examines the views of five key informants on the creation of LIFT.  
Three of these informants participated in face-to-face interviews, while two 
of them took part in telephone interviews.  All interviews were conducted 
towards the end of March or beginning of April 2009 and professionally 
transcribed.  The five informants included a senior representative from 
Partnership UK [PUK representative], three representatives of Community 
Health Partnerships [CHP representative 1,2 and 3], and the CEO of a 
LIFTCo [LIFTCo CEO] whose parent company had been selected as Express 
LIFT bidder. 
 
In terms of thematic focus these key informant interviews focused on two 
questions.  The first of these concerned the issue as to why LIFT was 
introduced, and, more specifically, whether this policy measure arose from 
failures of the existing LIFT model.  The second batch of questions sought to 
elicit informants’ views with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of 
the new Express LIFT model. 
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With regard to the reasons for the introduction of Express LIFT, one of the 
CHP representatives [CHP representative 1] noted that this was largely due 
to the failure of some LIFT companies to develop schemes in a timely 
manner: 
 
“Historically when you set up a LIFT Company and you have gone to 
tender for your private sector partner through OJU process they have to 
present, on the back of two sample schemes.  Now to be honest there are 
some LIFT Companies which still have not built their sample schemes.  
They have gone off and done other things and the sample schemes are 
still hanging around.  But the private sector partner had to present on how 
they would deliver two sample schemes, real schemes.  Now one of the 
major issues of LIFT is how long it takes to set a LIFT Company up, so you 
are talking up to two years to set up a LIFT Company which frankly does 
not suit a lot of people’s agenda.  What they decided therefore is to 
develop a new model of how you set up a LIFT Company.  The LIFT entity 
itself is no different at all, it is exactly the same as the first four waves.  
But what is going to happen now is that a PCT do an independent OJU to 
go out to request a private sector partner to come in to facilitate the LIFT 
Company.”   
 
However, when the same informant was asked further whether this should 
be interpreted as failure of the LIFT system, he rejected this notion and 
argued that Express LIFT had come about because of changes in health care 
and, in particular, a need to prioritise service needs and procure facilities 
quickly: 
 
“Express LIFT, going back to the relationships thing, now affects where we 
are in terms of service needs and primary care which is where we weren’t 
when LIFT was developed.  So, and I absolutely believe in this, LIFT is not 
broken. LIFT has not ever been broken and Express LIFT has not come 
about because of the faults in LIFT. It has come about because actually 
Healthcare’s evolved in the last 10 years.”   
 
Taking a somewhat different view, another CHP representative [CHP 
representative 2] agreed with the notion that the principal purpose of LIFT 
was to accelerate procurement, but argued further that Express LIFT was 
intended to shift risks to the private sector and, in so doing, make 
procurement easier for PCTs: 
  
“With Express LIFT, because there are no initial schemes, the private 
sector has to come in with its own money.  But the LIFTCo has to deliver.  
Therefore there is no income until delivery; unlike in LIFT where there is a 
definite scheme early on. This is a big risk for the private sector. … It also 
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shifts the front end work to the DoH, but puts the onus on the PCTs to 
make the selection. The private sector makes the contract with the DoH 
and is then able to participate in local competition.” 
 
This line of argument was further elaborate on by the third CHP 
representative [CHP representative 3] who suggested that Express made it 
easier for new and inexperienced PCTs to become LIFT partners: 
 
“Express LIFT probably makes it easier for less experienced PCTs to come 
in. But I think there is still an information gap and perhaps also a 
management training gap.  So what is coming through for us is the 
continued need for more information, more training of people,… 
benchmarking information and also just day to day hands on support.” 
 
This views were closely mirrored by the Partnership UK representative [PUK 
representative] who argued that the principal advantage of the new Express 
LIFT was not just that it made procurement faster, but that it significantly 
reduced the administrative burden faced by PCTs: 
 
“If you are a PCT, you have to have an SSDP.  For Express LIFT you do not 
need a final SSDP, but you do need a draft SSDP.  This is because the first 
job of the LIFTCo is to finalise the SSDP with the PCT; to bring it all 
together, what the estate looks like now, what is the commissioning 
strategy going forward. LIFT should be able to pull that together once you 
have seen what the gap is.” 
 
Implicit to this analysis was the assumption that the joint development of 
the SSDP by the public and private sectors would facilitate strategic thinking 
which had been lacking in some LIFTs that had become overly focused on 
estates development.  This need to refine the approach taken by PCTs to 
PPP was further highlighted by this informant when he explained the Pre 
Qualification Questionnaire requirement which now replaced requirements 
for a full SSDP: 
 
“If a PCT wants to do Express LIFT, they do a Pre Qualification 
Questionnaire.   They are asked to demonstrate that they have the 
capability and capacity to do LIFT. One of the problems with LIFT was 
PCTs not understanding or not putting resources in, so the PQQ addresses 
that, makes PCTs answer. Are youe capable of running a LIFTCo, do  you 
have resources and capacity.  It is not a business case, but a statement of 
readiness. It is not just about a £20 million building.” 
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Needless to say there could an argument that the new PQQ requirements 
itself creates a new layer of bureaucracy, or, alternatively, that the absence 
of a full SSDP puts the private sector in an overly strong position vis a vis 
the public sector in determining future needs and projects. 
 
Notwithstanding these issues, the PUK representative felt that the new 
Express represented a major improvement for PCTs: 
 
“So, the PCT demonstrate readiness.  They launch a competition amongst 
framework partners; they will get all the information. The national 
competition evaluated efficacy, specifically whether the private sector 
bidders are capable of delivering. The local competition evaluates the 
degree of local fit, which one do we like? Bidders then tailor their national 
submission, 25% is on ‘We’re the best for you …’ where they demonstrate 
local fit. The end point is to select, then enter into standard 
documentation, and then they become a normal LIFTCo.” 
 
As far as the issue of flaws of the previous LIFT system were concerned, the 
same informant was remarkably frank in stating that some LIFTs had failed 
to deliver to expectations and that much of this was related to an excessive 
focus on new buildings: 
 
“LIFT is not delivering what people want, and it is being blamed for the 
short-comings of buildings being delivered. There is a contradiction 
between where a big building = more money, small building = less money, 
when actually a small building = better relationship.  … The idea is to get 
LIFTCo entwined with the PCT at an early stage, to be proactive rather 
than reactive. Presentationally it is a problem, administratively its not.  
The point is to pick companies that have demonstrated their ability so far.” 
 
While highlighting the potential advantages of Express LIFT in terms of 
strategic planning within a framework of reduced bureaucracy, the 
Partnership UK representative [PUK representative] also suggested that 
Express LIFT was likely to encourage novice PCT’s to engage with PPPs: 
  
“There is no mandate that PCTs will have to use Express LIFT.  But we will 
be saying to the SHA your PCTs have five year plans. They all have 
building requirements, how are they going to meet that if they don’t use 
Express LIFT?” 
 
This view was closely aligned with the earlier statements of one of the CHP 
representatives [CHP representative 3] who had argued that one of the 
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principal advantages of Express LIFT was that it made easier for 
inexperienced PCTs to participate in this procurement process.  
 
Interestingly, when asked about the key advantages of Express LIFT, the 
LIFTCo CEO also highlighted the possibility that the new framework would 
encourage a more strategic approach which would favour smaller solutions 
(a view which was obviously closely related to the concerns which had been 
expressed independently by the PUK representative):    
 
“We have said and we continue to say, particularly in the context of 
Express LIFT, that we think that the LIFTCo-s, and PCTs more particularly, 
should be allowed to procure smaller simpler buildings and to use smaller 
simpler framework which again will be cheaper to the public sector.” 
 
Further to this, the same private sector informant noted that another 
advantage of Express LIFT was the fact that it would allow for a reduction in 
approval processes and, in particular, present the ‘double handing’ of 
approvals:  
 
“There seems to be quite a big overlap in the approvals process between 
what the PCT are allowed to approve and what they have to put up to the 
SHA.  There is an awful lot of double handing within the approvals process 
on the public sector side which takes a lot of time, unnecessarily I think.  
Addressing this is another advantage of Express LIFT.  Those are 
advantages of Express LIFT.” 
 
Despite the diverging emphasis of these informants, there was an 
underlying consensus that Express LIFT had the potential of reducing 
bureaucracy and complexity around the LIFT procurement process, while at 
the same time creating space for strategic, and where appropriate small-
scale solutions. Additionally, there was an expectation, particularly among 
informants advising the public sector, that Express LIFT would encourage 
novice PCTs to engage in this type of procurement.   
 
These perspectives appear to fall in line with government policies vis a vis 
the current economic climate, which favour public spending as a means for 
overcoming the ongoing recession.  However, both the PUK representative 
and the private sector representative also implied that Express LIFT made a 
contribution to future sustainability in that it created space for strategic, and 
potentially small-scale solutions, where these were appropriate.  This idea 
was made explicit by the private sector representative [LIFTCo CEO] who 
noted that Express LIFT had to evolve as a flexible and fit-for-purpose 
means of procurement: 
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“The Finance Directors of the PCTs now are looking ahead and expecting 
tighter public finances so they are.  Their own responsibilities are that they 
do not want to go into something unless they are absolutely sure it will 
help them and I honestly I genuinely think that a successful Express 
LIFTCo can make a major contribution to helping to rationalise PCT 
infrastructure in an environment where there are difficult public finances. 
… I think actually it is a really good format for the next few years and I 
just hope that people recognise that.”  
 
Although there was a possibility that, given this selection of informants, 
there would be a tendency to endorse rather than criticize Express LIFT, the 
team also enquired about the expectations informants had with regard to 
the future success of LIFT.   Interestingly this question elicited a number of 
responses which suggested that the switch-over from LIFT to Express LIFT 
would not be unproblematic.   
 
This view was expressed, among others, by one of the CHP representatives 
[CHP representative 2] who suggested that the new system would be a 
‘shock’ to those who had become accustomed to the earlier approach: 
 
“Initially, what the PCTs were doing was what the partner should do.  They 
were doing all the work in terms of the spec, then evaluating the private 
sector to see if they could do the work they had specified.  But really, we 
want the private sector to help do the spec. We will get that now because 
the design/spec will not be done until the private sector is on board.  It is 
a shock for the market, they only get to be evaluated on methods of 
turning needs into a plan and then into a project. … It is lower cost but I 
do not think it will be any easier.” 
 
This view was echoed by the PUK representative who suggested that there 
was no guarantee of success for Express LIFT, particularly because the new 
scheme placed new demand on PCTs: 
 
“Some of Express LIFT is utopian.  There is no guarantee it will make it 
better. But there is good logic behind it. It is in the lap of the PCTs. It will 
look like this type of procurement has failed if PCTs do not do it. We need 
to get the SHAs to do some of the work, look at the broader questions. We 
need to encourage localities to do some of the thinking for themselves. We 
will push it through gently to make sure it works. Half the SHAs have PCTs 
who are interested.” 
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Similarly the private sector representative [LIFTCo CEO] noted that there 
was a need for effectively communicating to potential users, the wide 
ranging changes which Express LIFT had brought: 
 
 “All I am questioning is whether PCTs know the substantial changes that … 
Express LIFT brings.  This is an internal communication thing throughout 
the NHS because without that the PCTs will not realize what is happening.  
They will just assume that it is the same:  and oh its long drawn out, and 
got all these big legal documents and takes a long time and they are 
expensive and all that sort of stuff.  … I think they have addressed all of 
those in the Express LIFT and I am not sure whether they have 
communicated that to the PCTs at large. I think they have tried but that is 
going to be the crux, I think.”  
 
Following the format of section 4, these interviews were imported as text 
fragements into the DICTION software package where they were analysed 
under the under the “politics” setting with the sub-setting “political 
debates”.  While this analysis did not produce any clearly discernable 
patterns, the mix of positive and negative scores for non-composite 
variables together with two significantly negative scores for the composite 
variable ‘uncertainty’ indicated that there was significant indecision and 
insecurity about the subject matter among informants.  This pattern is 
perhaps not surprising, given that the informants were asked to comment 
on potential failures of LIFT as a cause for the development of LIFT express.  
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Table A.1, DICTION output, Key informants, ‘Express LIFT’ text 
segments, standardized scores and significance 
 
Interviewee Praise Satisfaction Inspiration Accomplishment Certainty+ 
PUK 
representative  
 
 
0.53 
 
-0.23 
 
-0.27 
 
0.97 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
1 
 
-0.52 
 
1.19* 
 
-0.51 
 
-0.31 
 
0 
CHP 
representative 
2 
 
0.33 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.86 
 
0.38 
 
-* 
CHP 
representative 
3 
 
-0.19 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.54 
 
0.11 
 
-* 
LIFTCo  
CEO 
 
 
0.08 
 
-0.52 
 
-0.88 
 
-0.65 
 
0 
+ As composite variable ‘certainty’ produces spurious standard scores and requires varying 
significance thresholds, therefore only the sign and significance are recorded (0=within .05 confidence 
interval, +=above .05 confidence interval, -=below .05 confidence interval).   
 
The purpose of this addendum obviously was not to assess the validity of 
Express LIFT as a policy instrument from the perspective of the findings of 
this study.  Rather, the principal goal of this section was to identify the 
drivers which had motivated the introduction of Express LIFT and to place 
these into a broader context of LIFT and PPP based procurement.  Based on 
this remit, there is ample evidence that Express LIFT presents an instance 
of policy learning whereby aspects of the existing policy framework have 
been modified in order to ensure alternative short-term and long-term 
outcomes (such as an increased deal flow from novice PCTs and an 
enhanced level of strategic partnership between the pubic and private 
sectors).   
 
Notwithstanding these caveats, it can perhaps be noted that Express LIFT in 
its current format does not necessarily address all of the weaknesses of LIFT 
such as the lack of financial transparency or the fact that commercial 
viability of these schemes can be adversely affected by external factors such 
as the rurality of a location, lack of affordable land and insufficient GP 
demand.   
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Scientific Summary of the Project 
 
Scientific summary 
 
 
Background: 
The NHS LIFT initiative offers PCTs and other health care providers an 
opportunity to develop enhanced primary care premises and services in 
collaboration with private sector partners. Previous research on PFI 
procurement in the NHS, and NHS trust performance in general, has 
highlighted the crucial role of a range of cultural and behavioural factors in 
determining organisational effectiveness, the ability to successfully cope with 
innovation and the ability to achieve organisational objectives.  
 
Aim: 
This project seeks to explore the key cultural, behavioural, organisational and 
processual aspects which influence the success, or otherwise, of a LIFT project, 
and to assess the extent to which LIFT provides an effective means for 
enhancing primary care premises and services. 
 
 
Method: 
The study consists of 5 interlocking strands: 
1) A document analysis focussing on information relating to LIFT projects, 
such as business cases, planning documentation, contractual information. 
2) A series of key informant interviews involving high level staff from the 
DoH, PFH, the 4Ps, Treasury and other decision makers that have been 
involved in the design, development and implementation of LIFT as a policy 
instrument. 
3) Process focused case – unspecific interviews (ca. 30) with a broad range of 
participants in completed and planned LIFT projects, including public sector 
clients, Local Authorities and OSC representatives; private sector 
representatives; GPs, clinical and support staff. 
4) Outcome – focused case specific interviews (ca. 10) investigating the 
experiences of the full range of participants in completed LIFT projects. These 
detailed case studies are likely to elicit a range of relevant information from 
interviewees and will cover early as well as recently completed LIFT projects. 
5) A series of case specific user surveys which will gauge the views of patients 
using and staff working at LIFT facilities. These surveys are likely to focus on 
those facilities which are part of the detailed case studies and will be conducted 
face-to-face by the project researchers. 
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Implications for the NHS: 
The completed work will provide: 
1) A mapping of appropriate performance measures through the life cycle of LIFT 
projects. 
2) An assessment of the cost effectiveness, stakeholder satisfaction and 
value for money achieved by LIFT projects. 
3) The identification of key factors which contribute to the success or otherwise 
of LIFT projects. 
4) Recommendations with regard to Best Practice in LIFT procurement, 
management, monitoring and overall governance, and with regard to desirable 
future developments in these areas. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Original Specification of Activities 
 
The original project proposal envisaged the following plan of work: 
 
1) A document analysis: This part of the study will focus on two sets of 
information. First, it will analyse the available literature on public private 
partnerships with a special focus on cultural conflicts, success factors and Best 
Practice in governance. A comprehensive literature based search employing 
systematic approaches will be conducted to identify potentially relevant literature. 
Secondly, it will focus on document based information relating to LIFT projects, 
such as business cases, planning documentation and contractual information. 
Conceptually this part, and the consecutive parts, of the study will rely heavily on 
'grounded theory'. Grounded theory uses inductive reasoning, as opposed to 
deductive principles, and is aimed at generating, and not proving, theory. In 
grounded theory, investigations do not start with a set of hypotheses, but with 
observations aimed at identifying existing practice. These observations are 
used to formulate working hypotheses that describe them. These hypotheses, 
in turn, are then compared with the literature.  As a first step of this study, 
organisations involved in LIFT projects will be approached and asked to 
participate in this research project. They will be supplied with detailed 
information with regard to the purpose and methodology of this study as well 
as information with regard to its sponsor. Consecutively senior members of 
LIFTCo organisations will be asked to supply documents with regard to the 
financial, organisational and physical characteristics of their projects. This 
initial collection of information will be used to familiarise the research staff with 
the variety of LIFT projects which have already been implemented or are 
currently being implemented. As such, it will serve as basis for the key 
informant interviews as well as the case specific and case unspecific interviews 
and user surveys which will be conducted at later stages in the study. It is 
likely that some LIFTCo organisations will withhold some information due to 
issues of commercial confidentiality. However, it is expected that a close 
collaboration will the DoH, PFH, PCTs and LAs will ensure the success of this 
stage of the analysis. In any case the research team will make every effort to 
produce, as comprehensively as possible, a database at the early stages of the 
projects. 
 
2) A series of key informant interviews involving high level staff from the 
Department of Health (DoH), Partnerships for Health (PfH), the 4Ps, Treasury, 
GP representative groups (e.g. RCGPs, MHS alliance), Unions and employer 
organisation representatives, senior representatives of patients and users and 
other decision makers that have been involved in the design and development 
of LIFT as a policy instrument. It is expected that access to relevant 
interviewees can be relatively easily gained once the goals and sponsors of this 
project are clearly identified. It is envisaged that approximately a total of 10 
interviews will be undertaken. 
 
3) Process focused case unspecific interviews with a broad range of participants 
in completed and planned LIFT projects. Previous research by the principal 
applicant on PFI has highlighted the usefulness of case unspecific interviews. It 
is envisaged that a total of approximately 30 interviews will be undertaken with 
a range of stakeholder who have been involved in LIFT projects and who will 
have been identified during the document analysis stage. Under Activity 3 
interviews will be conducted with staff at all levels of the managerial 
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organisational hierarchy (senior, middle, junior) and across a range of 
professional groupings, including public sector clients, Local Authorities (LA) 
and OSC representatives; private sector representatives; representatives of 
sponsoring banks; representative of local acute trusts; GPs, clinical and support 
staff. 
 
4) Outcome focused case specific interviews investigating the experiences of 
the full range of participants specific in completed LIFT projects. These 
detailed case studies are likely to draw on a mix of information from interviews 
and will cover early as well as recently completed LIFT projects. Based on the 
previous activities, a purposeful sample of ca 10 LIFTCo projects will be 
selected on the basis of performance for in-depth analysis. Approximately half 
of these will be from what appear to be 'high' performing projects and half will 
be from 'low' performing projects. Performance will be assessed on the basis 
of soft intelligence on a range of factors including LIFTCo self rating, 
satisfaction of leasing GPs etc. which will be gathered in activity 1. Under 
Activity 4 a similar range of staff to Activity 3 will be interviewed (three to four 
staff in each organisation). However, the interview questions will relate 
specifically to the selected projects with a special emphasis being placed on 
issues of partnership working during various stages of the project (bidding, 
selection, pre contract completion, post contract completion). 
 
5) Financial document analysis. This activity will focus on: i) internal budget 
and financial planning documents of PCTs, published financial statements and 
annual returns of private sector providers (examining disclosures of the 
creation of special purpose vehicle companies, bond issues and investment 
gradings, insurance arrangements, contracts, etc.); ii) an analysis of stock 
market data for private sector providers to examine proportionate changes in 
financial risk as a result of diversification into LIFT projects; and iii) 
comparisons with similar investments of similar risk conducted in a purely 
private sector context, nationally and internationally. Where it is not possible 
to obtain full information due to commercial confidentiality, we will supplement 
our analysis with structured and semi structured interviews. A sample of ca 10 
LIFTCo projects will be selected and a person (financial planner) will be 
interviewed in each organisation. Questions will focus on perceptions of cost 
and risk from the point of view of the PCT, for example through comparisons 
to the terms and conditions of equivalent commercial loans. Additionally, we 
expect that we will be able to supplement the analysis of financial documents 
with a broader analysis of PCT strategy documents. This analysis will focus on 
the role specific LIFT projects play in a PCT's long term plan, the long term 
financial and strategic implications of PCT involvement in LIFT and the overall 
strategic opportunities which the pursuit of LIFT has opened or closed for 
PCTs. 
 
6a) A series of case specific user surveys which will gauge the views of patients 
using, and staff working at, LIFT facilities. A sample of ca 10 organisations will 
be selected and 40 users and 10 staff will be surveyed in each organisation. 
These surveys are likely to focus on those facilities which are part of the 
detailed case studies and will be conducted face to face by the project 
researchers. It is envisaged that these surveys are carried out at each of the 
case study sites. Separate survey instruments will developed for patients, 
clinical staff working at the respective LIFT site as well as non clinical staff. The 
survey will take the form of structured interviews using questionnaires with 
room for open comments. Staff will be selected from staff lists on the basis of 
job role. GPs will be asked to invite patients to take part in the study. 
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Addendum (6b): Developmental Case Studies (modification of Activities 2, 3 and 
4). As a modification to the research strategies listed under Activities 2, 3, and 
4, an attempt will be made to gain consent from 2 or more LIFT project groups 
to conduct developmental case studies of projects which are currently being 
established. These two developmental case studies, would take a special place 
among the 10 or so main case studies, in that an effort would be made to 
monitor, over time, the issues and problems arising for various actors, in the 
creation and mobilisation of the network. In order to achieve this, a number of 
methodological approaches would be employed, including asking relevant 
parties to keep written or audio diaries. In terms of phasing, there would be an 
obvious need for these special case studies to start early, perhaps in parallel 
with the initial high level staff informant interviews and the case unspecific 
interviews. One or two staff (programme directors/managers) will be selected 
in each organisation.  It has to be pointed out that the inclusion of this activity 
will 
depend entirely on the consent of research partners and that no guarantee can 
be given that this activity can be fully implemented. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Literature Reviewed by Type of Output 
 Group 1: Empirical Findings 
 
Ref. No. 
 
Author 
 
Date 
 
Title Type of paper
 
Method 
 
Location 
 
Key findings / opinions 
1 Paxton, W. 
and 
Lissauer, R. 
2000 Partnerships in 
primary care 
Book 
chapter 
Mixed -survey 
and interviews, 
case study 
National This text describes previous premises 
reimbursement programme. It recognises the 
changes in GP view of property: premises 
were part of their retirement fund but 
ownership is now seen as a burden and there 
is a risk of negative equity. GP demand for 
part-time work and flexible career patterns 
now makes PPP more attractive although the 
inflexible contracts do not contain break-out 
clauses making them more problematic, 
especially for GPs approaching retirement. 
Regarding the build, the text notes that 
private sector developers should bring their 
knowledge of the local property market and 
expertise in designing primary care facilities. 
It is acknowledged that there is a good 
opportunity to raise revenue through part- 
rental of premises. Day-use only buildings 
have limited opportunity for hotel services 
characteristic of standard PFI. There is a risk 
of a LIFT project being driven by the profit 
motive of the private sector - especially in 
areas of high rents - rather than health needs. 
Case study findings – administration costs 
are higher. Staff report 50% of their time is 
spent on maintenance issues. There is a lack 
of alternatives to PFI and little evaluation of 
PFI in primary care/hospitals. 
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2 Aldred, R.E. 2007 Closed policy 
networks: 
broken chains 
of 
communication 
and the stories 
behind an 
'entrepreneurial 
ploicy': The 
case of NHS 
LIFT 
Journal 
article 
Mixed - case 
study and 
interviews 
Not identified This article notes that the exclusivity clause in 
LIFT was demanded by the private sector. It 
acknowledges the duration of agreements (20 
years) and the encouragement for the NHS to 
maximise profit. It recognises that LIFT may 
privatise public assets, that publicly-owned 
sites are easier to access, refurbishment is 
less attractive to investors as it is less 
profitable and that LIFT represents a shift in 
government policy. It acknowledges that LIFT 
provides flexibility for finance but not service 
provision; it is the only option, bureaucratic 
and excludes tenants from a slow process. 
Any modifications to the building are identified 
as being expensive. It recognises that PCTs 
are taking on the headlease and offering 
flexible terms to GPs. It also acknowledges 
the high rental costs associated with LIFT and 
a perceived inability to criticise the LIFT 
procurement process. 
3 Aldred, R.E. 2008 Managing risk 
and regulation 
within new 
local health 
economies: 
The case of 
NHS LIFT 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: Case 
study, 
interviews, non- 
participant 
observation, 
document 
analysis 
Not identified A minority of GPs rented premises from 
specialist landlords before LIFT. LIFT projects 
are now under way in 50% of PCTs. This 
paper provides some description of the LIFT 
exclusivity clause. Civil servants are criticised 
for stalling service improvements through 
their refusal to accept risk. PPP created a 
market for risk which is now a tradable 
commodity. LIFT was designed to pass on 
risk. Holding companies transfer risk from the 
SPV to the sub-contractors or suppliers. 
Banks are identified as being highly risk- 
averse. A PCT may risk taking on headlease 
and thereby provide flexibility to GPs. The 
paper identifies that refinancing had not been 
considered, that there have been public 
protests about the closure of surgeries and 
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       poor transport links are creating problems. As 
the private sector has limited liability they can 
chose to walk away from a project so the 
public sector is placed in a weaker bargaining 
position. High rents in LIFT building are 
making it difficult to find retail tenants. It is 
recognised that a leisure component to a 
LIFT project is very popular as this provides 
guaranteed long-term revenue. It is 
suggested that NHS staff fail to feel part of 
LIFTCo. Private companies are viewed as 
having the power without any of the 
responsibility. It is recognised that local 
companies are being squeezed out of the 
process. 
4 Andalo, D. 2003 One stop to 
cure all ills 
Journal 
article 
Unspecified 
(although 
included 
interviews) 
Newcastle, 
Cheltenham, 
Eastbourne. 
A review of one-stop health care centres from 
the perspective of academics, GPs and 
managers in one-stop centres, private sector 
companies, NHS Alliance. This paper identifies 
the need to incorporate the views of 
users, prevent repetition of past mistakes and 
increase the sense of community and patient 
benefits. It recognises the bureaucracym 
complexity and expense of LIFT. 
5 Corney, R. 1994 Experiences of 
first wave 
general 
practice 
fundholders in 
South East 
Thames 
Regional 
Health 
Authority 
Journal 
article 
Postal 
questionnaire 
South East 
Thames 
Regional 
Health 
Authority 
A review of GP fund holding practices in SE 
Thames RHA. Several practices had 
developed outreach consultant, 
physiotherapy and audiology clinics. Patients 
preferred being seen in familiar surroundings, 
spent less time and money on travel and it 
facilitated communication between 
consultants and staff. Initial problems 
included antagonism and provider resistance, 
poor information. The paper identified the 
need for a VfM study of these clinics. 
6 Dix, A 2001 Delayed LIFT- 
off 
Journal 
article 
Telephone and 
face-to-face 
Southampton, 
Birmingham, 
This paper identified the difficulty in finding 
suitable sites, the time needed to go through 
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     interviews Walsall, 
Berkshire, 
Tyneside and 
London 
the planning process (reducing time available 
to GPs to deliver patient care), concern about 
how relocation may affect patient lists, doubt 
whether inducements sufficient to attract 
allied health workers to relocate from high 
street and the lack of evidence to support 
one-stop centres being what public/health 
professionals want or providing better 
services. Respondents wanted control over 
sub-letting/tenancy. It was identified that 500 
new health care centres equates to relocation 
of 10,000 of 27,000 GPs and approximately 
17.5m patients in England. 
7 Douglas, 
C.H. 
2004 A prospective 
health impact 
assessment to 
progress the 
sustainable 
futures of a 
city: The case 
of Salford, UK 
Journal 
article 
Mixed - key 
informant 
interviews and 
focus group 
sessions, 
quantitative - 
review of 
published data 
Salford An assessment of the potential impact of 
proposed changes to health and social care in 
Salford. It identifies impacts from a biological, 
personal/family/lifestyle, social/economic, 
physical environment, public services and 
public policy perspective. Concern is voiced 
that the private sector may exploit project and 
local labour force to make excess profits 
which would be removed from Salford and the 
new health centre will generate more traffic. 
8 Douglas, 
C.H., 
Higgins, A., 
Dabbs, C. 
and 
Walbank, M. 
2004 Health impact 
assessment for 
the sustainable 
futures of 
Salford 
Journal 
article 
Mixed - 
qualitative: key 
informant 
interviews and 
focus group 
sessions, 
quantitative - 
review of 
published data 
Salford An assessment of the potential impact of 
proposed changes to health and social care 
in Salford. It identifies impacts from a 
biological, personal/family/lifestyle, 
social/economic, physical environment, public 
services and public policy perspective. There 
is a preference for investments that will affect 
general wellbeing rather than provision of 
better health care, and a view that they 
should consider social inclusion (by gender, 
culture, ethnicity), partners should identify 
employment opportunities and train locals to 
access them (construction and operational 
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       phases), use local supply chains, consider 
the range of building uses and minimise 
impact of road traffic. 
9 Forrest, E. 2003 The generation 
aim 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: Case 
study (includes 
interviews) 
Wythenshawe Describes the Wythenshawe LIFT project - 
£20m to be spent on former theatre and 
community venue. Swimming pool and sports 
hall to be refurbished. New gym added. 
Library to be refurbished with more 
computers. GP surgery to be replaced with 
£4m one-stop shop incorporating health, 
social care and therapy. Will provide facilities 
for additional services (listed). Users will be 
given exercise 'prescriptions'. Council grant of 
£1.2m p.a. means prices will be comparable 
to other local authority facilities across 
Manchester. 
10 Foster, M. 2003 LIFT off or left 
down? 
Journal 
article 
Unspecified 
(although 
includes 
interviews) 
E. London Description of proposed one-stop shop under 
LIFT from perspective of GP Committee 
(GPC), GPs moving into the LIFT building, 
Local Medical Committee, Partnerships for 
Health. The GPC is concerned that LIFT may 
become only mechanism for premises 
development. GPs are concerned about the 
lack of control and reduced time for patients. 
The LIFT process is acknowledged as being 
time consuming and may draw patients away 
from GPs in poor local premises leading to 
greater disparity. It was also recognised that 
many GPs invest in property for their 
retirement (a potential lifetime commitment). 
11 Gilbert, H. 2005 Supersize me Journal 
article 
Mixed: Case 
study (includes 
interviews) 
Wigan, 
Barnsley 
Describes the introduction of two super- 
surgeries. Regular meetings held with service 
providers to create ownership. Layout and 
inclusive nature of centres creates sense of 
community spirit. Services being delivered 
locally reducing travel time for patients. llows 
better understanding of different services 
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       (between professionals). Better 
communication - less scope for 
misunderstandings. 
12 Gilbert, H. 2005 From chip shop 
to one-stop 
super surgery 
Journal 
article 
Unspecified 
(although 
includes 
interviews) 
S. Yorkshire Suggests one-stop centre offers more GPs to 
provide last minute cover if locums 
unavailable and improved communications 
with other care professionals. 
13 Hannay, 
D.R., 
Sunners, 
C.M. and 
Platts, M.T. 
1997 Patients' 
perception of 
primary health 
care in an 
inner-city 
practice 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: 
qualitative - 
questionnaire 
surveys and 
interviews. 
Sheffield Primary care is increasingly being delivered in 
purpose-built buildings. Patients were asked 
to identify the services they would like at their 
centre. Comments included the need for a 
play area, an open-plan reception area 
without glass barriers, a pay phone and 
transportation. It was suggested that adding 
services could create a health centre rather 
than a medical centre. 
14 Holmes, J., 
Capper, G. 
and 
Hudson, G. 
2006 Public Private 
Partnerships in 
the provision of 
healthcare 
premises in the 
UK 
Journal 
article 
Qualitative - 
Key informant 
interviews 
National Article reviews PCTs requesting large one- 
stop premises. It recognises that planning 
proposals presented as ‘mixed use’ are more 
likely to gain planning consent and offers a 
diversified revenue stream. It is suggested 
that developers avoid deprived areas as they 
offer reduced long-term value. In prosperous 
areas developers must compete with 
residential developers. A GP practice offers a 
developer a pre-let development. Including 
residential property includes a risk of property 
market shift or vacant units. With LIFT, 
offering monopoly provider status increases 
interest. Bids require human and financial 
resources (£500k - £1m) with 1 in 3 chance of 
success. The paper recognises the lack of a 
pilot phase and evaluation. It also identifies 
that designs are confidential so there is 
frequently little community input into this part 
of the process. It is suggested that later 
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       phases of LIFT may find it hard to attract 
GPs. It is acknowledged that there is inherent 
information asymmetry in the process   with 
attracted national companies having more 
experience of design and bidding processes. 
The high rents of LIFT buildings are acting as 
a disincentive to prospective tenants and it is 
recognised that it may be hard to 
demonstrate VFM. It is also identified that 
LIFT contractors are making higher Internal 
Rate of Return than traditional PFI. 
15 Hudson, G., 
Capper, G. 
and Holmes, 
J. 
2003 The implication 
of PFI on 
health care 
premises 
engineering 
design, 
durability and 
maintenance 
Journal 
article 
Mixed - 
qualitative: case 
study and 
interviews 
National GP premises are used as investment. In a 
poor property market it was identified that this 
may be disincentive for new GPs. Offering 
projects on a larger scale may attract 
investors. The bidding process is governed by 
European legislation which requires larger 
and experienced bidder. Finance is required 
to support unsuccessful bids. Specifying 
standards and requirements can stifle 
innovation. There is a perception of additional 
cost for sustainability. Having the right to 
review design data by a Trust does not 
transfer all design risk, only that related to 
clinical functionality. Initial capital costs take 
precedence over revenue (which increases 
uncertainty over sustainability). Smaller 
contractors are being squeezed out of the 
process. Larger companies have higher 
overheads which must be covered by costs. 
16 Milne, R.G., 
Torsney, B., 
Gilbert, J. 
and Reid, 
L.E. 
2001 Consultant 
outreach, 1991 
to 1998. An 
update and 
extension on 
its distribution 
in Scotland 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: Review 
of published 
data on 
consultant 
activity and 
postal survey 
Scotland Describes the increase in consultant outreach 
programmes in GP locations between 1991 
and 1998 (particularly general psychiatry). 
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17 Pollock, 
A.M., 
Player, S. 
and 
Godden, S. 
2001 How private 
finance is 
moving primary 
care into 
corporate 
ownership 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: review 
of market 
surveys/ 
commercial 
press/ annual 
reports, 
telephone 
interviews, 
written 
correspondence
National Examined companies providing primary care 
premises - found 8 market leaders engaged 
in over 300 projects. One group offer £20,000 
to each GP partner as an incentive to 
exchange premises for lease-holding, the 
payment being met from the 15-20% profit 
margins built into the project costs. Bundling 
was presented as a way to integrate service 
but the paper claims it provides the 
commercial sector ways of generating 
revenue to underpin their investment. It 
claims bundling decreases access to care 
and services. It is identified that there is little 
information on planning, the implications on 
affordability or accessibility. If commercial 
outlets do not provide required income, the 
paper questions whether funds will be 
diverted from NHS to service debts at the 
expense of patient care. 
18 Ratoff, L., 
Heyes, J. 
and 
Haddleton, 
M. 
1993 Does you don't 
have access? 
Journal 
article 
Mixed 
interviews and 
site visits 
Liverpool Visited 114 premises belonging to 104 GP 
practices: 40 single handed GPs. 22 in LA 
health centres, 12 purpose-built/privately- 
owned, 61 old premises adapted for use, 19 
U/K. Over 25% inaccessible to wheelchairs. 
19 Rice, G. 
Ingram, J. 
and Mizan, 
J. 
2008 Enhancing a 
primary care 
environment: a 
case study of 
effects on 
patients and 
staff in a single 
general 
practice 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: 
qualitative - 
questionnaire 
surveys, 
interviews and 
focus groups. 
Bristol Argues the design of premises can remove 
patient and staff stress and improve health 
care quality. 80% of health care is provided in 
primary care facilities. Satisfaction scores for 
reception, waiting and consulting rooms were 
all higher. The best scores were obtained by 
rooms with a more ‘domestic’ feel. The new 
buildings were perceived to be more patient- 
friendly, quieter, cleaner and tidier, more 
professional and modern with more privacy, 
space and light and they increased 
confidence in the health services provided. 
Health professionals had a higher level of 
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       satisfaction with the buildings than the 
administrative staff. The shared workspace 
and open-plan nature of the spaces were not 
always well received. The paper identified 
issues with the previous buildings and that 
there had been an increase in patients 
following move with an accompanying 
increased workload. 
20 Simpson, V. 2007 Primary and 
community 
care: changing 
faces 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: Review 
of 2 case study 
sites (includes 
interviews) 
Belfast and 
Burnley 
A review of LIFT buildings: generally a 
positive experience for staff and patients. It 
was recognised that there was a need to 
ensure any policy shifts did not make the 
buildings redundant. It was suggested that 
LIFT producing mediocre buildings,  that 
teamwork was required to overcome planning 
issues, rooms were designed to be flexible, 
local users were involved from the outset 
which helped improve way-finding, signage 
and usability and increased their sense of 
ownership (manifested by volunteers 
providing support). 
21 Snell, J. 1995 Three years 
after 
Tomlinson: 
why millions 
are still 
unspent 
Journal 
article 
Unspecified 
(although 
includes 
interviews) 
London Identifies that in early phases some money 
was not spent wisely due to pressure to 
spend from politicians, bids had to be in very 
quickly and mechanisms not in place to 
spend the money. This paper recommends 
slowing down the process and taking it more 
carefully. 
22 Thatcher, 
C., Hand, 
W. and 
Dickson, P. 
2005 Primary care. 
The only way is 
up 
Journal 
article 
Mixed: Case 
study 
Bradford A study of 42 GP practices, 17 single-handed, 
found that most were in unsuitable premises, 
had difficulty in recruiting GPs and nursing 
staff, additional workload created by 
deprivation and a significant number of GPs 
approaching or past retirement age. They 
implemented a GP recruitment and retention 
scheme - a supportive personal development 
programme – and now have 34% of GPs on 
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       the scheme. A new LIFT scheme will replace 
4 practices. It is claimed the others will 
continue to ‘struggle’. 
23 Lewis, R. 
and 
Williams, S. 
1998 LIZ: a legacy 
for London 
Journal 
article 
Based on third 
party study - 
semi-structured 
interviews 
London 65% of £400m LIZ funding was spent on 
improving premises, extra staff and 
computers. 1992 750 GP premises (62%) fell 
below acceptable standard. This fell to 42% 
by December 1997 and will fall to 32% by 
April 1999. The paper recognises that many 
patients prefer single-handed GPs which 
provided better continuity of care. 
24 Mahmood, 
A. 
2004 NHS LIFT: 
Appraisal and 
Evaluation of 
Public Private 
Partnerships in 
Primary Health 
Care 
Masters 
thesis 
Mixed: Analysis 
of quantitative 
financial data 
received from 
the NAO, site 
visits 
Site of 6 
Phase I LIFT 
projects 
Describes the context, aims and 
characteristics of LIFT and a literature review 
of PPP. It identifies the financial models 
developed by individual LIFTCos. No two 
financial models found to be alike but this 
thesis identifies similar key assumptions 
regarding development costs, revenues, cash 
in- and out-flows and financial models. It 
identified Nominal Internal Rates of Return of 
14.5 - 16.13%. It also identifies that each 
LIFTCo specified the residual value of their 
estate. This thesis provides funding analysis 
for 6 LIFTCos and P&L accounts and a 
balance sheet for one LIFTCo. 
25 British 
Medical 
Association 
2006 Survey of GP 
practice 
premises: 
report 
Study 
report 
Postal survey 
questionnaire 
National Reports on a survey issued to 973 GP 
practices across the UK 251 (26%) response 
rate. Found that 60% of GPs were in purpose 
built premises. 55.9% of the premises were 
less than 25 years old. 64% were owned by 
the practice. 44% had received funding to 
improve premises in last 5 years from grants, 
practice savings, loans, PFI, cost rent 
schemes or combination of these. 59% felt 
their premises were unsuitable for their 
current needs being too small or unable to 
expand further due to site restrictions 
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       meaning relocation was required. 72% GPs 
have a mortgage and 25% of these are in 
negative equity. 
26 Commission 
for 
Architecture 
and the Built 
Environment 
2008 LIFT survey 
report 
Study 
report 
Mixed: Site 
visits and 
interviews 
National A review of 20 LIFT projects. 40% of design 
criteria were found to be rated either good or 
excellent, the rest were classed as mediocre, 
poor or very poor. There was no systematic 
approach to shared learning. Space provision 
was often short of the required standards 
(including in consulting and exam rooms). 
There was a significant amount of unused 
space and little evidence of out-of-hours use. 
7/20 scored mediocre for wheelchair access. 
There were frequent problems with 
environmental conditions - temperatures were 
too high, there was poor air flow which was 
distressing to ill patients, windows un- 
openable, poor ventilation creating a risk of 
cross-infection, a lack of staff training on how 
to use buildings. It was thought that 
maintenance had been considered over 
comfort. Many planned cafes were found not 
to be in use as they had been unable to find 
operators for them. Clients had not been 
taught how to prepare design briefs. Many 
selected sites were felt to be too small or in 
inaccessible locations. Some of the designs 
were felt to be poor with layouts restricted air 
flow and long corridors creating 
disorientation. 
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27 Hines, C. 2003 How LIFT is 
helping 
Cornwall 
experience a 
taste of Eden 
Journal 
article 
Based on 
experience 
within project 
Cornwall Identifies LIFT as time-consuming and 
consequently reducing the hours available for 
other initiatives. Identified that it required 
specialist resources. The process was only 
believed to be quicker in the second wave 
due to staff enthusiasm rather than 
organisational learning. The paper identifies 
that the guidance and rules were prone to 
change. It also identifies the large work 
volume and short timescales. The paper 
describes the use of enabling funds. Sites will 
belong to LIFTCo but slow set-up meant they 
were owned by PCT short-term and it is 
unclear who will be liable for capital charges. 
GPs were involved throughout process but 
the paper identifies the need for broader 
involvement (local authority, local council etc) 
and that the project team must be adequately 
resourced. 
28 Aizlewood, 
K. 
2002 How our LIFT 
scheme will 
help us to 
speed up 
service 
improvement 
Journal 
article 
Based on 
experience 
within project 
Sandwell Description of Sandwell LIFT project (£15- 
20m). The main problem encountered was 
convincing new PCT boards of benefits of the 
project. 
29 Rassell, C. 2008 LIFT Review 
for Department 
of Health 
Report for 
Department 
of Health 
Mixed: Site 
visits and 
interviews 
National Review of 16 LIFTCos. Most stakeholders are 
happy that developments had been delivered. 
In the main the projects have been delivered 
on time and on budget. LIFT has not been 
found to be as innovative and risk taking as 
hoped. The promised order book from the 
public sector never materialised in some 
cases (usually because the order book was 
revised). It was recognised that the 
reorganisation of PCT affected corporate 
memory of LIFT. There was uncertainty about 
how LIFT will be treated financially. PCTs 
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       have rationalised their estates and now have 
funds to consider other options. It has also 
proved hard to find LIFT Chief Executive 
Officers. The report identifies the lack of 
required skills in some PCTs and that the 
private sector had not provided skills or 
support required. 
30 Capita 
Advisory 
Services 
2007 Swindon PCT: 
Wiltshire and 
Swindon LIFT 
VfM study 
Review VfM study Swindon Compares estimated Third Party 
Development (TPD) derived from data from 
District Valuer to LIFT based on shadow 
figures provided by PCT financial advisers. 
Risk assessed at 15%. Limited financial 
analysis provided. 
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Group 2: Guidance material 
 
Ref. 
No. 
 
Author 
 
Date 
 
Title Type of paper
 
Method 
 
Location 
 
Key findings / opinions 
31 Department of Health 2001 Briefing note on 
the .55m capital 
for GP premises 
improvements 
Guidance  National Briefing note 
32 Department of Health 2003 Enabling funds 
for LIFT 
Guidance  National Guidance on the use of enabling funds 
33 Department of Health 1999 General medical 
practice 
premises: a 
commentary: a 
guide to the 
size, design and 
construction of 
GP premises 
Guidance  National Guide to assist health authorities, general 
practitioners, developers and their 
respective advisers considering the 
provision or re-provision of practice 
premises 
34 Department of Health 2003 Guidance to 
PCTs on taking 
a shareholding 
in a local LIFT 
company 
Guidance  National Guidance note explaining development of 
policy recommending the formation of a 
number of joint venture companies to 
develop primary care facilities. 
35 Department of Health 2003 New GMS 
contract and 
changes to the 
GP premises 
funding 
arrangements 
Guidance  National Briefly describes new unified funding 
stream to meet all GP practice costs, 
including payments for GP premises 
36 Department of Health 2005 NHS LIFT 
business case 
approval 
process: 
establishing a 
LIFT company 
Guidance  National Guidance for SHA staff establishing their 
first LIFTCo 
37 Department of Health 2003 NHS LIFT 
starter pack 
Guidance  National Documents: MOI, exemplar, project 
management paper, strategic service 
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       development plan 
38 Department of Health 2001 NHS LIFT: Q 
and A 
Guidance  National Answers to FAQ about LIFT 
39 Department of Health 2001 PPP in the NHS: 
modernising 
primary care in 
the NHS: NHS 
LIFT prospectus 
Guidance  National Prospectus 
40 Harrison, A. 2001 LIFT briefing Guidance  National Briefing outlining high level view of LIFT 
presented to Royal Pharmaceutical 
Society 
41 Health Development 
Agency 
2001 New primary 
care premises: 
design to 
support 
workplace health
Guidance  National Guide to principles and processes of 
primary care premises development. 
Identifies key design considerations for 
non-clinical areas. Identifies difficulties in 
obtaining sites, need for early involvement, 
good communication, need to be a 
functional working environment yet have 
capacity and flexibility of build 
42 NAO 2006 A framework for 
evaluating the 
implementation 
of PFI projects 
Guidance  National  Presents evaluation framework to be used 
by evaluators when determining VFM of 
PFI projects. 
43 Partnerships for Health 2007 LIFT: Planning 
Toolkit for 
Primary and 
Social Care 
Guidance    
National 
Guidance for GPs, LAs and PCTs 
considering premises development. 
Includes explanations of the process, 
describes examples. 
44 Cawthra, L. 2006 NHS LIFT Guidance - 
presentation 
 National Power-point slides giving high-level 
summary of PFI in the NHS 
45 Jones, T. 2006 Proven 
strategies for 
long term 
partnering 
Guidance - 
Presentation 
 Manchest 
er 
 
Presentation about MAST LIFT projects by 
Trevor Jones, Director of Facilities, South 
and Central Manchester PCTs. 
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46 Commission, S.D. 2004 Progress in 
practice: LIFT 
and sustainable 
development in 
East Lancashire 
Guidance - 
website 
 E. 
Lancashire
Overview of LIFT development in E. 
Lancashire 
47 Department of Health 2006 Investment 
guidance 
routemap 
Guidance - 
website 
 National Department of Health website providing 
guidance on PFI investment 
48 Department of Health 2006 LIFT guidance Guidance - 
website 
  
National 
Department of Health website providing 
documentation and accounting advice 
about LIFT 
49 Colin-Thome, D. 2004 NHS LIFT - 
enabling social 
regeneration 
Letter  National Letter from Chair of Partnerships for 
Health. Identifies reasons for supporting 
LIFT (current premises prevent adoption of 
modern service practices, facilitating joint 
working, innovative way of working with 
private sector, will deliver new primary 
care centres. Describes first LIFT project 
successes. 
50 Department of Health 2004 2004/05 and 
2005/06 primary 
care premises 
funding 
Letter  National Letter from Richard Armstrong confirming 
allocations of an additional £108m for 
primary care premises over the next two 
years 
51 Stubbings, A. 2008 Business case 
approval 
guidance for 
PCTs with 
existing LIFTS: 
stakeholder 
consultation 
Letter  National Consultation document containing survey 
soliciting views on draft business case 
approval guidelines for PCTs with existing 
LIFT projects. 
52 Department of Health 2007 Examples of 
NHS LIFT in 
practice 
Report Case 
studies 
East 
London, 
Barnsley, 
Newcastl 
e and 
North 
Tyneside 
Describes schemes in East London, 
Barnsley, Newcastle and North Tyneside. 
London LIFT - described as positive. GPs 
didn't have stress associated with build or 
gaining finance. Build quality very good 
and delivered on schedule. Barnsley - 
premises may encourage more GPs/staff 
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       and facilitate extended range of services. 
53 NAO 2005 Innovation in the 
NHS: LIFT 
Report  National No framework to evaluate LIFT. No pilot 
scheme/evaluation. GPs become 
shareholders in LIFT to retain investment 
in property. Generally GPs lose capital 
asset and control of development. Little 
staff continuity at Partnerships for Health, 
slow process and high fees charged. No 
enabling funds paid back to Department of 
Health. Slow progress initially. Lack of 
shared learning. Analysis of LIFT required. 
PCTs find process complex and time- 
consuming. Difficult for some Local 
Authorities and Health Authorities to 
become involved. Shortage of suitable 
sites and human resources. GP buy-in 
patchy. High GP rents. Subsidised rents to 
attract tenants (pharmacies have to pay 
full rents). VfM must be determined. 
Potential conflict of interest identified. 
Financial analysis outsourced to Operis 
and a MSC student. IRR 
54 NHS Information 
Centre 
2008 Investment in 
General Practice 
2003/04 to 
2006/07: 
England, Wales, 
Northern Ireland 
and Scotland 
Report  National Identifies NHS expenditure on GP 
premises in 4 fiscal periods. In England: 
2003/4 - £5,810.589m, 2004/5 - 
£6,914.440m, 2005/6 - £7,746.920m, 
2006/7 - £7,757.015m. Breakdown of 
expenditure provided. 
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55 NHS confederation 2001 Getting the best 
out of future 
capital 
investment in 
health: building 
future-proof 
healthcare for 
local 
communities 
Report  National Critiques PFI/LIFT process: do not invest 
in good design/health care planning (leads 
to increased staff costs), 
social/environmental benefits excluded 
from VfM review, inflexible long term 
contracts, more expensive to modify 
buildings, inadequate cross-sector 
consideration, bidding costs too high (later 
passed to NHS), need to reduce 
bureaucracy, end of capital/revenue 
flexibility (staging, phasing of costs), 
strong incentive to discard existing 
buildings (may be inappropriate, 
unaffordable). 
56 Aldred, R.E. 2006 In the interests 
of profit at the 
expense of 
patients: an 
examination of 
the NHS LIFT 
model, analysing 
six key 
disadvantages 
Report 
commissione
d by UNISON 
 National Identifies six reasons why LIFT may be a 
"bad deal" - bureaucracy, profit, 
inflexibility, conflicts of interest, VfM and 
staff outsourcing. No pilot study. 
Bureaucracy - not local solution as small 
local companies lack resources, top-down 
with consultation late in the process. Profit 
- investment vs. area of need, may draw 
GPs from where they are needed, 
planning control shifts to private sector. 
Inflexibility - 30 year leases, money could 
be used to refurbish more GP surgeries, 
unable to make changes to buildings, 
PCTs bear risk of providing flexible leases 
to GPs. Conflicts of interest - 
PCT/LIFTCo/GP. VfM - 15.1% IRR vs. 8- 
9% IRR from traditional build, affordability 
gap. Staff - may be outsourced. Services 
may be privatised - support services; 
engage private companies to provide 
GP/other clinical services. 
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57 UNISON 2003 LIFT: what you 
need to know 
and what you 
need to ask: a 
briefing for non- 
experts 
Report 
commissione 
d by UNISON 
 National LIFT untested. Long-term legal 
obligations. Premises always owned by 
LIFTCo. Conflict of interest - LIFTCo 
public sector members - duty to keep 
costs down but duty to make profit for 
shareholders. Staff will be outsourced. 
PCTs make have to take over lease if GP 
lease expires. Alternatives to LIFT may be 
more affordable (if they do not have a 
profit component). Costs more for private 
sector to borrow money. All costs/profit will 
be reflected in the rental fees. Revenue 
implication. VfM assessment does not 
compare LIFT scheme to alternatives in 
the real world. Re-financing gains not 
passed back to public sector. PCTs must 
take head leases (with inherent risk). Can 
public sector afford to purchase the 
facility/land at the end of their contract? 
58 House of Commons 2006 Treasury 
minutes on the 
47th to 51st 
reports from the 
Committee of 
Public Accounts 
2005-2006 
Report to 
Parliament 
 National Limited development via conventional 
public finance - alternatives not always 
feasible. LIFT more expensive than 
existing estate but latter not always suited 
to modern services. Extra cost/high lease 
payments reflect additional service 
provision, full maintenance, and quality. 
Need for comparative costs and detailed 
explanation. Risk of affordability gap. All 
LIFT projects over £20m to include public 
sector comparator for more rigorous 
assessment of VfM. PCT subsidies for 
tenants to be explicit and short-term. 
Mechanism for evaluating LIFT still in 
development - required urgently. Supply 
chain must be benchmarked /market- 
tested for all new projects to ensure VfM. 
Lease payments to be assessed for 
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       fairness. Department of Health 
commissioned benchmarking of cost of 
LIFT schemes and VfM of design. LIFT 
contract revised in Aug 06 to "ensure" 
maximum VfM of LIFT projects. Building 
costs likely to increase at rate above 
inflation partly due to demand on 
construction industry arising from Olympic 
Games. Problems undertaking minor 
alterations within LIFT buildings. 
Centralising services causing access 
problems (less convenient locations). 
59 House of Commons 2006 NHS LIFT: 47th 
report of session 
2005-06 
Report with 
formal 
minutes, oral 
and written 
evidence 
 National LIFT is identified as the only mechanism 
for PCT premises development. The report 
recognises that new premises are more 
expensive than continuing in existing 
buildings (up to 8x higher) and this higher 
cost could displace other primary care 
spending. Subsidies are being used to 
encourage new tenants. There is no 
mechanism developed to evaluate LIFT. 
There is no explicit provision to target cost 
reduction. It is recognised that it is difficult 
and/or expensive to obtain repairs and/or 
changes to LIFT buildings. It is also 
acknowledged that there are patient 
access issues due to centralisation of 
services. It was recognised that there was 
a need to determine the effectiveness of 
LIFTCo Boards. It was recognised that a 
constant flow of projects is required to 
achieve VfM. In effect a LIFTCo has been 
granted monopoly status in a region. 
Internal rate of return of approximately 
15% seem high compared to the level of 
risk transferred. Other issues identified 
with LIFT included local companies being 
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       discouraged from seeing tenancies or 
involvement in the construction; the lack of 
a pilot study or evaluation, the risk of GPs 
moving to LIFT buildings leaving more 
deprived areas without doctors, enabling 
funds not being reclaimed by the 
Department of Health for reuse in future 
projects and financial analysis of LIFT 
being outsourced to Operis who are 
involved in LIFT schemes and a Masters 
student. The PAC commented on the lack 
of financial data provided to them. 
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Group 3: News Releases 
 
Ref. No. 
 
Author 
 
Date 
 
Title 
Type 
of 
paper 
 
Method
 
Location 
 
Key findings / opinions 
60 Department 
of Health 
2004 Hutton announces 
plans for more super 
surgeries: trusts 
invited to bid for new 
LIFT schemes 
News 
release 
 National NHS LIFT will "pump £1 billion of private investment 
into primary care". PCTs invited to bid for new one- 
stop health centres funded under LIFT - estimated 
additional investment of £150 - £225m. 
61 Department 
of Health 
2004 Lift off for first 'super 
surgery' 
News 
release 
 National Opening of first £4.9m one-stop super surgery built 
under LIFT initiative. Confirmed total of 42 LIFT 
projects in progress across 120 PCTs. One third of 
these in health action zones (deprived areas of the 
country). Wave 1 (Feb 2001) - 6 projects. Wave 2 
(Jan 2002) - 12 projects. Wave 3 (Aug 2002) - 24 
projects.£195 million in enabling funds made available 
to date 
62 Department 
of Health 
2006 Lift off for more 
doctor's surgeries 
and health centres 
News 
release 
 National NHS plans to open 60 new GP surgeries (one per 
week) during 2006 under LIFT offering services 
previously only found in hospitals. In excess of £700m 
set aside for LIFT. 54 new buildings open by end of 
2005. Claims 3,000 GP premises improved and over 
500 one-stop health centres opened since 2001. 
63 Department 
of Health 
2003 New 4.9 million 
health centre for East 
London is first for 
LIFT 
News 
release 
 National  E. London chosen as one of first areas for LIFT due to 
challenge in attracting investment. High number of 
sub-standard primary care premises. 
64 Department 
of Health 
2000 New initiatives to 
modernise GP 
premises 
News 
release 
 National Recognises areas of deprivation offer poor return on 
investment acting as disincentive to investment for 
private sector and GPs. GP current investment 
locked-in - poor patient access/inability to integrate 
services 
65 Department 
of Health 
2001 PFI extended into 
primary care into 
poorest parts of 
England 
News 
release 
 National Announcement of £55m package for GP investment - 
£30m capital to enable premises to train more 
doctors, £15m capital to accommodate expanding 
numbers of primary care staff and £10m for 6 first 
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       wave LIFT projects 
66 Department 
of Health 
2000 Radical reform will 
put patients at the 
centre of the NHS: .1 
billion for GP 
premises in Health 
and Social Care Bill 
News 
release 
 National Announcement of £1billion for GP premises in Health 
and Social Care Bill through LIFT 
67 Department 
of Health 
2002 Speech by John 
Hutton MP, Minister 
of State for Health, to 
NHS LIFT 
Conference, London 
News 
release 
 National Transcript of speech describing progress with LIFT to 
date 
68 Guillochon, 
R. 
2006 MPs say government 
scheme for GP's 
premises threatens 
other primary care 
needs 
News 
release 
 National Review of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 
report – it identifies that it cannot be determined 
whether LIFT will provide VfM. PAC has requested 
that an evaluation mechanism be developed urgently. 
The report identifies that providing new buildings will 
be more expensive, that there should be some form of 
demonstration of benefits to justify subsidies provided 
to tenants, that there is currently no minimum cost for 
building alterations, that the location of new LIFT 
buildings make create transport problems for patients 
and that LIFT may divert funds from other needs 
including the amendment of premises where LIFT 
does not apply. 
69 Roumeliotis, 
G 
2007 DH boasts younger 
NHS estates 
News 
release 
 National Presentation of Department of Health statement – the 
age of NHS estate has reduced from 50% over 60 
years old to 20% and capital expenditure has 
increased from £1.1b in 1997 to £5.5b in 2007. 
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Group 4: Opinion pieces 
 
 
 
Ref. No. 
 
Author 
 
Date 
 
Title Type of paper
 
Method 
 
Location 
 
Key findings / opinions 
70 Devereux, G. 
and Sutton, P. 
2004 PPP in urban 
health 
development: 
NHS: fit for 
purpose 
Conference 
paper - 
based on 
opinion 
 Manchester, 
Salford and 
Trafford 
Descriptive report of the MAST LIFT 
project including the role of the Joint 
Health Unit and PCTs. 
71 Dawson, D. 2001 The Private 
Finance 
Initiative: a 
public finance 
illusion? 
Guest 
editorial - 
journal 
 National Identifies that the level of risk 
transferred to the private sector must 
be high enough to justify belief of VfM. 
The paper identifies the lack of 
transparency in the PFI process and 
the lack of evidence that buildings have 
been constructed in such a way as to 
minimise maintenance costs (given that 
consortiums sell on their interest after 
construction). It is recognised that the 
bundling of all maintenance restricts 
the NHS bodies that are unable to 
delay, restrict or phase investment 
and/or maintenance expenditure. The 
paper discusses the commercial 
confidentiality around PFI internal rates 
of return, that the NHS is tied to these 
assets for a period of 30-50 years and 
that they are unable to change PFI 
contracts if new NHS policy is 
introduced. PFI is identified as the only 
finance mechanism available. 
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72 Pollock, A and 
Price, D. 
2006 Privatising 
primary care 
Guest 
editorial - 
journal 
 National This paper describes the anxiety over 
the commercial take-over of general 
practice and other NHS clinical 
services. A private company will 
provide elective surgery for one LIFT 
project. This article claims PCTs could 
stand against this by arguing against 
practice-based commissioning and for 
population-based planning. It is argued 
that GPs could force their PCT to 
protect services and could demand a 
repeal of the legislation. 
73 Aldred, R.E. 2005 Challenges of 
private provision 
in the NHS: 
Real story is 
beginning to 
emerge 
Journal - 
Letter 
 National This article sees LIFT as a way for 
private health companies to make 
money from primary care, creating 
monopolies, complex sub-contracting 
chains and complex long-term 
contracts. It recognises a lack of 
transparency created by commercial 
confidentiality and acknowledges that 
health care planning may become 
fragmented. 
74 Ballantyne, N 2005 Getting LIFT of 
the ground 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies some of the benefits of LIFT - 
adaptability, potential bid savings, 
ability to attract bidders to small 
projects. It also identifies some of the 
issues - lack of VfM assessment or 
dedicated resources and rationalisation 
of PCTs affecting their commitment to 
LIFT. 
75 Black, A. 2002 Reconfiguring 
health systems 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Discusses the reconfiguration of health 
care. The paper questions whether the 
whole systems approach in reality is 
merely a project-based investment 
(typically a new building). 75% of 
health expenditure pays for staff but 
the redesign of employment and 
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       remuneration has largely been ignored 
as a driver for change. The article 
claims the current configuration of 1 
GP per 2000 citizens is probably 
unsustainable. 
76 Bunce. C. 1997 Laying the 
foundations for 
a GP-led study 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Claims that young GPs are unable to 
invest in premises and bureaucracy 
slows private sector investment. It 
describes one partnership between a 
local and health authority redeveloping 
an old community centre and renting 
space to GPs (pre-LIFT). 
77 Burrell, R. 2004 Improving the 
practice 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Historically GPs have been owner 
occupiers and this article identifies that 
retirees want to extract their equity. 
Younger GPs have different work 
patterns to their predecessors. A higher 
level of investment required to buy 
and/or improve premises which 
increases the financial risk, increases 
involvement in management and 
reduces the time available for clinical 
work. 
78 Burton, R. 2004 Regeneration 
game 
Opinion 
piece 
 Liverpool Anticipates 30 LIFT schemes worth 
over £100m in Merseyside. This article 
compares the 'hub and spoke' design 
to 'stem and leaf' models with their 
improved flexibility, functionality, fit on 
urban sites and expansion capability. It 
describes two LIFT schemes and their 
impact based on urban regeneration, 
including the release of prior publicly – 
owned sites. 
79 Comerford, C. 2004 Is .108m of 
premises 
funding just 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Suggest that new LIFT money fails to 
address maintenance costs, GP rents 
have increased and premises costs 
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   papering over 
the cracks? 
   have increased further by the need to 
comply with disability legislation. This 
paper recognises opportunity cost – 
that one large project may consume all 
available funding. LIFT is considered to 
be expensive to set up for a PCT as it 
can include buy-out of previous 
premises, but there is no option other 
than LIFT. The paper also identifies the 
issue of the affordability gap. 
80 Cooper, G. 2006 Bright lights: 
London health 
care 
Opinion 
piece 
 London Describes three new developments 
and highlights two previous "future- 
proof" buildings marked for demolition. 
81 Cumberledge, 
J. 
1996 Primary care 
premises. 
Owners and 
occupiers 
Opinion 
piece 
 London Paper discusses tenancy 
arrangements including how the cost of 
community space in building must be 
covered by tenants, adding flexibility to 
contracts creates additional problems 
and the possibility that lack of 
consideration of terms of leases may 
result in polyclinics being put to more 
profitable purposes in the future. 
82 Davis, K. 2002 Primary 
concerns 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Report on CABE/King's Fund seminar. 
Identifies that a lack of innovation and 
quality in design is creating submissive 
architecture and that the aim of LIFT is 
not to produce “genius designs" but to 
"prevent the worst" ones. 
83 Douglas, M. 
and Naru, A. 
2005 Partnership for 
health 
Opinion 
piece 
 Newcastle 
case study, 
national 
commentary 
Discusses a partnership approach (in 
ProCure 21 by a private sector 
company who is also working on LIFT). 
It identifies the benefits of early 
involvement for familiarisation and 
education. It encourages openness and 
the sharing of information in meetings, 
the use of risk management to allow 
parties to raise concerns/obstacles, the 
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       early integration of specialist suppliers 
to bring specialist knowledge, reduce 
risk and improve quality and cost 
certainty. 
84 Dudman, J. 2003 Ready for lift-off Opinion 
piece 
 National First six LIFT projects took over a year 
to select preferred provider. Identifies 
one aim of LIFT is to free GPs from 
property ownership and the risk of 
negative equity by buying out leases 
and providing and maintaining new 
premises. The process is described as 
"horrendously complicated". Identifies 
how one LIFT team delayed discussing 
rents with GPs and there was concern 
over the transfer of equity from the 
public to the private sector. 
85 Forrest, E. 2004 Look lively Opinion 
piece 
 St. Helens Describes how a private sector partner 
selected a new site creating a more 
ambitious project 
(housing/shops/leisure development 
plus possible hotel) with the aim of 
developing an urban village. The 
concentration of GPs was intended to 
counteract the fragmentation of existing 
health care service. It was recognised 
that residents had moved away from 
area so they would still need to travel 
to visit their GP. 
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86 Godden, S., 
Pollock, A.M. 
and Player, S. 
2001 Capital 
investment in 
primary care. 
The funding and 
ownership of 
primary care 
premises 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Describes the history of GP premises 
funding and ownership. Recognises 
GPs as independent contractors who 
could build own premises but had no 
separate income stream available for 
this. Conversely there were 3 rental 
reimbursement schemes (cost rent, 
notional and actual). In 1998-9 the 
expenditure on practice premises was 
over £319m. The article provides a 
description of LIFT. Part-time GP 
employment rose from 5% in 1990 to 
17% in 1999. Complexity, risk, and 
scale of investment and change in 
working practice are all identified as 
being likely to accelerate the trend for 
companies buying out and owning GP 
premises. 
87 Hellowell, M. 2004 PPPs in 
perspective - 
Uplifting 
experience 
Opinion 
piece 
 E. London Describes how run-down facilities are 
encouraging some GPs to leave. 
Describes the new LIFT scheme and 
recognises that a LIFTCo may be 
expected to deliver clinical services or 
procure services as part of their remit, 
although it was felt that this may put 
some investors off. 
88 Hospital 
Development 
2007 £10m 'super 
surgery' 
contract for 
Morgan Ashurst 
Opinion 
piece 
 Camden Describes 'state of the art' super 
surgery to be built in Camden 
89 Hospital 
Development 
2006 CABE's 
community 
exemplars 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Announces CABEs "Designed with 
Care" campaign aimed at encouraging 
better design in health care buildings. 
90 Hospital 
Development 
2006 CABE's LIFT 
favourites 
Opinion 
piece 
 Birmingham 
and Solihull 
Two LIFT projects praised by CABE for 
their design and attention to detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
301 
91 Hospital 
Development 
2006 Design 
improved under 
PFI 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Comments on a survey of facilities 
managers commissioned by a health 
care consultancy company. LIFT is 
believed to be effective but costly and 
slow, however a lower approval rating 
was received for NHS Estates 
replacement. 
92 Hospital 
Development 
2003 East London 
LIFT raises 
questions 
Opinion 
piece 
 London Questions the procurement process for 
the first LIFT project - workload for 
bidders considered to be onerous and 
lengthy. It acknowledges that medium- 
sized organisations face resource 
issues. It is suggested that there 
should be a change in the process so 
that the selection of the winning bidder 
is based on approach and track record 
rather than on a specific design. 
93 Hospital 
Development 
2007 Europe's largest 
health care 
centre nears 
completion 
Opinion 
piece 
 Hounslow Describes a new super surgery being 
built in Hounslow 
94 Hospital 
Development 
2006 Forum report: 
Information for 
Health design 
Part Two: What 
should the 
future hold? 
Opinion 
piece 
Presentation of 
discussions at 
Hospital 
Development 
Forum 
National Identifies that written guidance is no 
guarantee that the final building will be 
what users either wanted or needed. 
Some issues may be caused by 
staffing rather than premises. One 
architect undertook a study of the 
factors affecting local residents’ 
satisfaction and buildings came 11th. 
The discussants argue that this was 
incorrect as quality of environment 
affects health, performance, 
recruitment and retention of staff. It is 
identified that there are few real health 
care architects - some claim to have 
developed 200 buildings, others feel it 
to be 200 repetitions of the same 
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       building. Guidance can remove 
'technical drudgery' but it is recognised 
that this can also stifle innovation. 
Often the same architects may be used 
as they have portfolio to show 
prospective clients. It is recognised that 
there is often poor interaction between 
architects and planners as they 
"wander into areas which are about 
architecture and planning buildings". 
95 Hospital 
Development 
2003 GP advocate 
suspicious of 
LIFT 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Chair of NHS Alliance is reported as 
doubting that private firms will be given 
charge of PCT facilities under LIFT in 
the same way as occurred for PFI 
projects as it would raise problems for 
GPs by taking services out of their 
hands. 
96 Hospital 
Development 
2005 LIFT bidding 
period 
increased 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies that the bidding period was 
extended from 12 to 15 months after 
the publication of the NAO report. It 
cites the report as claiming that funds 
were not routinely monitored and some 
schemes did not utilise funds in a 
timely manner. 
97 Hospital 
Development 
2006 LIFT health 
centres now 
more than 100 
Opinion 
piece 
 National LIFT offers super surgeries with 
services only previously available in 
hospital e.g. x-rays, medical tests, 
Speech and language therapy, 
chiropody, physiotherapy and dentistry. 
It is claimed that LIFT buildings are 
more convenient for patients 
(especially the elderly and patients with 
chronic conditions). 
98 Hospital 
Development 
2006 New £3 million 
health centre for 
Knowsley 
Opinion 
piece 
 Knowsley Identifies that the 100th LIFT centre 
has opened. Describes the project and 
services provided. 
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99 Hospital 
Development 
2007 NHS reaches 
LIFT milestone 
Opinion 
piece 
 Dudley 200th health centre under LIFT 
completed bringing total capital value 
to over £1.1bn. Identifies that the new 
building includes new services, attracts 
GPs to the area and improves staff 
morale. Describes the services at the 
centre. 
100 Hospital 
Development 
2003 Triple LIFT 
whammy for 
Galliford Try 
Opinion 
piece 
 Liverpool, 
Barnet / 
Enfield / 
Haringey and 
Coventry 
One private company announced as 
preferred bidder for 3 LIFT projects in 
Liverpool (£60m), 
Barnet/Enfield/Haringey (£32m) and 
Coventry (£45m) 
101 Hospital 
Development 
2006 Ulrich's view 
from the inside 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Reflections by Professor Roger Ulrich 
(former advisor to NHS Estates). This 
paper identified the limited experience 
of trusts in developing development 
briefs. 
102 Hospital 
Development 
2002 Winning design 
chosen for 
London LIFT 
pilot 
Opinion 
piece 
 N. London Describes how the design was result of 
Royal Institute of British Architects 
competition. 76 expressions of interest 
short listed to 4 for final designs. The 
winning design encompassed 
'unlimited flexibility' and the paper 
articulates the 'hope' that LIFTCo will 
use the design. 
103 Hospital 
Development 
2006 WYG supports 
£124m LIFT 
project 
Opinion 
piece 
 St. Helens Describes St Helens LIFT scheme - 40 
health centres / £125m. 
104 King's Fund 
and N. Alliance 
2001 PPP and 
Primary care 
Opinion 
piece 
 National PFI is identified as the only game in 
town and that there is little evidence 
that it offers value for money. Contracts 
cannot be specified rigidly enough. No 
enterprise should be privatised unless 
it could be allowed to fail (threat of 
subsidies). Lack of definition of mVfM. 
In effect the LIFTCo becomes a 
monopoly. There is also 
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       acknowledgement that there is a risk of 
a conflict of interest between public and 
private sector partners. The author also 
questions why the existing stock of 
premises is in such poor condition. 
105 Kmietowics, Z. 2001 Evidence that 
PPP can 
increase funding 
is 'paltry' 
Opinion 
piece 
 National The author feels that it is unclear 
whether LIFT will offer VfM and 
encourage investment in deprived 
areas however it frees GPs from 
maintaining premises and adds 
flexibility to GP careers. 
106 Kmietowics, Z. 2002 Relations 
between NHS 
and private 
sector are 'not a 
one night stand' 
says Milburn 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Reports on the announcement by 
Health Secretary Alan Milburn 
(including 12 second wave LIFT 
projects) 
107 Little, W 2006 Primary care. 
Settle for super 
Opinion 
piece 
 West 
Bromwich, 
Burnley, 
London case 
studies with 
national 
commentary 
Review of the white paper on health 
care outside hospitals. Describes how 
new super centres are to be opened in 
most deprived areas and how grouping 
practitioners under one roof increases 
shared learning. It recognises that 
there is no specific commitment from 
Department of Health on polyclinics, 
that it is up to local PCTs to do what 
they think will meet the needs of their 
local population. It recognises that 
planning for first super-surgery took 
years and suggests that services will 
be more integrated. It identifies that the 
LIFT process means that additional 
projects do not need to start fresh. It 
also argues that super-centres may go 
against ethos of family medicine that 
patients want. 
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108 Mathieson, S. 2002 LIFT doors still 
open (special 
report: 
buildings) 
Opinion 
piece 
 Manchester, 
London with 
national 
commentary 
Identifies that LIFT removes GP 
dependence on the value of the 
property and passes responsibility for 
maintenance to a dedicated company. 
Space is being rented out to other 
companies including local authorities, 
health care practitioners and private 
shops (although the LIFTCo hold a 
right of veto over selection of the 
tenants) providing a long term income 
prospect. The cost of purpose-built 
premises could be prohibitive for 
individual GPs. GPs only benefit from 
property value increases if they 
become shareholders in the LIFTCo, 
although it is recognised that this may 
increase the risk of a conflict of 
interest. It is suggested that LIFT 
provides easier entry into market and 
the ability to relocate for new GPs. It 
identifies that negative equity a risk for 
a LIFTCo in the same way it is a risk 
for individual GP owner occupiers. 
109 Mathieson, S. 2003 LIFT-long 
learning 
Opinion 
piece 
 London, 
Salford, 
Norfolk 
Outlines lessons from some second 
and third wave LIFT projects. Some 
schemes are described as 
unimaginative. It recognises the 
challenging timetable of LIFT and the 
workload for the PCTs. It recognises 
that it may still be difficult to attract 
funding if in areas away from large 
cities where it is more difficult to make 
money from property (e.g. Norfolk LIFT 
project). 
110 Meara, R. 2001 Do we have lift 
off? 
Opinion 
piece 
 National This article reviews LIFT and identifies 
drivers for change and a number of key 
questions: are the projects in areas of 
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       need? Will bundling of schemes be 
acceptable to GPs? Will LIFT result in 
better / competitively priced buildings? 
How will rents compare? Will it include 
option for privately-managed care 
centres? 
111 Montague, A. 2004 A LIFT for local 
communities 
Opinion 
piece 
 London Identifies most of existing stock of 
premises are out of date or unsuited to 
primary care delivery. Before LIFT, only 
40% of premises were purpose built 
with almost 50% being shops or 
adapted residential buildings. It 
describes one new health centre in 
Hainault describing how care has been 
taken over the design features. It 
recognises how some LIFT projects are 
being seen as urban regeneration 
tools. 
112 Neal, J 2005 LIFT consumes 
all premises 
funding 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Claims LIFT is using all premises 
funding. The bias is now towards large 
private providers who are able to raise 
funds for new buildings. 
113 Parker, J. 2006 Street life Opinion 
piece 
 N. London Provides a review of an early LIFT 
project. Designed in collaboration with 
the PCT and community leaders, the 
building has maintained a strong place 
in the community like the community 
hall that used to be on the site. Setting 
up the LIFTCo proved difficult and took 
two years; six months to get the 
preferred bidder and a year until 
financial close. The paper recognises 
that site selection may be difficult and 
can impact on the final building. It also 
acknowledges a lack of design flair in 
this building. 
114 Parker, J. 2005 Urban uplift Opinion E. London Provides a review of an early LIFT 
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    piece   project. Winner of 2004 NHS Estates 
Best Designed Primary Care Facility 
award. Developed in a demanding 
location in an area of widespread 
deprivation with special health needs, a 
low GP-Patient ratio and difficult staff 
recruitment. The high quality build 
helped attract, retain and integrate 
staff. It was recognised that there was 
a balance to be struck between the 
need for openness yet provision of 
security. This has been a positive 
experience for staff and patients. The 
building was developed with flexibility 
and adaptability to help maintain 
residual value. 
115 Parker, J. and 
Davis, K. 
2001 A LIFT for 
primary care 
Opinion 
piece 
Presentation of 
discussions at 
Hospital 
Development 
Forum 
National LIFT partnering is described as poor 
due to the long term agreement. The 
paper identifies that the NHS will not 
own the primary care property as it will 
all be leased. It suggests that the role 
of Local Authority has been 
underestimated. NHS Estates is under 
pressure to deliver projects from 
LIFTCo’s and there are concerns that 
not all projects are providing the right 
building in the right place. 
116 Parley, M. 2006 LIFT 
effectiveness 
questioned 
Opinion 
piece 
 National One MP comments that Department of 
Health and Partnerships for Health 
must speed up development of a tool to 
evaluate LIFT. This paper also asks 
whether funds are being diverted to 
LIFT which could be better sent 
elsewhere. 
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117 Pollock, A.M. 2001 Will primary 
care trusts lead 
to US-style 
health care? 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies that the Government has not 
published the revenue implications of 
using private finance. It recognises that 
there is a reliance on new income 
streams from provision of other 
services and commercial/retail outlets. 
Currently there are no restrictions on 
setting up business ventures. It is 
claimed that some PCTs may enter into 
joint ventures with private insurers and 
health companies to sell insurance 
products such as long term care and 
private healthcare cover to patients. 
This paper recommends that the 
government should reaffirm the 
principle of universal coverage and 
provide funding based on geographic 
population rather than practice and that 
it should prohibit sale of private 
services and health insurance from 
premises in which the NHS pays for 
care. 
118 Pope, N. 1988 Brightening up 
the inner city 
Opinion 
piece 
 E. London Describes pre-LIFT health centre - two 
GP practice partnership. Chose new 
site in centre of practice area. Found 
mechanism to fund multi-purpose room 
excluded under cost-rent scheme (cash 
payment from DHA). Charging DHA 
rental fee for use of space to cover cost 
rent deficit. 
119 Richer, G. 2007 Building a better 
NHS 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies that LIFT is perceived to be 
an expensive process. PCTs had pre- 
existing deficits which have slowed 
LIFT projects considerably. The 4th 
wave of LIFT includes delivery of 
clinical services within contractual 
remit. Once completed the 
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       procurement/set-up costs for LIFT 
projects may be forgotten. 
120 Robinson, F. 2005 The trouble with 
LIFT… 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Provides a review of the NAO report. 
The authors feel that LIFT will improve 
recruitment/retention of GPs, improve 
care for patients (having multiple 
providers in the same building). Some 
GPs are unhappy as they are unable to 
gain money from their PCT for basic 
improvements to their premises. 
Consequently GP buy-in has been 
patchy, independent practitioners have 
not been convinced about co-location, 
the benefit of the new build would not 
seem to be outweighed by high rents. It 
was recognised that one LIFT project 
may use all PCT funds and the notional 
rent scheme used to provide cost- 
efficient way of improving premises has 
now stopped. 
121 Sansom, A. 2007 London LIFT 
projects: 
Meeting of 
minds 
Opinion 
piece 
 London This paper dismissed the issue of 
conflict of interest. It is argued that the 
issue is one of the private sector 
making money (vs. public sector 
wasting it). It is recognised that the 
private sector must deliver. Gaining 
sign-off for the proposals was seen as 
difficult. To improve the process it is 
suggested that there must be a 
reduction in changes, time delays and 
financial instability. It describes PCT 
taking on the headlease sp GPs are 
not tied to long-term contracts, thereby 
allowing for different practice patterns. 
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       This also creates opportunities for GPs, 
easier referrals and communication. A 
LIFT project can include housing and 
this paper describes one example with 
72 apartments, 24 classed as 
affordable and 8 allocated for PCT 
staff. Their buildings are designed to 
incorporate some flexibility. The paper 
argues that buildings must be 
affordable, efficient and good-quality as 
well as civic landmarks. 
122 Slingsby, C. 2004 10 things to 
know about 
premises 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies a number of issues about 
renting premises including considering 
what may happen if a practice 
outgrows their space building, the 
lease rent review and lease terms. 
123 Slingsby, C. 1992 Escape the GP 
premises trap 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies that a lack of development 
money preventing the expansion of 
outgrown/ageing surgeries and that it is 
hard to find suitable sites and/or get 
planning permission. Barking and 
Havering FHSA identify that the area 
has problems with depreciation, small 
practices with substandard premises 
and fewer health centres but that they 
are prepared to liaise with GPs to 
identify ways to bring premises up to 
higher standard but these must fit with 
the services the FHSA want to develop. 
It also identifies alternate ways to 
obtain new premises (conversion of 
new property, developer willing to build 
premises in new development and 
lease it to GP, repurpose former 
hospital). 
124 Spinks, J. 2002 Heartened by 
headlines 
Opinion 
piece 
 Medway Describes the Medway PCT LIFT 
scheme. The process started in March 
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       2002. They were ready to find a private 
sector partner six months later and 
proposals for 17 centres will be 
completed by 2006. It recognises that 
the centralisation of services will impact 
GPs still in their own premises. 
125 Tredinnick, B. 1993 Getting into 
practice: part 1: 
Backdrop for 
change 
Opinion 
piece 
 Watford, 
Denbigh, 
Liverpool, 
Cheltenham, 
London, Ely, 
Epsom, 
Reading 
Identifies that 46% of premises in inner 
London are below minimum standards 
(compared to 7% in the rest of 
England). A lack of space is blamed for 
the inability to expand staff/services. 
The cost rent scheme is blamed as it 
only funds the basic unit of 
consulting/waiting/treatment and 
reception rooms based on number of 
GPs. The paper describes projects 
completed by GPs using a variety of 
other funding methods (pre-LIFT) 
126 Tynedale 
Biscoe, Julian 
2003 Why LIFT isn't 
hitting the mark 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies that here has been a £175m 
Government investment in LIFT over 4 
years. Having a standard lease means 
lower legal costs for GPs. It is claimed 
that it is impossible to say if LIFT 
provides VfM (especially given cost of 
tendering process). The paper 
recognises the lack of a pilot scheme 
and the complicated funding system. 
The cost of preparing bids is estimated 
at between £500k - £1m. LIFT rents 
evaluated by a District Valuer but these 
are affected by the cost of the scheme 
itself. The paper also claims that 
bureaucracy adds to the cost of LIFT 
projects. 
127 Ward, S. 2003 Cash dash Opinion 
piece 
 National Identifies that the process behind LIFT 
makes it unable to take advantage of 
unforeseen opportunities and that the 
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       lead PCT may get majority of funding. 
The paper recognises that there is 
some potential for the reconfiguration 
of existing NHS estate and that there 
are revenue implications of LIFT. 
128 Watson, J. 2002 Take the LIFT Opinion 
piece 
 National Provides an outline of the LIFT initiative
129 Bosanquet, N., 
Haldenby, A. 
and de Zoete, 
H. 
2006 Investment in 
the NHS - facing 
up to the reform 
agenda 
Opinion 
piece - 
report 
 National Describes how some private providers 
are building cheap/modern builds with 
5 year life, their argument being that as 
you cannot estimate practice 
requirements in 20 years time there is 
no need for all long term build/high 
capital investment. It identifiers that 
delays cost an average of £2.4m per 
PFI scheme. It argues that VfM is the 
key for future procurement and that 
local responsibility for investment must 
be placed with local managers to 
increase local freedom and flexibility. It 
recognises that it is unlikely that there 
will be any new funding from public 
sector and that improvements in 
infrastructure in next decade will be via 
PPP. It recommends use of amended 
form of PFI/LIFT which must be 
affordable, relate depreciation periods 
to useful life rather than fixed rule, 
provide a range of finance options 
including PFI with an emphasis on 
smaller projects which must be related 
to specific income streams. 
130 Banyard, R 2004 Funding GP 
premises: a 
constant 
challenge for 
PCTs? 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Describes the issues faced by PCTs 
trying to allocate resources for GP 
premises equitably with no central 
guidance re: criteria. Recognises that 
PCT staff will require technical estate 
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       and planning skills and information. It 
also recognises that a substantial 
proportion of staff time is likely to be 
spent upon LIFT projects and that GPs 
are unaccustomed to bureaucratic 
procedures when planning their 
premises. 
131 Wall, A. 2007 LIFT/PFI: will 
the NHS survive 
with further 
deals? 
Opinion 
piece 
 National Provides a synopsis of UNISON report 
(2006). It identifies that GP practices 
require additional space for new 
services although the needs and 
designs may change with demography 
in the future. It also recognises the 
need for a VfM review of LIFT. 
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Appendix 4 
 
Requests for Collaboration 
 
 
 
[University headed 
paper] [date] 
 
 
 
Dear <x>, 
 
The Role and Effectiveness of Public-Private Partnerships (NHS LIFT) in 
the 
Development of Enhanced Primary Care Premises and 
Services 
 
The Management School at the University of York has recently been awarded a 
grant from the NHS Service Delivery and Organisation Programme (SDO) to 
examine the effectiveness of Public Private Partnerships in the development of 
enhanced primary care premises.  The study is entitled The Role and Effectiveness 
of Public – Private Partnerships (NHS LIFT) in the Development of Enhanced 
Primary Care Premises and Services, and a detailed description of the project can 
be found on the SDO webpage at http://www.sdo.lshtm.ac.uk/sdo1562006.html. 
 
Part of the project involves conducting interviews with a variety of staff who have 
been involved in LIFT projects, and subsequently carrying out in-depth case 
studies across a range of PCTs, chosen to provide a broad spread both 
geographically and across the different waves of the LIFT programme. 
 
I am writing to you to ask whether you would be willing for your PCT to take part 
in the interview round of the project, with a view to possibly becoming one of our 
case study sites.  Initially, we would like to interview a selection of people 
including managers, finance directors, health care professionals and Board 
members from the public sector, plus representatives from private sector partners. 
 
Should you wish to discuss this further before making a commitment, please do 
not hesitate to contact me, or my Research Fellow, Dr Sally Brown. I can be 
reached via email at mb541@york.ac.uk, and Dr Brown can be reached at 
sb616@york.ac.uk or on 
01904 434894. 
 
I look forward to hearing from 
you. Yours sincerely, 
 
Professor Matthias Beck 
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[University headed 
paper] [date] 
 
 
 
Dear <x>, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Role and Effectiveness of Public-Private Partnerships (NHS LIFT) in 
the 
Development of Enhanced Primary Care Premises and 
Services 
 
Over the last year the Management School at the University of York has been 
carrying out a research project entitled The Role and Effectiveness of Public – 
Private Partnerships (NHS LIFT) in the Development of Enhanced Primary 
Care Premises and Services. This has been funded by the NHS Service Delivery 
and Organisation Programme (SDO), and a detailed description of the project can 
be found on the SDO webpage at http://www.sdo.lshtm.ac.uk/sdo1562006.html. 
 
Following the development of Express LIFT, and the announcement of the private 
sector framework partners, we should like to include some analysis of Express 
LIFT in our work. Therefore I am writing to you to ask whether it would be 
possible to interview people in your organisation who could contribute to our 
research. We would ideally like to speak to CEOs, Directors of Finance, Directors 
with responsibility for planning, strategy and business, and anyone else in your 
organisation whom you think would be relevant. 
 
Should you wish to discuss this further before making a commitment, please do 
not hesitate to contact me, or my Research Fellow, Dr Sally Brown. I can be 
reached via email at mb541@york.ac.uk, and Dr Brown can be reached at  
sb616@york.ac.uk or on 
01904 434894. 
 
I look forward to hearing from 
you. Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
 
Professor Matthias Beck 
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The Four Possible Bases for Accommodating Cultural Diversity within Health Care 
Organisations 
1) Synergy 
The objective is to meld both partners’ 
cultures and to achieve the best possible 
fit between the two. The best elements 
are combined with the objective of making 
the whole greater than the sum of its 
parts. Th e combination of management 
and clinical roles by clinical directors is an 
example of this. 
2) Se gregation 
Here the aim is to strike an acceptable 
balance between different subcultures by 
virtue of maintaining separation rather 
than seeking integration. In many health 
systems inter-professional alliances may 
be seen to be of this type. For example, 
accommodation between the 
nursing profession and doctors 
3) D omination 
This is based on recognition that 
integrating subcultures may prove 
impossible and accepts the right of 
dominance of one sub-group’s culture. 
Clinicians have traditionally assumed this 
role and have until recently been largely 
self-regulating rather than being the 
subject to external monitoring and 
assessment. 
4) Br eakdown 
This occurs when a sub-group seeks 
domination, integration or mutually 
acceptable segregation but fails to secure 
the acquiescence of the other group. For 
example, failed attempts in advanced 
health systems over many years to usurp 
the dominance of the medical profession. 
Appendix 5 
 
Expanded Version of Child & Faulkner’s Model 
 
 
The Meeting of Cultures: Achieving a Cultural Fit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domination 
By 
One 
Subculture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Integration 
 
Yes No 
 
 
Derived and expanded from a classificatory scheme on strategic 
alliances developed by Child & Faulkner, 1998. 
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Post senior debt post tax cash (RV) -1111.00 -1409.00 61.00 356.00 209.10 166.45 364.09 414.39 465.95 518.80 572.97 628.49 685.41 743.74 775.38 773.50 765.63 751.82 732.12 706.56 675.18 637.99 595.00 546.22 491.64 431.27      4422.98 
Appendix 6 
 
Tables 6.1 to 6.4, Financial Analysis 
 
 
1.   East Lancs Base Case 
 
Input assumptions 
Inflation rate 0.025 
senior debt amortisation rate   0.96 
subordinated debt amortisation    0.93 
tax rate   0.27 
Model Outputs 
Nominal Pre-Tax Project IRR no RV  7.60% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Project IRR no RV  8.07% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 15.69% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Blended Equity IRR (RV) 16.47% 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 13.90% 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR with RV 15.10% 
Detailed forecast 
 
Proforma P&L a/c 
 
total  30/9/04  30/9/05  30/9/06  30/9/07          30/9/08          30/9/09          30/9/10          30/9/11  30/9/12       30/9/13          30/9/14        30/9/15  30/9/16       30/9/17       30/9/18       30/9/19       30/9/20       30/9/21       30/9/22       30/9/23       30/9/24       30/9/25       30/9/26       30/9/27       30/9/28         30/9/29       30/9/30 
Lease plus payments  85703.12  98.00          2274.00          2576.00         2640.40         2706.41         2774.07         2843.42          2914.51      2987.37         3062.05       3138.61  3217.07      3297.50      3379.94      3464.43      3551.04      3639.82      3730.82      3824.09      3919.69      4017.68      4118.12      4221.08      4326.60        4434.77      4545.64 
third party revenues    1823.85  24.00  53.00  54.00  55.35  56.73  58.15  59.61  61.10          62.62  64.19  65.79       67.44          69.12          70.85          72.62          74.44          76.30          78.21          80.16          82.17          84.22          86.33          88.49          90.70  92.96          95.29 
Recovery of pass through costs  6278.92  80.00  182.00  186.00  190.65  195.42  200.30  205.31  210.44        215.70  221.10         226.62  232.29        238.10        244.05        250.15        256.40        262.81        269.38        276.12        283.02        290.10        297.35        304.78        312.40          320.21        328.22 
Recovery of utilities costs  3307.21  42.00  95.00  98.00  100.45  102.96  105.54  108.17  110.88        113.65  116.49         119.40  122.39        125.45        128.58        131.80        135.09        138.47        141.93        145.48        149.12        152.85        156.67        160.58        164.60          168.71        172.93 
Total revenue  97113.10  244.00          2604.00          2914.00         2986.85         3061.52         3138.06         3216.51          3296.92      3379.35         3463.83       3550.43  3639.19      3730.17      3823.42      3919.01      4016.98      4117.41      4220.34      4325.85      4434.00      4544.85      4658.47      4774.93      4894.30        5016.66      5142.08 
admin and secretarial  5038.91  274.00  139.00  143.00  146.58  150.24  154.00  157.85  161.79        165.84  169.98         174.23  178.59        183.05        187.63        192.32        197.13        202.06        207.11        212.28        217.59        223.03        228.61        234.32        240.18          246.18        252.34 
SPV Management  1687.45  21.00  49.00  50.00  51.25  52.53  53.84  55.19  56.57          57.98  59.43  60.92  62.44          64.00          65.60          67.24          68.93          70.65          72.41          74.23          76.08          77.98          79.93          81.93          83.98  86.08          88.23 
External fees 337.49  4.00 10.00  10.00  10.25  10.51  10.77  11.04  11.31          11.60  11.89  12.18  12.49          12.80          13.12          13.45          13.79          14.13          14.48          14.85          15.22          15.60          15.99          16.39          16.80  17.22          17.65 
Bank fees and charges  67.70  1.00 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.21 2.26 2.32 2.38 2.44 2.50 2.56 2.62 2.69 2.76 2.83 2.90 2.97 3.04 3.12 3.20 3.28 3.36 3.44 3.53 
Insurance  3036.41  38.00  87.00  90.00  92.25  94.56  96.92  99.34  101.83        104.37  106.98         109.66  112.40        115.21        118.09        121.04        124.07        127.17        130.35        133.61        136.95        140.37        143.88        147.48        151.16          154.94        158.81 
Hard FM Operating Costs  12878.98  174.00  380.00  381.00  390.53  400.29  410.30  420.55  431.07        441.84  452.89         464.21  475.82        487.71        499.91        512.40        525.21        538.34        551.80        565.60        579.74        594.23        609.09        624.31        639.92          655.92        672.32 
Pass through costs  4590.47  58.00  133.00  136.00  139.40  142.89  146.46  150.12  153.87        157.72  161.66         165.70  169.85        174.09        178.44        182.90        187.48        192.16        196.97        201.89        206.94        212.11        217.42        222.85        228.42          234.13        239.99 
Utilities costs  3307.21  42.00  95.00  98.00  100.45  102.96  105.54  108.17  110.88        113.65  116.49         119.40  122.39        125.45        128.58        131.80        135.09        138.47        141.93        145.48        149.12        152.85        156.67        160.58        164.60          168.71        172.93 
Total life cycle costs  4456.76  197.00  291.00  146.00  149.65  153.39        157.23  161.16         165.19  169.32        173.55        177.89        182.33        186.89        191.56        196.35        201.26        206.29        211.45        216.74        222.16        227.71          233.40        239.24 
balancing 
Total costs  35401.38  612.00  895.00  910.00         1129.75         1247.07         1125.97         1154.12          1182.97      1212.55         1242.86       1273.93  1305.78      1338.43      1371.89      1406.18      1441.34      1477.37      1514.31      1552.16      1590.97      1630.74      1671.51      1713.30      1756.13        1800.03      1845.03 
Gross profit  61711.71  -368.00          1709.00          2004.00         1857.10         1814.45         2012.09         2062.39          2113.95      2166.80         2220.97       2276.49  2333.41      2391.74      2451.53      2512.82      2575.64      2640.03      2706.04      2773.69      2843.03      2914.10      2986.96      3061.63      3138.17        3216.63      3297.04 
Depreciation  17940.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00        690.00  690.00         690.00  690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00        690.00          690.00        690.00 
Operating profit  -1058.00          1019.00          1314.00         1167.10         1124.45         1322.09         1372.39          1423.95      1476.80         1530.97       1586.49  1643.41      1701.74      1761.53      1822.82      1885.64      1950.03      2016.04      2083.69      2153.03      2224.10      2296.96      2371.63      2448.17        2526.63      2607.04 
stamp duty 
interest on senior debt 2 bullet    3500.00    140.00  140.00  140.00  140.00  140.00  140.00  140.00        140.00  140.00         140.00  140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00        140.00          140.00        140.00 
interest on senior debt 1amortising  20543.10  1222.00          1205.00         1190.00         1142.40         1096.70         1052.84          1010.72        970.29  931.48         894.22  858.45        824.12        791.15        759.50        729.12        699.96        671.96        645.08        619.28        594.51        570.73        547.90        525.98          504.94        484.75 
interest on subordinated debt   3640.04    285.00  271.00  266.00  247.38  230.06  213.96  198.98        185.05  172.10         160.05  148.85        138.43        128.74        119.73        111.35        103.55          96.30          89.56          83.29          77.46          72.04          67.00          62.31   57.95          53.89 
interest receivable   -1524.05     -28.00   -28.00  -48.00   -49.20   -50.43   -51.69  -52.98        -54.31   -55.67          -57.06   -58.48        -59.95        -61.44        -62.98        -64.55        -66.17        -67.82        -69.52        -71.26        -73.04        -74.86        -76.74        -78.65  -80.62        -82.64 
balance 
total financing costs  0.00          1619.00          1588.00         1548.00         1480.58         1416.34         1355.10          1296.72      1241.04         1187.92       1137.22  1088.82      1042.60        998.45        956.25        915.92        877.34        840.44        805.13        771.32        738.93        707.90        678.16        649.64          622.27        596.00 
Profit before tax -1058.00  -600.00  -274.00          -380.90          -356.13  -94.25  17.29  127.23        235.76  343.05         449.28  554.59        659.14        763.09        866.57        969.73      1072.69      1175.59      1278.56      1381.71      1485.17      1589.05      1693.47      1798.54        1904.36      2011.04 
tax 7445.94  28.15          91.32        162.02        240.22        325.92        419.12        519.85        628.12        743.96        867.42        998.53        1137.36      1283.96 
Profit after tax -1058.00  -600.00  -274.00          -380.90          -356.13  -94.25  17.29  127.23        235.76  343.05         449.28  554.59        659.14        734.94        775.25        807.71        832.48        849.68        859.44        861.86        857.05        845.09        826.06        800.01          767.00        727.08 
 
Deferred tax -285.66  -447.66  -521.64          -624.48          -720.64          -746.08          -741.42  -707.07      -643.41          -550.79        -429.48  -279.74      -101.77        104.26        338.23        600.06        889.69      1207.10      1552.31      1925.37      2326.37      2755.41      3212.65      3698.25        4212.43      4755.41 
 
Balance sheet cash flows 
Fixed assets  -14666.00         -8835.00 
Senior debt 2 bullet  1355.00  817.00 
Senior debt amortising  2020.10         12200.00          6977.00  -286.00  -303.00          -318.00          -365.60          -411.30          -455.16  -497.28      -537.71          -576.52        -613.78  -649.55      -683.88      -716.85      -748.50      -778.88      -808.04      -836.04      -862.92      -888.72      -913.49      -937.27      -960.10      -982.02      -1003.06    -1023.25 
sub debt  0.00 1737.00  667.00     41.00   -43.00  -48.00          -107.00          -107.00          -107.00  -107.00      -107.00          -107.00        -107.00  -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00        -107.00      -107.00 
-19560.90  626.00  -374.00  -245.00  -346.00          -366.00          -472.60          -518.30          -562.16  -604.28      -644.71          -683.52        -720.78  -756.55      -790.88      -823.85      -855.50      -885.88      -915.04      -943.04      -969.92      -995.72    -1020.49    -1044.27    -1067.10    -1089.02      -1110.06    -1130.25 
Residual values 
Fixed assets  8250.00 
Senior debt 2 bullet  -2172.00 
Senior debt amortising  -2020.10 
sub debt 
Operating pre tax cash flow -368.00          1709.00          2004.00         1857.10         1814.45         2012.09         2062.39          2113.95      2166.80         2220.97       2276.49  2333.41      2391.74      2451.53      2512.82      2575.64      2640.03      2706.04      2773.69      2843.03      2914.10      2986.96      3061.63      3138.17        3216.63      3297.04 
 
Project pre tax cash flows (no RV) -14666.00         -9203.00          1709.00          2004.00         1857.10         1814.45         2012.09         2062.39          2113.95      2166.80         2220.97       2276.49  2333.41      2391.74      2451.53      2512.82      2575.64      2640.03      2706.04      2773.69      2843.03      2914.10      2986.96      3061.63      3138.17        3216.63      3297.04 
Project pre tax cash flows (RV) -14666.00         -9203.00          1709.00          2004.00         1857.10         1814.45         2012.09         2062.39          2113.95      2166.80         2220.97       2276.49  2333.41      2391.74      2451.53      2512.82      2575.64      2640.03      2706.04      2773.69      2843.03      2914.10      2986.96      3061.63      3138.17        3216.63   11547.04 
Senior debt 2 cash flows  1355.00  817.00  -140.00  -140.00          -140.00          -140.00          -140.00          -140.00  -140.00      -140.00          -140.00        -140.00  -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00        -140.00    -2312.00 
Senior debt 1 cash flows  12200.00          6977.00         -1508.00         -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00    -1508.00        -1508.00      -1508.00          -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00      -1508.00    -3528.10 
Post senior debt pre tax cash no RV -1111.00         -1409.00  61.00  356.00  209.10  166.45  364.09  414.39  465.95        518.80  572.97         628.49  685.41        743.74        803.53        864.82        927.64        992.03      1058.04      1125.69      1195.03      1266.10      1338.96      1413.63      1490.17        1568.63    -2543.06 
Post senior debt pre tax cash (RV) -1111.00         -1409.00  61.00  356.00  209.10  166.45  364.09  414.39  465.95        518.80  572.97         628.49  685.41        743.74        803.53        864.82        927.64        992.03      1058.04      1125.69      1195.03      1266.10      1338.96      1413.63      1490.17        1568.63      5706.94 
Post senior debt post tax cash no RV -1111.00         -1409.00  61.00  356.00  209.10  166.45  364.09  414.39  465.95        518.80  572.97         628.49  685.41        743.74        775.38        773.50        765.63        751.82        732.12        706.56        675.18        637.99        595.00        546.22        491.64          431.27    -3827.02 
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Post senior debt pre tax cash no RV -1111.00 430.00 498.00 538.00 395.65 357.67 560.08 615.28 671.87 729.86 789.31 850.24 912.70 976.72     1042.33     1109.59     1178.53     1249.20     1321.63     1395.87     1471.96     1549.96     1629.91     1711.86     1795.86 1881.95    -1941.90 
Post senior debt post tax cash (RV) -1111.00 430.00 498.00 538.00 395.65 357.67 560.08 615.28 671.87 729.86 789.31 850.24 912.70 976.72       599.01       582.92       560.32       531.24       495.73       453.82       405.51       350.84       289.78       222.36       148.54 68.31     4319.54 
Nominal Pre-Tax Project IRR no RV 9.40% 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR with RV 43.97% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. East Lancs: Adjusted 3 years ex post data 
 
 
 
Detailed forecast 
 
Proforma P&L a/c 
 
total  30/9/04  30/9/05  30/9/06  30/9/07          30/9/08          30/9/09          30/9/10          30/9/11  30/9/12      30/9/13          30/9/14        30/9/15  30/9/16      30/9/17      30/9/18      30/9/19      30/9/20      30/9/21      30/9/22      30/9/23      30/9/24      30/9/25      30/9/26      30/9/27      30/9/28         30/9/29      30/9/30 
Lease plus payments  85703.12  98.00          2274.00          2576.00         2640.40         2706.41         2774.07         2843.42          2914.51     2987.37         3062.05       3138.61  3217.07     3297.50     3379.94     3464.43     3551.04     3639.82     3730.82     3824.09     3919.69     4017.68     4118.12     4221.08     4326.60        4434.77     4545.64 
third party revenues    1823.85  24.00  53.00  54.00  55.35  56.73  58.15  59.61  61.10         62.62  64.19  65.79   67.44         69.12         70.85         72.62         74.44         76.30         78.21         80.16         82.17         84.22         86.33         88.49         90.70  92.96         95.29 
Recovery of pass through costs  6278.92  80.00  182.00  186.00  190.65  195.42  200.30  205.31  210.44       215.70  221.10         226.62  232.29       238.10       244.05       250.15       256.40       262.81       269.38       276.12       283.02       290.10       297.35       304.78       312.40          320.21       328.22 
Recovery of utilities costs  3307.21  42.00  95.00  98.00  100.45  102.96  105.54  108.17  110.88       113.65  116.49         119.40  122.39       125.45       128.58       131.80       135.09       138.47       141.93       145.48       149.12       152.85       156.67       160.58       164.60          168.71       172.93 
Total revenue  97113.10  1890.00          2862.00          2914.00         2986.85         3061.52         3138.06         3216.51          3296.92     3379.35         3463.83       3550.43  3639.19     3730.17     3823.42     3919.01     4016.98     4117.41     4220.34     4325.85     4434.00     4544.85     4658.47     4774.93     4894.30        5016.66     5142.08 
admin and secretarial  4085.93  274.00  111.20  114.40  117.26  120.19  123.20  126.28  129.43       132.67  135.99         139.39  142.87       146.44       150.10       153.86       157.70       161.64       165.69       169.83       174.07       178.42       182.89       187.46       192.14          196.95       201.87 
SPV Management  1354.16  21.00  39.20  40.00  41.00  42.03  43.08  44.15  45.26         46.39  47.55  48.74  49.95         51.20         52.48         53.80         55.14         56.52         57.93         59.38         60.86         62.39         63.95         65.54         67.18  68.86         70.58 
External fees  270.79  4.00  8.00  8.00  8.20  8.41  8.62  8.83  9.05  9.28  9.51  9.75  9.99         10.24         10.50         10.76         11.03         11.30         11.59         11.88         12.17         12.48         12.79         13.11         13.44  13.77         14.12 
Bank fees and charges  54.36  1.00  1.60  1.60  1.64  1.68  1.72  1.77  1.81  1.86  1.90  1.95  2.00  2.05  2.10  2.15  2.21  2.26  2.32  2.38  2.43  2.50  2.56  2.62  2.69  2.75  2.82 
Insurance  2436.73  38.00  69.60  72.00  73.80  75.65  77.54  79.47  81.46         83.50  85.59  87.73  89.92         92.17         94.47         96.83         99.25       101.73       104.28       106.88       109.56       112.30       115.10       117.98       120.93          123.95       127.05 
Hard FM Operating Costs  10337.99  174.00  304.00  304.80  312.42  320.23  328.24  336.44  344.85       353.47  362.31         371.37  380.65       390.17       399.92       409.92       420.17       430.67       441.44       452.48       463.79       475.38       487.27       499.45       511.94          524.73       537.85 
Pass through costs  3683.98  58.00  106.40  108.80  111.52  114.31  117.17  120.09  123.10       126.17  129.33         132.56  135.88       139.27       142.76       146.32       149.98       153.73       157.57       161.51       165.55       169.69       173.93       178.28       182.74          187.31       191.99 
Utilities costs  2654.16  42.00  76.00  78.40  80.36  82.37  84.43  86.54  88.70         90.92  93.19  95.52  97.91       100.36       102.87       105.44       108.08       110.78       113.55       116.39       119.29       122.28       125.33       128.47       131.68          134.97       138.35 
Total life cycle costs  4456.76  197.00  291.00  146.00  149.65  153.39       157.23  161.16         165.19  169.32       173.55       177.89       182.33       186.89       191.56       196.35       201.26       206.29       211.45       216.74       222.16       227.71          233.40       239.24 
balancing 
Total costs  29334.86  419.00  716.00  728.00  943.20         1055.86  929.98  953.23  977.06     1001.48         1026.52       1052.18  1078.49     1105.45     1133.09     1161.41     1190.45     1220.21     1250.71     1281.98     1314.03     1346.88     1380.56     1415.07     1450.45        1486.71     1523.87 
Gross profit  67778.24  1471.00          2146.00          2186.00         2043.65         2005.67         2208.08         2263.28          2319.87     2377.86         2437.31       2498.24  2560.70     2624.72     2690.33     2757.59     2826.53     2897.20     2969.63     3043.87     3119.96     3197.96     3277.91     3359.86     3443.86        3529.95     3618.20 
Depreciation  17940.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00  690.00       690.00  690.00         690.00  690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00       690.00          690.00       690.00 
Operating profit  781.00          1456.00          1496.00         1353.65         1315.67         1518.08         1573.28          1629.87     1687.86         1747.31       1808.24  1870.70     1934.72     2000.33     2067.59     2136.53     2207.20     2279.63     2353.87     2429.96     2507.96     2587.91     2669.86     2753.86        2839.95     2928.20 
stamp duty 
interest on senior debt 2 bullet    3500.00    140.00  140.00  140.00  140.00   140.00  140.00  140.00       140.00  140.00         140.00  140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00       140.00          140.00       140.00 
interest on senior debt 1amortising  20543.10   1222.00          1205.00         1190.00         1142.40         1096.70         1052.84          1010.72       970.29  931.48         894.22  858.45       824.12       791.15       759.50       729.12       699.96       671.96       645.08       619.28       594.51       570.73       547.90       525.98          504.94       484.75 
interest on subordinated  debt    3640.04    285.00  271.00  266.00  247.38   230.06  213.96  198.98       185.05  172.10         160.05  148.85       138.43       128.74       119.73       111.35       103.55         96.30         89.56         83.29         77.46         72.04         67.00         62.31   57.95         53.89 
interest receivable   -1531.05  -7.00   -28.00   -28.00   -48.00   -49.20   -50.43  -51.69  -52.98        -54.31   -55.67          -57.06   -58.48        -59.95        -61.44        -62.98        -64.55        -66.17        -67.82        -69.52        -71.26        -73.04        -74.86        -76.74        -78.65   -80.62        -82.64 
balance 
total financing costs  1048.00          1590.00          1555.00         1548.00         1480.58         1416.34         1355.10          1296.72     1241.04         1187.92       1137.22  1088.82     1042.60       998.45       956.25       915.92       877.34       840.44       805.13       771.32       738.93       707.90       678.16       649.64          622.27       596.00 
Profit before tax -267.00  -134.00  -59.00          -194.35          -164.91  101.75  218.18  333.15       446.82  559.39         671.03  781.88       892.12     1001.89     1111.34     1220.62     1329.85     1439.18     1548.74     1658.65     1769.03     1880.01     1991.70     2104.22        2217.68     2332.20 
tax 14618.84  443.32       526.67       618.22       717.96       825.89       942.05     1066.45     1199.13     1340.13     1489.50     1647.32        1813.65     1988.56 
Profit after tax -267.00  -134.00  -59.00          -194.35          -164.91  101.75  218.18  333.15       446.82  559.39         671.03  781.88       892.12     1001.89     1111.34     1220.62     1329.85     1439.18     1548.74     1658.65     1769.03     1880.01     1991.70     2104.22        2217.68     2332.20 
 
Deferred tax -66.75  330.75  316.00  267.41  226.18  251.62  306.17  389.45       501.16  641.01         808.76  1004.23     1227.26     1477.73     1755.57     2060.72     2393.19     2752.98     3140.17     3554.83     3997.09     4467.09     4965.01     5491.07        6045.49     6628.54 
 
Balance sheet cash flows 
Fixed assets  -14666.00         -8835.00 
Senior debt 2 bullet  1355.00  817.00 
Senior debt amortising  2020.10         12200.00           6977.00  -286.00  -303.00          -318.00          -365.60          -411.30          -455.16  -497.28      -537.71          -576.52        -613.78  -649.55      -683.88      -716.85      -748.50      -778.88      -808.04      -836.04      -862.92      -888.72      -913.49      -937.27      -960.10      -982.02       -1003.06    -1023.25 
sub debt   0.00  1737.00  667.00   41.00    -43.00  -48.00          -107.00          -107.00          -107.00  -107.00      -107.00          -107.00        -107.00  -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00      -107.00         -107.00      -107.00 
-19560.90  626.00  -374.00  -245.00  -346.00          -366.00          -472.60          -518.30          -562.16  -604.28      -644.71          -683.52        -720.78  -756.55      -790.88      -823.85      -855.50      -885.88      -915.04      -943.04      -969.92      -995.72    -1020.49    -1044.27    -1067.10    -1089.02       -1110.06    -1130.25 
Residual values 
Fixed assets  8250.00 
Senior debt 2 bullet  -2172.00 
Senior debt amortising  -2020.10 
sub debt 
Operating pre tax cash flow  1471.00          2146.00          2186.00         2043.65         2005.67         2208.08         2263.28          2319.87     2377.86         2437.31       2498.24  2560.70     2624.72     2690.33     2757.59     2826.53     2897.20     2969.63     3043.87     3119.96     3197.96     3277.91     3359.86     3443.86        3529.95     3618.20 
 
Project pre tax cash flows (no RV)  -14666.00         -7364.00          2146.00          2186.00         2043.65         2005.67         2208.08         2263.28          2319.87     2377.86         2437.31       2498.24  2560.70     2624.72     2690.33     2757.59     2826.53     2897.20     2969.63     3043.87     3119.96     3197.96     3277.91     3359.86     3443.86        3529.95     3618.20 
Project pre tax cash flows (RV)  -14666.00         -7364.00          2146.00          2186.00         2043.65         2005.67         2208.08         2263.28          2319.87     2377.86         2437.31       2498.24  2560.70     2624.72     2690.33     2757.59     2826.53     2897.20     2969.63     3043.87     3119.96     3197.96     3277.91     3359.86     3443.86        3529.95   11868.20 
Senior debt 2 cash flows  1355.00  817.00  -140.00  -140.00          -140.00          -140.00          -140.00          -140.00  -140.00      -140.00          -140.00        -140.00  -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00      -140.00         -140.00    -2032.00 
Senior debt 1 cash flows  12200.00           6977.00         -1508.00         -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00        -1508.00         -1508.00    -1508.00        -1508.00      -1508.00          -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00    -1508.00       -1508.00    -3528.10 
 
Post senior debt pre tax cash (RV)  -1111.00  430.00  498.00  538.00  395.65  357.67  560.08  615.28  671.87       729.86  789.31         850.24  912.70       976.72     1042.33     1109.59     1178.53     1249.20     1321.63     1395.87     1471.96     1549.96     1629.91     1711.86     1795.86        1881.95     6308.10 
Post senior debt post tax cash no RV -1111.00  430.00  498.00  538.00  395.65  357.67  560.08  615.28  671.87       729.86  789.31         850.24  912.70       976.72       599.01       582.92       560.32       531.24       495.73       453.82       405.51       350.84       289.78       222.36       148.54  68.31    -3930.46 
 
Nominal Pre-Tax Project IRR no RV  9.77% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 44.39% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Blended Equity IRR (RV)  44.41% 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 43.95% 
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Profit and loss account 31/03/06 31/03/07 31/03/08 31/03/09   31/03/10   31/03/11   31/03/12   31/03/13   31/03/14   31/03/15   31/03/16   31/03/17   31/03/18   31/03/19   31/03/20   31/03/21   31/03/22   31/03/23   31/03/24   31/03/25   31/03/26   31/03/27   31/03/28   31/03/29   31/03/30       31/03/31 
Gross profit 49563.78 693 1253 1472 1508.8    1546.52  1585.183  1624.813  1665.433  1707.069  1749.745  1793.489  1838.326  1884.284  1931.392  1979.676  2029.168  2079.897  2131.895  2185.192  2239.822  2295.818  2353.213  2412.043  2472.344  2534.153   2597.50692 
 
 
 
3. Mixed West Midlands: Adjusted 3 years ex post data 
 
 
Total revenue 54618.74 839 1439 1618       1658.45  1699.911  1742.409  1785.969  1830.618  1876.384  1923.294  1971.376    2020.66  2071.177  2122.956    2176.03  2230.431  2286.192  2343.346    2401.93  2461.978  2523.528  2586.616  2651.281  2717.563  2785.503   2855.14008 
Cost of sales 5054.96 146 186 146 149.65  153.3913    157.226  161.1567  165.1856  169.3152  173.5481  177.8868    182.334  186.8923  191.5647  196.3538  201.2626  206.2942  211.4515  216.7378  222.1563  227.7102  233.4029    239.238    245.219  251.3494     257.63316 
 
Depreciation 8548.8 328.80 328.80 328.80 328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80      328.80 328.80 
Operating profit 41014.98 364.20 924.20       1143.20       1180.00    1217.72    1256.38    1296.01    1336.63    1378.27    1420.95    1464.69    1509.53    1555.48    1602.59    1650.88    1700.37    1751.10    1803.09    1856.39    1911.02    1967.02    2024.41    2083.24    2143.54    2205.35 2268.71 
Financing costs 1117.13       1072.73       1018.55      970.72      925.28      882.10      841.04      802.00      764.85      729.48      695.80      663.71      633.12      603.95      576.12      549.54      524.16      499.91      476.72      454.53      433.28      412.93      393.43      374.72 356.76 
Profit before tax  364.20       -192.93 70.47 161.45      247.00      331.10      413.91      495.59      576.27      656.10      735.21      813.73      891.77      969.47    1046.93    1124.25    1201.55    1278.93    1356.48    1434.31    1512.49    1591.13    1670.31    1750.12    1830.63 1911.95 
tax 13764.74    476.28      552.60      634.56      722.15      815.39      914.27    1018.84    1129.10    1245.09    1366.86    1494.44    1627.89 1767.27 
Profit after tax -192.93 70.47 161.45      247.00      331.10      413.91      495.59      576.27      656.10      735.21      813.73      891.77      493.19      494.32      489.69      479.40      463.54      442.21      415.47      383.40      346.04      303.45      255.68      202.74 144.67 
 
Deferred tax 98.33 46.24 65.27 108.86      175.55      264.95      376.71      510.52      666.11      843.25    1041.76    1261.47    1502.25    1764.00    2046.67    2350.22    2674.64    3019.95    3386.20    3773.47    4181.84    4611.44    5062.43    5534.96    6029.23 6545.45 
 
Financing cash flows 
interest on senior debt 2 bullet  2505.75 100.23 100.23 100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23      100.23 100.23 
interest on senior debt 1amortising 12150.82 759.90 729.50 700.32      672.31      645.42      619.60      594.82      571.02      548.18      526.25      505.20      485.00      465.60      446.97      429.09      411.93      395.45      379.63      364.45      349.87      335.88      322.44      309.54      297.16 285.28 
interest on subordinated debt  3640.04 285.00 271.00 266.00      247.38      230.06      213.96      198.98      185.05      172.10      160.05      148.85      138.43      128.74      119.73      111.35      103.55        96.30        89.56        83.29        77.46        72.04        67.00        62.31        57.95   53.89 
interest receivable  -1524.05  -28.00  -28.00  -48.00       -49.20       -50.43       -51.69       -52.98       -54.31       -55.67       -57.06       -58.48       -59.95       -61.44       -62.98       -64.55       -66.17       -67.82       -69.52       -71.26       -73.04       -74.86       -76.74       -78.65       -80.62 -82.64 
1117.13       1072.73       1018.55      970.72      925.28      882.10      841.04      802.00      764.85      729.48      695.80      663.71      633.12      603.95      576.12      549.54      524.16      499.91      476.72      454.53      433.28      412.93      393.43      374.72 356.76 
Balance sheet cash flows 
Fixed assets -15420 -15420 0 
Senior amort 11873 11873 0       -286.00        -316.40        -345.58     -373.59     -400.48     -426.30     -451.08     -474.87     -497.72     -519.64     -540.69     -560.90     -580.30     -598.92     -616.80     -633.97     -650.44     -666.26     -681.45     -696.03     -710.02     -723.46     -736.35     -748.74 -760.62 
Senior debt bullet 1542 1542 0 
sub debt 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
-13996.62 -2005 0       -286.00        -316.40        -345.58     -373.59     -400.48     -426.30     -451.08     -474.87     -497.72     -519.64     -540.69     -560.90     -580.30     -598.92     -616.80     -633.97     -650.44     -666.26     -681.45     -696.03     -710.02     -723.46     -736.35     -748.74 -760.62 
 
Total senior amortisation payment -1045.90 
 
Residual values 
Fixed assets 7200.00 
Senior debt 2 bullet -1542.00 
Senior debt amortising -1542.00 
sub debt 
Operating pre tax cash flow 693.00       1253.00       1472.00       1508.80    1546.52    1585.18    1624.81    1665.43    1707.07    1749.75    1793.49    1838.33    1884.28    1931.39    1979.68    2029.17    2079.90    2131.89    2185.19    2239.82    2295.82    2353.21    2412.04    2472.34    2534.15 2597.51 
 
Project pre tax cash flows (no RV) -15420.00 693.00       1253.00       1472.00       1508.80    1546.52    1585.18    1624.81    1665.43    1707.07    1749.75    1793.49    1838.33    1884.28    1931.39    1979.68    2029.17    2079.90    2131.89    2185.19    2239.82    2295.82    2353.21    2412.04    2472.34    2534.15 2597.51 
Project pre tax cash flows (RV) -15420.00 693.00       1253.00       1472.00       1508.80    1546.52    1585.18    1624.81    1665.43    1707.07    1749.75    1793.49    1838.33    1884.28    1931.39    1979.68    2029.17    2079.90    2131.89    2185.19    2239.82    2295.82    2353.21    2412.04    2472.34    2534.15 9797.51 
Senior debt amort cash flows 11873.40 0.00     -1045.90      -1045.90     -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90   -1045.90       -2587.90 
Senior debt 1 cash flows 1542.00 0.00       -100.23        -100.23        -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23     -100.23       -1642.23 
Post senior debt pre tax cash no RV -2004.60 693.00 106.87 325.87 362.67      400.39      439.06      478.68      519.31      560.94      603.62      647.36      692.20      738.16      785.26      833.55      883.04      933.77      985.77    1039.06    1093.69    1149.69    1207.09    1265.92    1326.22    1388.03       -1632.62 
Post senior debt pre tax cash (RV) -2004.60 693.00 106.87 325.87 362.67      400.39      439.06      478.68      519.31      560.94      603.62      647.36      692.20      738.16      785.26      833.55      883.04      933.77      985.77    1039.06    1093.69    1149.69    1207.09    1265.92    1326.22    1388.03 5567.38 
Post senior debt post tax cash no RV -2004.60 693.00 106.87 325.87 362.67      400.39      439.06      478.68      519.31      560.94      603.62      647.36      692.20      738.16      308.98      280.95      248.48      211.62      170.38      124.79        74.86        20.59       -38.00     -100.94     -168.22     -239.87       -3399.89 
Post senior debt post tax cash (RV) -2004.60 693.00 106.87 325.87 362.67      400.39      439.06      478.68      519.31      560.94      603.62      647.36      692.20      738.16      308.98      280.95      248.48      211.62      170.38      124.79        74.86        20.59       -38.00     -100.94     -168.22     -239.87 3800.11 
 
Nominal Pre-Tax Project IRR no RV  9.64% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Project IRR no RV 10.06% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 23.30% 
Nominal Pre-Tax Blended Equity IRR (RV) 23.59% 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR no RV 20.63% 
Nominal Post-Tax Blended Equity IRR with RV       21.21% 
 
-1111 -1409 61 356 209.1  166.4525  364.0888    414.391  465.9508  518.7996  572.9696  628.4938  685.4062  743.7413  775.3846        773.5  765.6274  751.8193  732.1194  706.5633  675.1786  637.9854    594.996    546.216  491.6436  431.2703     4422.9811 
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Profit and loss account 
Depreciation 12,707.5 508.30 508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30        508.30  508.30 
Profit before tax 52.00 -1062.97 398.38 507.61 611.62 714.41 816.14 916.99 1017.12 1116.68 1215.82 1314.68 1413.41 1512.13 1610.97 1710.05 1809.51 1909.45 2009.99 2111.24 2213.31 2316.31 2420.34 2525.50 2631.90 2739.64 
Profit after tax -1062.97 398.38 507.61 611.62 714.41 816.14 916.99 1017.12 1116.68 1215.82 1314.68 1413.41 743.47 724.87 699.29 666.83 627.58 581.59 528.93 469.65 403.79 331.37 252.43 166.96 74.98 
Deferred  tax 14.04 -272.96 -165.40 -28.34 136.79 329.68 550.04 797.63 1072.25 1373.75 1702.02 2056.99 2438.61 2846.88 3281.84 3743.56 4232.13 4747.68 5290.37 5860.41 6458.00 7083.40 7736.89 8418.78 9129.39 9869.09 
Financing cash flows 
interest on senior debt 2 bullet  1896.18   75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85  75.85 
Balance  sheet cash flows 1191.67 1143.32 1085.34 1033.86 984.92 938.38 894.10 851.95 811.83 773.61 737.19 702.47 669.35 637.76 607.59 578.79 551.26 524.95 499.78 475.69 452.63 430.53 409.34 389.02 369.52 
Fixed assets 
Senior amort -14586 13419 -7293 6710 -7293 6710 -286.00 -320.35 -353.33 -384.99 -415.38 -444.56 -472.57 -499.46 -525.28 -550.06 -573.85 -596.69 -618.61 -639.66 -659.87 -679.27 -697.89 -715.77 -732.93 -749.40 -765.22 -780.41 -794.98 -808.98 -822.41 
-14887.93 0 0 -286.00 -320.35 -353.33 -384.99 -415.38 -444.56 -472.57 -499.46 -525.28 -550.06 -573.85 -596.69 -618.61 -639.66 -659.87 -679.27 -697.89 -715.77 -732.93 -749.40 -765.22 -780.41 -794.98 -808.98 -822.41 
Total senior amortisation payment -1144.82
Residual  values 
Fixed assets      9392.50 
Senior debt 2 bullet 
Senior debt amortising 
sub debt                            
-1166.88 
-1166.88 
Senior debt 1 cash flows 583.44 583.44 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -75.85        -75.85        -75.85        -75.85        -75.85        -75.85        -75.85        -75.85 -75.85 -75.85 -1242.73 
Post senior debt post tax cash (RV) 0.00 52.00 -583.67 829.33 880.58 933.11 986.95 1042.15 1098.72 1156.70 1216.13 1277.06 1339.50 1403.50 700.45 650.25 594.52        533.25        466.47        394.16        316.34        232.97        144.04          49.53 -50.60 -156.39 6790.87 
 
 
4. Urban NE: Adjusted 3 years ex post data 
 
 
 
Total revenue  76,154.6  70 776  2328       2386.2   2445.855    2507.001    2569.676    2633.918    2699.766      2767.26   2836.442    2907.353    2980.037    3054.538    3130.901    3209.174    3289.403    3371.638    3455.929    3542.327    3630.885    3721.658    3814.699    3910.067    4007.818    4108.01367 
Cost of sales  9,150.0  18 139  278       284.95   292.0738    299.3756        306.86   314.5315    322.3948    330.4546      338.716   347.1839    355.8635    364.7601    373.8791    383.2261    392.8067    402.6269    412.6926    423.0099    433.5851    444.4248    455.5354    466.9238    478.5968      490.56177 
Gross profit  67,004.5  52 637  2050     2101.25   2153.781    2207.626    2262.816    2319.387    2377.372    2436.806    2497.726    2560.169    2624.173    2689.778    2757.022    2825.948    2896.596    2969.011    3043.237    3119.317        3197.3   3277.233    3359.164    3443.143    3529.221      3617.4519 
 
Operating  profit  54,297.0  52.00  128.70     1541.70      1592.95      1645.48      1699.33      1754.52      1811.09      1869.07      1928.51      1989.43      2051.87      2115.87      2181.48      2248.72      2317.65      2388.30      2460.71      2534.94      2611.02      2689.00      2768.93      2850.86      2934.84      3020.92          3109.15 
Financing  costs  1191.67      1143.32      1085.34      1033.86        984.92        938.38        894.10        851.95        811.83        773.61        737.19        702.47        669.35        637.76        607.59        578.79        551.26        524.95        499.78        475.69        452.63        430.53        409.34        389.02  369.52 
 
tax  21248.58  768.66        886.10     1010.76      1142.67      1281.87      1428.40      1582.31      1743.66      1912.52      2088.96      2273.07      2464.94          2664.66 
 
 
 
interest on senior debt 1amortising 13732.66  858.82        824.47        791.49        759.83        729.44        700.26        672.25        645.36        619.55        594.76        570.97        548.14        526.21        505.16        484.95        465.56        446.93        429.06        411.89        395.42        379.60        364.42        349.84        335.85  322.41 
interest on subordinated debt    3640.04  285.00        271.00        266.00        247.38        230.06        213.96        198.98        185.05        172.10        160.05        148.85        138.43        128.74        119.73        111.35        103.55          96.30          89.56          83.29          77.46          72.04          67.00          62.31          57.95    53.89 
interest receivable   -1524.05   -28.00        -28.00        -48.00        -49.20        -50.43        -51.69        -52.98        -54.31        -55.67        -57.06        -58.48        -59.95        -61.44        -62.98        -64.55        -66.17        -67.82        -69.52        -71.26        -73.04        -74.86        -76.74        -78.65        -80.62   -82.64 
 
 
Senior debt bullet  1167  583  583 
sub debt  0 0 0 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 
 
 
Operating  pre tax cash flow  52.00  637.00     2050.00      2101.25      2153.78      2207.63      2262.82      2319.39      2377.37      2436.81      2497.73      2560.17      2624.17      2689.78      2757.02      2825.95      2896.60      2969.01      3043.24      3119.32      3197.30      3277.23      3359.16      3443.14      3529.22          3617.45 
 
Project pre tax cash flows (no RV)  -7293.00  -7241.00  637.00     2050.00      2101.25      2153.78      2207.63      2262.82      2319.39      2377.37      2436.81      2497.73      2560.17      2624.17      2689.78      2757.02      2825.95      2896.60      2969.01      3043.24      3119.32      3197.30      3277.23      3359.16      3443.14      3529.22          3617.45 
Project pre tax cash flows (RV)  -7293.00  -7241.00  637.00     2050.00      2101.25      2153.78      2207.63      2262.82      2319.39      2377.37      2436.81      2497.73      2560.17      2624.17      2689.78      2757.02      2825.95      2896.60      2969.01      3043.24      3119.32      3197.30      3277.23      3359.16      3443.14      3529.22        13009.95 
Senior debt amort cash flows  6709.56  6709.56  -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82    -1144.82         -2311.70 
 
Post senior debt pre tax cash no RV  0.00  52.00  -583.67        829.33        880.58        933.11        986.95     1042.15      1098.72      1156.70      1216.13      1277.06      1339.50      1403.50      1469.11      1536.35      1605.28      1675.93      1748.34      1822.57      1898.65      1976.63      2056.56      2138.49      2222.47      2308.55  63.02 
Post senior debt pre tax cash (RV)  0.00  52.00  -583.67        829.33        880.58        933.11        986.95     1042.15      1098.72      1156.70      1216.13      1277.06      1339.50      1403.50      1469.11      1536.35      1605.28      1675.93      1748.34      1822.57      1898.65      1976.63      2056.56      2138.49      2222.47      2308.55          9455.52 
Post senior debt post tax cash no RV  0.00  52.00  -583.67        829.33        880.58        933.11        986.95     1042.15      1098.72      1156.70      1216.13      1277.06      1339.50      1403.50        700.45        650.25        594.52        533.25        466.47        394.16        316.34        232.97        144.04          49.53        -50.60      -156.39         -2601.63 
 
 
Nominal  Pre-Tax  Project IRR no RV    13.53% 
Nominal  Pre-Tax  Project IRR no RV    13.83% 
Nominal  Pre-Tax  Blended  Equity IRR no RV  199.98% 
Nominal  Pre-Tax  Blended  Equity IRR (RV)  199.98% 
Nominal  Post-Tax  Blended  Equity IRR no RV         199.98%  12.92 
Nominal  Post-Tax  Blended  Equity IRR with RV      199.98%    14.966667 
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Appendix 7 
 
Survey Analysis and Questionnaire 
 
This appendix summarises the findings of patient surveys carried out by the research team 
in March 2009. Despite earlier promises of collaboration from all four case study areas, 
eventually only three health centres collaborated with this part of the study. All 
participating health centres were mailed an initial batch of 100 questionnaires together 
with envelopes, which were to be distributed by the practice receptionist, allowing 
respondents to return their questionnaires in a sealed envelope.  All sealed envelopes 
were to be returned unopened to the research team by the practice managers after a 
period of one month via post (in a large sealed self-addressed envelope). As additional 
incentives, all participating practices were offered a donation to a charity of their choice 
for each returned envelope. 
 
The participants included one practice which was the sole practice occupying a health 
centre in rural West Midlands LIFT (rural West Midlands LIFT was not part of the case 
study 
analysis of section 7, but contributed to the user interviews of section 4.3). This practice 
returned seventy completed questionnaires. The other participants included two practices 
operating in two different health centres which were part of urban North East LIFT (which 
was part of both the financial analysis of section 5 and the case study analysis of section 
7). Since one of these practices returned only 17 questionnaires and the other 9 
questionnaires, it was decided to analyse the questionnaires from urban NE LIFT together. 
 
Overall, the number of questionnaires returned byrural West Midlands LIFT and urban NE 
LIFT were indicative of a low response. In addition, the demographic profile of 
respondents at both locations indicated the possibility of response bias with a large 
number of respondents being elderly, female and white. 
 
 
Table A7) Demographic Profile of Respondents 
 
Rural West Midl LIFT Urban NE LIFT 
 
 
Male 
 
27.1% (19) 
 
38.4% (10) 
Female 72.8% (51) 61.5% (16) 
Median Age 1953 1957.5 
Average Age 1954.6 1961.2 
Percentage White 100.0% (70) 96.1% (25) 
 
Percentage Asian 
 
0.0% ( 0) 3.8%  (1) is not part 
 
 
However, despite these limitations, there was strong evidence of a high degree of 
satisfaction among patients with their facilities.  This was demonstrated by a number of 
indicators which will be discussed below. 
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With regard to patient awareness that the facility had been procured via a public private 
partnership, there was evidence that only a small number of respondents knew about this. 
 
Table A7a) Patient Knowledge of Partnership 
 
Rural West Midl LIFT Urban NE LIFT 
Yes No Yes No 
 
 
Did you know that this 37.5% 62.5% 20.0% 80.0% 
Surgery/Health Centre 
was a partnership between 24 42 3 12 
the public and private 
sector? 
 
 
With regard to accessibility by different means of transport, all locations were generally 
rated favourably by the respondents.  One possible exception to this were the car parking 
facilities at the rural West Midl LIFT practice, which 30.9% of the respondents rated as not 
convenient. 
 
 
Table A7b) Patient Views on Accessibility 
 
Rural West Midl Lift Urban NE LIFT 
Yes Unsure No Yes Unsure No  
 
 
Do you think the location of this 
Surgery/Health Centre is 
convenient for 
walking 93.9% 6.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 62 4 0 25 0 0 
public transport 84.3% 14.3% 1.4% 96.0% 4.0% 0.0%
 59 10 1 24 0 1 
driving by car 97.1% 1.4% 1.4% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 67 1 1 24 0 0 
car parking 57.3% 11.8% 30.9% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
 39 8 21 22 0 0 
 
 
All locations were overwhelmingly rated as ‘safe’, with only a very small percentage of 
rural West Midl LIFT respondents expressing uncertainty over this matter. 
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Table A7c) Patient Views on Location Safety 
 
Rural West Midl LIFT Urban NE LIFT 
Yes Uns ure No Yes Unsure No 
 
 
Do you feel this is a 
 
97.1% 
 
1.4% 
 
1.4% 
 
100.0% 
 
0.0% 
 
0.0% 
Safe location? 67 1 1 26 0 0 
 
 
This was mirrored by generally positive views which respondents from all 
locations expressed with regard to buggy and wheelchair access. 
 
 
 
Table A7d) Patient Views on Special Access 
 
Rural West Midl LIFT  Urban NE 
LIFT Yes Unsure No Yes   
Unsure No 
 
 
Is this Health Centre 
accessible 
with a buggy 
 
 
 
98.5% 
 
 
 
1.5% 
 
 
 
0.0% 
 
 
 
96.0% 
 
 
 
4.0% 
 
 
 
0.0% 
 67 1 0 24 1 0 
with a wheelchair 95.5% 4.5% 0.0% 96.0% 4.0% 0.0% 
 64 3 0 24 1 0 
 
 
When asked about recent (over the past year) changes to the practice, most respondents 
expressed positive views. One possible exception to this was the issue of ‘getting 
appointments’ and ‘waiting times’, where slightly more than 10% of respondents at the 
rural West Midl LIFT practice expressed that this had become worse (a similar pattern 
was 
visible for the urban NE practices, where 8% of respondents indicated that waiting time had 
become worse at their practice). 
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Table A7e) Patient Views on Changes to this Building 
 
Rural West Midl LIFT Urban NE LIFT 
Better Unsure  Worse Better Unsure Worse 
 
 
Have you noticed changes to 
this building in general 60.6% 39.4% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
 40 26 0 12 12 0 
the furniture 56.7% 43.3% 0.0% 40.0% 60.0% 0.0%
 38 29 0 10 15 0 
cleanliness 63.6% 36.4% 0.0% 56.0% 44.0% 0.0%
 42 24 0 14 11 0 
the reception area 66.6% 33.3% 0.0% 44.0% 56.0% 0.0%
 44 22 0 11 14 0 
Staffing 57.3% 42.6% 0.0% 32.0% 68.0% 0.0%
 39 29 0 8 17 0 
getting appointments 67.1% 21.4% 11.4% 80.0% 20.0% 0.0%
 47 15 8 20 5 0 
waiting times 58.5% 31.4% 10.0% 56.0% 36.0% 8.0%
 41 22 7 14 9 2 
facilities for children 45.3% 50.0% 4.7% 52.0% 48.0% 0.0%
 29 32 3 13 10 0 
 
 
When asked to compare the current building with previous accommodation, the majority of 
respondents indicated that there had been improvements.  Again, these views were less 
pronounced when it came to the issue of ‘getting appointments’ and waiting times’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A7f) Patient Views on Changes from Previous Building 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
327 
 
Rural West Midl LIFT Urban NE LIFT 
Better Unsure  Worse Better Unsure Worse 
 
 
Have you noticed changes to 
 the furniture 85.2% 10.3% 4.4% 88.4% 7.7% 3.8%
 58 7 3 23 2 1 
cleanliness 81.1% 17.4% 1.4% 84.6% 11.5% 3.8%
 56 12 1 22 3 1 
the reception area 88.4% 8.6% 2.9% 88.4% 7.7% 3.8%
 61 6 2 23 2 1 
staffing 68.1% 31.9% 0.0% 68.0% 32.0% 0.0%
 47 22 0 17 8 0 
staff attitudes 66.6% 33.3% 0.0% 80.7% 19.2% 0.0%
 44 24 0 21 5 0 
getting appointments 69.6% 24.6% 5.8% 80.0% 12.0% 8.0%
 48 17 4 20 3 2 
waiting times 69.6% 27.5% 2.9% 76.9% 15.4% 7.7%
 48 19 2 20 4 2 
facilities for children 51.4% 44.1% 4.4% 69.2% 26.9% 3.8%
 35 30 3 18 7 1 
 
 
 
As regards overall patient perception with regard to the quality of services, this was 
overwhelmingly rated as either ‘very good’ or ‘good’ with respondents from the rural west 
Midl practice giving, interestingly, an even more positive picture than those form the urban 
NE LIFT practice. 
 
 
 
Table A7g) Patient View  on Overall Quality f Service at their Health Centre 
 
 
 
 
vpoor 
Rur l W st Midlands Urban NE LIFT 
Vgd gd  adeq  poor vpoor Vgd gd adeq  poor 
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Table A7g) Patient Views on Overall Quality of Service at their Health Centre 
 
 
 
 
vpoor 
Rural West Midlands Urban NE LIFT 
Vgd gd  adeq  poor vpoor Vgd gd adeq  poor 
 
 
How would you rate the 62.3% 34.7% 2.9% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Quality of service at   43 24 2 0 0  12 12 0 0 0 
this health centre? 
 
These results were closely mirrored by the respondents’ views on the quality of the 
building  which was rated as either ‘very good’ or ‘good’ by respondents in all locations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<formatting space> 
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Table A7h) Patient Views on Building Quality at Present 
 
Rural West Midlands Urban NE LIFT 
Vgood gd  adeq  poor vpoor Vgood gd  adeq poor vpoor 
 
 
How would you rate the 82.8% 17.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 72.0% 18.0%  0.0% 0.0% 
0.0% Quality of this Building   58 12 0 0 0  18 7 0 0 0 
at present? 
 
 
Similarly positive results were detected for the questions as to how patients thought 
services in their practice and their practice building compared with other practices. 
 
Table A7i) Patient Views on Services Compared to other Practices 
 
Rural West Midlands Urban NE LIFT 
Better Unsure  Worse Better Unsure Worse 
 
 
Overall, do you think the 
 
71.4% 
 
28.6% 
 
0.0% 
 
68.0% 
 
28.0% 
 
0.0% 
services here are better or 50 20 0 17 7 0 
worse than in other practices 
in the area?       
 
 
Table A7j) Patient Views on Building Compared to other Practices 
 
Rural West Midlands Urban NE LIFT 
Better Unsure  Worse Better Unsure Worse 
 
 
Overall, do you think this 
 
74.2% 
 
25.7% 
 
0.0% 
 
76.0% 
 
24.0% 
 
0.0% 
Building is better or 52 18 0 19 6 0 
worse than in other practices 
in the area?       
 
 
Overall this, albeit flawed and limited survey, gave considerable support to the 
statements by virtually all case study informants, that patients benefited from new LIFT 
premises in terms of the quality of the buildings and services delivered. 
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Health Centre ………………………… 
 
GP practice …………………………… 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please answer the 
questions by circling the answer which you agree with for each question. 
 
Once you have answered all the questions, please return the completed questionnaire 
to Reception in the envelope provided.  You do not have to write your name 
anywhere on the form, and the answers you give will remain confidential. 
 
 
 
1. Did you know that this GP’s surgery/health centre is a partnership between the public 
and private sector? 
 
Yes No 
 
 
 
2. Do you think the location of this surgery/health centre is convenient for: 
 
a) people walking here? Yes Not sure No 
 
b) getting here by public transport?
 
Yes 
 
Not sure 
 
No 
 
c) driving here by car? 
 
Yes 
 
Not sure 
 
No 
 
d) car parking? 
 
Yes 
 
Not sure 
 
No 
 
 
3. Do you feel this is a safe location? Yes Not sure No 
4. Is this health centre accessible? 
 
a) with a buggy? 
 
b) with a wheelchair 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Not sure 
 
Not sure 
 
 
 
No 
 
No 
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For the next set of questions, please think about your visits to this building over the last year. 
 
5. Have you noticed any changes in the building in general? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
6. Have you noticed any changes in the furniture? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
7. Have you noticed any changes in cleanliness? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
8. Have you noticed any changes in the reception area? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
9. Have you noticed any changes in the staffing? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
10. Have you noticed any changes in the time it takes to get an appointment? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
11. Have you noticed any changes in waiting times once you’re here? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
12. Have you noticed any changes in facilities for children (e.g.toys)? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
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For the next set of questions, please think about the building you went to before this health 
centre opened, and how it compares to here. 
 
 
 
13. Have you noticed any differences in the furniture? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
14. Have you noticed any differences in cleanliness? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
16. Have you noticed any differences in the reception area? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
17. Have you noticed any differences in the staff numbers? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
18. Have you noticed any differences in staff attitudes? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
19. Have you noticed any differences in the time it takes to get an appointment? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
20. Have you noticed any changes in waiting times once you’re here? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
21. Have you noticed any differences in facilities for children (e.g.toys)? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
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22. Overall, how would you rate the quality of service at this health centre 
at present?  
 
Very good Good       Adequate      Poor     Very poor 
 
23. Overall, how would you rate the quality of this building 
at present?  
 
Very good Good       Adequate      Poor     Very poor 
24. Overall, do you think services here are better or worse than other practices in the 
area? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
25. Overall, do you think this building is better or worse than other practices in the 
area? 
 
Better  Don’t know Worse 
 
 
 
 
26. Do you have any other comments about this health centre? 
 
 
 
 
 
It would help us if you could answer a few questions about yourself now. 
 
27. Are you:   male female 
 
28. In what year were you born? …………… 
 
29. Which ethnic group do you belong to?  
White 
  Mixed 
  Asian or Asian British  
  Black or Black British  
   Chinese 
  Other ethnic group 
Thank you very much for completing this questionnaire. Please return it to 
Reception in the envelope provided. 
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Appendix 8 
 
 
Glossary of Abbreviations 
 
CABE - Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment 
CABE is a statutory body, sponsored by the Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport but also funded by Communities and Local Government. Its goal is to 
promote design and architecture to raise the standard of the built environment 
(source: cabe.org.uk). 
 
CEO - Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or Chief Executive 
A CEO is one of the highest-ranking corporate officers (executives) or 
administrators in charge of total management. An individual selected as president 
and CEO of a corporation, company, organization, or agency, reports to the board 
of directors (source: Wikipedia). 
 
CHP - Community Health Partnership 
Community Health Partnerships (CHP) creates investment in, and helps 
deliver, innovative ways to improve health and local authority services. Its main 
activity has been to deliver the Local Improvement Finance Trust (LIFT) Initiative 
which provides modern, purpose-built premises for health and local authority 
services in England.  CHP is an independent company, wholly owned by the 
Department of Health (source: www.communityhealthpartnerships.co.uk). 
 
CINAHL - Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature 
CINAHL is a comprehensive resource for nursing and allied health 
literature. While starting out as a single bibliographic database, CINAHL has 
expanded to offer four databases including two full-text versions. CINAHL is 
owned and operated by EBSCO Publishing, with the Cinahl editorial team 
continuing to work out of the offices in Glendale, California (source: 
www.Ebescohost.com). 
 
CIPFA - Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy  
CIPFA a professional accountancy bodies in the UK that specialises in the 
public services (source: www.cipfa.org.uk). 
 
CRD - Centre for Reviews and Dissemination 
CRD is a department of the University of York and is part of the National 
Institute for Health Research.  CRD undertakes systematic reviews that evaluate 
the effects of health and social care interventions and the delivery and 
organisation of health care (source: www.york.ac.uk/inst/crd/).  
 
DETR/EPSRC MCNS – Programme Department of the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions and Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council, Meeting Clients’ Needs Through Standardisation 
Programme 
DETR/EPSRC MCSN was a grant funding programme sponsored by the 
EPSRC and DETR which aimed at improving the competitive performance of UK 
industries such as construction. 
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DoH - Department of Health (also DH)  
DoH is a department of the United Kingdom government but with 
responsibility for government policy for England alone on health, social care and 
the National Health Service (NHS). It is led by the Secretary of State for Health 
with two Ministers of State and three Parliamentary Under-Secretaries of State 
(source: Wikipedia). 
 
ESRC - Economic and Social Research Council 
ESRC funds research and training in social and economic issues. It is an 
independent organisation, established by Royal Charter, but recieve most of our 
funding through the UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills. Our 
planned expenditure for 2009/10 is £204 million, which funds over 2,500 
researchers in academic institutions and policy research institutes throughout the 
UK. We also support more than 2,000 postgraduate students (source: 
esrc.ac.uk). 
 
FHSA - Family Health Service Authority 
FHSAs were set up in the early 1990s by the government to provide 
common services, making payments and providing administrative support to GPs, 
practice nurses, dentists, pharmacists and opticians (source: 
www.amazon.co.uk/Practices-Make-Perfect-Services-Authority/dp/0118860852). 
 
 GMS contract - General Medical Services (GMS) contract 
The GMS contract has evolved in partnership between the NHS 
Confederation and the General Practitioners Committee (GPC) of the British 
Medical Association (BMA). It creates greater flexibility for GPs and represents an 
unprecedented level of investment in primary care (source www.dh.gov.uk). 
 
GP - General Practitioner 
A GP is a medical practitioner who provides primary care and specializes in 
family medicine. A general practitioner treats acute and chronic illnesses and 
provides preventive care and health education for all ages and both sexes. They 
have particular skills in treating people with multiple health issues and co 
morbidities (source: Wikipedia). 
 
HELMIS - Health Management Information Service 
HELMIS was established to provide access to information sources on 
health and social care management and policy in the UK and internationally and is 
located in the Nuffield Institute for Health Information Resource Centre (IRC), 
University of Leeds (source: www.ovid.com). 
 
HM Treasury - Her Majesty's Treasury (also The Treasury) 
HM Treasury is the United Kingdom government department responsible 
for developing and executing the British government's public finance policy and 
economic policy (source: Wikipedia). 
 
HMIC - Health Management Information Consortium 
HMIC’s database brings together the bibliographic database of two UK 
health and social care management organizations: the Department of Health's 
Library and Information Services (DH-Data) and King’s Fund Information and 
Library Service (source: www.ovid.com). 
 
HMSO - Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
HMSO is responsible for the publication of legislation and the management 
of Crown copyright (source: www.opsi.gov.uk). 
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IRR - Internal Rate of Return 
The internal rate of return (IRR) is a rate of return used in capital 
budgeting to measure and compare the profitability of investments. It is also 
called the discounted cash flow rate of return (DCFROR) or simply the rate of 
return (ROR).  In the context of savings and loans the IRR is also called the 
effective interest rate. The term internal refers to the fact that its calculation does 
not incorporate environmental factors (source: Wikipedia). 
 
LA - Local Authority 
LA is collective term used for lower levels of governments including 
Historic counties still exist with adapted boundaries, although in the 1990s some 
of the districts within the counties became separate unitary authorities and a few 
counties have been disbanded completely. There are also metropolitan districts in 
some areas which are similar to unitary authorities. In Greater London there are 
32 London boroughs which are a similar concept (source: Wikipedia).  
 
LIFT - Local Improvement Finance Trust (also NHS LIFT) 
LIFT is a major initiative by the Department of Health (DoH) in a national 
joint venture with Community Health Partnerships (CHP), to develop and 
encourage new markets for investment in primary care, social care and 
community based facilities and services. The NHS Plan published in July 2000 first 
announced the planned introduction of NHS LIFT and the formation of public-
private joint venture companies. To enable PCTs to take part in forming joint 
venture companies the Department of Health enacted changes in primary 
legislation to clarify the powers of PCTs to take shares in joint ventures (clause 4 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2001 as incorporated into the NHS Act 1977). 
The partnering arrangements for NHS LIFT are supported by the provisions of a 
Strategic Partnering Agreement (“SPA”), which is entered into by the participants 
(such as local authorities and PCTs in the area) and the local LIFT Company. The 
SPA sets out how the parties will act together in a collaborative, partnering, non-
adversarial and open manner with a view to achieving the objectives of the local 
LIFT. The SPA establishes the Strategic Partnering Board (SPB) and LIFT Co. The 
local health economy supervises the performance of the LIFT Co through a SPB 
which also approves new projects from the Strategic Service Development Plan 
(SSDP) which it reviews on an annual basis. Each LIFT Co is a joint venture 
company with 60% of its shareholding held by a private sector partner. Together 
the local PCTs and CHP hold the remaining 40% and local authorities may also 
take an equity stake. Shareholders in LIFT Co, are entitled to dividend payments 
in accordance with an agreed dividend policy. This is governed by a Shareholders 
Agreement (SHA) (source: Mersey Care NHS Trust).  
 
LIFTCo see LIFT 
 
LIZ - London Initiative Zone 
LIZ, encompasses an area of about 16 km radius from Piccadilly Circus, 
which was set up by the Department of Health in 1993 "to concentrate attention 
and resources on developing primary care in the inner city" (source 
www.bmj.bmjjournals.com). 
 
LMC - Local Medical Committee  
LMCs are professional organisations representing the interests of GPs (source: 
www.lmc.org.uk). 
 
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
337 
 
MaST LIFT - Manchester, Salford and Trafford NHS LIFT Initiative 
The long term private sector partner for MaST is Primary Plus Ltd. As well 
as MaST they are the private sector partner in five other LIFT companies with a 
total property portfolio of £280 million (source: www.mastlift.co.uk/). 
 
MP - Member of Parliament 
A Member of Parliament is a representative of the voters to a parliament 
(source: wikipedia). 
 
NAO - National Audit Office 
NAO audits central government accounts and reports to Parliament on the 
value for money achieved by government projects and programmes (source: 
Nao.org.uk). 
 
NCCSDO - National Co-ordinating Centre for NHS Service Delivery and 
Organisation Research and Development also  
NIHRSDO - National Institute for Health Research Service Delivery and 
Organisation  
NCCSDO/NIHRSDO is The National Institute for Health Research Service 
Delivery and Organisation (NIHR SDO) programme was established in 1999. It 
aims to improve health outcomes for people by commissioning research evidence 
that improves practice in relation to the organisation and delivery of healthcare 
and Building research capability and capacity amongst those who manage, 
organise and deliver services - improving their understanding of the research 
literature and how to use research evidence (source: NIHR SDO). 
 
NHS - National Health Service  
NHS is the name commonly used to refer to the three publicly funded 
healthcare systems in Great Britain, collectively or individually, although only the 
health service in England uses the name 'National Health Service' without further 
qualification. The publicly-funded healthcare organisation in Northern Ireland 
does not use the term 'National Health Service', though is still sometimes referred 
to as the 'NHS' as well. Each system operates independently, and is politically 
accountable to the relevant devolved government of Scotland (Scottish 
Government), Wales (Welsh Assembly Government) and Northern Ireland 
(Northern Ireland Executive), and to the UK government for England (source: 
Wikipedia).  
 
NHS Conf - NHS Confederation 
The NHS Confederation is an independent membership body for the full 
range of organisations that make up today's NHS. We represent over 95 per cent 
of NHS organisations and a growing number of independent healthcare providers 
(source: www.nhsconfed.org). 
 
PAC - Public Accounts Committee, strictly, the Committee of Public 
Accounts  
PAC is a select committee of the British House of Commons. It is 
responsible for overseeing government expenditures to ensure they are effective 
and honest. The PAC is seen as a crucial mechanism for ensuring transparency 
and accountability in government financial operations (source: Wikipedia). 
 
PCG - Primary Care Groups, see PCT 
In 1998, primary care groups and trusts became the new purchasers. The 
key difference between the primary care group and trust was that the former 
operated as a subcommittee of the health authority, whilst the later was self-
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governing. A primary care group was converted into a trust when it demonstrated 
its ability to manage budgets and services. (source: www.econ.qmul.ac.uk). 
 
PCT - Primary Care Trust 
Healthcare in the UK is divided into 'primary' and 'secondary' services. 
Primary care services are provided by the people you normally see first when you 
have a health problem. It might be a visit to your doctor or dentist, to your 
optician for an eye test, or a trip to your pharmacist. NHS walk-in centres and the 
NHS Direct phone service are also part of primary care. All of these primary care 
services are managed by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). There are about 147 
Primary Care Trusts in England, each one covering a separate local area.  PCTs 
are a very important part of the NHS, and they get about 80% of the total NHS 
budget. PCTs decide what health services a local community needs, and they are 
responsible for providing them. They must ensure that there are enough services 
for people within their local area, and that the services are accessible. These 
services include: GPs, Dentists, Pharmacists, Opticians, NHS Direct, and NHS 
walk-in centres.  PCTs make decisions about the type of services that hospitals 
provide and are responsible for making sure that the quality of service is high 
enough. They also control funding for hospitals (source: www.NHS.uk). 
 
PfH - Partnership for Health (see also Community Health Partnerships) 
PfH was renamed in Autumn 2007 as Community Health Partnerships.  
PfH/CHP is an independent company, wholly owned by the Department of Health 
(source: communityhealthpartnerships.co.uk). 
 
PFI - Private Finance Initiative  
PFI is a form of PPP (Public Private Partnership) which involves joint 
working between the public and private sector. In the broadest sense, PPPs can 
cover all types of collaboration across the interface between the public and 
private sectors to deliver policies, services and infrastructure. Where delivery of 
public services involves private sector investment in infrastructure, the most 
common form of PPP is the Private finance initiative (source: HM treasury).  
 
PFU - Public Finance Unit 
Several government departments including the NHS and MoD maintain a 
Private Finance Unit which advises on PFI procurement. 
 
P+L Accounts - Profit and Loss Accounts 
P+L accounts also referred as profit and loss statement (P&L), earnings 
statement, operating statement or statement of operations, is a company's 
financial statement that indicates how the revenue (money received from the sale 
of products and services before expenses are taken out, also known as the "top 
line") is transformed into the net income (the result after all revenues and 
expenses have been accounted for, also known as the "bottom line"). It displays 
the revenues recognized for a specific period, and the cost and expenses charged 
against these revenues, including write-offs (e.g., depreciation and amortization 
of various assets) and taxes. The purpose of the income statement is to show 
managers and investors whether the company made or lost money during the 
period being reported (source: Wikipedia).  
 
PPP - Public Private Partnership 
PPP involves joint working between the public and private sector. In the broadest 
sense, PPPs can cover all types of collaboration across the interface between the 
public and private sectors to deliver policies, services and infrastructure. Where 
delivery of public services involves private sector investment in infrastructure, the 
most common form of PPP is the Private finance initiative (source: HM Treasury).  
 
  SDO Project (08/1618/156) 
  Queen's Printer and Controller of HMSO 2010                                   Page 
                              
 
339 
 
 
PSC - Public Sector Comparator 
The PSC is a costing of a conventionally financed project delivering the 
same outputs as those of the PFI deal under examination. It is just one of a 
number of ways of evaluating a proposed PFI deal. It is directly relevant only 
when the publicly financed option on which it is based is a genuine alternative to 
the PFI deal. This is most likely to arise at the outset of a project (source: www. 
parliament.uk). 
 
PUK - Partnership UK (also P-UK) 
Partnerships UK (PUK) is a public private partnership which has a unique 
public sector mission: to support and accelerate the delivery of infrastructure 
renewal, high quality public services and the efficient use of public assets through 
better and stronger partnerships between the public and private sectors (source: 
www.partnershipsuk.org.uk). 
 
Q and A - Question and Answer 
 
R + D - Research and Development (also R and D or, more often, R&D) 
R + D  according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, refers to "creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order 
to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and 
society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications" 
(source: Wikipedia). 
 
SHA - Strategic Health Authority 
SHAs were created by the Government in 2002 to manage the local NHS 
on behalf of the secretary of state, there were originally 28 strategic health 
authorities (SHAs). On July 1 2006, this number was reduced to 10.  Strategic 
health authorities are responsible for: developing plans for improving health 
services in their local area, making sure local health services are of a high quality 
and are performing well, increasing the capacity of local health services - so they 
can provide more services, and making sure national priorities - for example, 
programmes for improving cancer services - are integrated into local health 
service plans. Strategic health authorities manage the NHS locally and are a key 
link between the Department of Health and the NHS (source: www.nhs.uk). 
 
SPA - Strategic Partnering Arrangement 
In a NHS LIFT venture, the SPA sets out how the parties will act together 
in a collaborative, partnering, non-adversarial and open manner with a view to 
achieving the objectives of the local LIFT. The SPA establishes the Strategic 
Partnering Board (SPB) and LIFT Co. The local health economy supervises the 
performance of the LIFT Co through a SPB which also approves new projects from 
the Strategic Service Development Plan (SSDP) which it reviews on an annual 
basis (source: cmis.derby.gov.uk).  
 
SPV - Special Purpose Vehicle 
A SPV is a legal entity (usually a limited company of some type or, 
sometimes, a limited partnership) created to fulfil narrow, specific or temporary 
objectives. SPE's are typically used by companies to isolate the firm from financial 
risk. A company will transfer assets to the SPE for management or use the SPE to 
finance a large project thereby achieving a narrow set of goals without putting 
the entire firm at risk. SPEs are also commonly used in complex financings to 
separate different layers of equity infusion. In addition, they are commonly used 
to own a single asset and associated permits and contract rights (such as an 
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apartment building or a power plant), to allow for easier transfer of that asset 
(source: Wikipedia). 
 
TPD - Third Party Development 
TPD is a development that is not directly tied to the primary product that a 
client is procuring (source Wikipedia).   
 
TTF - Treasury Task Force 
TTF was created by the Government l Taskforce as an operational 
taskforce acting on behalf of HM Treasury, based in Partnerships UK. The 
Taskforce maintains a helpdesk to assist public sector partners with operational 
PFI issues (source: HM Treasury). 
 
UNISON 
UNISON is Britain's biggest public sector trade union with more than 1.3 
million members (source: Unison.org.uk). 
 
VfM - Value for Money 
VFM is the term used to assess whether or not an organisation has 
obtained the maximum benefit from the goods and services it acquires and/ or 
provides, within the resources available to it. It not only measures the cost of 
goods and services, but also takes account of the mix of quality, cost, resource 
use, fitness for purpose, timeliness and convenience to judge whether or not, 
when taken together, they constitute good value. Achieving VfM may be 
described in terms of the 'three Es' - economy, efficiency and effectiveness 
(source: Imperial College London). 
 
WYG Group - White Young Green Company 
WYG is a private consulting firm. 
 
Disclaimer:  
 
This report presents independent research commissioned by the National Institute 
for Health Research (NIHR). The views and opinions expressed by authors in this 
publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
NHS, the NIHR, the NIHR SDO programme or the Department of Health. The 
views and opinions expressed by the interviewees in this publication are those of 
the interviewees and do not necessarily reflect those of the authors, those of the 
NHS, the NIHR, the NIHR SDO programme or the Department of Health” 
 
Addendum: 
 
This document is an output from a research project that was commissioned by 
the Service Delivery and Organisation (SDO) programme whilst it was managed 
by the National Coordinating Centre for the Service Delivery and Organisation 
(NCCSDO) at the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. The NIHR SDO 
programme is now managed by the National Institute for Health Research 
Evaluations, Trials and Studies Coordinating Centre (NETSCC) based at the 
University of Southampton.  
 
Although NETSCC, SDO has managed the project and conducted the editorial 
review of this document, we had no involvement in the commissioning, and 
therefore may not be able to comment on the background of this document. 
Should you have any queries please contact sdo@southampton.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
